

NICOLÁS SÁNCHEZ DURÁ

WITTGENSTEIN ON WAR AND PEACE¹

In the title of this essay there is an immediate echo of Leo Tolstoy's famous novel. However, before taking this Russian writer as the leitmotiv for my point of view, I will make some comments about the legitimacy of using the notes, letters, diaries, conversations and testimonies of the author of the *Tractatus* as a basis for reconstructing what he thought about this matter, since the texts by him that were published or intended to be published do not enable us to do so. Luigi Perissinotto has urged this caution concerning the use of private texts in the case of religion.² With regard to war and peace, or pacifism, the question is even thornier because we do not even have notes for his classes, or all the remarks about religion that he jotted down in *On Certainty*, for example.

All the same, I think it is legitimate to reconstruct Wittgenstein's thoughts about war by commenting on texts of this kind because, in the first place, I consider that philosophy is an authorial genre. To put it in the terms used by Michel Foucault in *Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur*, I think that philosophy is a genre in which the "author function" is of fundamental importance – as in the case of literature – as opposed to those texts – scientific or administrative texts, for example – in which authorship is erased, silenced or concealed. This dichotomy, admittedly, has not always had the same content in the course of history, or even in our cultural tradition. However, the fact is that since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries scientific discourses have been accepted and appreciated for their own sake, whereas literary discourses are always associated with their author. What we find in the first case is a concatenation – deductive or of some other kind – of truths that can be demonstrated or re-demonstrated and that form a system in which there is no reference to authors (at most, they appear by giving

1 This article forms part of the work of the research project *Culture and Religion. Wittgenstein and the Counter-Enlightenment*, FFI 2008-00866 FISO.

2 See Perissinotto, L., *Croire sans preuve. Wittgenstein et la religion*, "Esprit", vol. 391, 2013, pp. 81-97.

their name to a theorem or a pathological symptom or an experiment, etc.). On the other hand, with any literary text, nowadays we ask: Who wrote it? When and how? What led him or her to do so? With what intention? And the reception of the text has depended – and still does, to a large extent – on the answers to such questions. Philosophy is a special case because, since classical antiquity, it has been a genre in which the importance of the author is absolute. Perhaps what became known as analytic philosophy of language was one of the points in which the emulation of scientific knowledge was such that its authorial nature was blurred by the prominence of certain blocks of themes. In general, however, the kind of questions that are posed with regard to literary texts are also valid for philosophical texts. At any rate, in the authorial mode of considering texts the biographical aspects of the author form a substantial part of his or her significant intentions and therefore – although not exhaustively – of the interpretation.

Secondly, however, I consider that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is completely in accordance with many of the assumptions underlying the authorial consideration of a text. There are many passages in which Wittgenstein considers philosophy as "work on oneself", as an exercise in self-understanding leading to a dimension that is both descriptive (one's way of seeing things) and valorative (what one expects of them).³ Philosophy is a personal urgency so closely related to oneself that it can be compared to the discomfort of an itch (and we all have our itches). Therefore, philosophical reflection cannot be considered cumulatively, as an impersonal progress, like the constructive nature of scientific knowledge.⁴ So the exercise of philosophy has to do with one's personal temperament, because that is what determines the similes, metaphors or parables that one selects and that distinguish certain philosophies from others,⁵ and also the attitude that one adopts: precipitate or else patient and painstaking, in other words,

3 Wittgenstein, L. *Culture and Value*, Blackwell, Oxford 1998. [1931, #84] "Work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.)"

4 Ivi, [1950, #490] "Philosophy hasn't made any progress? – If someone scratches where it itches, do we have to see progress? Isn't it genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itching? And can't this reaction to the irritation go on like this for a long time, before a cure for the itching is found?"

5 Ivi, [1931, #106] "If it is said on occasion that (someone's) philosophy is a matter of temperament, there is some truth in this. A preference for certain comparisons (*Gleichnisse*) is something we call a matter of temperament & far more disagreements rest on this than appears at first sight."

rigorous.⁶ But it also depends on one's moral virtues and sensibility. In the 1930 Foreword to his book *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, Wittgenstein declares that he would like to say that the book is written to the glory of God. However, since such a statement would be misunderstood in our age, he explains that "It means the book is written in good will" and that in so far as it is not so written "but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to see it condemned". The identification between book and author is such that he ends the foreword with an assurance that "He cannot free it of these impurities further than he himself is free of them".⁷ So that, before attaining a more or less general understanding, a person who philosophises must concern himself with his own logical and moral mistakes, confusions, discomforts and uneasinesses.⁸ Only in this way can the philosopher attempt to persuade some people to see things in another way, from another point of view, without any assurance of success.⁹ Taking for granted that this personal activity of understanding, of oneself and of the world, will not be received universally, but only by those who have a certain cultural and moral, that is, existential rapport with the person who has practised it. In the oft-quoted "Sketch for a Foreword" for the *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, Wittgenstein considers the receivers of his book as a circle of "friends scattered throughout the four corners of the world". Now, the basis for this "friendship" is a "common sympathy"; in other words, his book will be understood by those who share his feeling against "the direction of European civilization", whose goals Wittgenstein says he does not understand. He deliberately emphasises that for him this common feeling does not constitute a judgement value, and he underlines the degree to which his personality forms part of his philosophy and its reception.¹⁰ He does not consider this circle of recipients to be an elite, nor – once again – does he think that

6 Ivi, [1939, #179] "In philosophy the winner of the race is the one who can run most slowly. Or: the one who gets to the winning post last."

7 Id., *Philosophical Remarks*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, p. 7.

8 Id., *Culture and Value*, op. cit. [1944, #254] "The philosopher is someone who has to cure many diseases of the understanding in himself, before he can arrive at the notions of common sense." [1944, #252] "Thoughts at peace. That is the goal someone who philosophizes longs for."

