

**HACIA UN RÉGIMEN INTERNACIONAL  
DE SEGURIDAD ECONÓMICA PARA  
EL DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO EN PAÍSES  
PRODUCTORES DE DROGAS ILÍCITAS  
(TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY REGIME  
FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ILLICIT DRUG  
PRODUCING COUNTRIES)**

***EXPLORANDO EL APOYO INTERNACIONAL PARA  
SUSTENTOS ALTERNATIVOS EN COLOMBIA  
(EXPLORING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS IN COLOMBIA)***

Tesis doctoral que, para su defensa pública, presenta el Ldo. D.  
**JORRIT KAMMINGA**  
Bajo la dirección del  
**PROF. DR. DR. h.c. D. CARLOS FLORES JUBERÍAS**

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*“The fields, water, crops, cattle: that was where concern began and ended.”*

V.S. Naipaul<sup>1</sup>



*“Drugs are a threat to the environment. Coca cultivation destroys vast swathes of Andean rain forest – the lungs of our planet – as well as national parks.”*

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon<sup>2</sup>



*“Clearly it is a threat. But the iconic image of this threat is not an airplane, still less a tank – in fact it is not a weapon at all, but a container.”*

Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> V.S. Naipaul, *India: A Wounded Civilization* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> Message of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon on the occasion of the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking (22 June 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano, ‘Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: The New Topography’, in: Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano (eds.), *Transnational organized crime and international security: business as usual?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 197.



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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

The following abbreviations have been used in this research:

<b>ADAM</b>	Areas for Municipal-Level Alternative Development Program/ <i>Programa Áreas de Desarrollo Alternativo Municipal</i>
<b>ATS</b>	Amphetamine-type stimulants
<b>CAN</b>	Andean Community of Nations/ <i>Comunidad Andina (de Naciones)</i>
<b>CCAI</b>	Coordination Centre for Integrated Action/ <i>Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral</i>
<b>CIAS</b>	Conflict Impact Assessment
<b>CICAD</b>	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission/ <i>Comisión Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas</i>
<b>CND</b>	Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations
<b>COP</b>	Colombian peso/ <i>Peso Colombiano</i>
<b>CSR</b>	Corporate Social Responsibility
<b>DEA</b>	United States Drug Enforcement Administration
<b>DPCI</b>	Directorate of the Illicit Cultivation Programme/ <i>Dirección de Programas contra Cultivos Ilícitos</i>
<b>DPS</b>	Department of Social Prosperity/ <i>Departamento para la Prosperidad Social</i>
<b>ECOSOC</b>	United Nations Economic and Social Council
<b>ELN</b>	National Liberation Army/ <i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i>
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUR</b>	Euro
<b>FAML</b>	Armed Forces Outside the Law/ <i>Fuerzas Armadas al Margen de la Ley</i>
<b>FARC</b>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia/ <i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i>
<b>FNC</b>	National Federation of Coffee Growers in Colombia/ <i>Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia</i>
<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now WTO)
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product

<b>IADB</b>	Inter-American Development Bank
<b>ICAD</b>	International Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development
<b>IIFE</b>	Illicit International Political Economy
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INCB</b>	International Narcotics Control Board
<b>INTERPOL</b>	International Criminal Police Organization
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IPE</b>	International Political Economy
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>Lao PDR</b>	Lao People's Democratic Republic
<b>LSE</b>	London School of Economics
<b>MIDAS</b>	More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development/ <i>Más Inversión para el Desarrollo Alternativo Sostenible</i>
<b>MNC</b>	Multinational Corporation
<b>NASA</b>	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PCF</b>	Colombia Forestry Programme/ <i>Programa Colombia Forestal</i>
<b>PCI</b>	Illicit Cultivation Programme/ <i>Programa contra Cultivos Ilícitos de Acción Social</i> (now part of DPS)
<b>PCIM</b>	Comprehensive Consolidation Plan of the Macarena/ <i>Plan de Consolidación Integral de La Macarena</i>
<b>PFGB</b>	Forest Warden Families Programme/ <i>Programa Familias Guardabosques</i>
<b>PNC</b>	National Plan of Consolidation/ <i>Plan Nacional de Consolidación</i>
<b>PNCRT</b>	National Policy of Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction/ <i>Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial</i>
<b>PPP</b>	Productive Projects Programme/ <i>Programa Proyectos Productivos</i>
<b>RDE</b>	Rural Development in a Drug Environment
<b>RECOMPAS</b>	Network of Community Councils of the South Pacific/ <i>Red de Consejos Comunitarios del Pacífico Sur</i>

<b>RISE</b>	International Economic Security Regime/ <i>Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica</i>
<b>SENA</b>	National Learning Service/ <i>Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje</i>
<b>TNC</b>	Trans-national Corporation
<b>TNI</b>	Transnational Institute
<b>UACT</b>	Administrative Unit for Territorial Consolidation/ <i>Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial</i>
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDCCP</b>	United Nations Drug Control and Crime Prevention (now UNODC)
<b>UNDCP</b>	United Nations International Drug Control Programme (now UNODC)
<b>UNGASS</b>	United Nations General Assembly Special Session
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations Refugee Agency
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization
<b>WOLA</b>	Washington Office on Latin America
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization



## PREFACE

Whilst studying for my Master's degree in International Relations at the State University of Groningen in the Netherlands (1996-2002), I became fascinated by the theoretical concept of the 'international regime'. For one of my Honours courses, I chose the topic of 'Multinational Corporations, National Governments and International Organisations'. Within this area I decided to explore the question of whether the international drug control system, shaped by its three international Conventions, could be considered an international regime according to the definition of Stephen D. Krasner, one of the leading scholars of international regime theory (Stanford University). In my PhD research I build on the initial modest thesis that resulted from that work in 2001, but there are many more connections between my previous academic and professional activities and the present dissertation.

For another Honours course in Groningen on 'Human Rights, Democracy and Development', I analysed the US-backed 'Plan Colombia' as implemented from 2000 onwards. The analysis explored in particular its possible negative side effects for human rights in Colombia.

Also as part of my studies, in 2001 I worked as an assistant to the Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement Section at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna, Austria, where I investigated the marketing potential of alternative development produce from Peru. In 2002, as part of that assignment, I helped to organise an information market in Germany, displaying products from alternative development projects in Peru, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Thailand, Myanmar and other drug producing countries.

I have dedicated the first ten years of my career since my graduation in 2002 to the analysis of a number of aspects of the global drugs phenomenon; initially mainly in its European context and from 2005 on Afghanistan and its illegal opium economy. This work has resulted in various publications which will be referenced, where relevant, in this research. According to Dr Arjan van den Assem, one of my professors in Groningen, I am one of the few students he has taught who has been able to directly convert an academic specialisation into a corresponding professional path in exactly the same field.

During my PhD research trajectory, I began working on the research for my *trabajo de investigación* (an obligatory second year thesis) in 2009. This research analysed a legal drug producing industry: the licensed, medicine-producing opium industry of Turkey. In

preparation for this *trabajo de investigación*, a field research trip was undertaken in July 2009 to the poppy growing region of Afyon in Western Turkey. The field research included meetings with the highest government officials in Ankara, a tour of the medicine processing factory in Bolvadin and a visit to farms in the poppy growing areas in the region of Afyon.

The research in Turkey can be considered to be of relevance to the present research, despite them taking place in two different countries (Turkey and Colombia) and examining two different drug-producing plants (the opium poppy in Turkey *versus* principally coca in Colombia). The licensing scheme for Turkish opium poppy farmers which featured in the field research can be considered as alternative development, a core element of the present research (although it uses the same crop as illegal drug production), and the official system put in place by the Turkish authorities uses economic (rural) development and trade policies to try to reduce the illegal cultivation and production of opium.

After finishing and successfully defending my *trabajo de investigación* in 2010, I was awarded a visiting scholarship at the Department of Sociology of the London School of Economics (LSE) where I spent two valuable terms developing the theoretical foundations of the present research. The final year of my research was spent as visiting scholar at the Institute of Political Studies of the University of Antioquia in Medellín.

The last period of the PhD trajectory included stimulating field research visits in May 2013 to the Colombian regional departments of Nariño in the south-west (bordering on Ecuador), the Sierra de la Macarena region in the department of Meta in the centre of the country, and the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in the north of Colombia (divided across the three regional departments of Magdalena, Cesar and La Guajira).

As I enter the final stages of my PhD trajectory, I have the feeling that I have come full circle. First, reflecting my previous academic research interests, this dissertation combines international regime theory with a case study on Colombia. Second, the focus of my research is on alternative development as a counter-narcotics strategy, including the role of alternative produce such as coffee, cacao and honey, which were among the agricultural products I first researched for UNODC and later helped to display and sell at the International Conference on The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation (Feldafing, Germany, 7-12 January 2002). Finally, once again researching the minutiae of UN treaties and corresponding Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) resolutions has not only taken me back to my earlier academic work, but has brought



back many happy memories of the time I spent working at the annual CND sessions in Vienna between 2004 and 2011.

I also realise that I have been extremely lucky with the choice of regional field research visits, particularly the mountainous areas I visited – la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in the north – which are undoubtedly among the most beautiful places on earth.

I could not have achieved this without the help of the following people who have provided their input or support to the academic research: Carlos Flores Juberías (for his ongoing support since 2008), Álvaro Balcázar Vanegas (Former Director, Unidad Especial para la Consolidación Territorial), Juan Diego Cely Barrera (former PCI, Acción Social), Guillermo García Miranda (UNODC Bogotá), Adriana González Gil (Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad de Antioquia), Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo (DPCI, Consolidación Territorial), Anja Korenblik (UNODC Vienna), Aldo Lale Demoz (former representative, UNODC Bogotá), Antonio Moneo (for his useful comments on an early outline), Plinio Pérez (Government of Nariño), Ángela Milena Picón, Paddy Rawlinson (my supervisor at LSE), Adrián Raúl Restrepo Parra (my supervisor at the Instituto de Estudios Políticos) and Carlos Antonio Zorro Sánchez (Universidad de los Andes). I am especially indebted to the Territorial Consolidation Unit of the Colombian government, which helped to plan and inform my field research in the three regions mentioned above.

In the professional domain, I would like to thank Norine MacDonald QC and Emmanuel Reinert (ICOS) for enabling me to work on drug policy issues since October 2003 and for their full support for my academic endeavours. They also made it possible for me to obtain first-hand field research experience in Afghanistan, Colombia, India and Turkey, and provided me with the opportunity to work in twenty other countries over the past ten years. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Jane Francis, long-time colleague at ICOS and the proof reader of this work.

On a personal level, I could not have come so far without the moral support, dedication and (academic) stimulation of my parents, Theun Kamminga and Diny Kamminga-Visscher, my brother Tjalling Kamminga, and the early support of my grandfather Piet Kamminga during my first degree in International Relations. Last but not least, my gratitude goes out to my girlfriend Mónica Valencia Jauregui, who has been particularly supportive and patient in the final months of writing this dissertation.

Medellín, September 13, 2013



## ABSTRACT<sup>4</sup>

This research explores the supply reduction aspects of the global drugs phenomenon, with a particular focus on national and international alternative development and trade policies aiming to reduce the supply of drug-producing plants, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through alternative development. The central argument of the research is that Colombia can be considered a benchmark for the development of an effective international regime on cross-border support for alternative development strategies to address the supply of illicit drugs around the world. This regime, a construction of the author and the key academic contribution of the research, would be called an International Economic Security Regime (RISE, using the Spanish acronym of *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica*).

Part I of the research places the issue area of the global drugs phenomenon firmly within the study of International Relations (a second key academic contribution of the research), particularly in its sub-field of International Political Economy. Within this sub-field, the research can be considered a contribution to the emerging ‘sub-sub-field’ of Illicit International Political Economy.

Subsequently, further exploring its central argument, the research has led to the design of a new functional instrument, called an International Economic Security Regime or RISE, based on the theoretical concepts analysed during this research. This new instrument combines Stephen Krasner’s international regime theory with the theoretical concepts of ‘economic security’ and ‘shared responsibility’. As the first main building block of the new international regime, shared responsibility is perceived as a key motivating factor behind the cooperation of states within the international regime. As the second principle building block, economic security is used in two ways: first with an emphasis on economic, focusing on economic welfare, prosperity, income and livelihoods within the legal economy; and second with an emphasis on security, focusing on links between security and the alternative development policies implemented at the two levels of analysis of the research: a) the national and sub-national levels; and b) the international level.

Part II of the research examines the case study of Colombia, focusing in particular on the findings of three regional field studies in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in the north

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<sup>4</sup> Annex IV contains an extensive summary of the thesis in Spanish.

of Colombia, the Sierra de la Macarena in the regional department of Meta in the centre of the country and in the area of Tumaco in the department of Nariño. The three regional studies aim to analyse Colombia's alternative development oriented counter-narcotics policy and its place within the broader international legal and political framework. The case studies are used to test the theoretical construction of the International Economic Security Regime and explore its effectiveness.

The first region, la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, was identified as an area taking a more classical approach to counter-narcotics policy, making use of projects with a clear focus on economic and social development. It includes important projects on eco-tourism or agri-tourism, coffee and honey production and fishing. The second region, la Sierra de la Macarena was selected as an area where the Colombian government has begun to develop a more integrated approach focusing on institution building, local governance, stability and security as preconditions for alternative livelihood and other counter-narcotics interventions. Through the implementation of a pilot project, this model led to the current national strategy of territorial consolidation. Similar to the Sierra de la Macarena, Tumaco, the last area visited, located in the southern region of Nariño is also included as one of the priority zones (*zonas de consolidación*) under the national strategy of territorial reconstruction and consolidation.

Through the field research, the functional instrument of the International Economic Security Regime is tested to explore the opportunities it can create for international cooperation between states on the issue area of alternative development. In summary, the research finds that the creation of a RISE would be particularly relevant for states in four ways. The first significant contribution of the RISE would be that it could increase international support for alternative development on the basis of shared responsibility. The second significant contribution of the RISE would be that it allows states to work on very specific issue areas within the framework of alternative development. Third, the RISE would offer a framework to connect the concept of economic security to alternative development in a positive way. Last, through the RISE, states can link policies of environmental protection abroad to drug-control objectives in alternative development programmes.

### MAP 1: PHYSICAL MAP OF COLOMBIA




Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2001).





**MAP 2: ILLICIT COCA CULTIVATION IN COLOMBIA (2011)**



Source: Colombian government and UNODC.





## INTRODUCTION

Illicit drugs and the drugs trade can devastate lives, destabilise societies and jeopardise the security of entire countries and regions. The global drugs phenomenon creates multiple, interconnected challenges for governments around the world, affecting a wide range of sectors including public health, law enforcement, governance, public security and economic development. Whether related to the cultivation of illicit crops, the production and trade of illegal substances, the consumption of illegal drugs, or the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts, the global drugs phenomenon can be considered a truly global and widespread concern that directly or indirectly affects people and countries all around the world.

The member states of the United Nations have recognised the universal character of the global drugs phenomenon and the immense challenge it poses. The 1998 ‘Political Declaration’ states:

*“Drugs destroy lives and communities, undermine sustainable human development and generate crime. Drugs affect all sectors of society in all countries; in particular, drug abuse affects the freedom and development of young people, the world's most valuable asset. Drugs are a grave threat to the health and well-being of all mankind, the independence of States, democracy, the stability of nations, the structure of all societies, and the dignity and hope of millions of people and their families.”*<sup>5</sup>

Faced with this vast, multifaceted challenge, the international community and individual states have been striving to find sustainable solutions to the drug phenomenon for at least one hundred years. This has so far resulted in a legal drug control framework at the international level that currently binds states in two important ways. First, they have the general ‘positive’ obligation to ensure sufficient narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances for medicinal and scientific purposes.<sup>6</sup> Second, they are bound by the general ‘negative’

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations, *Political Declaration. Guiding Principles of Drug Demand Reduction and Measures to Enhance International Cooperation to Counter the World Drug Problem*, adopted at the United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Countering the World Drug Problem Together (8-10 June 1998).

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* (1961), Preamble, p. 1.

obligation at the international level to prohibit the production, supply, and possession of controlled substances and reduce illicit demand for these substances at home.<sup>7</sup>

Despite all states being bound by this international legal framework, they – and even regions, provinces or cities within them – have different policies, different priorities and different visions of how to deal effectively with these controlled substances at local, regional and international levels. Consequently, the debate continues about how best to address the global drugs phenomenon. Colombia's President Juan Manuel Santos said in a recent report:

*“This is a global problem that demands a global solution, and therefore a new international consensus is needed. We must all make a sustained effort at thinking about creative and innovative ways to eradicate this scourge from our societies.”*<sup>8</sup>

While states generally acknowledge the importance of the global drugs phenomenon, there is certainly no global vision of how to address it and no clear path towards general international agreement. Quite the contrary; there is increased ideological debate within and between countries on the different ways of addressing parts of the global drugs phenomenon, resulting in the aforementioned diverse policies at the local and national levels.<sup>9</sup> At the global level, an interesting political development has been the coming together in 2011 of some former ‘world leaders’ in the Global Commission on Drug Policy that produced recommendations on how global drug policy could be improved.<sup>10</sup>

Policy evaluation with regard to the global drugs phenomenon is an ongoing activity. For example, the global framework of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) period (1998-2008) has been evaluated extensively,<sup>11</sup> and so have more specific

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Preamble, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Juan Manuel Santos, ‘Re-examining the Drug Problem Through a Fresh Lens’ in: *LSE IDEAS, Governing The Global Drug Wars. LSE IDEAS Special Report* (October 2012), pp. 2, 3. Available online at: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR014.aspx>.

<sup>9</sup> The details of these developments go beyond the scope of this research. Most developments take place at the sub-national or national level. Examples are: the plans of the Uruguayan Government in June 2012 to legalise cannabis by creating a state monopoly; Spain's increase of member-only ‘Cannabis clubs’ in some regions; the rejection of a referendum on cannabis legalisation in November 2010 in the state of California, United States; recent changes to the liberal approach to ‘soft drugs’ in the Netherlands, etc.

<sup>10</sup> See their two main reports: Global Commission on Drug Policy, *War on Drugs. Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy* (June 2011) and Global Commission on Drug Policy, *The War on Drugs and HIV/AIDS. How the Criminalization of Drug Use Fuels the Global Pandemic. Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy* (June 2012). Both reports are available online at the official website of this Commission: <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>11</sup> See, for example: David R. Bewley-Taylor, ‘The Contemporary International Drug Control System: A History of the UNGASS Decade’, in: *LSE IDEAS, Governing The Global Drug Wars. LSE IDEAS Special Report* (October 2012), pp. 49-55.

policy frameworks such as Plan Colombia (2000-2010).<sup>12</sup> At the official level, the United States adopted the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act in 2010, mandating the creation of an independent commission to evaluate domestic and international policies of supply and demand reduction in the regional context of the western hemisphere.<sup>13</sup> The latest development is the report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) which studied the drug problem in the Americas and came up with several scenarios of alternative policy options.<sup>14</sup>

While there is an ongoing need to look for new, practical and pragmatic solutions, finding effective policy instruments also requires examining lessons learned and best practices from the past. Indeed, as Part I of this research will demonstrate, the international community has in recent years increasingly focused on highlighting and exchanging best practices and lessons learned with regard to alternative development. Colombia is a case in point. It is an example of a country where an internationally-backed counter-narcotics policy with evolving strategies and different priorities over time has been in place for decades.<sup>15</sup> Those strategies will be examined in more detail in Part II of this research. The section below will first offer a short history of how Colombia became embroiled in the illegal drugs economy.

### **The history of Colombia's illicit drugs economy**

The global nature of the cocaine trade can be traced to the second half of the twentieth century. Paul Gootenberg writes:

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<sup>12</sup> See, for example: Beatriz Acevedo, David Bewley-Taylor and Coletta Youngers, 'Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytic Assessment', *The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme*, Briefing Paper 16 (September 2008); and, in the context of best practices and lessons learned for other regions and countries: Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy and WOLA, *A Cautionary Tale: Plan Colombia's Lessons for U.S. Policy Toward Mexico and Beyond* (November 2011).

<sup>13</sup> United States, 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, *A bill to establish the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy* (8 December 2010). Available online at: <http://www.menendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/WHDCBillFinal2.pdf> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>14</sup> The CICAD reports are available on the official website of the organisation. Available online at: [http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/Main/policy/default\\_ENG.asp](http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/Main/policy/default_ENG.asp) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>15</sup> Policies have ranged from crop substitution, agricultural subsidies and other economic incentives for coca farmers, development of coca farming communities to interdiction, aerial spraying of coca crops. The details of such strategies will be discussed in Part II of this research.

*“Nowhere prior to 1950 did active networks come together that linked coca growers to illegal refiners of cocaine to long-distance smugglers and active user markets, that is, to an illicit commodity chain with true possibilities of growth.”*<sup>16</sup>

In the early part of the twentieth century cocaine consumption in the United States was very low, particularly during the “*great drought*” between the 1920s and the 1950s.<sup>17</sup> Cocaine trafficking was initially organised on the basis of small-scale individual smuggling and only moved towards well-connected transnational networks in about 1948.<sup>18</sup> Colombia’s role in the illegal drugs trade only really gained significance in the early 1970s, particularly in the aftermath of the 1973 *coup d’état* in Chile that brought President Pinochet to power. That *coup* closed the most important trafficking route of the time – the so-called “*Chilean corridor*” that ran from Bolivia to Chile, through Panama and Cuba and onwards to the United States – and enabled the transition to an important role for Colombian drug traffickers.<sup>19</sup>

Prior to the rise of Colombia’s illegal coca economy, another important external factor that was to have an influence in Colombia was the spraying of cannabis crops in Mexico and (to a lesser extent) in Jamaica under Operation Condor, a US-supported drug eradication programme that began in 1975 and continued until 1985.<sup>20</sup> The increase in law enforcement activities in Jamaica and Mexico led to the displacement of drug-producing crops to the north of Colombia and represents a first example of the ‘balloon effect’ that will be discussed in more detail below.

As such, Colombia’s involvement in the illegal drugs economy started in the 1970s with the production and trafficking of cannabis, in particular ‘Colombian Gold’ or ‘Santa Marta Golden’, cultivated in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and in other areas along the Caribbean coast, that was transported to the fast-growing market for cannabis in the United States.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Paul Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: the making of a global drug* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), p. 251.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 250, 251.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 301. See also pp. 261-264 on the cocaine clans of Chile.

<sup>20</sup> Ernesto Samper Pizano, *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización. Una nueva propuesta* (Bogotá: Random House Mondadori, 2013), p. 46; Francisco Thoumi, *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 81.

<sup>21</sup> James D. Henderson, *Víctima de la Globalización. La historia de cómo el narcotráfico destruyó la paz en Colombia* (Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores, 2012), p. 49.; *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización. Una nueva propuesta, op. cit.*, p. 46.

James D. Henderson describes the role of Colombia as main cocaine supplier to the United States as a logical continuation of the role the country had traditionally been awarded by the system of international capitalism.<sup>22</sup> For five hundred years it has been an international commodity supplier of gold, emeralds, later coffee and nowadays products such as flowers, coal, nickel and oil.<sup>23</sup> Such a focus on Colombia as an exporting country of primary commodities fits well with the structuralist perspective of International Relations (described below in section 4.8) and the view of the country simply making the best of its comparative advantages in the Neo-Liberal view outlined in more detail further on.

From the northern coastal areas and Santa Marta, drug traffickers started to move operations to other regions such as Chocó and the Sierra de la Macarena.<sup>24</sup> Following the production of cannabis, they also started to import coca paste from Bolivia and Peru for processing inside Colombia.<sup>25</sup> From the 1970s onwards, the rise of Bolivian trafficking organisations on the international stage resulted in a larger supply of coca paste and cocaine base, which was in turn distributed to the foreign market via Colombia through, in particular, the Medellín and Cali cartels.<sup>26</sup>

In this way, these Colombian organisations became the dominant actors in marketing the majority of Bolivian cocaine at the international level, particularly towards the then rapidly growing US market.<sup>27</sup> Cocaine was more appealing to Colombian drug traffickers because of its better weight/value ratio.<sup>28</sup> The next and highly significant step in determining the future scope of Colombia's illicit drugs economy was the start of coca cultivation inside Colombia. Driven by the growing export market for cocaine, by 1980, Colombia was already producing an estimated 3.7 percent of the world's total coca, increasing to 11 percent in 1987.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> *Víctima de la Globalización. La historia de cómo el narcotráfico destruyó la paz en Colombia*, op. Cit., p. 16.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>24</sup> *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización. Una nueva propuesta*, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>26</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, op. cit., p. 118. Paul Gootenberg explains that the role of Colombian drug cartels initially grows because of two external factors: the coup d'état in Chile (1973) and the surge of drugs-related law enforcement efforts in Mexico around the same time. Both events partly reconfigured drug trafficking routes and gave the Colombian cartels more opportunities to become market leaders. Paul Gootenberg, keynote speech, 'Controlling cocaine: Policy 'blowback' and the hemispheric-historical origins of the Mexican Drug War, 1900-2000', Under Control? Alcohol and drug regulation, past and present conference (June 21-23, 2013).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

Francisco Thoumi estimates that in 1985, Colombia's illegal coca economy accounted for more than 8.7 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), representing a black market that was growing faster than the legal economy and swiftly becoming the country's most dynamic and important economic sector.<sup>30</sup> There are diverse reasons to explain why Colombia became such an important player in the illegal cocaine trade, three of which are worth mentioning here. Interestingly, they have little to do with economic comparative advantage related to international markets.

The first reason is location. The geographical position of Colombia between the main production centres at the time (Bolivia and Peru) and the main consumption market (the US) undoubtedly played an important role.<sup>31</sup> The initial proximity to the cannabis production centres of Jamaica and Mexico also played an important role in the early stages of developing domestic illicit drug production.

The second reason is political. The Colombian state has been historically weak (with governments often perceived as illegitimate) and persistently threatened by internal strife and violence.<sup>32</sup> A history of widespread corruption, structural violence, lack of effective state control over large parts of its territory and the clientelist nature of the political system created the perfect breeding ground for the development and growth of the illegal cocaine economy.<sup>33</sup>

The third reason is directly related to black markets. Colombia has a long tradition of contraband. The prevalence and social acceptance of contraband in Colombian society made the shift towards cocaine trafficking relatively straightforward.<sup>34</sup> It not only built on the tradition of smuggling of cigarettes or consumer goods (in which Pablo Escobar started his criminal career), but also on Colombia's illegal trade in emeralds and coffee.<sup>35</sup> This long history of contraband brought experience in using bribes, extortion, intimidation, money-laundering and concealment of illegal shipments to illegal cocaine trafficking.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Francisco Thoumi, *Economía Política y Narcotráfico* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1994), Chapter 5, especially p. 172.