9 Ivi, [1947, #356].

10 "This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it is written. This spirit is, I believe, different from that of the prevailing European and American civilization. The spirit of this civilization the expression of which is the industry, architecture, music, of present day fascism & socialism, is a spirit that is alien & uncongenial to the author. This is not a value judgement." Id., *Culture and Value*, op. cit. [1930, #29], p. 8.

they are better or worse than others; if he addresses himself to them it is because they share a cultural affinity, they share a familiarity, as immediate as it is diffuse, like the relationship sensed by “fellow countrymen”, in comparison with whom others are felt to be “foreign”.¹¹ Therefore, a very important part of the reception of this philosophical thinking and of the understanding of its dynamics – of a person’s particular “*Denkbewegungen*” – is bound up with the key features of his biography, with the tastes, fears and obsessions and with the spiritual life of the person who has experienced them. With regard to Wittgenstein’s constant worry about not being understood, Drury tells us that when he was working on the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein said to him: “It is impossible to say in my book one word about all that music has meant in my life. How then can I hope to be understood?”¹²

However, to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical thinking it is necessary not only to refer to the biographical aspects and testimonies provided by his private writings. It is also necessary to include in his philosophy how he tackled matters that cannot be included in – if we use the usual academic headings – logic, epistemology, the philosophy of language, and so on. It is also necessary to include in his philosophy matters that have to do with both private and public life; in other words, how he thought about himself in relation to the political community. A letter that he wrote to Norman Malcolm clearly indicates this conception of philosophy, the central focus of which never ceased to be the search for the meaning of life – of *his* life – in the variety of manifestations that it adopted for someone so obsessively reflective about his identity. Malcolm tells us that in October 1939 he argued with Wittgenstein about a headline in the German press that accused England of having tried to kill Hitler with a bomb. Wittgenstein, who thought the headline looked plausible, became angry when Malcolm contradicted him and said he considered the British to be too “civilized and decent”, that such an act was too incompatible with the British “national character” for it to be true. The importance that Wittgenstein attributed to

11 “If I say that my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if that can be called a circle) I do not mean to say that this circle is in my view the élite of mankind but it is the circle to which I turn (not because they are better or worse than the others but) because they form my cultural circle (*mein Kulturkreis*), as it were my fellow countrymen (*gleichsam die Menschen meines Vaterlandes*) in contrast to the others who are *foreign* to me.” (1931) Id., *Culture and Value*, op. cit., pp. 12–13.

12 Drury, M.O’C. “Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in Rhees, R. (ed.) *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Personal Recollections*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, p. 94.

this argument is shown by the fact that he came back to the matter in a letter five years later, confessing to Malcolm that whenever he thought about him he could not help thinking about that argument, because he had been shocked by his “primitiveness” and it had led him to think:

what is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life, if it does not make you more conscientious than any ... journalist in the use of the DANGEROUS phrases such people use for their own ends. You see, I know that it's difficult to think *well* about ‘certainty’, ‘probability’, ‘perception’, etc. But it is, if possible, still more difficult to think, or *try* to think, really honestly about your life & other people lives. And the trouble is that thinking about these things is *not thrilling*, but often downright nasty. And when it's nasty then it's *most* important.¹³

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So much for the justification of approaching my theme by looking at private testimonies and texts. In this regard, however, I can already make one substantive statement about the matter that concerns me. Wittgenstein's reflection is neither political nor sociological; rather, he thinks of war as an especially important opportunity in his search for the meaning of life, considering it, therefore, from an ethical and religious viewpoint. This does not prevent his viewpoint from being free of the political implications that we might suggest now.

The fact that the young Wittgenstein considered the first great European war of the twentieth century as an opportunity for his spiritual development can be glimpsed in the testimony of his sister, Hermine. Despite the double hernia that would have exempted him from military service, Wittgenstein insisted on enlisting, not only to defend his country but also because he felt “an intense desire to take something difficult upon himself and to do something other than purely intellectual work.”¹⁴ That he did not criticise or become disenchanted with this “war *Bildung*” is confirmed by the testimony provided by Brian McGuinness and Norman Malcolm, and also by Drury. Many years later, talking about his experience of war to a nephew whose viewpoint was of a pacifist hue, he said that “It saved my life; I

13 Wittgenstein, L. “Letter to Malcolm dated 16-11-44”, in Malcolm, N. *Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir*, . Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 93-94.

14 Wittgenstein, H. “My Brother Ludwig”, in Rhees, R. (ed.) *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Personal Recollections*, op. cit., p. 3.

don't know what I'd have done without it."¹⁵ As for Malcolm, he reports that, when he complained in a letter at the end of the Second World War about the boredom of being mobilised in a warship, Wittgenstein replied that he had never been bored and he had not disliked his army service. Furthermore, in his letter of reply Wittgenstein compared war to a school. If a pupil says that school is boring it is because he is incapable of learning what is taught at school:

... I can't help believing that an enormous lot can be learnt about human beings in this war – *if* you keep your eyes open. And the better you are at thinking the more you'll get out of what you see. For thinking is *digesting*...but the fact remains that if you're bored a lot it means that your mental digestion isn't what it should be. I think a good remedy for this is sometimes opening your eyes wider.¹⁶

To help him to consider the fighting as an opportunity for learning about himself and others, he recommended that Malcolm should read Tolstoy's short story *Hadji Murat*, of which he says in a later letter "I hope you'll get a lot out of it, because there's a lot *in* it."¹⁷ Lastly, I shall cite Drury's testimony. When Wittgenstein visited him in his quarters in 1940, at the beginning of the Second World War, Malcolm complained about his colonel's clinical incompetence. Drury says that Wittgenstein "gave him a lecture" on the importance of discipline and obedience to superiors in war.¹⁸ Wittgenstein reminded him that nobody joins up in order to have a good time in the army and Drury says that his impression was that he was really speaking about his own experiences in the previous war.

Now, for Wittgenstein the search for the meaning of life, in relation to the war, pivots on two intensely felt subjective experiences: fear of death (which sometimes takes the form of fear of madness)¹⁹ and the experience of obedience, of self-discipline. I shall relate these considerations to his experience of war, but I think that many of their elements remained ever

15 McGuinness, B. *Wittgenstein. A Life*, Duckworth, London, p. 204.

16 Malcolm, N. *Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir*, op. cit., p. 50.

17 Ivi, p. 117.

18 Drury, M.O'C., op. cit., p. 159.

19 "If in life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health of our understanding by madness." Wittgenstein, L. *Culture and Value*, [1944, #255], op. cit., p. 50. There are many biographies – and passages in Wittgenstein – that emphasise his constant fear of going mad.

afterwards, shaping the religious point of view from which he could not help considering any problem.²⁰

So, soon after the war began, in the entry for 7.10.1914 in the so-called “secret diaries”, that is, the diary entries that were written in code, we read:

I don't yet understand how to do my duty simply because it is my duty, or to reserve my entire person for the life of the spirit. I may die in an hour, I may die in two hours, I may die in a month or not for a few years. I can't know and I can't do anything about it one way or the other: that's how life is. How then ought I to live in order to hold my own at that moment? To live amid the good and the beautiful until life stops of itself.²¹

In this entry there is a connection between the notion of “doing one's duty”, the feeling of the possibility of imminent death (and also of the anticipation of future death) and the idea of a good life, which is expressed here as living “amid the good and the beautiful”. This connection runs through all the secret diaries, with more or less emphasis. On 4 May 1916 he notes:

Tomorrow perhaps I shall be sent out, at my own request, to the observation post. Then and only then will the war *begin* for me. And – possibly – life too! *Perhaps nearness to death will bring light into my life.* May God enlighten me. I am a worm, but through God I become a man. God be with me. Amen.

Five days later he concludes emphatically: “It is only death that gives life its meaning.”²²

Thus “nearness to death” provides an opportunity to examine the meaning of life, to succeed in glimpsing the beginning of a new life, a “resurrection” (the “beginning” of the war may be the beginning of “life”): “Now I should have the chance to be a decent human being, for I'm standing eye to eye with death”,²³ he says after his first experiences of combat. And this search for meaning has a religious dimension, it is bound up with God, with whose assistance he says he can transform himself from an animal to a human being. As in Tolstoy, incidentally, although I cannot go into that

20 “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view”. Drury, M.O.C., op. cit., p. 94.

21 Wittgenstein, L. *Diarios secretos*, Edición de Wilhelm Baum. Madrid, Alianza Universidad, 1991, pp. 65–67.

22 Id., *Diarios secretos*, pp.147–149.

23 Id., *Diarios secretos*, 15 September 1914, p. 55.

now.²⁴ I think that Wittgenstein never abandoned this connection between death, meaning and religious point of view which was forged in the war.

Moreover, for Wittgenstein as for Tolstoy, *fear* of death is the criterion for determining the mistakenness of the life one is leading or has led. And Wittgenstein was afraid of death.²⁵ On 6 May 1916 he notes: “In constant danger of death ... From time to time I become disheartened. This is the school of the false conception of life ...!”, and on 29 July of the same year he is even more explicit:

“Yesterday I was shot at. I was scared! I was afraid of death. I now have such a desire to live. And it is difficult to give up life when one enjoys it. This is precisely what ‘sin’ is, the reasoning life, a false view of life. From time to time I become an *animal*. Then I can think of nothing but eating, drinking, and sleeping. Terrible! And then suffer like an animal too, without the possibility of internal salvation. I am then at the mercy of my appetites and aversions. Then an authentic life is impossible.”²⁶

Sin is seen here as pure inertia in living, instinctively clutching to life without worrying about what each individual can and must accomplish in it, in accordance with his stature. Years later he said to Malcolm that the measure of the greatness of a man is found in what his work demands of him,²⁷ and one has only to read his war diaries to perceive the torment produced in him by the question of having or not having the spiritual state of mind that would allow him to work. All the same, this “state of sin” has a psychological translation. In the same period as the entries just quoted, he says: “I am still living in sin, in other words, *unhappily*. I am in a *bad mood*, without *happiness*. I am living in *discord* with everything around me.”²⁸ So that putting himself in God’s hands, submitting to his will – “thy

24 I have discussed this in “Muerte y religión: del Tolstói maduro al joven Wittgenstein”, *Logos. Anales del seminario de Metafísica*, n.º. 45, 2012.

25 Much has been said to the effect that Wittgenstein himself declared after the war that he had joined up as a volunteer in order to seek death. For example, W. Baum, the editor of the secret diaries (*Geheime Tagebücher!*, Turia and Kant, Vienna, 1991), in a footnote to the entry for 15 April 1916 of the Spanish edition. However, I think that his confrontation with death has the religious and moral sense to which I have alluded; I believe that all the courageous acts that he performed, and his efforts to get sent to dangerous positions on the front (see H. Wittgenstein, “My Brother Ludwig”, art. cit., op. cit., p. 5), must be interpreted thus, not as an absence of fear.

26 Id., *Diarios secretos*, p. 155.

27 Malcolm, N. *Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir*, op. cit., p. 61.

28 Wittgenstein, L. *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 11 August 1916, p. 157.

will be done” is an expression repeated almost obsessively in the *Secret Diaries* – is a condition for inner peace and happiness. In response to the question “But how to arrive at *inner peace*?” he answers “ONLY if I lead a life pleasing to God! *Only* then is it possible to endure life”,²⁹ “May God improve me! Thus I shall also be more *contented*”,³⁰ “May God keep me in a *cheerful* state of mind!”³¹

This psychological concomitant of a good life, or, if you prefer, a life that is honest from an ethical point of view³² or genuine from a religious point of view,³³ explains his rejection of nihilism in connection with his reading of a volume of Nietzsche’s works which included *The Antichrist*. Wittgenstein thinks that there is some truth in Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity. And after saying that “Certainly, Christianity is the only sure way to happiness”, he asks why one should not spurn that happiness; and whether it would not be better to perish unhappy in a hopeless struggle against “the external world”.³⁴ For him, such a life is without meaning, but why not lead a meaningless life? Wittgenstein does not answer his own question about whether such a life would be *unworthy*, but he declares that that life would be unhappy *for him*, without *content* or *joy*. He thought a great deal about this question. Although he does not answer the question about why one should not lead a meaningless life at this point, he does so two years later in his *Notebooks (1914–1916)*. He says there that “again and again” he comes back to the idea that “simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad” and that the further question of why one should live happily seems to him of itself “to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of

29 Id., *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 6 May 1916, p. 149.

30 *Ibid.*, my emphasis.