<sup>31</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, op. cit., p. 42; *Andean Cocaine: the making of a global drug*, op. cit., p. 301; Francisco E. Thoumi, *Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), Chapter 5, pp. 167-179.

<sup>32</sup> *Andean Cocaine: the making of a global drug*, op. cit., p. 301. *Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia*, p. 175.

<sup>33</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>34</sup> *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización. Una nueva propuesta*, op. cit., p. 47; *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, op. cit., pp. 43-45; *Andean Cocaine: the making of a global drug*, op. cit., p. 302.

<sup>35</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

The consequences of these historic developments were disastrous for Colombia. There are currently few countries around the world as scarred by illegal drugs as Colombia. This is not only apparent at the domestic level where many families have been indirectly or directly victim of either drugs-related violence or the drugs-funded *Fuerzas Armadas al Margen de la Ley* (FAML, armed forces outside the law) and criminal gangs. It is also visible in the country's image and stigmatisation outside of Colombia. For many people abroad, the country is still synonymous with 'Pablo Escobar', the 'Medellín cartel' and the 'Cali cartel' which operated there from the 1970s to the 1990s.

The associated violence and linkages between the illegal drugs trade and the activities of the leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary forces have had a profound impact on Colombia, its people and the way the country is portrayed abroad.<sup>37</sup> While the Colombian government attempts to improve the country's image and promote its legal products and tourist attractions, the huge shadow of the illegal drugs trade continues to hang over it.<sup>38</sup> The illegal cocaine industry remains substantial and its impact on the political, socio-economic and legal fabric of Colombia continues to be felt.<sup>39</sup>

Analysis of crime and crime prevention strategies related to illicit drugs often focuses in particular on drug traffickers, other criminals, trafficking networks and 'cartels'; the links in the illegal drugs production chain that make most profits. However, this research will move away from those actors, and will focus on the people who make the vast profits possible for drug traffickers: the farmers and farming communities involved in the cultivation of illegal drug (plants) such as coca bush and opium poppy. The next section of this paper will briefly examine how different countries have tried to address the illegal drug market through alternative economic development strategies (alternative development) focusing on the rural communities where these plants are cultivated.

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<sup>37</sup> *Víctima de la Globalización, op. cit.*, pp. 18, 19.

<sup>38</sup> Ironically, a 2012 television series about the life of Pablo Escobar, *Escobar, El Patron del Mal*, was hugely popular in Colombia, despite the logical criticism that the series reinforced the stigmas of violence, drugs and crime. The series' motto "those who do not know their history, are condemned to repeat it" (in Spanish: *Quien no conoce su historia, está condenado a repetirla*) can be considered to provide the counter-argument to this criticism.

<sup>39</sup> The nature of this impact will be qualified in Chapter 9.

### Success stories of alternative development-oriented drug policy

There are few available success stories of economic development policies to curb the supply of illegal drugs. Thailand is considered by some as having implemented the most successful development-led opium poppy reduction programme.<sup>40</sup> But the conditions in place at the time of Thailand's 30 year opium reduction trajectory (strong leadership of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, good government coordination and cooperation, strong economic growth for a period of 32 years, strict law enforcement and crop eradication policies, and highly successful agricultural reforms), make the country an example that is hard to follow.<sup>41</sup>

From the other countries that had or still have large scale alternative development programmes in place (in addition to Thailand: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Laos, Pakistan, Peru and Vietnam) only Vietnam<sup>42</sup> and Pakistan<sup>43</sup> can be regarded as successful in significantly reducing the supply of illicit drugs at their domestic source. However, while both of these countries ran significant development-led crop eradication and rural development programmes related to drug control, illicit drug production itself never reached the scale of Colombia.

Most recently, the Peruvian model of alternative development, known as the 'San Martín model' has been promoted as a success story, on the basis of alternative development projects implemented in the department of San Martín, which for a large part is located in the Amazon rainforest in the north-east of Peru.<sup>44</sup> While this model is even described as a

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<sup>40</sup> Marcus Williamson, Highland Research and Development Institute Thailand, *Opium Reduction and Highland Development: Thailand Case Study* (25 October 2006), p. 13. Available online at: [http://www.adkn.org/assets/adkn\\_33.pdf](http://www.adkn.org/assets/adkn_33.pdf) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p.13.

<sup>42</sup> Between 1990 and 2001, opium production in Vietnam decreased by 98 percent. However, despite the implementation of some rural development programmes, economic incentives provided by the state did not play a decisive role in reaching this reduction. At all times, opium production was relatively low at less than 90 metric tonnes. See: James Windle, 'The suppression of illicit opium production in Viet Nam: an introductory narrative', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, Vol. 57, Issue 4 (May 2012), pp. 425-439.

<sup>43</sup> During the 1990s, Pakistan significantly decreased opium cultivation and production levels to reach 'poppy free' status in the growing season of 2000-2001. Although alternative development was part of the government's policy mix, total cultivation levels were never large (at all times less than ten thousand hectares during this period). See: UNODC *Illicit Drug Trends in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: UNODC, 2008), p. 8. See also: Jorrit Kamminga and Nazia Hussain, 'From Disengagement to Regional Opium War? Towards a Counter-Narcotics Surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan', *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 29 (May 2012).

<sup>44</sup> Hugo Cabieses, 'The 'miracle of San Martín' and symptoms of 'alternative development' in Peru', *TNI Drug Policy Briefing No. 34* (December 2010).



“*miracle*” of alternative development, the UNODC report on the project already admits that not all elements of the project can be reproduced elsewhere.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the lack of clear success stories, this research investigates whether Colombia could nonetheless be regarded as a useful benchmark for establishing an International Economic Security Regime to help understand and explain the impact, or lack of impact, of international support for alternative development-driven efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs. Over the years, Colombia has developed and fine-tuned (using trial and error) a counter-narcotics model that has culminated in what is now called the national strategy of Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction. In March 2013, the current version of this model was presented by the Colombian government to the member states of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.<sup>46</sup> The model will be explained in more detail in Chapter 9.

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<sup>45</sup> UNODC, *The Alternative Development Model in San Martín. A case study on Local Economic Development. Executive Summary* (no date), p. 11. Available online at: [http://www.unodc.org/documents/alternative-development/San\\_Martin\\_english.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/alternative-development/San_Martin_english.pdf) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>46</sup> Presentation of the Colombian government at a side event on the occasion of the fifty-sixth session of the Commission on Narcotics Drugs (13 March 2013). The title of the presentation was ‘New territorial model to eliminate illicit crops in Colombia’.



## CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH RATIONALE

Following an explanation of the central argument of this research (section 1.1), this chapter subsequently explores the objectives of the research (section 1.2), the motivation for the focus of the research (section 1.3) and its intended contribution to the academic field of International Relations (section 1.4).

### 1.1 Central argument

Focusing on alternative development, related to the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon, the central argument of this research is that Colombia can be used as a benchmark to develop an efficient international regime on cross border support for alternative development strategies aimed at reducing the supply of illicit drugs around the world. This international regime, devised by the author as a result of the research is called an International Economic Security Regime (RISE). Its core theoretical base has been developed by adding a combination of the theoretical concepts of ‘economic security’ and ‘shared responsibility’ to international regime theory. Both of these theoretical concepts and international regime theory are part of the study of International Relations and its sub-discipline of International Political Economy.

In other words, through the lens of the theoretical pillars of ‘shared responsibility’ and ‘economic security’, this research examines the rationale for and the objectives and characteristics of international support for alternative development. This examination aims to provide an assessment of their suitability for use as the building blocks for an international regime for internationally-backed, development-driven strategies to reduce the supply of illicit drugs.

International regimes can be seen as the vehicles used by states to cooperate and solve complex global issues that cannot be addressed by states individually. The International Economic Security Regime will be considered a sub-regime within the broader international regime of the international drug control framework, focusing on the specific issue of supply reduction. While a RISE does not exist in practice, its creation as a theoretical construction is useful to foster debate, increase understanding and help describe

international cooperation on supply reduction in source countries. In this light, international cooperation on supply reduction policies can be seen as reflecting the nature of a RISE, but it does not necessarily embody this regime in practice. Thus, the development of an International Economic Security Regime could help to start a serious academic discussion on how international support for alternative development functions and why it is needed.

Within the context of the International Economic Security Regime, the role of economic security considerations in international support for alternative development policies will be analysed with a case study of Colombia. This analysis will take place at two levels: 1) the national and sub-national level; and 2) the international level. For example, at the national level economic security can be understood in terms of the provision of a sustainable income and basic necessities (sufficient food, water, clothing, shelter and education, etc.<sup>47</sup>) to a population. This constitutes economic security in what could be called the traditional sense, relating to considerations of human development that intend to boost economic and social rights and opportunities.

At the international level, economic security could involve strengthening the economy, protecting its (export) companies, increasing the state's control over territory, safeguarding supplies of raw materials, while protecting the national economy from what has been described as the "*dark side of capitalism and the open trading order in terms of illegal trade.*"<sup>48</sup> At this level, economic security is concerned with economic factors and international markets that directly or indirectly affect the security and stability of a state, without necessarily being a direct threat to the very survival of the state.<sup>49</sup>

At the core of the RISE lies the principle of shared responsibility, the notion that states share the responsibility to address the global drugs phenomenon because consumption, trafficking and production patterns are interconnected and cannot be confined to and dealt with within the territory of a single state. This principle is of particular importance when focusing on the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon as illicit drug cultivation, production and trafficking routes can easily shift across state borders. Thus, shared responsibility and economic security are considered the two central pillars of the International Economic Security Regime.

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<sup>47</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 104.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>49</sup> This debate will be return to in section 5.6 where the concept of economic security is discussed in relation to the global drugs phenomenon.

## 1.2 Objective of the research

The overarching objective of this research is to explore whether Colombia could be regarded as a benchmark to establish an International Economic Security Regime or RISE to reduce the global supply of illicit drugs through alternative development. To reach this objective, the research examines the realities of policy and practice in Colombia through the perspective of three regional case studies, with the aim of identifying existing elements of cross border support and identifying missed opportunities for international cooperation that could form the basis of a RISE. The research investigates both national and international efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs through alternative development policies in the Colombian context. In Colombia, alternative development and the international support for this strategy form a central pillar of the efforts to reduce the supply of drugs.<sup>50</sup> In addition, broader rural development and (preferential) trade instruments have also been applied to the Colombian case in previous years and some of them are still in place today. These will also be analysed in the context of a RISE.

Using the case study of Colombia and the findings of the three regional field studies, the research identifies the (theoretical) outline of the RISE based on shared principles and norms, and joint actions and programmes to tackle the supply of illicit drugs through alternative development.

## 1.3 Motivation for the research

The two parts of the section below provide an explanation of the general motivation for the research, (the broad reasons behind the selection of the global drugs phenomenon as an area of research), and the specific motivation (outlining the arguments for the particular focus of the research on international support for alternative development policies in Colombia).

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<sup>50</sup> This assessment is based on several meetings the author had with Colombian government officials and UNODC staff between 2011 and 2013.

### 1.3.1 General motivation

The continued size and scope of the international drug phenomenon merits an ongoing and thorough analysis of the policy instruments that are used to tackle it. It could be argued that there are few other international concerns that represent such a wide-reaching public health and social challenge combined with regional and international insecurity and instability (the negative consequences of the illegal economy) in such a devastating way as the international drug phenomenon. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) writes:

*“In addition to health and social consequences they bring, drugs provide the economic clout for insurgents and organized criminals to confront the state. They pay for arms and bribes. Competition for these profits is typically violent, and the targets for this violence can easily shift from rival traffickers to officials and other members of the public.”*<sup>51</sup>

Despite the dramatic overtone of this citation, the profound consequences of the illegal drugs economy on society cannot be denied. Indeed, the general motivation of this research is based on four main elements that are related to the serious challenges generated by the global drugs phenomenon in terms of its negative impact on 1) public health, 2) economics, 3) security and 4) political stability.

First, drug use is widespread and represents a serious public health challenge. For the year 2010, an estimated 230 million people (roughly 5 percent of the global population) were found to have used illicit drugs.<sup>52</sup> So-called ‘problematic drug use’<sup>53</sup> is linked to 27 million people, about 0.6 percent of the world adult population.<sup>54</sup> In terms of public health, in 2010 illicit drug use resulted in between 99,000 and 253,000 deaths worldwide.<sup>55</sup> In addition, of around 16 million injecting drug users in 2008, three million were living with HIV and AIDS.<sup>56</sup> Other diseases such as hepatitis B and hepatitis C related to drug use are also

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<sup>51</sup> UNODC, *The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment* (Vienna: UNODC, 2010), p. 224.

<sup>52</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2012* (New York: UNODC, 2012), Preface, p. iii.

<sup>53</sup> ‘Problematic drug use’ generally refers to any kind of physical, psychological, social or legal problems a person may suffer following illicit drug use.

<sup>54</sup> *World Drug Report 2012, op. cit.*, Preface, p. iii.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, Preface, p. 7.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, Preface, p. 7.

widespread among illicit drug users. In 2010 about 7.4 million injecting drug users were infected with hepatitis C and around 2.3 million with hepatitis B.<sup>57</sup> Of course these are the most extreme cases of the public health consequences of illicit drug use. Generally, the negative impact of illicit drug use is broader, resulting in diverse types of psychological problems (e.g. feelings of depression or anxiety, and mental illnesses such as psychosis) and physical problems (e.g. affected lungs, teeth or skin).

Second, although measuring the illicit drugs economy is extremely difficult,<sup>58</sup> in terms of total turnover the illicit trade in narcotics is one of the biggest black markets in the world.<sup>59</sup> A 1999 estimate put the global illegal drug market at an annual figure between 45 and 280 billion USD (between 34 and 210 billion EUR).<sup>60</sup> US Secretary of State John Kerry even used figures between 420 billion and one trillion USD (roughly 309 to 736 billion EUR) without, however, citing a source for these numbers.<sup>61</sup> However, these studies often seem to confuse the aggregate value of the retail market with the value of the international trade in narcotics across borders.<sup>62</sup> The latter is much smaller and has been estimated to amount to approximately 20-25 billion USD annually (15-19 billion EUR), making illegal drugs a “*modest contributor to total world trade.*”<sup>63</sup> Whatever the real economic value of the illicit drugs economy actually is, its estimated size is vast in relation to the gross domestic product (GDP) of many countries. Its impact, therefore, whether positive or negative, on the licit economy and the economic stability of states should not be underestimated.

Third, in terms of security there are important direct and indirect linkages between the illegal drugs economy and other forms of crime, terrorist or insurgent movements, and the stability of political institutions of states. In Colombia, despite the military success of the national security forces, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC,

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<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, Preface, p. 7.

<sup>58</sup> For a description of some of the main “technical, conceptual and political” obstacles, see: Francisco Thoumi, ‘The Numbers Game: Let’s All Guess The Size Of The Illegal Drug Industry!’, *Journal of Drug Issues*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 185-200.

<sup>59</sup> Peter Reuter and Victoria Greenfield explain that estimates regarding the global drug market vary substantially, because, in particular, of the uncertainties in the calculations and a difference in approach between studies that focus on the aggregate total retail value and others that focus on the value of international trade. They argue that the 400 billion USD number (around 300 billion EUR) that is often used for the total size of the illicit drugs trade is actually more likely to refer to the turnover of the whole the industry. Most profits are made within the borders of the consumer markets. See: Peter Reuter and Victoria Greenfield, ‘Measuring Global Drug Markets: How good are the numbers and why should we care about them?’, *World Economics*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October–December 2001), pp. 159, 160.

<sup>60</sup> *The Numbers Game: Let’s All Guess The Size Of The Illegal Drug Industry!*, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

<sup>61</sup> John Kerry, *The New War: The Web of Crime That Threatens America’s Security* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 87.

<sup>62</sup> ‘Measuring Global Drug Markets: How good are the numbers and why should we care about them?’, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 162, 163.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerrillas and other groups such as the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN, National Liberation Army) continue to profit directly or indirectly from the illegal cocaine industry.

Although exact numbers or even estimates are hard to provide in an illegal industry where non-state actors do their best to hide its size and scope from the authorities, a government estimate put the annual income of the FARC at 1.36 billion USD (roughly 1.05 billion EUR) for the year 2003.<sup>64</sup> That year, about 46 percent (630 million USD or 487 million EUR) was indirectly or directly derived from the illegal drugs trade. Average estimates indeed place the annual drugs-related income of the FARC between 500 and 600 million USD (387-464 million EUR).<sup>65</sup> The ELN has benefited indirectly from the illegal drugs economy by introducing a *gramaje* or protection tax on coca and poppy cultivation, resulting in an income of approximately 5 million USD (3.87 million USD) in 1998.<sup>66</sup> Right-wing paramilitary forces could have derived as much as 40 to 70 percent of their income from the illegal drugs economy.<sup>67</sup>

In Afghanistan<sup>68</sup>, the situation is similar as the illegal opium economy to some extent funds the Taliban<sup>69</sup> insurgency which between 2005 and 2008 derived as much as 450-600 million USD (roughly 345-460 million EUR) from taxing opium poppy cultivation and the opium trade.<sup>70</sup> There are numerous other examples that show the negative impact of the illegal drugs economy. Here, a few more examples will suffice. In the year 2010, in Mexico more people died as a consequence of drugs-related violence than the number of US soldiers killed in Afghanistan and Iraq during the previous seven years.<sup>71</sup> Over 50,000 people have been killed since Mexico's President Felipe Calderón declared his war against organised

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<sup>64</sup> Jeremy McDermott, 'Colombian Report Shows FARC is the World's Richest Insurgent Group', *Jane's Intelligence Review* (September 2005), pp. 12-17.

<sup>65</sup> Stephanie Hanson, 'FARC, ELN: Colombia's Left-Wing Guerrillas', Backgrounder, *Council on Foreign Relations* (19 August 2009).

<sup>66</sup> 'Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN', Latin America Report N°2, *International Crisis Group* (4 October 2002).

<sup>67</sup> Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (eds.), *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact Of U.S. Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p. 103.

<sup>68</sup> The impact of the illegal opium economy on Afghanistan is described in: Peter van Ham and Jorrit Kamminga, 'Poppies for Peace? Reforming Afghanistan's Opium Industry', *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2006-07), pp. 69-81.

<sup>69</sup> The term 'Taliban' is used here for a set of loosely connected but often very diverse and decentralised groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Behind the abstract term 'Taliban', there is a complex and constantly changing reality.

<sup>70</sup> UNODC, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency. The transnational threat of Afghan opium* (Vienna: UNODC, 2009), p. 3.

<sup>71</sup> NPR, 'Mexico's Intensifying Drug War Spills Into 2011', *NPR interview with Jason Beaubien* (2 January 2011). Available online at: <http://www.npr.org/2011/01/02/132583031/Mexicos-Intensifying-Drug-War-Spills-Into-2011> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).



crime in 2006.<sup>72</sup> On May, 15 2011, drugs-related violence in Guatemala claimed 27 lives, one of the worst mass killings since the end of the country's civil war.<sup>73</sup> Addressing the issue of violence, UNODC writes:

*“Drug trafficking can also have a catastrophic effect on local violence levels. Drug “wars” can rival some conflicts in terms of body counts. Of the countries with the highest murder rates in the world today, many are primary drug source or transit countries.”*<sup>74</sup>

In his groundbreaking work on the relationship between drugs and contemporary warfare, Paul Rexton Kan argues that the complex linkages between the illegal drugs economy and conflict deserve more scholarly analysis and revisiting of theoretical concepts in fields such as International Relations (IR).<sup>75</sup> The current research is intended to do just this.

Last, the political stability of states is affected in multiple ways by the economic forces of the illegal drugs trade. The most important link is corruption, which affects not only the way politics takes place within countries, but also affects and limits the ability of the state to implement a successful counter-narcotics policy. Wherever there are profits from the illegal drugs economy, there is corruption:

*“The sums of money involved are just too great. At a minimum, it is virtually guaranteed that where there are substantial drug profits, there will be corruption and official complicity – very often at the highest levels.”*<sup>76</sup>

The involvement in politics of actors of the illegal drugs economy can also take a more direct form. The clearest example is Bolivia, where the *cocalero* (coca growers) movement managed to reach the highest political circles, with its representative Evo Morales becoming the country's president in January 2006. The *cocalero* movement may be more representative of the farmers involved in coca cultivation than of the drug traffickers, but the

<sup>72</sup> Randal C. Archibold, Damien Cave and Elisabeth Malkin, ‘Mexico’s President Works to Lock In Drug War Tactics’, *The New York Times* (15 October 2011). For the 50,000 number, see: Randal C. Archibold and Damien Cave, ‘Numb to Carnage, Mexicans Find Diversions, and Life Goes On’, *The New York Times* (15 May 2012). At the time of concluding the research, the number may already be closer to 60,000.

<sup>73</sup> ‘Dozens dead in Guatemala drug violence’, *Al Jazeera* (16 May 2011).

<sup>74</sup> *The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

<sup>75</sup> Paul Rexton Kan, *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2009), p. 144.

<sup>76</sup> Moisés Naím, *Illicit. How smugglers, traffickers and copycats are hijacking the global economy*, London: William Heinemann, 2006), pp. 83, 84.

movement was nonetheless in direct conflict with the previous President Hugo Banzer Suárez, who under US pressure had committed to the eradication of coca cultivation (and the promotion of alternative development) in Bolivia.

### 1.3.2 Specific motivation

The specific motivation for this research is based on nine arguments. First, the size of the illicit drug problem in Colombia remains significant. Despite decades of national and international commitment and efforts to fight drug production and trafficking in Colombia, and notwithstanding recent declines in cultivation and production, the country remains the world's biggest coca leaf and cocaine producer.<sup>77</sup> In 2008, it cultivated roughly half of all coca bush cultivation in the world and also produced roughly half of the world's cocaine supply.<sup>78</sup> In 2011, Colombia had 64,000 hectares of illicit coca cultivation, with hardly any variation compared with the year before (62,000 hectares).<sup>79</sup> Potential cocaine production in 2011 amounted to 345 metric tonnes compared to 350 metric tonnes in 2010.<sup>80</sup> The latest UNODC report indicates that in 2012 coca cultivation decreased a further 25 percent to 48,000 hectares.<sup>81</sup> In the same year, potential cocaine production dropped another 10 percent to 309 metric tonnes.<sup>82</sup>

Second, the significant size and scope of alternative development projects and programmes related to the drug phenomenon in Colombia makes the focus of the research highly relevant. A substantial percentage of crop-based development programmes in Colombia are directly related to drug control strategies such as alternative development.<sup>83</sup> For example, of a total cultivation of around 120,000 hectares of cocoa in Colombia, almost 59,000 hectares are part of alternative development projects.<sup>84</sup> This discovery was one of the key motivating factors to limit the research to alternative development policies. It shows that

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<sup>77</sup> This situation is pending the forthcoming data on illicit coca cultivation in Peru.

<sup>78</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2010* (New York: UNODC, 2010), pp. 65, 66.

<sup>79</sup> UNODC, *Colombia. Coca cultivation Survey 2011* (Bogotá: UNODC, 2012), p. 7.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>81</sup> UNODC, *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012* (Bogotá 2013), p. 7.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>83</sup> For a product such as coffee, around 10 percent of Colombia's total output is related to drug control programmes. For cocoa, it is even around 50 percent (amounting to 58.886 hectares of a total cultivation of 120.000). This data was collected during a first visit of the author to the UNODC Office in Bogotá, Colombia.

<sup>84</sup> Data provided to the author in meeting with Guillermo García Miranda, Programme Director, UNODC in Bogotá (23 August 2010 and 2 September 2010).

alternative development – policies to shift farming communities towards livelihoods within the legal economy – is still central to supply reduction efforts in Colombia.

Third, the illegal drugs economy continues to destabilise regions and entire states. Although the impact of the illegal drugs economy in Colombia today is perhaps less damaging than it was in the 1980s, it continues to have a serious influence on the country's development and stability. In 2009 there were still 56,910 households involved in illicit coca cultivation with many more people directly or indirectly involved in the illicit coca economy.<sup>85</sup> As described above, in other countries such as Afghanistan, Guatemala and Mexico, the illegal drugs economy directly threatens the stability and integrity of the state. This reinforces the need to assess how Colombia's development-driven policy is linked with support and cooperation between states at the international level, what role the concepts of 'economic security' and 'shared responsibility' play, and how it can help to understand the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon in other settings and contexts.

Fourth, while new substances continue to emerge - for example synthetic drugs and synthetic forms of traditional drugs such as cocaine and heroin - and in the context of ever-changing patterns of drug consumption, plant-based drugs such as cannabis, cocaine and heroin continue to be a serious challenge in counter-narcotics policy.<sup>86</sup> This continued importance within the larger international drug problem merits a focus on these traditional drugs and ways to reduce their supply. UNODC's *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment* (2010) confirms that among the major transnational trafficking flows of illegal commodities, the first four positions still concern the trafficking of plant-based drugs: cocaine from South America to North America and Europe, and heroin from West Asia to Europe and Russia.<sup>87</sup>

Fifth, the policy instrument of alternative development, part of the broader supply reduction strategy, is still very relevant for Colombia and the international community at large. As an outcome of two UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) resolutions,<sup>88</sup> an International Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development was organised in

<sup>85</sup> UNODC, *Colombia. Coca cultivation survey 2009* (Bogotá: UNODC, 2010).

<sup>86</sup> In 2011, the estimated total area under opium poppy cultivation worldwide was 207,000 hectares (with a potential opium production of 7,000 tonnes). In 2010, the estimated total area of coca bush cultivation was 149,200 hectares. The total global area with cannabis cultivation is not known given the lack of reporting by countries. See: *World Drug Report 2012*, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 27, 35 and 43.

<sup>87</sup> *The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

<sup>88</sup> United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Resolution 54/4 on 'Follow-up on the proposal to organize an international workshop and conference on alternative development' (25 March 2011) and: United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Resolution 53/6 on 'Follow-up to the promotion of best practices and lessons learned for the sustainability and integrality of alternative development programmes and the proposal to organize an international workshop and conference on alternative development' (12 March 2010).