31 Id., *Diarios secretos*, 6 August 1916, p. 157, my emphasis.

32 I think that it is from this perspective that we must interpret statement 6.422 in the *Tractatus*: “The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form ‘thou shalt ...’ is: And what if I do not do it. But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the *consequences* of an action must therefore be irrelevant. At least *these consequences will not be events*. For there must be something right in that formulation of the question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie *in the action itself*. (And this is clear also that the reward must be something *acceptable*, and the punishment something *unacceptable*.)” My emphasis. Wittgenstein, L. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Cosimo Inc., New York, 2009, pp.105–106.

33 “What is Good is Divine too. That, strangely enough, sums up my ethics.” [1929, #20] Id., *Culture and Value*, op. cit., p. 5.

34 Id., *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 8 December 1914, p. 109.

itself, it seems that it is the only right life”.³⁵ In any case, in 1914, in answer to the question “What must I do then so that my life will not be lost?” he replies “I must always be conscious of it – always conscious of the spirit”.³⁶

Years later, at the start of the Second World War, Wittgenstein came back to the same idea but with a non-religious phraseology: the challenge in life is not the absence of fear, but mastering it in order to have a courageous attitude, on which a meaningful life depends:

*Not funk but funk conquered is what is worthy of admiration & makes life worth having been lived. Courage, not cleverness; not even inspiration, is the grain of mustard that grows up to be a great tree. To the extent there is courage, there is connection with life & death.*³⁷

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But a courageous attitude also depends on strengthening the spirit (*Geist*) in order to live amid the good and the beautiful, the only way of “holding one’s own” against the fear inspired by death and the *animal life*, reduced to pure instinct that it encourages. To the extent that even dying loses its terrible quality. This is what he says in 1937, in perfect accord with his wartime meditations:

The horrible instant in an unblessed death must be the thought: ‘Oh if only I had... Now it’s too late.’ Oh if only I had lived right! And the blessed instant must be: ‘Now it is accomplished!’ But how must one have lived in order to tell oneself this! I think there must be degrees here too.³⁸

At the height of the 1914–18 war, Wittgenstein would not have admitted “degrees”, his challenge was more radical and his ethical/religious demands less benevolent. This radicalness had to do with his spiritual transformation, for, from an ethical and even physical point of view, not losing his life depended on being “always conscious of the spirit”, on strengthening it.

Now it is not easy to disentangle the semantic field of the term “spirit”, practically absent from the writings intended for publication (it appears

35 Id., *Notebooks, 1914–1916*. University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 78.

36 Id., *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 8 December 1914, p. 109.

37 Id., *Culture and Value*, op. cit. [1940, #208], pp. 43–44. The sentence written in italics is in the original text.

38 Wittgenstein, L. “Movements of Thought: Diaries, 1930–1932, 1936–1937”, in James C. Klagge, Alfred Nordmann (eds.): *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham (MA), 2003, p. 185 [176].

once in the *Philosophical Investigations*), whereas Wittgenstein uses it profusely in his private writings, especially in what has been known as the secret diaries and the *Notebooks (1914–1916)*, in *Movements of Thought: Diaries 1930–1932, 1936–1937* and in *Culture and Value*.³⁹ In one of its senses, “spirit” is the most radically characteristic nucleus of each person. On one occasion Wittgenstein summed it up as “character and will”.⁴⁰ But it also includes the creative potential, the intellectual virtues, moral sensibility, that in which I recognise myself most intimately and to which I always aspire; an ego ideal, if we were to express it in Freudian phraseology. All of which includes the particular cultural component (*Kultur*) in which I participate and in which I have been brought up and which, therefore, subsumes the canon of the great works of art, but also a certain idea of social organisation, at least in its more general features.⁴¹

For Wittgenstein, therefore, the “spirit” that must be strengthened and that must strengthen him and help him to live decently inasmuch as it involves a mastery of himself – of his “appetites and aversions”, his instincts and passions⁴² – is invoked in very different ways, depending on whether he is alluding to its personal or transpersonal dimension. Sometimes he wishes it were stronger (“Oh, if only my spirit were stronger!!!”) so that it might help him in his weakness (“I am a weak person, but the spirit helps me”); sometimes it gives him the necessary manly courage to face danger (“Cowardly thoughts, frightened hesitations and womanish complaints don’t change the wretchedness, *They don’t make you free!*”);⁴³ the spirit is also where one takes refuge when physical penury and emotional malaise are pressing (then “one turns towards the spirit”, or it is “inside me countering my depressions”);⁴⁴ something that must be cultivated with total dedication, that makes him free because it disengages him from ex-

39 See Sanfélix, V. “Una filosofía del espíritu. Wittgenstein y la cuestión judía”, in Mariano Rodríguez (ed.), *La mente en sus máscaras*, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 2005.

40 “As I can infer my spirit (character, will) from my physiognomy, ...” Wittgenstein, L. *Notebooks, 1914–1916*, op. cit., entry for 15/10/1916, p. 229.

41 The text that follows continues the quotation in note 10: “Culture is like a great organization which assigns to each of its members his place, at which he can work in the spirit of the whole, and his strength can with a certain justice be measured by his success as understood within that whole.” “Sketch for a Foreword” to the *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, Wittgenstein, L. *Culture and Value*, [1930, #29], op. cit., p. 39.

42 See note 26.

43 Wittgenstein, L. *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 20 February 1915, p. 127.

44 Id., *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 20 October 1914, p. 75.

ternal contingencies and shelters him (“So long as the spirit is alive! It is the safe harbour, set apart from the desolate, endless grey sea of events”).⁴⁵ Wittgenstein attributes a divine quality to the spirit because it is a condition of the good life: “To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life,” he declares in the *Notebooks*,⁴⁶ a thoroughly Tolstoyan affirmation, to be sure.

The term “spirit” that appears in the war diaries certainly has a Tolstoyan affiliation. Wittgenstein himself says so the first time that “spirit” appears in the secret diaries, soon after he joined up. Fearing that he might not do his duty properly under fire, he said to himself: “Over and over again, inside myself, I repeat Tolstoy’s words: ‘Man is *weak* in the flesh but *free* in the spirit.’ Would that the spirit were in me!”⁴⁷ And four days later he emphasises that it is “only through it” that man is free.⁴⁸ And, indeed, in Tolstoy’s *The Gospel in Brief* – the famous book that Wittgenstein bought in a bookshop in Tarnów and carried around with him constantly – the subtitle of chapter I is “Man, the son of God, is weak in the flesh but free in the spirit” [*Der Mensch ist ein Sohn Gottes, ohnmächtig im Fleische und frei durch den Geist*].

The fact that Tolstoy was a lasting influence on Wittgenstein is beyond doubt and deserves a detailed study for which there is no space now. But that influence is due to a reading not only of *The Gospel in Brief* but also of his literary work, especially the popular tales and *Hadji Murat*, the reading of which he recommended throughout his life.⁴⁹ He told Drury that only two European writers had had anything important to say about religion in recent times: Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. He recommended the latter’s *The Brothers Karamazov* and *Crime and Punishment*, and Tolstoy’s traditional stories published in English as *Twenty-Three Tales*. When they met again Drury told him that he preferred Dostoyevsky to Tolstoy and Wittgenstein disagreed, declaring that Tolstoy’s short stories would always survive and that the one he liked best was “The Three Hermits”.⁵⁰ Similarly, Malcolm insists that Wittgenstein did not like *Resurrection*, the great novel of Tol-

45 Id., *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 13 December 1914, p. 111.

46 Id., *Notebooks, 1914–1916*, op. cit., entry for 8/7/1916, p. 209.

47 Id., *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 12 September 1914, p. 53.

48 Id., *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., p. 55. My emphasis.

49 I have discussed Wittgenstein’s lifelong fixation with this novel by Tolstoy in “La virtud moral de las alegorías. Wittgenstein y *Hadji Murat*”, in Marrades, J. (ed.) *Wittgenstein. Arte y Filosofía*, Plaza y Valdés, Madrid, 2012.

50 Drury, M.O’C., op. cit., p. 100. However, Bertrand Russell’s impression in 1919 was the opposite: “But on the whole he likes Tolstoy less than Dostoewski (especially Karamazov).” Letter to Lady Ottoline 20/12/1919, in Brian McGuinness (ed.)

stoy's final period, but that he very much liked the short stories because he considered that Tolstoy's philosophy is "most true when it's *latent* in the story" (which was not the case with *Resurrection*). In Malcolm's case, the story he was commenting on was "How Much Land Does A Man Need?"⁵¹ Moreover, Engelmann – who met Wittgenstein in 1916 when he was transferred to an officers' school in Olmütz after being promoted to sergeant and decorated with the Medal for Bravery – tells of their conversations about religion in which they talked about Tolstoy's story "Two Old Men". All this is true, but despite the fact that the notion of "spirit" in Wittgenstein has a Tolstoyan affiliation, and that they both attribute a divine quality to the spirit, and that Tolstoy's influence on Wittgenstein's religious thinking goes beyond the explicit, all this does not mean that there is a total coincidence between them; especially with regard to war, peace and pacifism, which is what we are talking about now.

Because the core of Tolstoy's religious thinking is that, going beyond all superstitious rituality, true religion can be summed up in the maxim that "loving God is simply loving one's fellow man", which is spelt out in five laws or commandments to confront and overcome the corresponding temptations. Five laws, three of which insist on the same point:

The first (Matt. v. 21–26), that man should not only do no murder, but not even be angry with his brother, should not consider any one worthless: 'Raca,' and if he has quarrelled with any one he should make it up with him before bringing his gift to God – i.e., before praying. [...] The fourth (Matt. 38–42), that man should not only not demand an eye for an eye, but when struck on one cheek should hold out the other, should forgive an offence and bear it humbly, and never refuse the service others demand of him. The fifth (Matt. 43–48), that man should not only not hate his enemy and not fight him, but love him, help him, serve him.⁵²

This is the conclusion of *Resurrection*, in which Tolstoy refers to the Sermon on the Mount in the Gospel according to St. Matthew. And Tolstoy made this point of view a banner that he constantly displayed publicly. He expounded the doctrine of non-violent resistance to evil, resulting from his religious thinking, in many of his writings, such as *The Kingdom of God Is Within You*, *What Is Religion?*, *The Slavery of Our Times*, and in many

Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911–1951, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2012, p. 112.

51 Malcolm, N. *Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir*, op. cit., pp. 52 and 59.

52 Tolstoy, L. *Resurrection*, translated by Mrs Louise Maude. Pennsylvania State University, 2000, pp. 616–617.

articles of journalism or agitation, such as “Thou Shalt Not Kill” or “The False Doctrine of the State” and many others. His appeals for non-violence, for deserting the army, for not answering the call-up or for disobeying orders were so constant, and Tolstoy’s fame in this regard was so extensive, not only in Europe but further afield, that the adoption of non-violence by Ghandi – who contacted Tolstoy – was due to his reading of “A Letter to a Hindu”, written in 1908, in which the Russian writer recommended non-violence as a way of freeing India from British colonialism; and also to his reading of *The Kingdom of God Is Within You*, a book in which Tolstoy set out to rescue all those who defended non-violence from oblivion.