Thailand from 6 to 12 November 2011.<sup>89</sup> A follow up International Meeting on Alternative Development was held from 15 to 16 November 2012 in Lima, organised by Peru and Thailand.<sup>90</sup> In its *World Drug Report 2012*, UNODC writes:

*“Alternative development is the key to reducing illicit drug crop cultivation and drug production. At present, only around one quarter of all farmers involved in illicit drug crop cultivation worldwide have access to development assistance. If we are to offer new opportunities and genuine alternatives, this needs to change.”*<sup>91</sup>

Sixth, given the fact that plant-based drugs such as cannabis, cocaine, and heroin will remain among the most demanded illicit drugs internationally in the foreseeable future, an economic development focus is required that includes attention to farmers and land labourers who are involved in the illegal drugs economy. As long as part of the global drugs phenomenon is agricultural, there will be a need to ensure the availability of profitable and sustainable alternatives and other economic incentives in rural areas, in addition to general rural development, institution building and good governance.

Seventh, the concept of a common or shared responsibility is highly relevant and seems to have increased in importance in recent years. Although already a central principle of international drug policy efforts for at least a decade, ostensibly the international community has increasingly used the notion of shared responsibility to try to solve the international drug problem. At the fifty-fourth session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2011, a round-table discussion was devoted to the topic of ‘Revitalization of the principle of joint and shared responsibility as the centrepiece of international cooperation to confront the challenges posed by the world drug problem, in a manner consistent with the relevant United Nations conventions and declarations’.<sup>92</sup>

In March 2012, the same topic was again selected for a round-table discussion, underlining the continuing need to increase understanding on how the principle works and

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<sup>89</sup> First High-level ‘International Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development’ (ICAD), Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces, Thailand (6-12 November 2011).

<sup>90</sup> Second High-Level ‘International Conference on Alternative Development’ (ICAD), Lima, Peru (14-16 November 2012).

<sup>91</sup> *World Drug Report 2012*, *op. cit.*, Preface, pp. iii, iv.

<sup>92</sup> See: United Nations, Commission on Narcotics Drugs, Resolution 54/12 on ‘Revitalization of the principle of common and shared responsibility in countering the world drug problem’ (25 March 2011). The author was invited to speak at this round-table discussion with Member States as one of the two selected representatives from civil society organisations taking part in the CND.

how states use it to shape international cooperation on drug policy issues.<sup>93</sup> At the fifty-sixth session of the CND in March 2013, another resolution was devoted to the topic of strengthening shared responsibility, drafted by Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Thailand.<sup>94</sup> Through the analysis of this principle in the context of Colombia, it will be possible to better understand ongoing and future international support for other countries and regions as well.

Eighth, there is a global trend towards higher world prices for agricultural commodities. Although world prices for these commodities tend to fluctuate, there is a clear upward trend in recent years, produced in part by cyclical (e.g. bad weather, crop diseases, etc.) and fluctuating problems (e.g. a weak dollar and export bans by countries safeguarding their own domestic consumption). But there have also been other structural changes (e.g. higher oil prices, and more demand for agricultural produce, boosted chiefly by the use of crops such as corn for use as bio fuels, but also by higher demands (and demand for more types of food) by the emerging economies of especially China and India).<sup>95</sup>

The significant factor here is that structurally higher world prices could have positive effects for some of the alternative livelihood programmes, as it could become easier for certain types of alternative produce to compete with the illicit market. Of course, this is uncertain as other structural changes on world markets could easily prove to be detrimental for alternative produce. The crisis in the global coffee markets since 1989 is a good example of how alternative development projects relying on coffee cultivation can be negatively affected by international market factors.<sup>96</sup>

Last, there are not only higher prices for agricultural commodities but also new ways to sell them. In this regard, there may be increased opportunities for Fairtrade and other types of specialised branding.<sup>97</sup> In recent years, the international market for Fairtrade,

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<sup>93</sup> United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, *Report on the fifty-fifth session (13 December 2011 and 12-16 March 2012)*, Document E/CN.7/2012/18 (New York: United Nations, 2012), Chapter III, pp. 37, 38.

<sup>94</sup> United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, draft resolution E/CN.7/2013/L.8/Rev.1 on 'Strengthening of the principle of common and shared responsibility as the basis for guiding international action in combating the world drug problem with a comprehensive and balanced approach' (12 March 2013).

<sup>95</sup> 'Increase in demand from India, China to drive up food prices: Obama', *The Economic Times* (18 August 2011).

<sup>96</sup> For a comprehensive historic overview of the crisis in the global coffee market, see the introduction chapter of: Mario Samper and Steven Topik (eds.), *Crisis y transformaciones del mundo del café. Dinámicas locales y estrategias nacionales en un periodo de adversidad e incertidumbre* (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2012), pp. 9-36.

<sup>97</sup> As assistant to the Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement Section (SRLES) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the author investigated possibilities for fair trade branding in the context of alternative livelihood programmes in Peru. The results of this initial research can be found in Jorrit Kamminga, 'The Marketing Component of Alternative Development. UNDCP Projects in Peru', *UNDCP Report* (January

premium brands and organic products has increased substantially. A general trend that has become known as the ‘Starbucks Revolution’, describes a market shift towards more demand for special and high quality coffees.<sup>98</sup> In general, Fairtrade and specialised branding has increasingly become part of mainstream marketing strategies, a process driven by a large group of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) focusing not only on fair prices for coffee farmers, but also on sustainable production processes.<sup>99</sup>

Although the latter argument can be important for commodities such as coffee and cocoa that form a substantial part of alternative livelihood programmes in Colombia, it is necessary to add a note of caution. In the case of coffee, the so-called Starbucks Revolution does not necessarily result in higher prices and better incomes for coffee farmers. Instead, it produces what is known as the ‘*paradoja del café*’ (coffee paradox): ever-increasing prices for consumers in rich countries at the counters of Starbucks and its competitors, but historically low prices for coffee farmers in poorer producing countries.<sup>100</sup> Nevertheless, the share of Colombian premium coffee as part of total coffee exports has increased from 2 percent in the year 2000 to 26 percent in 2011.<sup>101</sup> In Colombia, the demand for high grade coffee is also rising, in parallel with the increasing number of specialised coffee establishments such as Juan Valdéz, OMA, El Gualilo and Café Quindío.<sup>102</sup> In 2014, Starbucks will also open its first establishments in Colombia.<sup>103</sup>

#### 1.4 Contribution of the research

With regard to International Relations theory, the research aims to contribute to the academic debate and theory on where and how the international drug phenomenon fits within the study of IR and how it shapes international cooperation between states. As an issue area situated on the nexus of international economics and relations between states, the research will place

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2002). Available online at:

[http://www.jorritkamma.com/sites/default/files/A59\\_JK\\_UNDCP\\_Marketing\\_Report.pdf](http://www.jorritkamma.com/sites/default/files/A59_JK_UNDCP_Marketing_Report.pdf) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>98</sup> *Crisis y transformaciones del mundo del café. Dinámicas locales y estrategias nacionales en un periodo de adversidad e incertidumbre, op. cit.*, pp. 14, 15.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>101</sup> ‘El consumo de cafés especiales sigue creciendo’, *Especial Café, AgroNegocios* (24 October 2012), p. 20.

<sup>102</sup> ‘Tiendas Juan Valdez se ‘pelean’ con otras 1.400’, *Portfolio* (11 June 2012).

<sup>103</sup> Francisco Javier Arias R., ‘Juan Valdez ya le lleva una ventaja a Starbucks: Méndez’, *El Colombiano* (1 September 2013).

the global drugs phenomenon firmly within the subfield of International Political Economy (IPE), an approach that has not benefitted from significant research at present. Peter Andreas writes:

*“Much more scholarly attention should be devoted to (...) [the] important but often-misunderstood [illicit] realm of globalization. (...) Unfortunately, international relations scholars have only minimally and sporadically engaged the illicit globalization debate.”*<sup>104</sup>

The research aims to contribute to this emerging subfield by examining international relations between states with regard to cross-border support for the supply reduction strategy of alternative development.

With regard to the academic literature on the international drug phenomenon, the research aims to contribute in the following ways to the existing body of analysis and research.

First, it aims to provide a better understanding of the principle of ‘shared responsibility’ and how this principle relates to international cooperation between states and at the level of international organisations to address drug supply reduction. At the same time, the research aims to identify gaps where more action based on shared responsibility is needed to improve the impact of counter-narcotics policies. Part of the assessment of this international mechanism will be a thorough analysis of the international legal framework, which can provide both obstacles and opportunities for development-driven drug policies.

The importance of reviving and strengthening the principle of shared responsibility was underscored at the CND sessions in March 2011 and March 2012, increasing the academic value of this research. Looking at the concept of shared responsibility from a new theoretical perspective provides a fresh way of analysing patterns of international cooperation related to supply reduction strategies that aim to reduce the supply of plant-based drugs such as cocaine.

Second, using the principle of ‘shared responsibility’ as the key linking device, the research combines international regime theory with economic security theory to devise a new functional instrument, the International Economic Security Regime or RISE. This regime can be used to analyse international cooperation to address the global drugs

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<sup>104</sup> Peter Andreas, ‘Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons’, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 126, Number 3 (2011), p. 22.

phenomenon. This will increase knowledge about the linkages between national and international counter-narcotics strategies and programmes on the one hand, and the projects that are implemented at the local level on the other. In other words, the research aims to provide a thorough systemic analysis of how and why development-driven drug policies have been supported (or not) by international actors in Colombia, through the example of the three regional case studies.

Third, through the lens of the functional instrument of the RISE structure, the research analyses whether Colombia could be seen as a positive benchmark for increasing understanding on the way the international community deals with alternative development support to countries struggling with substantial amounts of illicit drug cultivation or production. It can help understand why and how states work together on supply reduction, but could also generate ideas on how to improve cooperation in the specific area of alternative development. In parallel, it will provide practical substance to the principle of shared responsibility by identifying the action and inaction of states cooperating on supply reduction.

Fourth, the research will be among the first studies to link (economic) security analysis and the securitisation process with international and national policies of states in a positive way. To date, the connection has largely been established in a negative way, focusing principally on possible threats to national security. The emphasis of much academic analysis has been placed on the negative side effects of a militarised counter-narcotics policy and a critique of the 'War on Drugs' or of the securitisation processes in the context of the global drugs phenomenon to maintain, reinforce or justify the current international drug control regime.

Fifth, the case study of Colombia will be examined as a reference model (combining economic security and international regime theory) that explores principles and norms related to supply reduction strategies such as alternative development. Plant-based illicit drugs continue to be in high demand, which means that cultivation and production will continue for the foreseeable future, and could easily shift to other countries and regions with less or no experience of how to deal with this problem. The case of Colombia will not be used directly to draw lessons learned or give recommendations for a country such as Afghanistan, but the latter is an example of a country where experience with alternative development and alternative livelihood strategies is still limited and does not take into account wider concerns such as poverty and economic security.



Addressing the general success of alternative development strategies, Pierre Arnaud Chouvy writes:

*“Alternative development as a strategy has not failed because it was the wrong approach to drug supply reduction but rather because it has barely been tried and because drug supply reduction has consistently been considered separate from poverty reduction.”*<sup>105</sup>

Indeed, some deem alternative development efforts in Afghanistan to be a complete failure.<sup>106</sup> Colombia is perhaps no more successful in carrying out these supply reduction policies, but has much more experience in testing and implementing different strategies over time. As such, increasing understanding of international cooperation on these issues by looking at the Colombian case may also indirectly benefit countries such as Afghanistan.

Last, rather than providing an impact assessment<sup>107</sup> – many studies are limited to an examination of the impact of ten years of Plan Colombia, with an analysis often blurred or influenced by ideological bias<sup>108</sup> – this research explores how international support and cooperation has operated to assist Colombia in its struggle to deal with its part of the global drugs phenomenon. As such, it offers a systemic analysis of how Colombia’s domestic component of the global drugs phenomenon is linked with the international level of support and cooperation between states. Such a systemic account, centred on economic security analysis, is currently missing in the literature on the global drugs phenomenon and will be among the most important contributions of this research.

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<sup>105</sup> Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, *Opium. Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy* (London: I.B. Taurus & Co, 2009), p. 183.

<sup>106</sup> See for example: Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror. How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda* (Oxford: One World Publications, 2009), p. 6 and pp. 209, 210.

<sup>107</sup> The particular problems surrounding impact assessments of Colombian drug control programmes were made clear to the author by Professor Carlos Zorro Sánchez (Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá). Multi-year impact assessments or evaluations are very challenging as a) the aim, focus or project elements were often changed from year to year; and b) different methodologies were used to assess the impact of programmes at different intervals. The latter problem is similar to comparing the statistical data provided by UNODC, which sometimes is gathered using different research methodologies at different periods in time.

<sup>108</sup> ‘The Numbers Game: Let’s All Guess The Size Of The Illegal Drug Industry!’, *op. cit.*, pp. 185, 186.



## CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology of the research will be described in this chapter, including the definitions of the basic concepts used (section 2.1) and the delimitations of its scope (section 2.2). The key research questions are set out in section 2.3 and the hypotheses are explained in section 2.4. A description of the research plan is provided in section 2.5, divided into three phases, and the main challenges and ethical considerations are explored in section 2.6.

### 2.1 Definitions of basic concepts

The definitions of the concepts used in this research described below are all directly or indirectly related to the global drugs phenomenon. Other, for example more theoretical concepts, will be explained elsewhere.

#### 2.1.1 The global drugs phenomenon

The *global drugs phenomenon* is defined here as the combined challenges presented by the illegal production, trafficking and consumption of internationally controlled substances. To avoid adopting a judgemental stance or becoming embroiled in a complex discussion about what constitutes ‘a problem’, the research avoids addressing this phenomenon as ‘the global drug problem’.<sup>109</sup> The definition of the global drugs phenomenon used here should be regarded as a very broad definition, including any kind of social, economic, political or legal consequences caused directly or indirectly by the illegal drugs economy.

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<sup>109</sup> David R. Mares has used a similar argument. See: David R. Mares, *Drug Wars and Coffeeshouses. The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade* (Washington: CQ Press, 2006), p. 5.

### **2.1.2 Counter-narcotics policy**

*Counter-narcotics policy* is defined as the combined efforts at local, national, regional and international level, to combat the negative impact of the global drugs phenomenon worldwide.

### **2.1.3 The international drug control regime**

The *international drug control regime* is defined as the international legal system to control certain psychotropic substances, which came into being at the start of the twentieth century. Its current legal and administrative framework is based on three international Conventions which sit within the United Nations (UN) system:

1. the *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* adopted in 1961 (known as the ‘Single Convention’) and the *Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961* (Single Convention Protocol);
2. the *Convention on Psychotropic Substances* of 1971 (known as the ‘Psychotropic Convention’);
3. the *Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* adopted in 1988 (known as the ‘Trafficking Convention’).

In this research, the abovementioned international drug control regime is considered an international regime according to the definitions by Stephen D. Krasner. The term international regime and the most relevant theoretical perspectives will be explained further in Chapter 7.

### **2.1.4 Narcotic drugs, psychotropic or psychoactive substances**

Using the definition of the World Health Organization (WHO), *psychotropic* or *psychoactive substances* will be understood in this research as substances that:

“(…) when ingested, affect (the mind) or mental processes, e.g. cognition or affect. (…). [A] psychotropic drug is any chemical agent whose primary or significant effects are on the central nervous system. (…) In the context of international drug control, “psychotropic substances” refers to substances controlled by the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.”<sup>110</sup>

Within the international drug control framework the terms ‘narcotic drugs’ and ‘psychotropic substances’ (which can be used either as synonyms or separate categories) will be considered synonymous, despite the fact that the 1961 Convention used the former and the 1971 Convention used the latter terminology. In the Single Convention, narcotic drugs were mainly considered to be plant-based drugs: heroin, opium, cocaine and cannabis, and their derivatives (or substances similar to their derivatives: codeine, morphine and morphine-based substances, etc.).<sup>111</sup> In contrast, in the Psychotropic Convention of 1971, psychotropic substances also included different types of synthetic substances, consisting mainly of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) such as ecstasy.<sup>112</sup> Nevertheless, while this implies distinction between natural and synthetic drugs, the definition of the term ‘psychotropic substance’ used by the 1971 convention referred to “(…) any substance, natural or synthetic.” For this reason, both terms will be considered synonymous in this research.

### 2.1.5 Supply reduction

Within counter-narcotics policy, the strategy of *supply reduction* is understood here as any activity or programme conducted to reduce the availability, trade and the use of illicit drugs at their source. The term ‘source countries’ is used here to describe countries where the illegal cultivation or production of certain narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances take place. The terms *drug producer/supplier countries*, *transit/trafficking countries* and *drug consumer countries* will also be used. Although this can be considered as a rather outdated

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<sup>110</sup> World Health Organization, *Lexicon of alcohol and drug terms published by the World Health Organization* (August 1994), available online at the official website of the WHO:

[http://www.who.int/substance\\_abuse/terminology/who\\_lexicon/en](http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/who_lexicon/en) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>111</sup> See the Schedules of controlled substances at the back of the Single Convention: *Single Convention on Illicit Drugs, op. cit.*, Schedules I to IV, pp. 26-30.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, Schedules I to IV, pp. 17-20.

form of describing the role of countries in the illegal drugs trade, it nonetheless offers an understanding of global patterns of the cocaine trade, for example from production in Colombia to consumer markets in the United States or elsewhere. Supply reduction is part of the so-called ‘*balanced approach*’, described in the next section.

### 2.1.6 A balanced approach of supply and demand reduction

The supply and demand of illicit drugs are two sides of the same coin. Demand drives supply, and supply can create or boost demand. Policy-makers must therefore address both facets of the challenge. For example, a focus predominantly on tackling demand and the associated public health challenges cannot disregard the issue of supply and its devastating impact on societies and the environment in traditional producer countries. As a result, the international community has agreed on a *balanced approach* focusing on both supply and demand. In a Political Declaration of 1998, Member States of the UN committed to bringing about a ‘drug-free world’ by 2008.<sup>113</sup> The objective of the UN at that time was to achieve “(...) *significant and measurable results in the field of demand reduction*”<sup>114</sup> and make “(...) *real progress in eliminating or reducing significantly crops of opium poppy, coca and cannabis [by the year 2008]*.”<sup>115</sup>

In part, this was to be achieved by a “*comprehensive approach*”.<sup>116</sup> The comprehensive approach aims to reduce the supply of illicit drugs by eliminating illegal narcotics crops through alternative development, crop eradication programmes and law enforcement measures to counter illicit cultivation, production, manufacture and trafficking. In particular, the approach called for strong support for the work of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP, now UNODC) in the field of alternative development.<sup>117</sup>

With regard to alternative development in particular, the Political Declaration’s corresponding ‘Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development’ recognised that:

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<sup>113</sup> *Political Declaration 1998, op. cit.*

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 17, p. 5.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1: Statement by United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan to the Opening of the Twentieth Special Session of the General Assembly.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 18, pp. 5, 6.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 18, pp. 5, 6.

“(…) [T]he problem of the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is often related to development problems and that those links require, within the context of shared responsibility, close cooperation among States, the competent organs of the United Nations system, in particular the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, regional bodies and the international financial institutions.”<sup>118</sup>

Alternative development, or the broader strategy of creating alternative livelihoods for people involved in illicit drug cultivation or production, is one of the central pillars of supply reduction. The other pillar is law enforcement, including *inter alia* arresting and prosecuting drug traffickers, seizures of illegal drugs and eradication of illegal crops. While law enforcement provides the ‘stick’, alternative development provides the ‘carrot’ with a series of incentives aiming to convince coca farmers to switch from illegal coca cultivation to other crops.

### **2.1.7 Alternative development and alternative livelihoods**

Within the strategy of supply reduction, the definition of *alternative development* is taken from the United Nations Twentieth General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) in 1998. According to this definition, Alternative development is:

“(…) [A] process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotics and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular socio-economic characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.”<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>119</sup> United Nations General Assembly Twentieth Special Session (UNGASS), Resolution A/RES/S-20/4, ‘Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development’ (8 September 1998).

Although this definition places alternative development within the context of broader sustainable development efforts, the concept of alternative development has sometimes been distinguished from an *alternative livelihood* approach, which David Mansfield and Adam Pain have described as aiming to mainstream counter-narcotics policy within the broader national development strategy in order to tackle the root causes of illegal cultivation.<sup>120</sup> In their view, alternative development is the more limited strategy of addressing illicit drug cultivation in a specific area by focusing on its symptoms rather than on its underlying causes.

In this research, both terms – alternative development and alternative livelihoods – are used in accordance with this distinction: alternative development is used to refer to interventions that are specifically intended to provide an alternative to drug production, and alternative livelihood is used with reference to interventions that aim to mainstream or integrate drugs-related development efforts into a broader approach of integrated rural development.

The controversy regarding the term alternative development nevertheless persists and in an attempt to provide a suitable substitute, participants at an expert meeting in Berlin in 2006, suggested using “*Rural Development in a Drug Environment*” (RDE).<sup>121</sup> However, the term that is mostly used at the international level of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) is alternative development. As will be shown later in this research, states are urged to embed (support for) alternative development interventions into their broader national development plans and strategies. Thus it can be concluded that while using the term alternative development, the CND is in fact referring to the broader concept of alternative livelihoods.

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<sup>120</sup> David Mansfield and Adam Pain, ‘Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan?’, *AREU Briefing Paper* (October 2005), pp. 1, 2.

<sup>121</sup> International Workshop on ‘Development in a Drugs Environment: Beyond Alternative Development?’, Berlin, Germany (29<sup>th</sup> of May – 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2006). See the final report, p. 8. Available online at: <http://www.giz.de/Themen/en/17754.htm> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).



To better understand the concept and demonstrate that alternative development is still an important, mainstream strategy supported widely at the level of the United Nations, the CND Resolution 55/4 can be quoted, which acknowledges that:

*“(...) [A]lternative development is an important, lawful, viable and sustainable alternative to the illicit cultivation of drug crops, that it is one of the key components of policies and programmes for reducing illicit drug production and that it is an integral part of the efforts made by Governments to achieve sustainable development within their societies.”<sup>122</sup>*

Section 5.2 will discuss alternative development and alternative livelihood strategies in more detail.

### **2.1.8 Globalisation**

Globalisation is a disputed concept with many different definitions. Thus in practice, its exact meaning can be unclear. In this research, the term *globalisation* will be used in line with the definition of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Scholars from that institute analysed numerous definitions of the term, distilling them into the following:

*“Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and trans-cultural integration of human and non-human activities.”<sup>123</sup>*

This rather general definition, however, requires some additional clarification for this work. As the term globalisation is most relevant here in the sense of economic globalisation, the following general ‘cause and effect’ definition of the globalisation process by Philip Cerny is also taken into account in this research. According to Cerny, globalisation entails:

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<sup>122</sup> United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Resolution 55/4, ‘Follow-up on the proposal to organize an international workshop and conference on alternative development’ (16 March 2012), Article 1.

<sup>123</sup> Dr. Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan and Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, ‘Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition’, *GCSP* (19 June 2006). Available online at: <http://www.sustainablehistory.com/articles/definitions-of-globalization.pdf>.

“(…) [A] set of economic and political structures and processes deriving from the changing character of the goods and assets that comprise the base of the international political economy.”<sup>124</sup>

The definition is particularly useful here as it covers the central elements of the illegal drugs economy: ‘goods’, understood primarily as commodities such as raw materials or final products, and ‘assets’ related to the production facilities or systems that produce these commodities.<sup>125</sup> For the purpose of this research, goods therefore include drug-producing plants such as coca bush or opium poppies and the drugs they produce. Assets include the production facilities (e.g. laboratories) and systems operating within the illegal drug producing market. In addition to the above definition of globalisation, the research will also explore alternative perspectives on the concept, for example as developed by Saskia Sassen (section 4.6).

### **2.1.9 Human Security**

The term *human security* in this research follows the conceptual definition of the United Nations Development Programme’s *Human Development Report 1994*. This report presented human security as an umbrella concept based on two important shifts: 1) a shift from focusing on territorial security of states towards the security of individuals and 2) a shift from security through military means to security through sustainable human development.<sup>126</sup> According to this report, the broad concept included (at least) seven categories: 1) Economic security; 2) food security; 3) health security; 4) environmental security; 5) personal security; 6) community security; and 7) political security.<sup>127</sup>

Human security is important in this research because it is the embodiment of a shift in thinking about (national) security. Sayaka Fukumi writes:

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<sup>124</sup> Philip G. Cerny, ‘Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action’, *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn, 1995), p. 596.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 598.

<sup>126</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 24.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 25.

*“From the perspective of ‘human security’, the life and quality of life of individuals should be the central concern (...) for security and the goal should be the sustainability and improvement of quality of life.”<sup>128</sup>*

This directly relates to the concept of economic security. Promoting and strengthening human security can be seen as one of the positive objectives of a country’s policy to enhance economic security. Using the division of the *Human Development Report 1994*, economic security is considered to be a sub-category of human security. The concept will be dealt with in the next section.

### **2.1.10 Economic Security**

Although *economic security* is part of human security when focusing on the human development of the individual (e.g. the socio-economic development of a person), it is used in this research with a broader meaning. Here, the term economic security assumes two complementary definitions that relate to two different levels of analysis. First, at the international level of states, economic security refers to the strategy used by a state with the objective of increasing the security, stability and economic welfare of the country through economic policies. Those policies can be either domestic or external, but are primarily aimed at national interests. Second, at the national or sub-national level of analysis, economic security refers to the growth, maximisation or protection of the level of welfare of a variety of actors and entities including regional territories, institutions, companies, individuals or their communities.

In other words, the narrow interpretation of economic security used by UNDP (focusing in particular on employment, income and working conditions<sup>129</sup>) and its overarching, accompanying shift from the state-centred to the individual-centred approach is not used here. Instead, economic security involves both the state and diverse non-state actors, and focuses both on the level of the individual and the level of the state in terms of the protection of national markets, industries, resources and welfare. Economic security is not only a matter of risks or threats to the domestic stability or (international) influence of

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<sup>128</sup> Sayaka Fukumi, *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), p. 24.

<sup>129</sup> *Human Development Report 1994*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25, 26.

the state; it is also a question of how states can positively boost economic security through deliberate development strategies, targeting individuals, communities, regions and national markets.

### 2.1.11 International Regime

The concept of *international regime* which is used in this research takes the definition of Stephen Krasner, developed in the early 1980s:

*“Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”*<sup>130</sup>

As such, international regimes can be considered as formal or informal structures, platforms or agreements that states use for cooperation or policy coordination on a specific issue area. The international regime is a vehicle that states use to create more impact, stability or international order by working together on specific issue areas of international relations. In their most formal state, such structures can take the form of international treaties or international (intergovernmental) organisations.

## 2.2 Delimitations

The scope of this research is subject to the following delimitations.

**1. Ideological delimitation:** The research assumes that the international drug control regime, based on the three UN conventions and additional instruments in the framework of

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<sup>130</sup> Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 2.

the CND and the broader UN system, will not radically change in the near future. Although there is increasing debate about different models to control or regulate illegal substances, it seems unlikely that Member States at the UN level will agree to abolish or even significantly change the current conventions. Thus the research avoids taking position in the ideological debate regarding alternative international control regimes or the global drugs phenomenon. Any potential changes or new models and approaches explored in this research will be considered as changes within the current international drug control framework, and not as changes towards a completely new framework.

**2. Geographic delimitation:** The research focuses on Colombia, using three regional case studies to identify existing elements of cross border support and missed opportunities for international cooperation that could form the basis of the RISE. All three regions (the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta encompassing the northern regional departments of Magdalena, La Guajira and Cesar, the Sierra de la Macarena in the central region of Meta, and the region of Tumaco in Nariño in the south-east of Colombia) are important in terms of alternative development programmes. Two of them – la Sierra de la Macarena and Tumaco – are considered priority areas (*zonas de consolidación*) under the 2009 National Plan of Sustainable Consolidation.<sup>131</sup> These regions are mostly rural and are characterised by a weak institutional state presence, a high risk of human rights violations, the cultivation of illicit crops and evidence of links between drug trafficking and terrorism.<sup>132</sup>

**3a. First thematic delimitation:** The research is limited to supply reduction policies and instruments and does not tackle demand-reduction strategies such as prevention and treatment, or risk reducing approaches such as harm reduction. Although research into these aspects of drug control is highly relevant to the overall debate on the control of illegal drugs, Colombia is traditionally a producer country with many rural areas dependent on coca cultivation, making issues of supply most relevant in its case.

**3b. Second thematic delimitation:** Framed within the international strategy of supply reduction, the research only analyses policies and instruments relating to alternative development that have a clear direct or indirect link to the objective of reducing the supply

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<sup>131</sup> Colombia, Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral, *Reporte Ejecutivo Plan Nacional de Consolidación* (Bogotá: CCAI, 2010), pp. 8, 9.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

of illicit drugs from Colombia. Within these policies, the focus is placed on alternative development and alternative livelihood strategies (see also thematic delimitation 3c below). This delimitation means that this research does not aim to cover other supply reduction instruments such as interdiction or crop eradication, although where relevant, these will be addressed briefly. An example of this can be found in policies where there is a direct relationship between the ‘sticks’ of law enforcement and the ‘carrots’ of alternative development.

**3c. Third thematic delimitation:** Within the scope of supply reduction policies, the research specifically examines international programmes and trade agreements directly or indirectly related to alternative development and alternative livelihood programmes aiming to reduce coca cultivation in Colombia. The volume of licit crops such as coffee or cocoa that is included in alternative livelihood programmes is highly significant, demanding a thorough analysis of how these programmes work – both locally and at the international level – and how they relate to and depend upon cooperation between states.

**4. Time delimitation:** A fourteen year period from 1998 to 2012 has been chosen as the most pertinent to this research. However, within this period, attention will be focused on recent and current alternative development programmes, thus not all years are covered in equal detail.

The period 1998-2012 starts with the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem held in June 1998, coinciding with the election of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango (President of Colombia between 1998 and 2002). The period also includes the two mandates of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2006 and 2006-2010) and ends in 2012 after the first two years of the mandate of current Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos.

The 1998 UNGASS was a pivotal moment because member states of the United Nations committed to significantly reduce illicit drug production and consumption over a period of ten years. The year 1998 is also when the then United States President Bill Clinton signed the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act, which can be considered a significant change of direction in US counter-narcotics policy. The Act called for a substantial increase in (financial) support for drug interdiction efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. While

stressing the importance of demand reduction in the United States, the introduction of the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act reads:

*“But with the streets of our nation flooded with more cocaine and heroin at cheaper prices than at any time in our history no one should expect demand-side efforts to succeed until the supply of drugs coming into our nation from abroad is dramatically reduced.”*<sup>133</sup>

This balance between supply and demand reduction strategies has become known as the ‘balanced approach’, which broadly can be taken to mean “*giving demand as much attention as supply.*”<sup>134</sup> Thus, 1998 can be considered a watershed moment, with increased US support for supply reduction strategies; a shift that was reinforced in the Colombian case with the conception of Plan Colombia one year later. This strategy was conceived between 1998 and 1999 by the government of President Pastrana with extensive input by the Clinton administration.<sup>135</sup>

The research period of 1998 to 2012 also includes two terms of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010) which saw the continuation of the Plan Colombia strategy. The year 2010 can be considered the end of Plan Colombia in its original form, particularly as funding priorities changed under the administration of American President Barack Obama, resulting in severe spending cuts on military aid to Colombia.<sup>136</sup> The first two years of President Santos’s current mandate were included after discussions with the Colombian Department of Social Prosperity (DPS, *Departamento para la Prosperidad Social*), which highlighted some important policy changes during this period that merited inclusion in the research.

Although the main body of research is limited to the 1998-2012 period, a short historic overview was added (see introduction) to provide context. Applying this time delimitation avoids covering periods that have already been studied extensively, for example

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<sup>133</sup> Introduction of the ‘Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act’ by Hon. Bill McCollum of Florida, in the House of Representatives (22 July 1998).

<sup>134</sup> UNODCCP, *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001* (New York: UNODCCP, 2001), Preface, p. 1.

<sup>135</sup> Evidence of the strong influence of the United States can, for example, be found in the fact that the first version of the Plan Colombia document was drafted in English.

<sup>136</sup> Plan Colombia in its original form can also be considered to have lasted until 2007. In that year, the Colombian government presented its new Strategy of Strengthening Democracy and Social Democracy (2007-2013), which can be considered as the second phase of Plan Colombia.

the period of the 1980s and early 1990s when the Medellín and Cali cartels<sup>137</sup> were operating in Colombia.

Last, it should be noted that focusing on a research period that includes the full evolution of Plan Colombia, does not mean a limitation to US-Colombian bilateral relations in the area of counter-narcotics policy. The research will include a broader international focus, including support from other countries and international organisations such as the European Union, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank or the Andean Community.

### 2.3 Key research questions

This section describes the key research questions of the dissertation. These questions have been developed and defined throughout the research, particularly during the initial research carried out at the London School of Economics.

Question 1: *To what extent have local and national alternative development projects in Colombia been connected to the international level in terms of support and access to international markets?*

Overall, the assumption here is that local or national counter-narcotics efforts are only useful if they have linkages with the international level. The international and trans-border nature of the illegal drug challenge dictates that a purely local or national approach will be unsuccessful in significantly changing the negative dynamics of the global drugs phenomenon. This means that alternative development policies must be analysed within the broader framework of international cooperation, coordination and support. This first research question intends to reveal what the scope and strength of an International Economic Security Regime would be. Analysing the character of international cooperation patterns in drug control in Colombia also reveals information about the scope of the instrumental framework of a possible International Economic Security Regime.

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<sup>137</sup> Although the term ‘cartel’ has been used frequently, the drug trafficking networks never behaved as cartels in the economic sense of fixing prices, arranging market shares, fixing the output of the entire industry or other forms of agreements among (competing) companies.



Question 2: *What have been the main drivers behind international support for alternative development projects as implemented in Colombia?*

It is important to understand the main reasons for international cooperation on alternative development instruments operating within the framework of Colombia's counter-narcotics policy. This includes an analysis of the arguments used by different governments in the domestic context to support a supply reduction strategy abroad. This second research question aims to define the most important principles and norms of the RISE. In other words, it intends to identify what its normative framework could look like.

Question 3: *To what extent has the principle of shared responsibility been an active component of international support for alternative development projects implemented in Colombia?*

Related to the research question on why states and international actors have supported alternative development programmes in Colombia, using the three regional case studies the research assesses to what extent the principle of shared responsibility has been an active component of international patterns of collaboration. Focusing on the principle of shared responsibility, this analysis aims to provide answers to the following three sub-questions:

*Sub-question 3.1:* Is shared responsibility – as the link between the international agreement on a balanced approach and the actual alternative development policies supported by the international community – any more than political rhetoric and is it applied in a rigorous manner? This question is important: one of the research hypotheses is that it will be impossible to solve Colombia's part in the drug phenomenon without international action based on meaningful shared responsibility and at least some shared objectives based on common principles and norms;

*Sub-question 3.2:* Are there areas where shared responsibility is missing as a guiding principle leading to action? The research identifies areas where there is room for improvement and recommends steps to increase efficiency with regard to international coordination and cooperation relating to alternative development policies in Colombia and elsewhere;

*Sub-question 3.3:* Can shared responsibility and related international principles and norms be regarded as a constituent part of the normative framework of an international

regime? The research will test whether the principle of shared responsibility is used by states at the international level to substantiate the need to assist drug-producing countries.

Question 4: *To what extent has the principle of economic security been an active component of international support for alternative development projects implemented in Colombia?*

Analysis of the role of economic security considerations in international support for alternative development policies in Colombia will take place at the sub-national, national and international levels. For example, at the sub-national level economic security relates to the provision of a sustainable income and basic necessities (e.g. sufficient food, water, clothing, shelter and education<sup>138</sup>).

At the national level, economic security could mean the protection of the economic infrastructure and national industries from the negative consequences of the illegal economy. It could also mean that the Colombian government partly uses counter-narcotics policies and broader rural development policies to protect or increase the state's access to important national resources.

Last, at the international level it could involve strengthening the national economy by protecting foreign investments and sheltering foreign companies from the illegal drugs trade or from drug-fuelled violence or instability. At this level, the state protects its own economic interests and protects its national economy from what has been described by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde as the “*dark side of capitalism and the open trading order in terms of illegal trade.*”<sup>139</sup> This fourth research question incorporates two important sub-questions:

*Sub-question 4.1:* To what extent has Colombia established a positive relationship between alternative development policies and the concept of economic security? As such, this sub-question will not only focus on the analysis of economic security threats that may impact the stability of the state, but also on positive policies that the state can implement to maintain or boost economic security;

*Sub-question 4.2:* To what extent can support for positive policies to boost economic security in Colombia be found in international and bilateral support programmes? This sub-question examines whether international cooperation on alternative development has also

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<sup>138</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.* p. 104.

<sup>139</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.*, p. 98.

taken into account concerns related to, for example, the protection of markets, national interests and assets, or natural resources abroad.

## 2.4 Hypotheses

The research contains eight hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 1:* Whatever the role and importance of the principle of shared responsibility in current international relations, the self-interest of states is an important driver behind a state's decision to invoke the principle of shared responsibility and collaborate on alternative development strategies. As such, there will always be a degree of disconnect between the domestic political and economic reasons for Colombia to implement these policies and the political and economic reasons behind international support for Colombia. Nevertheless, a basic degree of shared responsibility, joint commitment and shared objectives based on a set of common principles and norms (the normative framework of the regime) is necessary to tackle the global drugs phenomenon.

*Hypothesis 2:* Associated with the central position of states within the international system in which shared responsibility arises, the paradigm of Neo-Realism (described below) is expected to provide the most accurate explanatory framework for cooperation between states. However, this analysis is not complete without a more flexible approach of security analysis as offered by the English school (analysed in section 3.7). Within the Neo-Realist approach to international regime theory, the international drug control framework, as embodied in the three United Nations Conventions, is considered to represent an existing, 'diffuse' international regime. The latter assumption is partly based on earlier academic research into this area (discussed further in Chapter 7).<sup>140</sup>

*Hypothesis 3:* Colombia can function as a benchmark for the international community to improve its support for alternative development policies through an international regime,

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<sup>140</sup> Jorrit Kamminga, 'Het Mondiale Drugsprobleem. De Verenigde Naties en Internationale Regimevorming', *Multinationale Ondernemingen, Nationale Overheden en Internationale Organisaties*, Honours' course thesis within the Masters Degree of International Relations, State University of Groningen, The Netherlands (19 November 2001), pp. 1-40. Available on request.

chiefly because of its experience with internationally-backed policies and its ability to adapt its policies based on lessons learned over past decades.

*Hypothesis 4:* An International Economic Security Regime, derived from an examination of the shared principles and norms of the current drug control framework (and tested through three regional case studies in Colombia), will in all probability be an informal type of regime, not necessarily governed by concrete institutions or administered by an international secretariat. As a consequence, it is likely to have a strong normative framework, but a weak instrumental framework, unless it gains strength within the broader international regime of the international drug control framework.

*Hypothesis 5:* The International Economic Security Regime will not only be ‘informal’, it will be a ‘specific’ rather than a ‘diffuse’ regime. This means it will only deal with a limited range of issues within the area of supply reduction. The specific character of this Regime follows from the focus on alternative development policies in the framework of international supply reduction. As such it can also be characterised as a sub-regime: part of the bigger framework of international drug control at the level of the United Nations.

*Hypothesis 6:* The International Economic Security Regime will not only be informal, specific and a sub-regime, it will also be a ‘partial’ regime in the sense that it will be limited by the consensus of states. It will therefore not incorporate some sensitive issues or areas of divergence between states. Any such issues that are omitted from the international regime by states will be identified during the research and will be highlighted where relevant.

*Hypothesis 7:* Although Colombia’s alternative development-driven counter-narcotics policy can positively impact development at the sub-national level and to a lesser extent the national level, the country has very little impact on narcotics control at the global level. At this level, sustainable results in the counter-narcotics efforts depend too much on developments in other countries and regions and on the willingness of the international community at large to commit to effective cooperation, coordination and burden-sharing in terms of operational, technical and financial efforts and costs.

*Hypothesis 8:* Alternative development policies are crucial to solving the sub-national or national supply of illicit drugs, but as long as there are underdeveloped areas in or outside of Colombia and illicit drugs remain lucrative for all actors in the supply chain, illicit cultivation and production will simply move elsewhere. In other words, there needs to be a fully international approach to ensure other territories in weak or failed states do not become the next production centres. For illicit coca cultivation, this means looking beyond national geographic borders and towards “*novel borderings*”, demarcated by factors directly or indirectly influencing the illegal drugs economy, such as agronomic or climatic conditions, availability of (trade) infrastructure or certain types of micro-economic or development conditions in specific territories.<sup>141</sup>

## **2.5 Research plan**

There are three distinct phases supporting this research: 1) development of the theoretical framework, literature review and field research planning; 2) field research and meetings in Colombia, (with additional meetings in Europe and the United States), and 3) data analysis and writing of the research paper. These three phases are outlined below.

### **2.5.1 Phase One: theoretical framework, literature review and planning**

Using secondary literature on the political economy of the international drugs trade and on economic development and international trade theory in general, the author has constructed a thorough theoretical framework. This theoretical framework aims to place the global drugs phenomenon firmly into the realm of international relations and its sub-field of International Political Economy. To support this framework, information was gathered on past and present projects and programmes in Colombia, and general (historical) data related to the research.

An important element of the planning of the twelve-month field research trip was the identification of the key data needed to obtain insight into and an assessment of the structure of international alternative development policy support in Colombia. The field research comprised two main components: 1) general and specific meetings in Bogotá, Cali and

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<sup>141</sup> The term is borrowed from Saskia Sassen. See: Saskia Sassen, ‘When National Territory Is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel Borderings’, *New Political Economy*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2005), pp. 523-541.

Medellín with academics, experts and officials; and 2) specific field research in three Colombian regions (See Part II of this dissertation). Field research preparations included the development of a number of semi-structured, qualitative interviews that were used to inform and complement the research by approaching farmers, staff working within the relevant programmes implemented in the selected regions, experts and academics to assess their perceptions on the four main research questions detailed in section 2.3 above. The semi-structured interviews were tailored to the different target groups involved in the research. See the next section for a description of the methodology used.

### **Secondary sources analysed in Phase One**

The following (sometimes overlapping) secondary sources were used:

- 1) literature on International Relations theory;
- 2) literature on International Political Economy;
- 3) literature on Illicit International Political Economy;
- 4) literature on the international drug phenomenon in general;
- 5) literature on the Colombian context of the drug problem (e.g. reports by the Colombian government and international organisations such as UNODC);
- 6) literature on alternative development as relevant to drugs-related projects in Colombia (e.g. reports of the Inter-American Development Bank, UNDP, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), etc.).

### **2.5.2 Phase Two: field research and meetings in Colombia**

The second phase of the research consisted of field research in Colombia. This lasted approximately one year. The associated costs were funded entirely by the author, as were all other costs related to the PhD trajectory (2008-2013). The field research in Colombia focused on three levels: the sub-national level; the national level; and the international level.

At the sub-national level, the research investigated how national and international alternative development policies and instruments work in the local areas where they are applied. Following discussions with the Colombian Administrative Unit of Territorial

Consolidation (UACT), led by the Department of Social Prosperity (DPS) and responsible for the programmes focusing on illicit crops, three regions in Colombia were selected by the author for the field research: la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, la Sierra de la Macarena and Tumaco. During the field research, semi-structured, qualitative interviews were conducted with farmers, project staff, the local government and other stakeholders of relevant programmes that are implemented locally in the regions visited.

The author developed an interview guide that contained the basic questions and main themes to be covered during the interviews. Annex III provides the graphic interpretation of this interview guide which was used to ensure all central themes were covered during the interviews. Using this guide, interviews started with general questions about the interviewee's position, work and role in alternative development strategies or programmes. It then moved on to introductory questions to gather opinions and information on the four main research questions: 1) perceptions on the linkages between local projects and the international level; 2) perceptions about the main drivers behind international and bilateral cooperation and support for these projects; 3) perceptions of the principle of shared responsibility; and 4) perceptions of the two different notions of economic security used in this research.

The sampling method used was a combination of opportunity sampling<sup>142</sup> and snowball sampling<sup>143</sup>, starting from a few meetings in the regions that were previously arranged by the Territorial Consolidation Unit and adding interviewees as they became available or where suggested to the author while in the field. The objective was not to interview a large sample of individuals but rather to include in each region at least one representative of the most relevant stakeholder groups in the sample. Thus the objective was to interview at each research location farmers or other project beneficiaries, representatives of local government, local experts and other (technical) staff involved in the implementation of the projects.

Last, the interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed.<sup>144</sup> This has made it possible to include direct quotes of the interviewees in the dissertation. The breadth of information gathered in this way will also serve for follow up research and articles on the

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<sup>142</sup> Opportunity sampling entails interviewing individuals when encountered and when they are available to be interviewed. The interviews with these individuals were not planned in advance, but the opportunity arose to include them in the field research.

<sup>143</sup> Snowball sampling entails interviewing individuals who are suggested or introduced to the author during the interview process by other interviewees.

<sup>144</sup> The transcripts of the interviews are available on request. They were considered to be too long to include as annexes to this dissertation.

issue of shared responsibility, economic security in drug control or on alternative development in general.

At the national level, the research investigated how existing alternative development policies are connected to nation-wide efforts to reduce the supply of cocaine. Qualitative interviews with officials in the relevant ministries and international organisations operating in Colombia were the main focus at this level. Note, in this research, the sub-national and national levels are considered as one and are subject to the same level of analysis.

Finally, at the international level, the research investigated the structure and position of alternative development policies within the broader framework of 1) international drug policy and 2) international trade. For this level of analysis, the author not only benefited from information obtained at the national level, but also interviewed staff of international organisations outside of Colombia. Some of these interviews took place during a visit to Washington, but they were mostly conducted by email or Skype correspondence.

### **2.5.3 Phase Three: data analysis and writing of the thesis**

A period of data analysis was followed by a period of drafting of this final dissertation. The first draft dissertation was finished on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 2013 and the final draft on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 2013. Annex I of this research contains a more detailed overview of the research trajectory as implemented, including a list of the meetings, email exchanges and Skype calls with experts consulted during the research.

### **2.6 Challenges and ethical considerations**

Six main challenges were identified with regard to the research, necessitating actions to mitigate any negative impact they may have.

The first challenge is ethical. Illicit drugs have undeniable negative consequences for individuals and society. This negative reality may influence the author's opinions and analysis with regard to illicit drugs and the way they are produced, traded and consumed. To mitigate this challenge, the research focused primarily on the economic alternative development policies designed and implemented within the legal economy. As such, it does



not analyse the conditions of drug users or traffickers but focuses on the conditions of former and current drug cultivating coca farmers and the conditions and specificities of the rural areas they live in.

The second challenge is practical and is present in any research into illegal markets. Coca cultivation is an illegal activity but the illegal cocaine industry is also entrenched in Colombia's legal political and economic spheres. Many people's livelihoods are directly or indirectly dependent on the illegal cocaine economy in Colombia. This renders the issue area of the research highly sensitive and there was a risk when gathering data that people who are indirectly or directly involved in the illegal drugs economy may not wish to discuss their activities (or that others not involved in the trade may be unwilling to discuss issues relating to drugs for other reasons). This could have created a challenge in finding credible sources of information, but was partly solved by using government contacts to be introduced to project beneficiaries at the local level.

The third challenge relates to the country's security situation. Most of the development projects linked to drug control take place in areas with coca cultivation or limited state control, and therefore in areas where criminal groups, the leftist *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) insurgency or paramilitary groups may be present. This could have limited access to certain areas and projects, and could have created some direct risks for the author. Nevertheless, with careful planning and with support from the Colombian government, it was possible to visit areas in the departments of Meta and Nariño that are generally considered to be dangerous as (former) strongholds of the FARC or paramilitary forces, and/or hotbeds of crime and violence. While government support proved to be essential to obtain access to certain areas in Meta or Tumaco, the involvement of the government did not have an impact on the type of questions or topics the author was able to raise while interviewing project beneficiaries.

The fourth challenge relates to the ideological nature of the academic study of the global drugs phenomenon. Although a very diverse field of study, the discipline reflects the political debate and can be portrayed as a continuum that is broadly divided between a 'leftist' approach of academics analysing and supporting the positive benefits of different forms of legalisation, regularisation, de-penalisation or toleration and harm-reduction policies, and a 'rightist' approach of academics whose analysis is more inclined to favour policies of zero-tolerance, abstinence, a 'drug-free' society, and strict prohibition of

psychotropic substances. This is obviously a simplified representation of the academic field and there is an undeniable difference between purely scientific study and the reports released, for example, by activist or lobby organisations favouring a certain position. Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw a clear line between science and ideology, especially in an issue area as sensitive and politicised as the global drugs phenomenon.

While it is hard to escape the wide ideological divide influencing the academic debate on this issue area, the author has intentionally stayed clear of entering into this broadly two-sided debate in this research. In order to achieve this, the academic work has been limited to the analysis of the current situation: the dynamics of the global drugs phenomenon within an international legal framework determined by the control of selected narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through prohibition. The author has also aimed to be as neutral as possible, for example, by not favouring certain types of policies over others, or by not condemning the aerial spraying of illicit coca crops.

The fifth challenge relates to the phenomenon of selection bias. There is a risk that because of the choice of three regions in Colombia for the case studies of the research, the work may be regarded as a study that gives attention to an extreme country where hard drugs, violence, drug gangs, insurgency and conflict come together in way that is not really representative of the drug phenomenon elsewhere. This is partly true, although perhaps in that case a case study on Afghanistan or Mexico would have been more rational at the time of starting the final research in 2010. In fact, the present case study was primarily chosen because of Colombia's model of alternative development to address the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon, and much less because of the relationships between, for example, the FARC and the illegal drugs industry, or the links between youth gangs (*combos*) engaged in illegal drugs trade and violence in the cities of Colombia. It is the focus on economic security within the Colombian context that reveals interesting concepts, patterns of international cooperation and development-driven strategies for other countries or regions, which shows there is no selection bias, based on, for example, Colombia's history of violence, drug cartels and civil war.

The sixth and last challenge concerns the concept of 'economic security' in the context of a new area of security concerns for states. The concept is described as being "*fraught with contradictions and complications*"<sup>145</sup> and "*riddled with contradictions and*

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<sup>145</sup>*Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.*, p. 95.

*paradoxes.*”<sup>146</sup> On the one hand this provides a challenge to turn the concept into a useful building block of the International Economic Security Regime. However, on the other hand, it provides opportunities to add more detailed input to this still rather underdeveloped concept, particularly when trying to move away from predominantly negative threat analysis, towards research on the more positive aspects of economic security that increase the stability and security of the state. Contributing to a larger understanding of the concept of economic security and the ways in which it can be applied to the global drugs phenomenon, therefore, was perceived by the author as an opportunity and much less as a challenge.

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<sup>146</sup> Barry Buzan, ‘New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3 (July 1991), p. 446.



## CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL APPROACH

The theoretical approach of this research is analysed in this chapter. Section 3.1 begins this analysis by summarising the main approach and purpose of the research, followed by an examination of its legal framework in section 3.2. Section 3.3 addresses the question of regime change within the current drug control system, while section 3.4 deliberates if the research fits best within the area of International Relations or that of Political Science. In section 3.5, a particular focus is placed on International Political Economy theory, as this provides theoretical insight into the relationship between the dominant economic nature of the global drugs phenomenon and the political relations between states to tackle it. Section 3.6 presents the research as an addition to the sub-field of Illicit International Political Economy, an emerging scholarly field that offers a clear advantage of focus. Last, in section 3.7 the study of international institutions is explained within the context of international relations, examining how international regimes can be considered as types of international institutions and *vice versa*.

### 3.1 Main approach and purpose

Focusing on alternative development to address the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon, the theoretical approach of the research uses the case study of Colombia (examined through three regional field studies) to test the framework of a new functional instrument called the International Economic Security Regime (RISE). The RISE will combine International Relations and International Political Economy theory as its theoretical base.

Developing this functional instrument has a dual purpose. The first purpose is to better understand how and why states collaborate (or have collaborated) on supply reduction strategies in the case of Colombia. The second purpose is to identify and understand similar (potential for) cooperation in this or related issue areas where international support is currently limited. This means the International Economic Security Regime is an instrument for functional analysis; a theoretical regime. This does not mean that the regime could not become real. For example, states could decide to form an international regime around the

specific issue area of alternative development to strengthen international cooperation or the exchange of lessons learned and best practices.