It is impossible that Wittgenstein should not have known this aspect of Tolstoy and the central importance that he attributed to it in a morality that had an immediate political dimension. However, Wittgenstein was never a pacifist, as indicated by the testimonies already cited. He was certainly not a pacifist at the height of the 1914–18 war. In this respect, Engelmann’s recollections are enlightening. When they met in 1916, Engelmann had already abandoned the militaristic exhilaration that had swept the whole of Europe at the beginning of the war. He had even collaborated with an early pacifist, Karl Kraus, collecting newspaper cuttings so that the latter could write his play *The Last Days of Mankind*, which is possibly the work that formally best expresses the collapse of European order because of the absurdity of the war. As for Wittgenstein, Engelmann says that he had “a complete different opinion [from his own] ... He considered his obligation to go to the war as something that he had to fulfil in any circumstance”.⁵³

Now it has to be said that there was not just one pacifism but various pacifisms of very different kinds. There were pacifisms such as that of the poet Siegfried Sassoon at a certain point,⁵⁴ which simply expressed his disagreement with the way in which the Allied General Staff was conducting the war without being bothered about the mass slaughter resulting from obsolete conceptions of war and clumsy strategic and tactical decisions. There were pacifisms that many people thought were simply a covert nationalist mobilisation, such as the cases of Barbusse and his novel *Le Feu* or, on the other side of the trench, Erich Maria Remarque and his *Im Westen nichts Neues*. There were also pacifisms whose rejection of the war sought a final class war, a long civil war that would wind through the whole of Europe and put an end to capitalism, the cause and reason of all wars; this

53 Engelmann, P. *Wittgenstein-Engelmann, Cartas, Encuentros, Recuerdos*, Pre-Textos, Valencia, 2009, p. 125.

54 Sassoon, S. *Memoirs of an Infantry Officer*, Faber and Faber, London, 1974.

was the case with members of the left who had Bolshevik leanings, such as Ernst Friedrich and his famous illustrated book *War against War!* or the Walter Benjamin of *Einbahnstraße*. This kind of warlike pacifism, if you will forgive the oxymoron, prospered in the interwar period, as Stefan Zweig relates in his account of the failure of the *Clarté* project, a group intended to include writers and artists with the aim of opposing all enmity between nations. Apart from the immense difficulties brought about by the Treaty of Versailles, what killed off the project and made Zweig abandon it was Barbusse's move to the USSR after writing his novel *Le Feu*; he had become convinced that universal brotherhood could not be achieved by bourgeois democracies and he wanted to convert *Clarté* into "an instrument of class struggle".⁵⁵ But there were also pacifisms that made no concessions, such as those of Zweig himself or those descended from Tolstoy, to give two examples.

Now, Wittgenstein rejected even Engelmann's sophisticated pacifism. Engelmann felt antipathy for the pacifism that was displayed in neutral countries, in other words, countries that did not feel involved in the extreme situation being experienced by the combatants (and the populations engaged in war). He thought that those displays "would only be serious if they led to opposing war activity with an equally serious action, one that was equally dangerous personally". Therefore he agreed with the view of some British courts with regard to conscientious objectors: the accused should prove that throughout his life he had behaved in a way "that made it legitimate for him to place religious obligation above obligation to the State"; only in those circumstances was he allowed to perform "an (equally dangerous) service without weapons". Engelmann considered, therefore, that his subjective opposition to war did not excuse him from his "obligation" to the State. He also did not share the opinion maintained by one kind of pacifism that existed then (like Tolstoy's, incidentally); namely, that human life "is the greatest of all possible goods in any circumstance"; he "only felt that there are higher goods, but that it is forbidden to annihilate life for the sake of something less valuable than the supreme goods".⁵⁶ At any rate, in his notes he refers to war as "mass murder" and declares that after the stabilisation of the fronts in 1915 he realised that he "had to devote

55 Zweig, S. *The World of Yesterday*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln (NE), 1964, p. 306.

56 Engelmann, P., *Wittgenstein-Engelmann, Cartas, Encuentros, Recuerdos*, op. cit., pp. 124-125.

all my life to the service of a single thing = to try to shorten the duration of the mass murder”.⁵⁷

In contrast to Engelmann, Wittgenstein argued that his obligation was to go to the war in any case. Engelmann adds that there was no possibility of any compromise between their respective points of view. But the interesting thing is how Wittgenstein considered his companion’s particular pacifism: it was an “honest” attitude because it derived from a profound conviction, even “more honest although no more meaningful” than that of a “militant pacifist” or that “of the martyrdom ... of a conscientious objector”.⁵⁸ Of Bertrand Russell he thought the same, it was an honest position – because of his conviction and because he had risked going to prison – but an inappropriate one. Ilse Somavilla cites the testimony, reported by Brian McGuinness, that Wittgenstein condemned Bertrand Russell’s attendance at a meeting for Peace and Freedom after the war. When Russell said to him “Well, I suppose you would rather establish a World Organization for War and Slavery,” Wittgenstein replied, “Yes, rather that, rather that!”⁵⁹ Somavilla comments that Wittgenstein did not consider that war was better than peace, but he thought the preaching of peace more insincere than the war. I do not believe that his rejection was just a question of sincerity or hypocrisy. Wittgenstein had no doubt, for example, about the sincerity of Engelmann’s desire for peace. What is more important, for an understanding of his disagreement, is the different perception that they had of what the duty of an honest man worthy of living a genuine life was. But “duty” is a concept that needs clarification here, because I think that in Wittgenstein generational elements are mixed with a very personal elaboration of an ethical and religious nature.

I shall dwell on this aspect that I have called “generational”. In an excellent book about the cultural history of what preceded the First World War, and about its development and what came afterwards, *Rites of Spring, The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age*, Modris Eksteins provides an analysis – based on personal diaries, private correspondence, etc. – of the differences between the use of the term *Duty* by the British and French combatants, on the one hand, and that of *Pflicht* – which is the word Wittgenstein uses in his war diaries – among the Austro-German soldiers. In one letter, after days of being in the mud, being bombarded, resisting the assaults of the French infantry, etc., a soldier called Gerhart Pastors writes:

57 Id., *Wittgenstein-Engelmann, Cartas, Encuentros, Recuerdos*, p. 203.

58 *Ibid.*

59 Loc. cit. note nº 1, p. 204

You become strong. This life sweeps away violently all weakness and sentimentality. You are put in chains, robbed of self-determination, practiced in suffering, practiced in self-restraint. But first and foremost: you turn inward. The only way you can tolerate this existence, these horrors, this murder, is if your spirit is planted in higher spheres. You are forced into self-contemplation, you have to come to terms with death. You reach, to find a counterweight for the ghastly reality, for that which is most noble and highest.⁶⁰

This letter might have been written by Wittgenstein. Eksteins quotes numerous letters by soldiers written in the same vein which I cannot include here, but I will sum up what he concludes. The important thing in the notion of duty (*Pflicht*) for the Austro-German combatants was being ready to make a sacrifice, not the purpose of the sacrifice. The notion of *Pflicht* went beyond the defence of the fatherland because, among other reasons, there were many lands in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Above all, it had a powerful subjective element, made up of willpower and personal honour. An honour which requires that personal inspiration and initiative and temperament be put to the test. Therefore the will is the way of giving specific form to honour and it is experienced as a creative force. Another soldier wrote in a letter: "...the stronger [a person] he is, the more he obeys." As Eksteins says, concealed behind this notion of duty there is the metaphysical assumption that death regenerates, and that was the reason for the popularisation of the expression "*die heilige Pflicht*", "*sacred duty*." Quoting Eksteins: "Horror was turned into spiritual fulfillment. War became inner peace. Death, life."⁶¹ Once again, this expression could be applied to Wittgenstein.