Using the broad approach of International Political Economy (IPE) theory, the RISE will combine international relations (why do states cooperate?) with international economics (both in terms of the nature of illegal commodity markets and the economic instruments applied to combat the supply side of these illicit markets). As such, the theoretical foundations of this research are rooted in the field of study known as ‘Illicit International Political Economy’. Illicit International Political Economy (IIPE) is described by Peter Andreas as:

“(…) [T]he relationship between states and illegal international markets [defined by the policies states adopt to deal with illegal (cross-border) economic activities related to both licit and illicit goods, finance or migration]. Through its monopoly on the power to criminalize certain economic sectors, the state defines the boundaries of illegal market activities.”<sup>147</sup>

In other words, IIPE is concerned with the way states deal with the illegal side of national and international economic transactions in markets that are criminalised by the states themselves or the international community of states together.

Within the state-centred approach of IIPE, the theoretical framework of this research consists of combining elements of international regime theory with economic security analysis. To a certain extent, the research can be seen as bridge between the state-centric, Neo-Realist view on international regimes of the American school and the more flexible or “wider”<sup>148</sup> interpretations of state security associated with the English school of International Relations (see below, section 3.7 for more information on the two schools).

First, before constructing the new functional instrument of the International Economic Security Regime, a thorough analysis of relevant theories and paradigms of International Relations and International Political Economy will be presented. The objective of this academic exercise is to better understand supply reduction strategies in the global

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<sup>147</sup> Peter Andreas, ‘Illicit international political economy: the clandestine side of globalization’ *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 11, Issue 3 (August 2004), p. 642.

<sup>148</sup> Vincent Cable, ‘What is International Economic Security?’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April 1995), p. 323.

domain, and place the global drugs phenomenon more firmly within the field of international relations.

Second, an analysis of academic literature, reports and UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) resolutions on alternative development and broader economic development and trade policies will identify key principles and norms that will represent the normative framework of the International Economic Security Regime. As the main policy-making body of the international drug control regime, the CND has important normative functions, for example in the implementation of the international drug treaties, and adding new psychotropic drugs or precursors to the lists of controlled substances.<sup>149</sup> According to the United Nations, the CND:

*“(...) [D]evelops strategies on international drug control and recommends measures to combat the world drug problem, including through reducing demand for drugs, promoting alternative development initiatives and adopting supply reduction measures.”<sup>150</sup>*

In addition to the international treaties and CND resolutions, the reports and declarations of international alternative development conferences have been researched. The following international conferences in particular are included in this analysis:

- ‘The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation’, International Conference, Feldafing (Munich), Germany (7-12 January 2002);
- International Workshop on ‘Development in a Drugs Environment: Beyond Alternative Development?’, Berlin, Germany (29 May – 1 June 2006);
- Open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on ‘international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development’, Vienna, Austria (2-4 July 2008);
- First High-level ‘International Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development’ (ICAD), Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces, Thailand (6-12 November 2011);

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<sup>149</sup> For the role, mandate and functions of the CND, see the official website of UNODC at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/commissions/CND/01-its-mandate-and-functions.html> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, UNODC website section on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/index.html> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

- Second High-Level ‘International Conference on Alternative Development’ (ICAD), Lima, Peru (14-16 November 2012).

More expert meetings and workshops have taken place, but these five conferences are taken as representing the common ground (and diversities) of international cooperation on alternative development strategies in recent years. The above expert meetings have also been selected because they had an international character as opposed to, for example, a focus on only one region or country.

In addition to these international conferences, an analysis of the body of reports released by the United Nations on the theme of alternative livelihoods and rural development is discussed, both relating specifically to Colombia (for Part II of this research) as well as to alternative development in general (to establish the RISE structure in Chapter 8). An important additional document is also the 2005 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, *Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report*.<sup>151</sup>

Where possible, the analysis of the above-mentioned sources also identifies relevant rules and decision-making procedures, thus aiming to give shape to the instrumental framework of the RISE as outlined in this research. The sources for these rules and decision-making procedures are the relevant international treaties and CND resolutions, including Action Plans and Political Declarations.

Third, the new functional instrument will be tested through three regional case studies in Colombia to examine to what extent the identified principles and norms can be found in practice. The case studies were conducted through qualitative techniques of analysis. This involved a combination of desk research and field research in three Colombian regions, including semi-structured interviews with project beneficiaries, experts, officials and others working in the field of counter-narcotics, trade or development policy. Last, as described above, the literature review (Part I), mainly based on the desk research, consists of four theoretical chapters that will together help establish the structure of the RISE.

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<sup>151</sup> UNODC, *Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation. Final Synthesis Report* (New York: UNODC, 2005).



### 3.2 The legal framework of the research

The twentieth century gradually saw the international drug control regime taking shape, changing the legal status of commodities such as cocaine, opium and heroin, which have been intermittently legal and illegal over the past hundred or so years. The drug control regime was built on several international treaties starting with the International Opium Convention of 1912 and eventually leading to the 1961 Single Convention on Illicit Drugs. The 1961 Convention can be regarded as the centrepiece of the current international control regime for substances such as cocaine and heroin and the plants they are derived from. Together with two subsequent UN Conventions, it forms the legal framework of this research: the international drug control regime.<sup>152</sup> It is within this international legal framework that the theoretical foundations of this research are placed.

These legal foundations are part of what can effectively be called an international regime on international drug control. Besides the three UN Conventions, this international regime is an institutionalised regime within the framework of the United Nations, including the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (a functional commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as the principle institutions of the regime.

However, the international drug control system does not constitute the entire legal framework of this research. The remaining part of the legal framework is formed by a broader set of international trade rules of the international trade regime governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO), that ultimately decide what states are permitted to do in terms of market intervention and market support. Often, support for development-oriented supply reduction policies takes the form of subsidies (frequently temporary), other price (or farmer) support mechanisms or preferential access to markets. Clearly, any type of such 'market-distortion' policies need to comply with the trade rules countries establish at the highest international level.

In sum, in this research the international drug control framework is considered to be an international regime in line with the definition of Stephen Krasner. It provides the first

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<sup>152</sup> The other two international treaties are the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.

part of the legal framework of this research. The RISE, the theoretical model that is constructed in this research, is considered as a sub-regime within this broader, more diffuse international regime. The international trade regime provides the second part of the legal framework.

### **3.3 Regime analysis *within* the current system**

The literature review in Part I below will demonstrate that the academic debate on drug control is dominated by contributors who explore (or even seek) a shift away from the current international drug control framework, which is considered by the author to be an international regime in its own right. However, because this international framework is the primary international regime on drug control for states – and is set to remain so for the foreseeable future, the research will focus on changes and improvements within the current system. Until there is sufficient international political will and agreement to change towards an alternative regime, this is deemed the most useful contribution. This approach is considered by the author to be far from a case of ‘rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic’ because the current international system is still firmly in place, despite an increasing number of mostly local, regional or national pilot projects, political *referenda* or alternative policies that are moving away from the main provisions of the current system. In addition, any new regime will most probably be built to a considerable extent on the foundations of the old regime, with a strong economic development and poverty reduction pillar.

### **3.4 International Relations *versus* Political Science**

This research includes a focus on public policies implemented in Colombia which aim to tackle its domestic part in the global drugs phenomenon. It also addresses commonalities and differences between public policy priorities among states when cooperating on the issue area of illegal drugs. Such public policies are normally associated with the discipline of Political Science. Nevertheless, the balance of the analysis of this research tilts more towards International Relations, understood as the relations between states. There are several reasons for this:

First, the trans-national drug phenomenon cannot be resolved by one country alone, meaning that individual public policies will have no or very limited sustainable effect if they are not supported by international cooperation and coordination.

Second, the notion of shared responsibility, the first central theoretical pillar of this research, is a guiding principle of international cooperation between states to address the global drugs phenomenon, and is therefore more related to International Relations and the field of International Political Economy.

Third, economic security, the other principle theoretical pillar of this research, both concerns Political Science (the public policies at the local and national levels in Colombia) and International Relations (as part of the motivation of why states cooperate on resolving the trans-national issue of illegal drugs). However, the latter is of more relevance for this research as it concerns the interaction between shared responsibility and economic security at the international level of analysis: cooperation (or lack thereof) between states to increase economic security at home or abroad.

Last, International Political Economy, including the basic international relations theories that will be used in this research, is considered here as an integral part of international relations. Therefore, the discipline of international relations provides the necessary framework for this research with a particular focus on the branch of International Political Economy.

### **3.5 The subfield of International Political Economy**

In this research, International Political Economy theory is considered to be an integral part of international relations, encompassing those theories that have, in varying ways, attempted to bridge the gap between international economics and international relations.<sup>153</sup> The theoretical concepts underpinning IPE theory have long been part of the study of international relations. Benjamin Cohen writes:

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<sup>153</sup> Benjamin J. Cohen, *International Political Economy. An Intellectual History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 3.

*“As a practical matter, political economy has always been part of international relations (IR). But as a distinct academic field, surprisingly enough, IPE was born just a few decades ago.”*<sup>154</sup>

Although some scholars consider IPE increasingly as a separate field from standard international relations, this research takes the view of Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner who describe it as a subfield, rather than a standalone field of study, that evolved from earlier analysis of a wide range of aspects of world politics.<sup>155</sup> The field of International Political Economy contains a very diverse group of different schools and theories, many related to theories of international relations, linking international economics and international relations between states. The main Neo-Realist argument for linking these concepts is based on the connection between economic and military power. This is formulated particularly well by Kenneth Waltz:

*“States use economic means for military and political ends; and military and political means for the achievement of economic interests.”*<sup>156</sup>

For this research, it is useful to analyse the global drugs phenomenon within the context of several theories falling within the field of International Political Economy and the broader framework of International Relations. This analysis can be found in Chapter 4.

### **3.6 The subfield of Illicit International Political Economy**

Illicit International Political Economy is a recent effort to raise the profile of the illicit aspects of the global economy within the field of International Political Economy.<sup>157</sup> The most recent manifestation of IPE was developed in 2004 by Peter Andreas. Andreas' work is particularly interesting because it helps to bridge the academic approach of International Political Economy with International Relations and its focus on security studies.<sup>158</sup> As such,

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<sup>154</sup> *International Political Economy. An Intellectual History*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>155</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner, 'International Organization and the Study of World Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4. (Autumn 1998), p. 645.

<sup>156</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 94.

<sup>157</sup> 'Illicit international political economy: the clandestine side of globalization' *op. cit.*, p. 641.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 641.

it fits well with the focus of the current research on ‘economic security’, which can be considered both an integral part of IPE and part of security studies as developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde. Andreas defines IIPE concisely as: “*the relationship between states and illegal international markets.*”<sup>159</sup>

This relationship is at the heart of the current research: How do states – individually or together – in institutions, through international regimes or using *ad hoc* arrangements, deal with illegal international markets? It is the state that not only decides on where the limits between the legal and illegal economy are placed, but also how to navigate this divide with a combination of economic incentives (carrots) and the pressure of law enforcement (sticks). In the case of the three areas of Colombia selected as case studies for this research, how are the economic aspects of the illegal drugs economy addressed at the various points of the illegal supply production chain? What is offered to coca farmers and others involved at the production stage in terms of sustainable alternative livelihoods? Are they connected to international markets? And to what extent does international support play a role?

The emerging area of IIPE builds on the work of Nadelmann, Naylor, Andreas, Strange and others<sup>160</sup> (all cited elsewhere in this research) that has explored the linkages between the illegal economy and international relations in a changing world. More specifically, IIPE studies the connections between the legal and illegal economies, with the central idea that every area of the legal economy has its illegal equivalent.<sup>161</sup> The multinational corporation is the equivalent of the transnational criminal organisation. The coca farmer is comparable to the legal coffee farmer. The demand for cocaine is similar to the legal demand for high-end consumer goods. To a certain extent, the process of globalisation affects both segments of the economy in equal terms: the international networks of financing, transport, trade, information and communication brought by globalisation create opportunities for Colombian companies, but also for illicit drug production and trafficking networks operating in Colombia.

The academic field of IIPE concentrates primarily on two important questions. First, similar to the subfield of IPE, one of the central questions of IIPE is to explore to what extent illicit markets and transnational criminal networks have corroded the power of states. It can be argued that state power survives despite a changing and increasingly globalised

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<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 642.

<sup>160</sup> US Secretary of State John Kerry is one of them. His 1997 book is part of this literature: *The New War: The Web of Crime That Threatens America's Security*, *op. cit.*

<sup>161</sup> ‘Illicit international political economy: the clandestine side of globalization’, *op. cit.*, p. 644.

international society. In fact, the argument that the illegal drugs economy corrupts the state apparatus which is sometimes used to confirm the decline of the power of states can be used to reaffirm the central role and importance of states; seemingly the state is still so important that bribes are needed to bypass its system of controls.<sup>162</sup> Also, criminals need state borders and national control laws to create their lucrative markets. Simply crossing a border (for example between Mexico and the United States) often multiplies earnings significantly. In any case, the effects of globalisation on national and international criminal organisations have only recently gained importance in IPE, partly confirmed by the fact that UNODC only released its first report on this issue, *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, in 2010.<sup>163</sup>

The second central question of IPE concerns the nature of the relationship between the illegal economy and armed conflict. This question will be partially covered by the ‘economics and conflict’ body of literature identified in section 5.4, but has so far not been integrated firmly within the fields of IPE and IPE.<sup>164</sup> Also, the ‘economics and conflict’ literature can be considered broader in scope and more multidisciplinary, drawing from research areas such as security studies, development studies and economics.

What is most interesting here is that elements of economics and conflict literature deal with the relationship between states and specific forms of international cooperation that aim to address the ‘war economy’<sup>165</sup> and similar phenomena. Since the end of the Cold War, such research has highlighted the need for more cooperation because it has identified the complex patterns and international flows of illegal activities and clandestine organisations operating across borders.

The current research will return to the concept of war economy when discussing the situation in Colombia, where the links between illegal economic activities and the ongoing armed conflict represent a key motivation for the Colombian government and (to a lesser extent) its international partners to address the illegal drugs economy.

The importance of this relationship was confirmed in the latest peace negotiations with the FARC, which included the illegal narcotics trade as one of its five main agenda

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<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 647.

<sup>163</sup> *The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, *op. cit.*

<sup>164</sup> The study edited by Dietrich Jung was identified by Peter Andreas as the exception: Dietrich Jung (ed.), *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State Wars* (London: Routledge, 2003). See also: ‘Illicit international political economy: the clandestine side of globalization’, *op. cit.*, p. 649.

<sup>165</sup> The term ‘war economy’ is often associated with economic activities intended to fund war efforts or to make a profit within or on the margins of a conflict.

items. This provides evidence of the shift of the global drugs phenomenon from low politics to the high politics of the security and stability of the state (analysed below in section 4.1). It is also a clear manifestation of how a domestic, non-traditional (economic) security issue can threaten national stability by challenging the state's territorial integrity and its monopoly on the use of arms.

The most extreme interpretations of this drug-conflict link – identified in the body of literature labelled ‘crime terror nexus’ or ‘crime rebellion nexus’ in section 5.5 below – can lead to the oversimplification of the complex and multifaceted nature of the relationship between the illegal economy and conflict. The September 11 attacks on the United States have played an important role in fostering such narrow interpretations, for example by linking Al Qaeda directly to the Afghan opium trade in Afghanistan or even directly to opium poppy cultivation by Afghan farmers.<sup>166</sup> When exploring the situation through the lens of the case study in the three selected regions in Colombia in Part II, the research will further analyse this complex relationship.

In a second article on illicit globalisation, Peter Andreas has elaborated on the development of IPE.<sup>167</sup> In this piece, he calls for a more nuanced vision of the current situation of international crime, and even more importantly, a more meaningful analysis of the contested concepts of ‘globalisation’, ‘transnational organised crime’ or the ‘crime-conflict’ link and their impact on states and society at large.<sup>168</sup> He argues that the subfield of IPE should move away from the often misinformed or inaccurate common statements found in recent literature:

*“They all have the same basic storyline: global crime is booming, unprecedented, and a grave threat.”<sup>169</sup>*

The problem of misrepresenting the reality of the illegal economy is related to what Andreas calls the “*Achilles heel of IPE research*”; the lack of reliable, accurate data on the size and scope of illegal markets.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> For a useful analysis of the relationship between Al Qaeda and heroin trafficking networks, see: *Seeds of Terror. How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-19. Less helpful, rather simplistic, statements also abound. For example, Fukumi writes: “(...) the indication that the Al Qaeda (sic) was involved in opium poppy cultivation struck fear into the international community by showing the potential financial power residing in TOCs [Transnational Organised Crimes]”, *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>167</sup> Email exchange between the author and Peter Andreas, (October 2012).

<sup>168</sup> ‘Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons’, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-3.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

For this research, the most pertinent of Andreas' arguments is that despite the alarming tones and dominant research focus on the deepening and expanding nature of the globalisation process, states still matter.<sup>171</sup> States still define what is illegal, recent examples being new trade regulations covering areas such as the trade in antiquities and the protection of endangered species, and the additional financial and anti-money-laundering regulations that have been put in place at the national and international levels following the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington.<sup>172</sup> Through state control and the law enforcement apparatus, states continue to determine the boundaries between the illegal and legal markets, and continue to partly determine how illegal, non state actors have to operate to attempt to bypass these state controls. Mónica Serrano explains how prohibition affects the ability of states to regulate markets:

*“By banning trade in certain goods and services, the state not only creates illegal markets but de facto abrogates the enforcement of many other regulatory laws in these illicit economic spheres. In other words, by banning these activities and transactions, the state renounces many of its own regulatory powers.”*<sup>173</sup>

However, globalisation does not mean that states are losing the ability to tackle illegal markets.<sup>174</sup> They never had full control over them in the first place.

What is relatively new is the increasing awareness that states need to collaborate more with each other and that they have the shared responsibility to address international criminal phenomena that are based on cause and effect relationships materialising across borders. Instead of depicting the state as an entity that is increasingly losing control and is becoming obsolete in the face of the globalisation process in both the legal and illegal economy, it is more constructive and relevant to re-evaluate and reassess what states can do, individually and together, to address the illegal economy.

With regard to the global drugs phenomenon, the increased awareness among states of the need to cooperate more extensively explains the renewed interest for the principle of shared responsibility at the level of the United Nations and its international drug control

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<sup>170</sup> ‘Illicit international political economy: the clandestine side of globalization’, p. 646.

<sup>171</sup> ‘Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons’, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>173</sup> Mónica Serrano, ‘Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual?’, in: Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano (eds.), *Transnational organized crime and international security: business as usual?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 15.

<sup>174</sup> ‘Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons’, *op. cit.*, p. 21.



framework. However, this principle is only relevant if it goes beyond political rhetoric and when it is increasingly implemented in cooperation patterns between states, for example in the form of international regimes or international institutions. These concepts will be introduced in the next section.

### 3.7 The study of institutions in International Relations

In general terms, the study of International Relations (and of International Political Economy from the 1970s onwards) can be divided into an ‘American school’ and an ‘English school.’<sup>175</sup> The American school is associated with scholars such as Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Stephen D. Krasner, Joseph Nye, and Kenneth Waltz. The English school is associated with Susan Strange, Robert W. Cox, Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and more recently with Barry Buzan. Philip G. Cerny, an American, can be considered as part of the ‘second generation’ of the English school.<sup>176</sup>

While there are many commonalities, synergies and shared theoretical paradigms between proponents of these two schools, it can be argued that the paradigm of Structural Realism (or Neo-Realism) and international regime theory are dominated by the American school, while the concept of international society is related to the English school.<sup>177</sup> The fact that international regime theory builds on the same convention of international society thinking, indicates how difficult it is to draw a clear line between the two schools.<sup>178</sup>

In analysing international society, Bull asserts that states agree on common rules (“*general imperative principles*”) and create corresponding institutions (“*that secure adherence to rules*”); concepts very close to that of international regimes.<sup>179</sup> In this view, if an international society is “*well developed*” it could be regarded as states cooperating in networks of international regimes and institutions that arrange their interaction.<sup>180</sup> It could

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<sup>175</sup> This division is not undisputed but often cited. The birth of both ‘schools’ is described in detail in: *International Political Economy. An Intellectual History, op. cit.*, Chapter 1 and 2.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>177</sup> Barry Buzan, ‘From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School’, *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 327.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 328.

<sup>179</sup> *International Regimes, op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>180</sup> ‘From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School’, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

even be considered a “*regime of regimes*”, the basic legal and political framework in which states can decide to commit to shared principles and norms in a wide range of issue areas.<sup>181</sup>

In their approach to international institutions, there are clear differences between the English school and regime theory in the tradition of the American school.<sup>182</sup> Broadly speaking, the English school is more concerned with the character of international society and international order at the global level and the common interests and shared values of states that lead to the creation of international institutions.<sup>183</sup> Regime theory is focused more on the “*sub-global*” level where states mainly follow their self interests and engage with each other in specific regimes or institutions concerning economic, environmental or technological issues (e.g. trade, environmental pollution or arms control).<sup>184</sup>

The American school approach to regime theory seems to be the most interesting approach for this research because of its focus on economics. Andreas writes:

*“Realist and other statist perspectives (...) can help us to understand how state structures shape the transnational world (including the illicit transnational world). (...) The creation and maintenance of a global drug prohibition regime cannot be explained without taking into account the backing of the most powerful states in the international system”*<sup>185</sup>

As already shown above, the powerful states of the international system can create (or decide to maintain or abandon) the hegemonic order or international regime around drug control. While non-state actors are also important players in the construction of regimes, in the end, institutions and international regimes are in general state structures, created by states for the purpose of coordination or cooperation on transnational issue areas and trans-border challenges.

In the Neo-Realist view of the American school, international economic regimes help states to control trans-border economic transactions. Hollis and Smith explain this as follows:

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<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 350.

<sup>182</sup> Buzan summarises six points in: Barry Buzan, *From international to world society? English school theory and the social structure of globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 161, 162.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 162.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 162.

<sup>185</sup> ‘Illicit international political economy: the clandestine side of globalization’, *op. cit.*, p. 645.

*“International economic regimes are embodiments of structural power in the international system, and their existence allows states to control one area of the international agenda [international economic transactions] that eluded Realism.”*<sup>186</sup>

In the Neo-Realist view, there is little difference between an institution and an international regime. Krasner sees institutions as:

*“[F]ormal or informal structures of norms and rules that are created by actors to increase their utility.”*<sup>187</sup>

Despite the fact that this definition allows for ‘informal’ institutions, broadly speaking, institutions can be considered more formal than international regimes. Keohane, however, provides a clearer definition that describes international regimes as *“specific institutions involving states and/or transnational actors, which apply to particular issues in international relations.”*<sup>188</sup> In this definition, international regimes are institutions. However, there is an important difference between informal regimes and formal international organisations:

*“Unlike international regimes, international organisations can engage in goal-directed activities such as raising and spending money, promulgating policies, and making discretionary choices.”*<sup>189</sup>

For this research, the relevant debate on institutions in international relations (as described by Ruggie) can be divided in three visions:

First, the extreme Neo-Realist interpretation of institutions as direct reflections of the balance of power and the interests of the state (e.g. John Mearsheimer<sup>190</sup>); second, the more moderate Neo-Realist view of institutions that allows for the continuation of the international institution even if the power structure of the international system changes (e.g. Stephen

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<sup>186</sup> Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 37.

<sup>187</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 43.

<sup>188</sup> Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1988), p. 384, footnote 2.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 384, footnote 2.

<sup>190</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49.

Krasner<sup>191</sup>); and, third, the Neo-Liberal view that gives institutions most importance, whether independent from or dependent on the power of states.<sup>192</sup>

Following Keohane's definition within regime theory mentioned above, Buzan sees international regimes as institutions, and lists them as part of the category of so-called 'secondary institutions', also including international governmental organisations (e.g. the World Trade Organization, the Bretton Wood Institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund), institutions of the United Nations (Security Council, the UN Refugee Agency, etc.) or NATO).<sup>193</sup> He contrasts them with the predominant focus of the English school on 'primary institutions' – institutions that define the basic nature and purpose of states and international society in generally more abstract notions of trade liberalisation, humanitarian intervention, multilateralism and international law.<sup>194</sup>

In this research the approach of 'secondary institutions' will be adopted. International regimes are either informal or formal, and the degree of formality will normally be a reflection of the extent to which the international regime has been institutionalised (e.g. run by a secretariat, an international coordinating body or an international organisation) or is governed by specific agreements or Conventions under international law. Following this perspective, section 4.7 below will elaborate on Neo-Realism as the most useful theoretical paradigm for this research. In the interim, other relevant theories of international relations will be discussed that are important for creating a better understanding of how the global drugs phenomenon both demands, shapes and drives international cooperation.

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<sup>191</sup> Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Cornell University Press 1995).

<sup>192</sup> John G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 10.

<sup>193</sup> *From international to world society? English school theory and the social structure of globalisation., op. cit.*, p. 187.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 166 and 187.

## **PART I. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS**

Part I of this dissertation provides the theoretical foundations of the research and will progressively construct the RISE. It begins with a general literature review (Chapter 4). This corresponds to the general contribution of the research to academic debate as outlined in Chapter 1, examining where and how the global drugs phenomenon fits within the study of international relations and how it shapes international cooperation between states.

The subsequent three chapters provide the building blocks and theoretical structure for the RISE instrument. Chapter 5 contains the literature and theories relating to the concept of economic security, the first pillar of the RISE. This chapter corresponds to the stated contribution of the research to link economic security analysis and international cooperation between states in a positive way, and examine the opportunities for the international community to support a country's national policy of protecting markets and natural resources.

Chapter 6 then explores the literature and theories related to shared responsibility, the second pillar of the RISE. This chapter corresponds to the stated contribution of the research to better understand the principle of shared responsibility, and how it relates to international cooperation between states and at the level of international organisations to address the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon.

Chapter 7 analyses international regime theory, which provides the theoretical structure of the RISE instrument. While international regime theory has been linked with the global drugs phenomenon in previous studies and analysis, this research is among the first to link it specifically to international support for the supply reduction strategy of alternative development in source countries.

Finally, Chapter 8 combines the theoretical structure of the international regime with the two pillars of economic security and shared responsibility to construct the RISE. In addition to the two central pillars, it will identify the regime's principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. While the two pillars determine why states support and cooperate on alternative development, these provide the substance of the functional instrument as they explain on which particular issues states agree to cooperate.



## CHAPTER 4: GENERAL LITERATURE REVIEW

While counter-narcotics policy is still primarily a function of states (and of states working together), concepts related to the global drugs phenomenon are difficult to place clearly and exclusively within one of the existing paradigms of International Relations theory. Illicit drugs, by their very nature as illegal commodities, fall outside of official market mechanisms or trade structures managed by companies or states. Yet states play an important role in determining the value of these commodities through the act of deciding to control them. Their inflated price, caused by the forces of prohibition that are derived from the state-centred international control regime that took shape in the second part of the previous century, turns them into highly lucrative trading commodities. This draws a wide range of individuals and non-state actors into a vast illegal, cross-border economy that is extremely difficult to control by individual states.

This chapter places the global drugs phenomenon, and more particularly its corresponding supply reduction strategies firmly within IR theory. This is achieved by analysing the phenomenon in the context of a number of important theories that together create a better understanding of how the economic and transnational nature of the global drugs phenomenon relates to international cooperation between states. The chapter can also be read as a standalone academic investigation into where the global drugs phenomenon fits within the theories of international relations.

### 4.1 High and low politics

The international nature of the drug phenomenon requires that any analysis of where it fits within International Relations and International Political Economy (IPE) theory must begin by examining how the issue of illegal drugs relates to the interests of states and how it affects their behaviour. To characterise the global drugs phenomenon, the division between what is termed ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’ is a useful starting point. High politics can be considered to refer to issues that directly or indirectly deal with the survival of the state (e.g. security and military concerns) while low politics generally includes areas that are not essential to the state’s survival (e.g. economic and cultural issues). The former can be

perceived to encompass the so-called ‘traditional’ and the latter the ‘non-traditional’ threats to national security.

Particularly at the outset of the study of international relations, high politics focused on “*conflict and national security in a dangerous, anarchic world*” in which stability was threatened by a Cold War turning hot and the associated use of nuclear weapons.<sup>195</sup> The concept can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes and his thinking in the seventeenth century on the establishment of states and legitimate governments. Using his ideas, high politics can be considered the ‘Hobbesian’ elements of behaviour that allow states to survive, including national laws and the rule of law, but also trade between nations. In this view, the primary objective of states is to obtain “*material gain, glory and security*”<sup>196</sup>, often (but not necessarily) at the expense of other states and their people.

Fast forwarding three centuries to 1969, US President Richard Nixon identified drug use as a “*serious national threat*”, in effect upgrading the global drugs phenomenon from low to high politics. Two years later in June 1971, he officially launched the ‘War on Drugs’, identifying drug use as “*public enemy number one*.”<sup>197</sup> Despite this strong political rhetoric, the issue of illegal drugs was still primarily linked to the domestic challenge of drug consumption in the US. The real securitisation of the broader drug phenomenon started under President Ronald Reagan. In 1986, the Reagan Administration designated drug trafficking as a national security threat in National Security Decision Directive 221 – a clear indication that the issue had been upgraded from low to high politics:

*“While the domestic effects of drugs are a serious societal problem for the United States and require the continued aggressive pursuit of law enforcement, health care, and demand reduction programs, the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside U.S. borders.”*<sup>198</sup>

This Directive opened the door to more involvement of the US military and the US intelligence community in counter-narcotics operations, both abroad and inside the United States. The colossal counter-narcotics apparatus put in place by the United States in its War

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<sup>195</sup> *International Political Economy. An Intellectual History*, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>196</sup> Kenneth Waltz, ‘Force, Order and Justice’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1967), p. 279.

<sup>197</sup> ‘Timeline: America's War on Drugs’, *NPR* (2 April 2007). Available online at:

<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>198</sup> United States, The White House, National Security Decision Directive, Number 221, Narcotics and National Security (8 April 1986).



on Drugs confirms the high priority given to counter-narcotics policy.<sup>199</sup> It is an example of a state attempting to address a series of domestic problems (drug abuse or drugs-related crime, violence, corruption or money-laundering) through both national and international action, using all the basic foreign policy instruments the state has at its disposal: development cooperation, diplomacy, and military and security cooperation.

In February 1996, President Bill Clinton followed in Reagan's footsteps by elevating the fight against international organised crime to an issue of national security.<sup>200</sup> One month later, Clinton remarked on the occasion of the swearing-in ceremony for Barry McCaffrey as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy that:

*“Drugs are as much a threat to our security as any outside enemy is today. They are a leading cause of crime and violence.”*<sup>201</sup>

Interestingly, in relationship to power (the guarantee for security) Joseph Nye has developed an alternative, but related division of issue areas according to their importance. Using the analogy of a three-dimensional chess game, he divides issue areas in three categories: 1) issues of military power on the top chess board (this is what could be called ‘high politics’ in the traditional sense); 2) issues of economic power on the middle chess board (part of ‘low politics’); and 3) issue areas such as international crime, terrorism, climate change and the propagation of infectious diseases (also part of ‘low politics’ in the traditional sense) on the lowest chess board.<sup>202</sup>

This latter category may be less important in terms of absolute power considerations (and therefore considered low rather than high politics), but it is precisely at this level where power is distributed most heterogeneously among various state and non-state actors.<sup>203</sup> In this context, one contribution of the present research can be described as moving the issue area of ‘international crime’ (and specifically the global drugs phenomenon) from the lowest chess board to the middle one (economic interests and power relations). This shift is depicted

<sup>199</sup> *Illicit. How smugglers, traffickers and copycats are hijacking the global economy, op. cit.*, pp. 67, 68.

<sup>200</sup> United States, Statement to Congress of President Clinton to present the 1996 National Security Strategy (February 1996).


<sup>201</sup> United States, Remarks by President Clinton at the Swearing-In Ceremony for Barry McCaffrey as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (6 March 1996). Available online at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=52498&st=National+Security&st1=> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>202</sup> For a description of Joseph Nye's three-dimensional chess board, see: Joseph S. Nye, *La Paradoja del Poder Norteamericano* (Madrid: Santillana Ediciones Generales, 2003), pp. 66-69.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

in Graph 1 below. Some may argue that the global drugs phenomenon has been lifted directly towards the level of military issue areas, for example with US military support for Plan Colombia. However, the focus here on economic security means the challenges related to the global drugs phenomenon are increasingly dealt with inside the economic realm.

**Graph 1: The three ‘chess boards’ of interests and power**



*Source: construction of the author, based on ideas presented in Joseph Nye’s 2002 book ‘The Paradox of American Power. Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone’.*

The inclusion of the illegal drugs trade in the five-point agenda of peace talks formally launched with the FARC in Colombia in October 2012<sup>204</sup> also demonstrates how the issue of illegal drugs can enter the realm of ‘high politics’. In this case it is directly linked to the national security and domestic stability of the Colombian state. Classifying the global drugs

<sup>204</sup> In fact, from the five central points in the peace negotiation agenda, it was the only issue with direct international ramifications. The other four issues were agricultural reforms, the insurgency’s right to political participation, recognition of the conflict’s victims’ rights, and putting an end to the armed conflict.

phenomenon as an external threat to national security, whether caused by external markets or actors, seems to reinforce the dominance of the Realism paradigm of International Relations theory in which states compete for power and security in an anarchical international society. However, the involvement of domestic non-state actors such as the FARC and *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) demands a more thorough domestic analysis of the global drugs phenomenon. What is needed, therefore, is an analysis that combines the classification of the global drugs phenomenon as ‘high politics’ or a strategic security concern with the increasing importance of non-state actors that operate within or alongside states. This approach will be discussed below. Prior to this, the next section first explores the academic bridge between security and the economic nature of the global drugs phenomenon (introducing the concept of economic security).

#### 4.2 New security analysis

Belonging to what has become known as the ‘Copenhagen school’<sup>205</sup>, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde have studied the concept of security outside of its conventional military sphere in non-traditional areas such as the economic, societal and environmental sectors.<sup>206</sup> In this sense, they have effectively bridged the concepts of high and low politics within the framework of security analysis. The most relevant area for this research is the economic sector, which they define as the relationships between trade, production, and finance.<sup>207</sup>

Although economic security is initially understood here as the ability of states to tap into resources, finance and markets to sustain or increase their welfare and power, later analysis also includes non-state authorities as so-called ‘referent objects’ in this sector.<sup>208</sup> As non-state authorities in the illegal drugs economy operate as economic agents trying to maximise their control over resources and markets, the illegal economy can be readily added to this analysis. For example, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde analyse companies and criminal gangs in the context of the economic sector.<sup>209</sup> This demonstrates that their concept of

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<sup>205</sup> This school is associated with a group of scholars that have been working at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and is focusing especially on social and other non-traditional aspects of security.

<sup>206</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 2.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

economic security allows analysis of both the legal and illegal nature of the international economy.

In the context of developing countries, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde also mention the fear these countries have of:

*“[T]he dark side<sup>210</sup> of capitalism and the open trading order in terms of illegal trade- especially drugs, which empowers criminal fraternities, and light weapons (...).”<sup>211</sup>*

It shows that their concept of economic security is not limited to the legal economy and could include an analysis of the illegal aspects of the international economy.

Adding this concept of economic security to the current analysis allows for research that moves away from the classic paradigm of Realism in which threats are mostly related to the core interests of states (particularly external threats to national power), to encompass economic concerns that are unrelated to these core interests. This has two important consequences: first, analysing the drug phenomenon in terms of economic security takes it out of the traditional security context and enables an assessment that goes beyond often futile arguments about the militarisation of drug policy; second, non-state authorities become important actors (alongside states) within the new, non-traditional context of security analysis in the economic sector. This opens the door for more profound analysis of how the illegal drugs economy works and how it relates to the domestic stability of states.

In an increasingly interdependent world economy, brought about (at least to some extent) by the forces of globalisation, a single state cannot control a problem related to economic security that is determined by international transactions, illegal cross-border trade flows and international networks of powerful non-state authorities. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, this new reality has given rise to criticism of the Realist assumptions of international relations.

Before elaborating on the analysis of economic security in relation to the global drugs phenomenon, it is necessary to look at more general processes such as the emergence of non-state actors, new strategic issue areas for states to consider and the often related process of globalisation. In response to the previously dominant theory of Realism, the most important

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<sup>210</sup> Stephen Ellis has spoken of the ‘dark side of globalisation’, referring to the negative effects of globalisation that occur in parallel to its positive effects. See: Stephen Ellis, ‘West Africa's International Drug Trade’, *African Affairs*, Joseph S. Vol. 108, No. 431 (2009), pp. 171-96.

<sup>211</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.*, p. 99.

alternative vision that has been developed is Complex Interdependence theory, exploring and explaining the relative decline of power and authority of the state in present-day international society.

### 4.3 Complex Interdependence theory

The Complex Interdependency school of thought was developed in the late 1970s by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The theory rejects the assumptions of the primacy of military force and issue hierarchy assumed by the theory of Realism.<sup>212</sup> States remain important actors, but they are no longer the sole determining factor in the system of international relations.<sup>213</sup> Using or threatening to use military force may still be of central importance, but it is no longer necessarily the most effective policy instrument states can use to meet their objectives.<sup>214</sup> Military instruments of state power may even prove to be counter-productive, which means that states should increasingly embrace other options.

Rather than classic Realist relationships between states, Complex Interdependence refers to multiple channels of interaction through which states establish cooperative relations in a more dynamic way, through either interstate, trans-governmental or transnational relations.<sup>215</sup> Within these new channels of interaction, new issue areas develop that need to be addressed by states together, resulting in foreign affairs agendas that become more diverse, incorporating issues that previously were considered part of domestic policy.<sup>216</sup> In an ever more interdependent world, the distinction between internal problems (originating at home) and external problems (originating abroad) is fading, reinforcing the need for states to solve transnational problems such as drug trafficking and international organised crime through international cooperation and joint action. Similarly, in the context of security, Kolodziej has argued that the blurring of national and international security issues has resulted in a new perception of international security as an expression of domestic security concerns.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> *International Regimes, op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>213</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, (New York: Longman, 2001), pp. 23-25.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 22.

<sup>217</sup> Edward Kolodziej, 'What is Security and Security Studies?', *Arms Control*, Vol. 13, No 1 (April 1992), p.

In the new reality, there is no issue hierarchy, which in essence indicates that the clear distinction between high and low politics has disappeared. This lack of issue hierarchy means that issue areas such as transnational crime can now rise in priority on foreign affairs agendas whereas before (under classical Realism theory) they would have been subordinated by more structural concerns of the state (for example, state survival, maximisation of the state's relative power (power and influence over other states), etc.).<sup>218</sup> Hollis and Smith summarise the theory of Pluralism (an umbrella term for those schools of thought rejecting the main assumptions of Realism) as follows:

*“The very notion of a foreign policy process changes, as the issues and actors involved challenge the distinction between domestic and international environments. The processes are characterized by a wide range of policy concerns with no obvious hierarchy of dominance. Foreign policy becomes less to do with ensuring the survival of the state, and more to do with managing an environment composed of newly politicized areas and a variety of actors.”*<sup>219</sup>

The state is still important, but loses part of its territorial control and autonomy to a series of non-state authorities and *de facto* powers competing with the state. The theory of Complex Interdependence provides a good starting point for the theoretical framework of this research. To better understand the global drugs phenomenon in the context of international relations, clarification is needed as to why international cooperation and coordination on counter-narcotics policy have become so important and unavoidable.

But it is equally necessary to take a closer look at the global drugs phenomenon's main actors: alongside the state itself, the non-state authorities that not only compete for the states' power and authority but also represent the direct or indirect causes of the state's loss of some of its power and relevance at the level of international society.

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<sup>218</sup> *Power and Interdependence, op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>219</sup> *Explaining and Understanding International Relations, op. cit.* p. 39.

#### 4.4 Non-state authorities

Focusing on the international political economy, Susan Strange signals the decline in the authority of the state within its territorial borders.<sup>220</sup> She connects this decline to a shift in the balance of power from states to market.<sup>221</sup> Although she uses the term ‘market’ to refer to the open world market economy, the parallel illegal international economy can be viewed in the same light when looking at the elaboration of her analysis. Benefiting from this shift of power are non-state authorities that play economic roles within a given society.<sup>222</sup> The clearest example of non-state authorities that function as economic actors are transnational corporations (TNCs) which are making inroads into the domains of power that were previously restricted to the authority of states.<sup>223</sup> But Strange also refers to mafias, drug cartels and other transnational criminal organisations that function as non-state authorities developing into ‘counter-authorities’ that are competing for power with the state.<sup>224</sup>

Any resulting decline of state power is caused by an increase of the authority of world markets and of a diverse set of economic agents that are operating in these markets. Kolodziej has analysed the emerging tensions between states and international economic actors and networks such as multinational corporations.<sup>225</sup> In addition to increasing the scope of security concerns of states, he writes that:

*“These transnational networks inevitably set limits to state coercive power and authority in the pursuit of its welfare imperative.”*<sup>226</sup>

The term ‘welfare imperative’ is interesting as this can be seen in terms of the need to increase economic security at the level of the state.

Similar tensions are created between transnational networks in the illegal economy, for example, in the form of trafficking networks. Within illegal international markets, cartels or similar organised criminal groups clearly exercise authority over other parts of the production chain; over, for example, the coca farmers, processors, middlemen or

<sup>220</sup> Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 3-15.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>225</sup> Edward A. Kolodziej, ‘Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992), p. 428.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 428.

traffickers.<sup>227</sup> To a large extent they operate as a regular business although they are not bound by official state and international rules and regulations. The illegal market has a value chain, price mechanisms, laws of supply and demand, and other characteristics found in regular markets. There are, however, some major differences: the actors operating in the illegal market use violence in pursuit of financial gain and raise revenue through extortion.<sup>228</sup> It could be argued that they play the role of TNCs in world markets that are not fully controlled by governments.<sup>229</sup>

Adding TNCs, transnational organisations in general, and their illegal counterparts to the analysis is valuable to better understand the position of the global drugs phenomenon in international relations. This analysis must, however, also explain how these non-state authorities are different from those in the past (for example the Italian mafia that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in Sicily) and how they compete more effectively for state power and authority than previous non-state actors. The biggest difference identified by Strange is that organised crime has developed from a counter-society with its economic base primarily local and regional, into one where operations are rooted and take place in global markets and use international networks.<sup>230</sup>

As such, criminal organisations, including drug trafficking cartels, have been affected by the forces of globalisation on a scale that can no longer be compared to international interactions of previous centuries. To a certain extent, the internationally operating criminal networks are both a symptom and product of an increasingly globalising world. Developments in transport, logistics, communication, information and financial technologies make their global presence and operations much easier to achieve.

#### **4.5 Globalisation**

Despite the changes that have affected the international system in which criminal actors operate, some elements have not changed. Indeed, patterns of international drug trafficking have remained fairly static and large trafficking networks still dominate the illicit drugs

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<sup>227</sup> *The Retreat of the State, op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.



industry, although small players do appear to be on the rise.<sup>231</sup> For example, taking the case of the international cocaine trade, Colombia is still the world's biggest producer country,<sup>232</sup> while the United States is still the biggest consumer country. Illegal drugs from Colombia are on the whole still smuggled in the same way to the US market as they were 30 or more years ago (although, of course, there have been developments in trafficking routes and there are new ways of concealing the drug shipments).

There have been some minor changes to trafficking patterns, such as shifts in producer or transit countries. For example, the main hub of trafficking operations targeting the US market is now Mexico rather than Colombia as it was previously. Afghanistan has become the number one producer country of opiates, whereas before the 1970s its poppy cultivation and opium production levels were remarkably low. Similarly, since about 2004, West Africa has become an important drug trafficking hub, engendering shifts in the patterns of international trade.<sup>233</sup>

However, despite these slight changes in geographical patterns, the main production centres (Latin America for cocaine and South/South-East Asia for opium and heroin) and main consumption centres (Europe and the United States) remain the same. In fact, even the 1996 assessment that “[m]ost drugs are grown by farmers in Third World countries”<sup>234</sup> still holds true today, despite the fact that Colombia can nowadays hardly be considered a ‘Third World’ country.<sup>235</sup> Thus, while globalisation may have affected the illegal drugs trade, it has not completely changed its underlying trade relationships.

Despite this, as the previous section on non-state authorities has shown, changes in world markets and criminal world market players have indirectly eroded the authority of states and have increasingly become a direct or indirect threat to state authority. How has this happened, when general trade patterns of the illegal drug market have in essence not changed?

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<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73. At the time of concluding the writing of this dissertation (September 2013), it had not yet been confirmed whether Peru will take over Colombia's position as the largest cocaine producer (based on 2012 figures), but given the substantial decline in Colombian production in 2012 this seems to be a likely scenario.

<sup>233</sup> Anne Frintz, ‘Drugs: the new alternative economy of West Africa’, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (February 2013).

<sup>234</sup> Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe and Peter Andreas, *Drug War Politics. The Price of Denial* (London: University of California Press, 1996), p. 11.

<sup>235</sup> The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranks Colombia as an ‘upper-middle income country’. See the factsheet of the OECD on its Development Assistance Committee's list of Official Development Aid recipients (January 2012). Available online at: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/49483614.pdf> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

Moisés Naím has analysed how the transformations of the 1990s have entirely changed the nature and increased the power of illicit markets.<sup>236</sup> While the global system is changing illicit markets, he also sees criminal activities changing the international system, asserting that:

*“Global criminal activities are transforming the international system, upending the rules creating new players, and reconfiguring power in international politics and economics.”*<sup>237</sup>

This affects the sovereignty of states because they can no longer control all trans-border movements. Of course, it can be argued that states never could fully control their borders, but a new reality has made this increasingly difficult. Krasner writes:

*“When contemporary observers assert that the sovereign state is just about dead, they do not mean that constitutional structures are about to disappear. Instead, they mean that technological change has made it very difficult, or perhaps impossible, for states to control movements across their borders of all kinds of material things (from coffee to cocaine) and not-so-material things (from Hollywood movies to capital flows).”*<sup>238</sup>

In addition to their impact on the sovereignty of states, globalising forces appear to increasingly be shaping the international system in which criminal actors operate. Advances in technology (information and communication, transport, navigation, etc.), financial liberalisation, open borders and a general surge in commerce since 1990, are identified as the key transformations that have affected the structure of both the legal and illegal economy.<sup>239</sup> For illegal trading networks, this has resulted in new sources of supply and product destinations and new trafficking routes.<sup>240</sup>

The illegal economy has also benefited from the increase of ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states since 1990.<sup>241</sup> States and regions with limited rule of law and limited control over their

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<sup>236</sup> *Illicit. How smugglers, traffickers and copycats are hijacking the global economy, op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>238</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sovereignty’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 122 (January and February 2001), p. 21.

<sup>239</sup> *Illicit. How smugglers, traffickers and copycats are hijacking the global economy, op. cit.*, pp. 17-24.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

national territory, for example in West Africa and the Balkans, have opened up new market opportunities or have become important trafficking hubs. Lack of rule of law and low levels of central government control are also among the reasons why illegal opium poppy cultivation has become so ubiquitous and significant in Afghanistan after 2001. Poverty, underdevelopment, insecurity and the slow recovery from previous conflicts provide other explanations.

In addition to the above-mentioned changes, technological developments have also created new illegal substances, causing a partial shift from plant-based to synthetic drugs such as amphetamines. This shift is significant because it could, in the long term, seriously decrease the importance of plant-based drugs in the illegal drugs market. Such a shift would also mean that production centres would not be confined to territories with certain agronomic or climatic conditions.<sup>242</sup> As such, the dynamics of the illegal drug market could completely change, necessitating new international approaches to tackle the illegal drug phenomenon. However, the analysis of these potential future changes lies beyond the scope of this research.

Applying the term ‘globalisation’ to the context of the illegal economy has also been disputed. R.T. Naylor has criticised the blurred nature of the concept. He argues that while it is true that developments in information and communication technology, combined with more open borders have affected and boosted the illegal part of the international economy, they have also hugely impacted the legal international economy, meaning that the “*ratio of illegal to legal business*” may actually have remained the same or even may have decreased.<sup>243</sup>

Naím is less concerned by this argument and contends that the changing nature of the illegal economy is a by-product of the policies of the international community, which aim to increase levels of global economic integration and encourage open and integrated economies and increasingly open societies.<sup>244</sup> In other words, the forces of globalisation have purposely brought benefits to the legal global economy. In parallel, they have equally benefited the illegal global economy, deepening and reinforcing the potential impact, power and influence of trafficking and other criminal networks at the expense of the authority of states. This is

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<sup>242</sup> Besides a possible shift to the production of more synthetic drugs, large-scale indoor cannabis production in the Netherlands already demonstrates that with the proper technology, the climatic conditions of, for example, Morocco are not needed to produce high quality cannabis.

<sup>243</sup> R.T. Naylor, *Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 5.

<sup>244</sup> *Illicit. How smugglers, traffickers and copycats are hijacking the global economy, op. cit.*, p. 36.

the new reality that states face as they seek to address the increasing challenge posed by internationally or globally operating non-state authorities.

According to Naím, the biggest change in recent years has been the financial revolution that has taken place over the past two decades, making it easier for drug traffickers to finance, manage and whitewash the proceeds of their illegal operations.<sup>245</sup> The same applies to organised crime in general and for other non-state actors such as insurgent or terrorist groups. John Gray writes:

*“As capital has gone global, so has crime. Nearly everywhere, the irregular armies and political organisations that practice the new forms of warfare are linked with the global criminal economy.”*<sup>246</sup>

These new forms of ‘warfare’ have transformed security policies of states. Peter Andreas and Richard Price have analysed a shift in states’ foreign policy from fighting wars to fighting organised crime.<sup>247</sup> Taking into account the number of ongoing wars across the planet, this can only be a partial shift, but it is nonetheless important to realise that states, especially since the end of the Cold War, have increasingly associated threats to national security with terrorism and organised crime.<sup>248</sup>

It is the financial aspect of globalisation in particular that has significantly changed the dynamics of the global drugs phenomenon. Rexton Kan writes:

*“Following the Cold War, numerous civil wars erupted, creating new demands for funds. (...) A variety of warring groups, such as insurgents, guerrillas, paramilitaries, militias, and professional armies, have found wider opportunities to generate support from illicit activities to meet varying goals (...).”*<sup>249</sup>

This relates directly to the ‘economics and conflict’ literature that will be explored in Chapter 5 (see section 5.4). The financial aspect is equally important in the ‘crime terror nexus’ which will be discussed in section 5.5. The United States has greatly increased the

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<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>246</sup> John Gray, *Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2003), p. 74.

<sup>247</sup> Peter Andreas and Richard Price, ‘From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State’, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 31-52.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>249</sup> *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, op. cit.*, p. 2.

importance of the counter-terrorism pillar of its national security strategy, particularly since the September 11 attacks in 2001, with a special focus on the financial sources (including crime) of terrorist organisations. Perhaps it is the financial aspects of globalisation that have truly created a new international system that is so very different from pre-1989 eras of ‘globalisation’. In section 4.7 below on Neo-Realism, the financial relationship between the illegal drugs economy and destabilising challenges to national security will be addressed in more detail.

Whether or not reinforced by international financial factors, the erosion of state authority probably represents the biggest change in international relations over the past 40 years. But does this mean that state control has been seriously undermined? Krasner does not think so:

*“There is no evidence that globalization has systematically undermined state control; indeed, the clearest relationship between globalization and state activity is that they have increased hand-in-hand, and in some arenas states are more capable than they have been in the past.”<sup>250</sup>*

There is a paradox at play in which states have been at the same time both strengthened and weakened by the process of globalisation. But regardless of the increasing importance of states in some issue areas, the rising number of non-state actors and the expansion of the roles they play in international relations cannot be denied. Some of them affect or even limit the authority of states. The next section will address the notion of authority in more detail, in the context of the theory of Neo-Medievalism.

#### **4.6 Neo-Medievalism and the transformation of international society**

The growing importance of non-state actors and transnational processes has been compared to the multi-actor and multi-authority system of the Middle Ages. Hedley Bull introduced the notion of ‘Neo-Medievalism’ into International Relations theory, contemplating that a new

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<sup>250</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Abiding Sovereignty’, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2001), p. 236.

system could emerge of “*overlapping or segmented authority*”<sup>251</sup> that characterised the medieval period. Despite the obvious differences between medieval order and the current international system of states, the comparison is nonetheless useful to try to better understand how international society has been transformed over time.