All Wittgenstein's war diaries show a connection between the possibility of immediate death, the notion of "doing one's duty (*Pflicht*)" and the ideal of a life lived amid the good and the beautiful. Ten days after he started reading Tolstoy's gospels, in the first entry in which he uses his reading of it, after the quotation "Man is *weak* in the flesh but *free* in the spirit" Wittgenstein goes on writing, "How shall I behave if they start shooting? I'm not afraid of being killed by a shot, but I *am* afraid of not doing my duty (*Pflicht*) properly. May God give me strength! Amen, Amen, Amen."⁶²

Now, despite what has been said, I think that one can and cannot identify Wittgenstein with a generation at this point. Yes, in the sense that the

60 Eksteins, M. *Rites of Spring, The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age*, Anchor Book –Doubleday, New York, 1990. See pp. 193 ff.

61 *Ibid.*

62 Wittgenstein, L. *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 12 September 1914, p. 53.

combatants in the Great War had an experience that cannot be compared with any other and that, as Ilse Somavilla says with regard to Wittgenstein and Engelmann, “moved them very deeply and changed them for ever”.⁶³ Yes, in the sense that I have tried to show by commenting on the notions of duty, obedience and self-discipline. The more general conceptions of his youth undoubtedly had a family resemblance to those of many young combatants in his social environment. In another sense, however, Wittgenstein’s response is particular because of its religious configuration and its apolitical nature in a period – which, once again, has been considered by recent historiography as a European civil war – when it was not easy, and was certainly a minority reaction, to abstain from the political extremes that soon appeared in the post-war period.

Because, despite the situation in which he found himself, Wittgenstein thought that unhappiness came from an imbalance between himself and how life was, but at the same time he considered that it was his *duty* to acknowledge that it was not life that was to blame for this imbalance but how he was. It is evident that a different attitude would have been possible, such as that of his friend Engelmann and many others: devoting one’s energy to changing the circumstances of life as it is in order to rectify the imbalance that is the origin of unhappiness. For Wittgenstein, however, religiousness was, in fact, a recognition of that imbalance, which he always kept in sight as a spur to making moral demands on himself, without excusing his conduct because of external circumstances. He rejected the possibility of considering that the facts that circumscribed his life should be altered because it was in that given reality that it was his *duty* to show that his spirit (in a personal sense) measured up to the demands of the Spirit (in a different, transpersonal sense). Because the freedom that strength of spirit gives is for distancing oneself from the world and its contingencies (“A human being should not depend on chance. Neither on favourable nor on unfavourable chance”),⁶⁴ in order to make oneself independent not only of things but even more of people (“It is easier to be independent of things than of people. But one must also manage to achieve this!”).⁶⁵ The desire for a good life – always lived in a fragile, precarious equilibrium – consisted in doing one’s duty for duty’s sake without any utilitarian calculation, in

63 Somavilla, I. “Paul Engelmann y Ludwig Wittgenstein. Penas existenciales y búsqueda apasionada”, in Engelmann, P., op. cit., p. 309.

64 Wittgenstein, L. *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., p. 65.

65 Id., *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., p. 43.

doing things well and being indifferent⁶⁶ to the contingencies of the world in order to achieve peace of spirit and be able to work on logic (which, in turn, constitutes a contribution to the life of the spirit in so far as the spirit has a cultural objectification). All of which was foreshadowed when Wittgenstein said that in order to hold one's own in the vicissitudes of a life that could cease at any moment one had to live amid the good and the beautiful until life ended. For aesthetic and ethical consideration have to do with seeing an object or the world (respectively) *sub specie aeternitatis*, in other words, they consist in seeing from outside, not in being among them.⁶⁷

*

Wittgenstein's lack of historico-political perspicacity is not surprising. Engelmann described the moral demand that war made on him as the imperative of devoting his life to a single aim, "to try to shorten the duration of the mass murder". The expression "mass murder" is not innocuous. It reveals the grasp of a fundamental feature of technological warfare that appeared in the 1914–18 conflict and since then has not abandoned our age: the ability to kill *en masse* and from a distance as a result of the development of weapons that no longer point at individual bodies but sweep abstract spaces, annihilating everything that they contain, resources, cities, combatants and non-combatants. The Great War introduced what General Ludendorff called "total war". However, there is not a single entry or comment by Wittgenstein about this feature of contemporary warfare. "Mass murder" is an expression foreign to his way of referring to the war, because he continues to think of it in terms of the obsolete image of a duel, as a personal challenge that he has to measure up to. But a peculiar duel, because he embodies both duellists.

It is true that there are some notes and comments – after the Second World War – which express a socio-political consideration of the new nature of war. In 1945, just after the end of the fighting, he says quite plainly that the end of the war does not fill him with joy because he cannot help thinking that peace is only a truce, that it is a fabrication of propaganda to think that a future war could only break out because of those who are now defeated.⁶⁸ Similarly, the distant, sceptical tone with which he refers to

66 "My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them." Id., *Culture and Value*, [1929, #16], op. cit., p. 4.