Although a strong proponent of the state-centric view of International Relations, Bull suggests that the evidence of a neo-medieval international order may be found in five features of the current system of world politics (using Bull’s terminology):<sup>252</sup>

- 1) the “*regional integration of states*” (e.g. the European Union);
- 2) the “*disintegration of states*” (e.g. separatist movements in the Basque or Catalan autonomous regions in Spain that could become new states);
- 3) the “*restoration of private international violence*” (caused by either international organisations (e.g., NATO or the UN) or by political groups and other non-state actors such as private military companies);
- 4) the growing influence of “*transnational organisations*” (e.g. multinational corporations, but also their illegal counterparts: the transnational organised criminal organisations);
- 5) the “*technological unification of the world*” as a result of globalisation.<sup>253</sup>

Joseph Nye has also used the comparison with the first feudal period in the Middle Ages (roughly speaking between the fifth and the tenth centuries), emphasising that new non-state actors do not directly compete with states but rather provide a new layer of international relations and dynamics that the state cannot fully control.<sup>254</sup> From this perspective, non-state actors involved in drug trafficking do not directly attack the sovereignty of states, but rather provide the state with challenges it can no longer deal with singlehandedly or by using established policies of the past.<sup>255</sup> In the case of Colombia in the 1980s and early 1990s, it can be argued that the drug phenomenon posed a problem of domestic terrorism and violence threatening the authority of the state, rather than jeopardising its sovereignty.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 254-255.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 254, 255.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 255-266.

<sup>254</sup> *La Paradoja del Poder Norteamericano, op. cit.*, pp. 87, 88.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

<sup>256</sup> William O. Walker III, ‘The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: U.S. Drug Policy and Colombian State Stability, 1978-1997’, in: H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (eds.), *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), p. 153.

While perhaps not jeopardising the sovereignty of states, the non-state actors of the illegal drugs economy can be considered to be part of the network of transnational organisations that increasingly competes with states for power and authority. Following the historic analogy of the Middle Ages, the drug cartels and networks of shopkeepers, traders and other middlemen in the illegal drugs economy could be seen as modern-day equivalents of the ‘translocal’ actors of the medieval times: guilds or trade associations and commercial leagues.<sup>257</sup>

Although neo-medievalism is essentially impossible in Bull’s vision of the international society where states continue to be the dominant units, the theoretical concept has nonetheless resurfaced in more recent scholarly research. For example, Barry Buzan has added a useful elaboration to the debate about whether a situation of anarchy produces an international society that becomes more homogenous or more heterogeneous. He draws on terminology first elaborated by Kenneth Waltz, based on the idea that states may become (more) like each other following international interaction (so-called ‘like-units’), or that they do not become like one another (so-called ‘un-like units’):

*“In a neomedieval international system, the only possibility for shared identity is not in acceptance of likeness as units but in acceptance of a set of rules that legitimize the differentiation of units and establish the distribution of rights and responsibilities among functionally differentiated actors.”*<sup>258</sup>

This suggests that in the context of the creation of international rules, international arrangements such as international regimes could be more important in developing an international society than any shared cultural identity between states and other actors. Nevertheless, as international regimes are built on at least some shared norms, principles and converging expectations around an issue area, it is likely that international interaction and cooperation will, to a certain extent not only be based on but will also create, more cultural commonalities between states.

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<sup>257</sup> *Constructing the World Polity. Essays on international institutionalization*, *op. cit.*, p. 145. Saskia Sassen also touches upon this question in her analysis of how “intercity trade and the mobilities of particular corporate groups (...) produced a specific type of spatiality” leading to a system of “urbanized authorities” over the intercity trade routes of the Middle Ages. See: Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 29.

<sup>258</sup> ‘From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School’, *op. cit.*, pp. 335, 336.

Regardless of whether states continue to be the dominant source of authority in international society, a new global domain might be emerging in which non-state actors can also become sources of authority, similar to the multi-actor system of the Middle Ages. In Colombia, the FARC movement is a clear source of authority, controlling some territories, and farming communities, natural resources and around 8,000 guerrilla fighters.<sup>259</sup> However, in line with one of the central tenets of the English school, Buzan argues that any type of neo-medieval international society that may arise will probably need to evolve from a solid international society that is based on converging, similar units.<sup>260</sup>

Sociologist Saskia Sassen<sup>261</sup> uses medieval history in a different way. It is not a 'medieval' type of system that is being recreated, but the medieval influence on the current international system of states that indirectly allows us to understand globalisation. Sassen first explores the emergence of territorial states and the concept of sovereign authority through the development of key capabilities during the medieval period.<sup>262</sup> This is particularly relevant in the current context because the transformation from the medieval order to the order of states can help understand the current transformation from the predominantly national to a global order. Just as certain "*capabilities*" developed during the medieval period (e.g. a system of collecting taxes<sup>263</sup>) helped to create states, similarly the global order will also be built on the foundations of capabilities of the national domain. The same applies to the economic realm of globalisation. Sassen writes:

*"(...) [T]oday's most developed form of globalization, economic corporate globalization, could not have happened without the use of highly developed capabilities of national economies."*<sup>264</sup>

Echoing the discussion in section 4.5 about how present-day globalisation differs from earlier periods of internationalisation, Sassen argues that there is a substantial difference between the scale of the world economy in earlier times and the scale of today's global

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<sup>259</sup> Juan Carlos Monroy Giraldo, 'El negocio de las droga de cara a diálogo con Farc', *El Colombiano* (27 September 2012).

<sup>260</sup> 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School', *op. cit.*, p. 336.

<sup>261</sup> Saskia Sassen distances herself from the International Political Economy scholarship on states. See: *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, chapter 2.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.



economic system.<sup>265</sup> Sassen attributes this change in scale to the growing number of ‘global projects’ that an increasing number of states are developing to create international systems.<sup>266</sup> Those global systems, a concept very similar to the notion of ‘international regimes’, are different from earlier global systems:

*“In earlier periods, including Bretton Woods, the logic was geared towards building national states; in today’s phase, it is geared toward building global systems inside national states.”*<sup>267</sup>

Overall, Sassen’s understanding of globalisation is very valuable. She sees globalisation – *“the emerging apparatus of global institutions and dynamics”* – as a transformation that to a large extent is intrinsic to the national domain.<sup>268</sup> Developments at the domestic level determine the changes at the international level. She explains:

*“Today’s world scale is constituted as foundationally different from the earlier scale. [It] is constituted in good part through the insertion of global projects into a growing number of nation-states with the purpose of forming global systems (...).”*<sup>269</sup>

The notion of global projects is interesting for this research. States can be considered to come together to address the global drugs phenomenon as a global project or a series of linked global projects. These global projects are based on a set of shared principles and norms, and can take shape with a corresponding set of common actions. As such, a global project is an international regime or a sub-regime addressing parts of the global drugs phenomenon that cannot be tackled by states individually.

According to Sassen, two sets of dynamics are driving the transformation taking place at the international level: first, the formation of explicitly global institutions (e.g. the World Trade Organization) and global processes (e.g. global financial markets); and second, the coming into being of new processes originating predominantly from within the national domain but *“oriented towards global agendas and systems.”*<sup>270</sup> The latter set of dynamics

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<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.* p. 16.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

connects sub-national or national actors across borders within international networks. Sassen uses the example of national activists from different countries coming together to support a global agenda (e.g. climate change activists or the Anonymous movement against internet censorship). These dynamics can also arguably be applied to organised crime and the black market of illicit commodities when criminal groups connect across borders around a common objective; gaining control over and making large profits within lucrative illegal markets.

The origin of most criminal organisations, whether or not employing members of many different nationalities, can normally be traced back to a geographically limited, local setting that often has very little international characteristics. For example, they can be established within a specific family (e.g. the Bonanno crime family in New York), a city (e.g. the Medellín cartel), a region of a country (e.g. the Sicilian mafia in Italy or the Sinaloa Cartel in the Pacific state of Mexico), a national or ethnic group (e.g. Japanese Yakuza, or criminal groups in diaspora communities,<sup>271</sup> and other groups sharing the same ethnicity or nationality).<sup>272</sup> From these roots in local, sub-national or national identities, they build cross-border networks or expand to areas beyond their original territory. They may not have a global agenda beyond simple profit maximisation and economies of scale, but come together (or compete with each other) in a global market characterised by internationally controlled substances and the corresponding promise of high profits. While the origins of these criminal actors may be sub-national, it is often the international character of their operations that make them lucrative. An example of this can be found in the price surges in illegal commodities when crossing borders and the relatively cheap sourcing in supply countries.

The full analysis of Sassen's comprehensive analytical framework of using concepts of 'territory', 'authority' and 'rights' to explore both the national and global domain goes beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, there are two relevant components in her analytical framework – territory and authority – which can be applied to the study of the illicit economy. She includes authority as one of the basic foundational components of her

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<sup>271</sup> See for example: Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano, 'Introduction', in: Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano (eds.), *Transnational organized crime and international security: business as usual?* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2002), p. 5.

<sup>272</sup> Similarly, even internationally operating terrorist groups can be considered to have national or local roots. Al Qaeda, probably the first terrorist groups described as a 'global organisation' could not have started without its roots in Pakistan during the organisation of the Mujahedeen's resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and its subsequent development in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Yemen where local conditions determined the growth and consolidation of the group. For a description of the global character of Al Qaeda, see: *Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern, op. cit.*, p. 77.

theory on globalisation.<sup>273</sup> In the parallel illegal economy, ‘authority’ can be analysed in terms of the ‘counter authority’ or even ‘counter state’<sup>274</sup> (or ‘parallel state’) originating in organised criminal organisations or other groups such as insurgent or terrorist groups tapping into the illegal economy.

Where relevant, the concept of ‘authority’ will be included in the analysis of Part II of this research, the case study of three regions in Colombia. In addition to the ‘counter authority’ represented by non-state actors in the illegal drugs economy, there is a broader, international concept of authority at play: the formation of international regimes can be considered to represent the concrete embodiment of the internationalisation of authority.<sup>275</sup> A strong international regime will normally develop elements of authority similar to any kind of collective framework with institutionalised behaviour.<sup>276</sup> Thus, while individual countries are in control when determining to join, shape or change an international regime such as the global drug control system, the regime builds up an authority of its own, sometimes with corresponding ‘sticks’ (e.g. in the form of possible sanctions or policies of ‘naming and shaming’) that the regime can impose on states that do not comply with the rules and regulations of the regime. The INCB can be considered such an authority.

Sassen’s second relevant component is ‘territory’, relating to the borders of the state. Indeed, for this research, Sassen’s focus on border concepts is perhaps the most pertinent element of her analysis.<sup>277</sup> She argues that there are new types of bordered spaces, quite inaccessible to outsiders, which cut across conventional interstate borders.<sup>278</sup> Illicit trading networks create and navigate these new bordered spaces.<sup>279</sup> Trafficking networks (or the FARC) operate across borders between, for example, Colombia and Venezuela, Mexico and the United States or in the area of the Golden Triangle in South-East Asia. Although there are formal state borders, these merely become operational obstacles within the unified territory of a given criminal network or gang, to be negotiated through bribes, violence or inventive smuggling techniques. Another interesting example from Sassen’s work is her

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<sup>273</sup> *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>274</sup> The term ‘counter-state’ or ‘parallel state’ has been used extensively in the context of insurgencies or guerrilla movements within countries. See, for example, Timothy W. Luke, ‘The Insurgency of Global Empire and the Counterinsurgency of Local Resistance: New World Order in an Era of Civilian Provisional Authority’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2007), pp. 419-434.

<sup>275</sup> *Constructing the World Polity. Essays on international institutionalization*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>277</sup> ‘When National Territory Is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel Borderings’, *op. cit.*

<sup>278</sup> Email correspondence with Saskia Sassen (25 August 2011).

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.* (25 August 2011).

concept of the bordered space formed by the Fairtrade certification and labelling system, which operates both within and across national borders.<sup>280</sup>

Of course, these bordered spaces can also be found within the territory of one country. UNODC's threat assessment about the globalisation of crime discusses this phenomenon:

*“Organized crime can become even more important when rebels gain exclusive control of a portion of a country. The pseudo-states thus created have no international accountability and, particularly when strategically placed, often become trafficking hubs and retail centres for all manner of illicit goods and services. They also continue to pose a threat to national and international security, providing a safe haven for international fugitives, including terrorists.”*<sup>281</sup>

The control of the Taliban in some parts in southern Afghanistan provides an example of territories that are defined by the economy of the illegal opium trade in opium production centres. Opium poppy cultivation is by far highest in the most disputed areas of the country where the Taliban has more support and more territorial control.<sup>282</sup>

At the level of the city or neighbourhood, there are similar borders that take the form of the so-called ‘invisible border’, demarcating the territories of different gangs controlling parts of the neighbourhood. In the Colombian city of Medellín, there are regular news stories about people being gunned down crossing an invisible border that ‘marks’ the territory of another *combo* (gang).<sup>283</sup>

In extreme cases, a government can even decide to cede control over part of its territory. Colombia's experience in this context is of particular interest. President Pastrana's ‘peace laboratory’, a demilitarised zone (the ‘Caguán demilitarised zone’ in San Vicente del Caguán in South Colombia), became *quasi* FARC-held territory as part of peace negotiations (1999-2002) that ultimately collapsed. The territory not only provided a safe haven to the

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<sup>280</sup> Saskia Sassen, ‘When Territory Deborders Territoriality’, *Territory, Politics, Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (21 March 2013), pp. 33, 34.

<sup>281</sup> *The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>282</sup> In 2009, the Taliban stronghold of Helmand province contained around 57 percent of the total poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for that year. See: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009. Summary Findings* (Vienna: UNODC, 2008), p. 8.

<sup>283</sup> See, for example: Jim Glade, ‘2 students shot dead in Medellín's Comuna 13’, *Colombia Reports* (13 May 2011).

FARC but also gave them unlimited access to the illegal coca economy. Francisco Thoumi writes:

*“This zone included some of the main coca-producing areas and was used by FARC to expand its participation in the illicit drug trade.”*<sup>284</sup>

The ‘Caguán peace process’ still casts a long shadow over the current peace negotiations taking place in La Havana as its failure has made it more difficult for the Santos government to make concessions.<sup>285</sup>

The alternative interpretation of borders generating new territories not (fully) controlled by states, is included in the analysis of the International Economic Security Regime and the case study in Colombia. An international regime on supply reduction policies must deal with economic spaces (often cutting across official state borders), in which traffickers and other criminal groups operate. These areas also include those spaces where illegal drug-producing plants are grown, where drugs are processed, where trafficking networks originate and where they operate. If the structure of the RISE can be constructed as a partial regime focusing on specific parts of the issue area of supply reduction and source control, it can be understood to govern such economic spaces.

Ideally, the RISE would determine and drive international cooperation to address the global drugs phenomenon in specific territories, not only inside but also outside of Colombia. For example, the geographical area where coca bush can be grown, principally in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, could be considered one vast economic territorial space where invisible borders are demarcated by the agricultural conditions necessary for coca cultivation. In this interpretation, climatic and agricultural conditions become more important than official state borders to determine where states should cooperate to address the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon.

Similarly, a ‘trafficking territorial space’ could be identified that would cover the main trading routes connecting a specific cultivation or production area to an important consumer market. In this case, the logistical opportunities and available transport routes

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<sup>284</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes, op. cit.*, p. 90.

<sup>285</sup> For a discussion of the challenges of the current peace process and the linkages with drug policy, see: Jorrit Kamminga, ‘Klem tussen oorlog in de Colombiaanse jungle en de spotlights van La Habana’, *Internationale Spectator*, Vol. 67, No. 2 (February 2013), pp. 56-59 and Jorrit Kamminga, ‘Peace with the FARC: Integrating Drug-Fueled Guerrillas into Alternative Development Programs?’, *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 6, Issue 6 (June 2013), pp. 26-29.

would determine where international cooperation should be geographically focused. The very existence of such non-traditional, bordered economic spaces reiterates the need for an international response to tackle the supply of illicit drugs stemming from these areas. The analysis of this phenomenon goes beyond the scope of this research but will be included at the end as a possible topic of ‘further research’.

#### **4.7 Neo-Realism**

This dissertation has thus far discussed some important questions regarding the emergence of the global drugs phenomenon as an important security issue: its shift from low to high politics; the logic of international cooperation to address it; the rise of non-state actors within it and the influence of the dynamics of globalisation. But there is one important question that still needs to be addressed. Do states still matter?<sup>286</sup> To answer this question, this section will discuss Neo-Realism. This theory was developed from the end of the 1970s (as an alternative theory to Realism, the dominant concept since the 1930s) in the face of important changes in international society and the international system of states.

Examining the theoretical perspectives above, through the lens of the global changes of the past four decades, it becomes clear that these changes have affected the behaviour of states and limited their room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, states are still the dominant actors in international relations, despite the influence of globalisation on the environment in which they operate and coordinate their policies.

For the purpose of this research, Neo-Realism can be understood as a theoretical paradigm that builds on Realism by including economic factors in the analysis of power-maximising states. Hollis and Smith write:

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<sup>286</sup> This is the question of a huge volume of International Relations theory. It could even be considered one of the central questions of International Relations after 1970.

*“The first [area of concern] is an attempt to rectify Realism’s inability to deal with the economic issues. (...) Neo-Realists see states as able to control international economic transactions in a way that restores explanatory power to Realist assumptions about the role of the power-maximizing state. (...) International economic regimes are embodiments of structural power in the international system, and their existence allows states to control one area of the international agenda that eluded Realism.”*<sup>287</sup>

This area is defined by economic factors influencing the behaviour and power relations of states. According to Neo-Realists such as Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin, state power still aims to increase the state’s influence in international society, but the instruments of state power are not limited to military resources, but also include a wide range of economic and political assets.<sup>288</sup> Military strength is, therefore, no longer the only important factor in determining the state’s relative power and influence in comparison with other states.

Within the theoretical paradigm of Neo-Realism, the issue area of the global drugs phenomenon (understood here as primarily an economic issue caused in essence by the political and legal decision to prohibit certain types of narcotic and psychotropic substances), is particularly important because by threatening domestic stability it indirectly affects the state’s national security and power. Using a Neo-Realist approach, a state will be less concerned by the socio-economic or public health challenges the global drugs phenomenon poses to its population, than with national security threats and challenges related to the domestic instability caused by the illegal drugs economy.

As already touched upon in section 4.5 on globalisation above, such threats should increasingly be understood in terms of financial relationships, for example between insurgent or terrorist groups and the global drugs phenomenon; from funding derived from the illegal drugs trade to drug money corrupting political institutions or politicians. John Gray writes:

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<sup>287</sup> *Explaining and Understanding International Relations, op. cit.*, pp. 36, 37.

<sup>288</sup> *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses, op. cit.*, p. 23.

*“Terrorism and the trade in illegal drugs are intertwined. Most terrorist organisations derive a significant portion of their income from the drugs trade. In many parts of the world, they have formed symbiotic relationships with organised crime. Crimes such as trafficking in people and identity theft are part of their everyday business.”*<sup>289</sup>

Thus, for Colombia, Neo-Realists will predict that the government is less concerned with drug addiction than with drug-funded terrorism or crime which could potentially affect the stability or security of the state. The same applies to any country assisting Colombia and worried about the external effects of drugs-related terrorism.

It is important to realise that any kind of relationship between terrorist, insurgent or paramilitary organisations and the illegal drugs trade will predominantly be more a ‘*mariage de convenance*’ than based on any kind of shared ideological or political agenda.<sup>290</sup> In other words, non-state actors benefiting from the illegal drugs economy will do so primarily because of opportunistic reasons, not because they want to be part of this economy for intrinsic reasons related to ideology, identity or politics.<sup>291</sup>

The only two exceptions to this loose relationship are: 1) the case of drug cartels using violence to pursue political goals (e.g. the Medellín Cartel’s attempt to put pressure on the Government to withdraw the 1979 extradition agreement with the United States through a bloody campaign of terror<sup>292</sup>); and 2) the case when political, terrorist or insurgent groups gradually abandon their ideological or political agenda and move into the direction of becoming *quasi* for-profit criminal organisations themselves. The latter exception concerns a transformation that is similar to what in the context of civil wars has been described as a shift from political grievance to economic greed.<sup>293</sup> Cornell explains:

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<sup>289</sup> *Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern, op. cit.*, pp. 90, 91.

<sup>290</sup> The author has analysed the concept of a ‘marriage of convenience’ in the context of Afghanistan. See: Jorrit Kamminga, ‘Afghanistan: Linkages Between the Illegal Opium Economy, International Crime and Terrorism’ in: David Spivack (ed.), *Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan for the Production of Morphine and Other Essential Medicines* (Kabul: Senlis Council, 2005), pp. 349, 350.

<sup>291</sup> Sporadic accounts of terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda being involved in the illegal drugs trade to ‘poison the unbelievers’ are the exception and not the rule of why terrorist organisations are involved in the illegal drugs economy.

<sup>292</sup> ‘The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: U.S. Drug Policy and Colombian State Stability, 1978-1997’, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

<sup>293</sup> See for example: Paul Collier, ‘Doing Well Out of War’ in: Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.): *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) or Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, *Oxford Economic Papers*, New Series, Vol. 56, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 563-595.



*“Perhaps the most dangerous impact of the link between narcotics and conflict is the potential for changing motivational structures within insurgent groups arising from involvement in the drug trade. Increasing drug production in situations of civil war creates economic functions of violence for actors on both sides of the conflict and, hence, incentives for the continuation of conflict.”*<sup>294</sup>

Such dynamics may lead to the prolongation of conflict as there is no economic incentive for non-state actors to give up their highly lucrative position of being able to tap into the illegal drugs economy and other forms of crime.<sup>295</sup> Earlier demobilisations of conflict parties in Colombia have shown that somewhere between 10 to 15 percent of the demobilised fighters will continue in other criminal activities such as the drugs trade.<sup>296</sup>

Of course it is not only Neo-Realism which has incorporated economic factors in its theory. In fact, the fields of Neo-Realism and what is known as Neoliberal Institutionalism (or Neo-Liberalism) have converged considerably in their analysis of international economic factors and even share very similar analytical foundations.<sup>297</sup> Krasner describes one of the main differences between the two paradigms as follows:

*“(...) [F]or neorealism the basic issues are survival and distributional conflict while for neoliberalism they involve the resolution of market failures.”*<sup>298</sup>

Another difference is Neo-Realism’s focus on the potential use of force as an ever present possibility for states (or at least as a factor influencing state behaviour at all times) and on relative power calculations (whether or not reflected in international institutions). Neo-Liberalism on the other hand, generally focuses more on the role of institutions as correcting problems of market failure, and less as embodiments or reflections of relative power relationships between states.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Svante E. Cornell, ‘The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict’, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (November 2005), p. 758.

<sup>295</sup> This is an interesting thought in the context of the ongoing peace process between the Colombian government and FARC launched officially in October 2012.

<sup>296</sup> Daniel Rivera Marín, ‘Gran reto del proceso de paz: tener un buen proyecto de reinserción’, *El Colombiano* (29 October 2012), p. 5.

<sup>297</sup> John Gerard Ruggie analyses this convergence in: *Constructing the World Polity. Essays on international institutionalization*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-11.

<sup>298</sup> Stephen Krasner quoted by Ruggie from an unpublished manuscript in: *Constructing the World Polity. Essays on international institutionalization*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9. 10.

An interesting theoretical bridge between the Neo-Liberal perspective and the statist view of Neo-Realism would be the extreme case of states or non-state actors tolerating or even promoting illicit drug cultivation and production because of comparative advantages normally associated with the legal economy. Andreas explains this as follows:

*“Viewed from the economic perspective of comparative advantage (as stressed by neoliberal economics), (...) a reliance on illegal drug crops can be interpreted as rational specialization based on a country’s competitiveness in a global market niche (thus, Afghan poppy growers and Bolivian coca farmers are, in a sense, taking the advice of western liberal economic advisors literally by growing high-demand export crops in which they have a competitive advantage and that offers them the highest international market returns).”<sup>300</sup>*

As will be described in more detail in Chapter 5 on economic security theory, in the Neo-Realist view, such an economic comparative advantage could be considered as part of the power calculations of a state and its (economic) strengths and weaknesses *vis-à-vis* its main competitors.

Neo-Realism provides the best explanatory framework for international cooperation between states on the issue of the global drugs phenomenon. While the importance of non-state actors that both influence and shape the global drugs phenomenon cannot be denied, it is still at the level of states and their national interests and priorities that decisions are made to collaborate or not when it comes to policies that address the supply side of drug control. These decisions will often be based on calculations of domestic interest related to political or economic power.

#### **4.8 The Structuralist perspective**

This section examines the Structuralist theoretical perspective, which adds to the theoretical framework of this research with its focus on the relationship between states in more and less developed parts of the world, respectively known as the ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ of the international society of states. In the context of the economic character of the drug

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<sup>300</sup> ‘Illicit international political economy: the clandestine side of globalization’, *op. cit.*, p. 645.

phenomenon at the international level, this makes it pertinent to this research. It is one of the few theoretical paradigms almost entirely based on the analysis of economic interests of states. Hollis and Smith write the following about this perspective:

“[T]he state is still a dominant actor in international relations, but in a very specific sense, which is that of representing a set of economic interests.”<sup>301</sup>

In this way, the economic interests determine the state itself and the way it interacts with other states. The Structuralist approach is normally associated with a Marxist interpretation of how international society works. Thus, the main analysis often involves the position of classes and the location of states within an international system dominated by capitalism.<sup>302</sup> The underlying idea is that some classes or countries benefit more than others from this international system. As a result, the world can be described in terms of centre-periphery relations – either between classes within a state or between different countries – that maintain or reinforce economic domination by some over others.

While it is difficult to describe the global drugs phenomenon in terms of international relations of dependency or domination, the most useful aspect of the theory of Structuralism is its central focus on economic interests, and the way these affect centre-periphery relationships. Within the production and trade patterns of the illegal drugs economy, there may no longer be a clear distinction between drug producing and drug consuming regions or countries, but there are nevertheless broad patterns of illegal trade flows going from less to more developed countries.

Plant-based illicit drugs are still mainly cultivated and produced in less developed regions of the world (although some of these countries are clearly emerging economies), with the exception of cannabis herb which is also produced substantially in Western European countries such as the Netherlands.<sup>303</sup> The main coca growing countries are Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.<sup>304</sup> The main opium poppy growing countries are Afghanistan in South-West Asia, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and Myanmar in South-East Asia<sup>305</sup>. The principal cannabis resin producing countries are Afghanistan and

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<sup>301</sup> *Explaining and Understanding International Relations, op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>303</sup> *World Drug Report 2012, op. cit.*, pp. 47, 48.