67 Cf. Id., *Notebooks, 1914–1916*, op. cit., entry for 7.10.1916, p. 227.

68 "Perhaps I ought to feel elated because the war is over. But I'm not. I can't help feeling certain that this peace is only a truce. And the pretence that the complete

the victory celebrations is significant.⁶⁹ In 1947 he notes that after infinite misery the progress of science and industry will succeed in shaping a world “in which to be sure peace is the last thing that will then find a home. For science & industry do decide wars, or so it seems.”⁷⁰ And it is precisely this conviction that explains his – only apparently – provocative remarks about the Atomic Bomb. Perhaps this is his most profound comment about the new nature of war, which, incidentally, had already appeared in the war in which he fought. In any case, it is not a comment with a pacifist sensibility. Not even in this context of extermination of the civilian population does he use any expression close to the “mass murder” used by his friend Engelmann in regard to the 1914 war. Wittgenstein speaks of the “hysterical fear” of people in general and describes those who “are making an outcry” or who are “now making speeches against the production of the bomb” as “philistines” and “dregs of the intelligentsia”.⁷¹ We may suppose that at least part of those philistines includes the pacifist and disarmament movements that emerged after the apocalyptic end of the war in Asia. It is not that Wittgenstein was a defender of the Bomb, but he cannot resist the idea that there is something good in the fear and anguish inspired by the scenario ushered in by Hiroshima, which he considers “bitter medicine”. The pathology that this expeditious remedy had to cure was the uncritical confidence in science, the “bedazzlement” produced by “the idea of Great Progress”.⁷² For “the bomb creates the prospect of the end, the destruction of a ghastly evil, of disgusting soapy water science”;⁷³ so that it does not seem to him foolish to think that “the scientific & technological age is the beginning of the end for humanity” and that the humanity that strives for the progress of scientific knowledge “is falling into a trap”.⁷⁴

In other words, Wittgenstein’s criticism of the Bomb as a culmination and summing up of industry – governed by the far from altruistic principle of profit –, together with science and technology, all conceived in accord-

stamping out of the ‘aggressors’ of this war will make this world a better place to live in, as a future war could, of course, only be started by them, stinks to high heaven &, in fact, promises a horrid future.” Wittgenstein, L. “Letter to N. Malcolm”, in Malcolm, N., op. cit., p. 117.

69 “Rhees ... is here & I see a good deal of him. – We’ve had two VJ [Victory over Japan] days & I think there was much more noise than real joy.” Id., “Letter to Norman Malcolm”, in Malcolm, N., op. cit., p. 116.

70 Wittgenstein, L. *Culture and Value*, [1947, #364], op. cit., p. 72.

71 Ivi, p. 56.

72 Ivi, p. 64.

73 Ivi, p. 56.

74 Ivi, p. 64.

ance with the abstract principle of accumulation,⁷⁵ is based on the well-known *Kultur/Zivilisation* opposition that developed in the German-speaking world during the nineteenth century. It is not possible to understand his criticism about this matter without referring to the famous draft foreword for *Philosophische Bemerkungen* and the related *Culture and Value* aphorisms that I cited earlier. It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein uses this opposition from 1929 almost until the 1950s; in other words, until a very late date, when this schema had already fallen into disuse. However, although it is true that the genesis of this conceptual opposition covers the whole of the nineteenth century – as studied meticulously by Norbert Elias in his well-known book *The Civilizing Process*⁷⁶ – it is no less true that it was reactivated powerfully, with a sense of defence of the cultural particularity of Germany, during the 1914 war. Practically the whole of the “cultural war” against France and England revolved around the defence of *Kultur* against *Zivilisation*. Examples are the so-called “Manifesto of the Ninety-Three”, *Aufruf an die Kulturwelt*, or Thomas Mann’s article “Gedanken im Krieg” (November 1914) and *Reflections of an Unpolitical Man*; hundreds of other examples could be added.

I am not saying at all that Wittgenstein was a German nationalist. In fact, in his *Secret Diaries* he says, at the beginning of the conflict, that the thought that “the German race” – he declares himself to be “completely” German – was inevitably going to be beaten by the English, “the best race in the world”, “depresses me terribly”.⁷⁷ (Which is really rather curious, because Wittgenstein was fighting against the Russians on the east front, not against the British.) But I am saying that using that conceptual opposition

75 Ivi, p. 9: “Our civilization is characterized by the word progress. Progress is its form, it is not one of its properties that it makes progress. Typically it constructs. Its activity is to construct a more and more complicated structure. And even clarity is only a means to this end & not an end in itself.” This fragment begins an assertion by Wittgenstein that the typical scientist of this civilisation does not understand his “spirit”, in the same way that in the planned foreword for the *Philosophische Bemerkungen* he says that he views the direction of European civilization “without sympathy and without understanding for its goals, if indeed it has any”.

76 Elias, N. *The Civilizing Process*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969 and 1972.

77 Wittgenstein, L. *Diarios secretos*, op. cit., 25 October 1914, p. 77. In 1940, when there was fear about the invasion of England and the *Blitzkrieg* was at its height, he confessed to Drury: “You have often heard me speak of my dislike of many features of English life. But now that England is in real danger; how I would hate to see her destroyed.” Drury, M.O.C., op. cit., p. 159.

and subscribing to one of its poles (*Kultur*) involved him in a conception of culture that declined in the 1930s.

Sensing that he was far from the feeling of the great movement of European and American civilisation, whose spirit (*Geist*) he found “uncongenial” (*unsympathisch*), Wittgenstein did not conceal what the cultural affiliation of his own feeling was:

I often wonder whether my cultural ideal is a new one, i.e. contemporary, or whether it comes from the time of Schumann. At least it strikes me as a continuation (*Fortsetzung*) of that ideal, though not the continuation that actually followed it then. That is to say, the second half of the 19th Century has been left out. This, I ought to say, has happened quite instinctively & and was not the result of reflection.⁷⁸

Precisely for this reason, and despite his later socio-political comments about the war, I think that Wittgenstein never stopped thinking about it from the heroic perspective – Romantic in origin – with which he viewed it in his youth.

78 Id., *Culture and Value*, [1929, #17], op. cit., p. 4.

THE DARKNESS OF THIS TIME

Ethics, Politics, and Religion
in Wittgenstein

Edited by
Luigi Perissinotto



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E-mail: mimesis@mimesisedizioni.it

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