<sup>304</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Morocco.<sup>306</sup> Afghanistan and Myanmar are classified by the World Bank as low income countries. Bolivia, Morocco and Lao PDR are classed as lower middle income countries, and Colombia and Peru as upper middle income countries.<sup>307</sup> By contrast, the main consumer markets for cocaine are found predominantly in North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand.<sup>308</sup> The largest markets for (Afghan) opium and heroin continue to be Europe and the Russian Federation.<sup>309</sup> This indicates that some elements of economic interdependence, underdevelopment or an uneven distribution of economic assets may be part of the global patterns shaping supply and demand in the illegal drugs economy.

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<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>307</sup> World Bank, *World Bank List of Economies* (July 2012). The classification is valid until 1 July 2013.

<sup>308</sup> *World Drug Report 2012*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*, Section B. Illicit Opium Market, pp. 26-34.

## CHAPTER 5: ECONOMIC SECURITY THEORY

The following four chapters will be more closely related to the main objective of this research. They work towards the creation of the RISE, combining the Neo-Realist approach of international regimes with a theoretical perspective on the concept of economic security applied (in both a positive and negative way) to the supply side of the illegal drugs economy. The new functional instrument that results from these four chapters, the RISE, is subsequently tested in Part II in the context of the case study of Colombia.

This chapter analyses the concept of economic security, the first pillar of the RISE instrument. It begins by exploring the economic nature of the global drugs phenomenon, before addressing linkages with alternative development. The chapter then examines how the issue area has been approached thus far by security studies and international relations theorists, concentrating in particular on two bodies of literature: ‘crime terror nexus’ literature and ‘economics and conflict’ literature. The final three sections of the chapter (sections 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8), are pivotal because they prepare the concept of economic security for its inclusion in the instrument of the RISE as one of the two key pillars that determine why states cooperate on the issue area of illicit drug supply reduction in source countries. The last section (5.8) contains the author’s analysis of the concept of economic security.

### 5.1 The economic nature of the global drugs phenomenon

At its heart, the global illicit drug phenomenon is primarily an economic affair. Similarly, at its origin, the illegal trade in drugs is a market problem.<sup>310</sup> In fact, focusing on the plant-based illicit drugs, it can be described in terms of commodity systems found in the markets of the legal economy. Such systems include:

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<sup>310</sup> *Drug War Politics. The Price of Denial, op. cit.*, p. 12.

*“(...) all the participants in the production, processing, and marketing of a single farm product, including farm suppliers, farmers, storage operators, processors, wholesalers, and retailers involved in a commodity flow from initial inputs to the final consumer.”*<sup>311</sup>

Within the commodity system of the illegal economy, demand for illicit drugs drives supply in a black market economy with relatively high prices for these illegal commodities. The economic laws of supply and demand within the black market economy do not only determine the price of illicit drugs, but also to a large extent determine the potential success of any counter-narcotics policy measures. For example, if demand remains high or stable for an illicit drug such as cocaine, any successful efforts of reducing supply will simply increase black market prices, inflating profits and encouraging newcomers to enter the illegal drugs economy. R.T. Naylor has expressed this in the strongest way by stating that throughout history, black markets have never been overcome through supply reduction policies.<sup>312</sup> He elaborates:

*“Supply-side controls act, much like price supports in agriculture, to encourage production and increase profits. At best a few intermediaries get knocked out of business. But as long as demand persists, the market is served more or less as before.”*<sup>313</sup>

Bertram, Blachman, Sharpe and Andreas concur, stating that the central objective of supply reduction – to substantially increase the price of drugs and to lower their availability, has never been met.<sup>314</sup> Their analysis is, however, apparently contradicted in the case of the Taliban’s ban on opium cultivation in Afghanistan, which seems to provide an example of this causality. However, the one-year experience of the Taliban’s ban in 2000/2001, which did drastically drive opium supply down and (eventually) prices up, is much more the exception than the rule.<sup>315</sup> However, of course, supply reduction policies are not

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<sup>311</sup> Ray A. Goldberg and Leonard M. Wilson, *Agribusiness Management for Developing Countries – Latin America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 4.

<sup>312</sup> *Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy*, op. cit., p.11.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>314</sup> *Drug War Politics. The Price of Denial*, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>315</sup> Martin Jelsma, ‘Learning lessons from the Taliban opium ban’, *International Journal of Drug Policy*, Vol. 16, Issue 2 (March 2005), pp. 98-103.

implemented in isolation and it is impossible to analyse the effects of a global counter-narcotics approach that entirely ignores the supply side.

Regardless, a steady demand for black market commodities will continue to provide traffickers with lucrative market opportunities. The illegal nature of the illicit drugs economy presents what James Inciardi calls a ‘crime tax’, which is the difference between a commodity’s price in the legal and the illegal markets.<sup>316</sup> Ted Galen Carpenter also writes about this crime tax:

*“The tax is reaped principally by traffickers, who pass a sufficient amount of it on to induce peasant growers and minor underlings to flock to the drug enterprise with abandon. Thus, illegality makes it almost impossible to devise a policy mix (risks and incentives) that would generally induce growers to abandon their crop.”*<sup>317</sup>

The phenomenon of the crime tax leads to what is known as the ‘profit paradox’. Given the high profitability of illegal substances, any successful attempt to tackle the illicit drug phenomenon will increase the incentives for other actors to enter the drugs trade.<sup>318</sup> In other words, the success of supply reduction and law enforcement strategies raises prices and inflates profits.<sup>319</sup> In terms of elemental microeconomics theory, some analysts have even compared the crime tax to a government ‘price support’, in the form of an indirect subsidy that keeps the price (for farmers, and indirectly for others in the production chain) artificially higher than they would be under normal market conditions.<sup>320</sup>

Compensation to counter the risks of entering the illegal market (e.g. the possibility of ending up in jail or being injured or killed during illegal activities), comes in the form of a ‘risk premium’ (the crime tax mentioned above). This – if high enough – could convince individuals (whether farmers or drug traffickers) that it is worth the risk of entering the illegal market.

Taken together, the profit paradox and crime tax can be considered the Achilles’ heel of supply reduction and law enforcement policies. However, despite the apparently self-

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<sup>316</sup> James A. Inciardi, *The War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, Crime and Public Policy* (Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1986).

<sup>317</sup> Ted Galen Carpenter, *Bad Neighbor Policy. Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 115. See also: LaMond Tullis, *Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in Nine Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

<sup>318</sup> *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, op. cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>319</sup> *Drug War Politics. The Price of Denial, op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

defeating logic of supply reduction, there are nevertheless two possible theoretical outcomes that may provide long term benefits to policies aiming to reduce the supply of and demand for illicit substances. First, if successful in driving up prices, reducing supply may structurally decrease demand or change consumption patterns: consumers may at some point simply be confronted with illicit drugs that are too expensive. The extremely high (legal) cigarette prices in some Western European countries are an example. This may not entirely eradicate drug use, drugs-related crime or eliminate the public health challenges associated with them, but could be considered a partial success in the fight against specific substances.

A second positive outcome could be achieved if, by consistently reducing demand (through a combination of reduced supply and effective prevention, treatment and rehabilitation policies), illicit drug producers and traffickers are forced into different illegal (commodity) markets. This could, however, be only a temporary interruption if the supply reduction and law enforcement pressure cannot be maintained, or if demand reduction efforts prove unsustainable (for example due to a large number of relapsing drug users or because of new drug users entering the market). Again, this outcome may not in fact lead to a reduction in crime levels, making political success in terms of crime prevention difficult to claim, but it may help reduce illicit drug consumption.

However, both of these scenarios are theoretical constructions and they imply that demand and supply reduction policies would be implemented with equal success in the entire country or indeed all around the world. In reality, the principle challenge to the feasibility of the theoretical scenarios mentioned above is that international demand and supply for illicit drugs has proven to be remarkably stable over the past decade, despite a wide range of demand and supply reduction policies implemented around the world. Notwithstanding sometimes significant annual fluctuations, a number of statistics with regard to the global drugs phenomenon are remarkably stable.<sup>321</sup> For example, the estimated potential manufacture of heroin in 2010 was 384 metric tonnes; in 1998 it was 376 metric tonnes.<sup>322</sup> The estimated global illicit cultivation level of coca bush in 2010 was 149,200 hectares; in 2003 it was 153,800 hectares.<sup>323</sup> The estimated global potential manufacture of cocaine in 2008 was 865 metric tonnes (latest available figures); in 1998 it was 785 metric tonnes.<sup>324</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> The numbers used here are taken from United Nations sources. They should be regarded as indicative, not hard facts, and sometimes UNODC's research methodology differs from year to year.

<sup>322</sup> UNODCCP, *Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999* (New York: UNODCCP, 1999), p. 3; and *World Drug Report 2012*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>323</sup> *World Drug Report 2012*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>324</sup> *Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999*, *op. cit.*, p. 3; and *World Drug Report 2012*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.



With regard to illicit cocaine production, the general trend – similar to other plant-based drugs – is towards stabilisation, as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has acknowledged:

*“Global production of cocaine increased strongly in the 1980s and the 1990s but stabilized over the past decade, and the amounts available on the illicit market appear to have declined. (...) While the situation with regard to plant-based drugs in general appears to be showing signs of stabilization, following many years of increases in the 1980s and the 1990s, the illicit production and use of ATS [amphetamine-type stimulants] continue to rise.”*<sup>325</sup>

This suggests that despite the difficulties of the two theoretical scenarios described above, the expansion of some key illegal drug markets seems to have come to a halt. Of course, this ‘success’ can be explained less in terms of structurally decreasing supply and demand, and more in view of containing the global drugs phenomenon, but it is nonetheless important. The question, however, is whether stabilisation at a high volume of production and consumption at the global level regardless of what the underlying cause really is, can be considered a sustainable success in the political struggle against the global drugs phenomenon – particularly if states consider drugs a serious threat to their domestic stability and (international) security.

Furthermore, the trend towards stabilisation is not yet wholly confirmed and factors such as global population growth, the emergence of new drugs and changing drug consumption patterns may also alter this trend in the future. Nevertheless, the stabilisation of illicit drug consumption can be supported with some data. With regard to drug consumption, the estimate for cocaine use at the global level in 2010 stood at between 13.3 and 19.7 million users (the equivalent of between 0.3 and 0.4 percent of the global adult population (aged 15 to 64)).<sup>326</sup> At the end of the 1990s, the global cocaine use level was very similar, estimated at 14 million people (at the time 0.3 percent of the global population aged fifteen and above).<sup>327</sup> However, this data presents two (unrelated) concerns: first, the range of the 2010 estimate makes a comparison difficult, and second, if the percentage of the global

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<sup>325</sup> *World Drug Report 2012, op. cit.*, pp. 97, 98.

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>327</sup> UNODCCP, *World Drug Report 2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), p. 70.

population using drugs remains stable, a large increase in the number of drug users may occur as the global population grows.

For opiate use (including heroin), the 2010 estimate figure was 0.3-0.5 percent of the world population (between 12.9 and 21 million opiate users).<sup>328</sup> At the end of the 1990s, global opiate use was estimated at 0.3 percent of the world population (13.5 million users).<sup>329</sup> The same two concerns apply to this data. However, in general terms, the data leads to one clear conclusion. It confirms that global illicit drug use has either remained relatively stable or has grown in size with the increasing world population; it does not indicate any significant decreases in global drug use levels. Indeed, UNODC writes in 2012:

*“Throughout the world, illicit drug use appears to be generally stable, though it continues to be rising in several developing countries.”*<sup>330</sup>

The question of the possible increase in drug use in developing countries has two very different faces to it. The increase could come from the large populations of urban poor, or it could come from the emerging middle classes that can now afford high end illicit drugs such as cocaine.

The intrinsic profit-incentive (the crime tax that gives rise to the profit paradox) of the illegal trade makes the hard-line approach of tough law enforcement, interdiction and other structural supply reduction strategies difficult to sustain in the long term; in addition to yielding poor results in terms of global supply and demand reduction, these methods are costly. Even in the fictional world of Frederick Forsythe’s novel *Cobra*, where the most extreme measures are permitted and unlimited funds are available to halt the supply of the international cocaine trade, the message at the end is that results are only transitory before the illegal drugs economy returns to previous levels. The main character in the novel explains his only partly successful mission:

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<sup>328</sup> *World Drug Report 2012, op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>329</sup> *World Drug Report 2000, op. cit.*, p. 70.

<sup>330</sup> *World Drug Report 2012, op. cit.*, Preface, p. iii.

*“I was asked to destroy the cocaine trade because it was the vice growing completely out of control. Most of that problem derives from the fact that in our country alone [the United States] cocaine has a profit-value of forty billion dollars a year, almost double that worldwide. (...) The instant they [the law enforcement measures taken by the staff he hired] let up, the trade flow will resume. Nothing can impede that level of profit for more than a heartbeat.”*<sup>331</sup>

Despite the extreme nature of the law enforcement activities undertaken in this fictitious account (for example systematically shooting down aeroplanes<sup>332</sup> and bombing the ships of drug traffickers), black market forces indeed dictate that criminals will always try to reap the economic benefits of the unremitting demand for illicit commodities. In the real world of non-fiction, Moisés Naím identifies the crux of the matter:

*“The economic force of the drug trade defies governments.”*<sup>333</sup>

Jeffrey Miron adds to this that while prohibiting drugs may decrease drug use, significant black markets will persist, even under extreme forms of enforced prohibition.<sup>334</sup>

If one views the illegal drug phenomenon in this manner, only two sustainable, long-term solutions seem feasible in theory: first, increasing the efficacy of illicit drug prevention and demand reduction policies to structurally lower demand; and second, legalising or regulating illicit drugs so that their economic value decreases considerably and they become unattractive (or at least less attractive) for illegal drug producers and traffickers. The former has so far proven impossible, particularly in a world where new illicit drugs become available on an almost daily basis and drug consumers are getting younger.<sup>335</sup> Politically, the latter is difficult to accomplish in the foreseeable future as most forms of regulation or legalisation are still rejected by the majority of governments around the world and in any

<sup>331</sup> Frederick Forsyth, *The Cobra* (London: Corgi edition, 2011), pp. 404, 405.

<sup>332</sup> In reality also an option in Colombia.

<sup>333</sup> *Illicit. How smugglers, traffickers and copycats are hijacking the global economy*, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>334</sup> Jeffrey A. Miron, ‘Government Policy Toward Illegal Drugs: An Economist’s Perspective’, conference paper, in: Ernesto Zedillo and Haynie Wheeler (eds.), *Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism* (New Haven: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012). Available online at: <http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/rethinking-war-on-drugs.pdf> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>335</sup> For Colombia, both international and national studies confirm that more and more school-age youth and university students consume drugs. See for example, the following editorial: ‘Una dosis mínima de prevención. Estudios propios y ajenos sobre consume en Colombia demuestran que cada vez más jóvenes en edad escolar y universitarios quedan atrapados por la droga. Despenalización agravaría la crisis’, *El Colombiano* (11 February 2013), p. 19.

case are often in direct violation of the provisions of the international drug control treaties. The most recent example of such an infringement was in August 2013 when the Uruguayan lower house of parliament passed a bill to create a fully legal cannabis market. This would result in a violation of international law, should it be fully adopted.<sup>336</sup>

The idea that the legalisation of drugs is currently politically impossible is shared by John Gray, a proponent of legalisation:

*“Most of the worst evils of drugs can be removed by legalising them. Such a policy would have many benefits in terms of public health and crime control. (...) [I]t would strike a blow at one of the chief sources of income of terrorist groups. Unfortunately, except in a few European countries, legalising drugs is politically impossible.”*<sup>337</sup>

However, as will become clear in section 5.5 below on the linkages between drugs and terrorism, the ‘marriage of convenience’ between most terrorist groups and the illegal drugs economy, would dictate that they would most probably move elsewhere to obtain funding. A paradoxical consequence of this relationship is that some politicians stress the link between drugs-related funding and terrorism to support strict drug control policies, while others do the same to champion the opposite approach, proposing drug legalisation to remove the funding opportunities for terrorists.

In addition to the most familiar political arguments against legalisation (motivated by moral and political judgement related to the ‘evils of drugs’ or their relationship with other evils), there is also genuine concern about whether legalising or regulating certain illegal substances would not open up some kind of Pandora’s Box. It is very difficult to predict how organised crime would react to a serious decrease of their market opportunities. For example, the loss to criminal networks of one of their biggest cash cows could lead to increased violence and crime.

Even in European countries, some of which have a more liberal approach to drug use, legalisation seems to be more and more unlikely given the increased convergence of national law systems through European law. While some individual states may be relatively tolerant (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal), the European Union laws and regulations are

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<sup>336</sup> Uruguay wants to regulate the production, distribution and sale of cannabis within a state-controlled legal market. The Uruguayan Senate still has to adopt the bill, which will probably take place at a session in October 2013.

<sup>337</sup> *Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern, op. cit., p. 91.*

developed on the basis of consensus with other less tolerant countries such as Italy and Sweden.<sup>338</sup>

Also, the question needs to be asked as to whether legalisation would indeed be a panacea for the global drugs phenomenon. Legalisation would solve the ‘profit paradox’ and inflated black market prices of the illegal drugs economy, but it is unlikely that it would eradicate the entire global drugs phenomenon, despite its negative effects on the current structure of power, authority, opportunity and income in the illegal economy. Current evidence supports the assumption of an endless cycle of development of new and more dangerous psychotropic substances that would still require control measures. In addition, drug producers and traffickers may shift towards illegal sales of legal, government controlled and taxed substances. The latter consequence could be similar to the existing illegal trade in (counterfeit or authentic) tobacco or alcohol. The bottom line is that criminals do not necessarily need prohibited substances to earn a living; they can find their crime taxes and criminal opportunities in legal markets as well.

In any case, legalisation or regulation at an international or global level is still politically unrealistic. This means that with regard to cooperation between states based on shared principles and norms, states are bound by a balanced approach of law enforcement, demand reduction and supply reduction as prescribed and regulated by the international drug control system at the level of the United Nations.

## **5.2 Alternative development and alternative livelihoods**

This section will focus particularly on the strategy of supply reduction, and will discuss the drug control approaches of alternative development and alternative livelihoods which lie at the heart of this research. As discussed above in section 2.1.7, alternative development is considered here as a relatively limited and specific intervention, while alternative livelihood strategies are considered as part of a process that mainstreams or integrates drugs-related development efforts into broader (rural) development. Section 5.2.1 below explores the links between development and drug control. Section 5.2.2 briefly analyses the relationship between alternative development and security.

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<sup>338</sup> This assessment is based on the author’s experience in lobbying for pragmatic, effective drug policies within the policy-making structure of the European Union.

### 5.2.1 Development and drug control

In order for development-driven drug control strategies to be successful, the general consensus is that these must be mainstreamed into broad-based rural development strategies.<sup>339</sup> Alternative development can be seen as the positive (carrot) strategy that provides a substitute, or complement, to the negative (stick) strategy of illicit crop eradication. It is a complementary approach that, if properly sequenced and implemented, could theoretically make supply reduction sustainable. Crop eradication alone lacks this sustainability, as farmers need to have alternative income sources to fall back on. In the context of Afghanistan, Doris Buddenberg, at the time the representative of UNODC in Kabul, mentioned this weakness of illicit crop eradication strategies in a 2004 interview:

*“Eradication usually does not bring about a sustainable reduction of poppy crop – it is a one-time, short-term effort. Also eradication usually pushes the prices up. As we have seen from the Taliban period, the one-year ban on opium-poppy cultivation increased prices enormously the following year and it became extremely attractive for farmers to cultivate poppy.”*<sup>340</sup>

This confirms both the profit-paradox and the need for an integrated development approach that includes a long-term perspective and considerations of sequence. In the long term eradicating illicit drug producing crops simply has more success if profitable alternatives are available and can be sustained over time. Sustainability could rely on the availability of profitable markets or continued government support for former coca farmers.

In some cases, the lack of such proper sequencing has been identified as one of the most important causes of counter-narcotics policy failure. The UNODC *Thematic Evaluation Report*<sup>341</sup> on alternative development mentions the need for farmers to have time to adapt to the new situation:

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<sup>339</sup> This consensus has been found in most (CND) documents and conference reports related to alternative development. It will be included in section 7.2.1 below as part of the principles that are identified within the normative framework of the International Economic Security Regime.

<sup>340</sup> Interview with IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks), part of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (30 November 2004).

<sup>341</sup> This Thematic Report provides the conclusions of a broad evaluation of alternative development in the regions of South America and South East Asia. The thematic evaluation was initiated following CND Resolution 45/14 on ‘The role of alternative development in drug control and development cooperation’ (15

*“As growers of illicit crops agreed to participate in alternative development projects, they needed to be allowed a transition period until alternative development activities (on- or off-farm) proved to be suitable to their agro-ecological environment and local knowledge and started generating income that would contribute to improving the quality of their lives.”*<sup>342</sup>

However, offering farmers a transition period to achieve proper sequencing of counter-narcotics policy instruments may be at odds with more short-term political agendas. At the international level, it may also be illegal under international law if it means states openly tolerate illicit cultivation while they are officially obliged to implement action to tackle it. In practice, however, states concerned with proper sequencing will try to temporarily avoid any interference with illicit cultivation which could deteriorate the situation further in the long term.

At the local level, periods of transition may also result temporarily in ambivalent legal conditions in which some illegal activities are allowed to continue, giving farmers the opportunity to simultaneously benefit from both the legal and illegal economy. Nevertheless, it is one of the common principles that have been developed over time through best practice and lessons learned in the field of alternative development. One of the reasons behind a transition period may simply be the creation of trust between the government and local communities.<sup>343</sup>

The 2005 *Evaluation Report* also states that eradicating farmers’ drug-producing crops before viable alternatives have become available undermines development efforts.<sup>344</sup> It therefore recommends that the crop eradication should only be applied once serious improvements in the “*lives and livelihoods of households*” have taken place.<sup>345</sup> This means that a certain degree of economic security, understood here to denote human security and

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March 2002), which urged “*Member States, in cooperation with the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, to facilitate a rigorous and comprehensive thematic evaluation, within available voluntary resources, for determining best practices in alternative development by assessing the impact of alternative development on both human development indicators and drug control objectives and by addressing the key development issues of poverty reduction, gender, environmental sustainability and conflict resolution*”.

<sup>342</sup> *Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation. Final Synthesis Report, op. cit.*, p. vii.

<sup>343</sup> In the context of the PNCRT, Álvaro Balcázar explains the importance of building trust in a presentation at a CSIS event called ‘Returning Government to Colombia’s Conflict Zones: A Light Footprint’ (Washington, 13 July 2011). His presentation can be accessed online at the website of CSIS. Available online at: <http://csis.org/event/returning-government-colombias-conflictive-zones> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

human development, should be present before eradication targets those farmers who – while having alternatives available – are unwilling to abandon their illicit crops.

The other general recommendation is that by itself, crop eradication should not be made a precondition for farmers to receive economic development aid. In other words, they do not have to eradicate their crops before receiving assistance. As such the carrot can be offered without first using the stick. With regard to alternative development interventions, experts generally agree on this. For example, the Feldafing Declaration of the expert meeting that took place in Germany in January 2002 states clearly that:

*“Alternative Development should neither be made conditional on a prior elimination of drug crop cultivation nor should a reduction be enforced until licit components of livelihood strategies have been sufficiently strengthened.”*<sup>346</sup>

The overarching idea here is that development should be the cause of a reduction of illicit crops, and not the prerequisite for it.<sup>347</sup>

It makes little sense to offer development only after illicit drug crops are removed, as development assistance is needed to achieve this reduction. If it was not, there would be no need for alternative development. But of course there must be a shared understanding from the beginning that government support will only continue if farmers show a willingness to abandon illegal crop cultivation as soon as the alternatives provided allow them to do so.<sup>348</sup> In Part II of this research it will become clear that the Colombian government also attaches clear conditions to its alternative development programmes and the subsidies that it provides to farmers and farming communities.

Last, as already touched upon above, the *Evaluation Report* confirms that an alternative livelihood approach, integrated with broader economic development policies is generally more successful:

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<sup>346</sup> ‘Report on the international conference on The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation’ (7-13 January 2002), Feldafing Declaration, Article 4, p. 5. See the online documentation of the Feldafing International Conference on the The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation at the website of UNODC. Available online at: [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative%20Development/RoleAD\\_DrugControl\\_Development.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative%20Development/RoleAD_DrugControl_Development.pdf) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>347</sup> ‘The ‘miracle of San Martín’ and symptoms of ‘alternative development’ in Peru’, *op. cit.*, p.7.

<sup>348</sup> The conditionality of alternative livelihood interventions in Colombia will be addressed further in part II.



*“Alternative development is more effective and more sustainable as part of a wider development scheme whose goal is to improve the livelihoods of marginal rural populations.”*<sup>349</sup>

Some of the principles and norms of the International Economic Security Regime that will be identified in Chapter 7 are based on the findings of CND resolutions and on the results of the thematic evaluation discussed in this section.

### **5.2.2 Alternative development and security**

Linking alternative development directly to security is a relatively new phenomenon. Criminologist Wolfgang Heinz undertook some initial analysis in 2002, making use of parts of the ‘economics and conflict’ literature (particularly Collier on the links between greed and conflict motives).<sup>350</sup> His initial contribution to the debate was twofold. His first contribution was to elaborate a list of possible conflicts related to alternative development settings.<sup>351</sup> It is interesting to provide the full list here (using the terminology of Heinz, but slightly paraphrased):

- 1) *“conflicts around alternative development programmes as a consequence of differences of opinion on its implementation, on its activities or on the distribution of the programme’s benefits”*;
- 2) *“selective violence by social movements in the context of social vindication”*;
- 3) *“violence in the context of organised crime”*;
- 4) *“armed conflict with the objective to bring down the government and/or control territory”*, and;
- 5) *“the threat to use violence to sustain an elected, but authoritarian government”*.

Conflict type 1 is most interesting as it is a risk that is generated by the supply reduction programmes themselves. It also relates to a specific threat to economic security that will

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<sup>349</sup> *Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation. Final Synthesis Report, op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>350</sup> ‘Report on the international conference on The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation’, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 17.

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 17.

further be explored in section 5.6 with regard to “*the negative impact of (international) counter-narcotics policies on the wellbeing and socio-economic development of groups and individuals that are affected by the illegal drugs economy.*” This could include a conflict caused by individuals who are not included in the programme, or who see their position deteriorate in one way or another by the implementation of the programme. It could also result from flawed project design or the failure to deliver on the programme’s promises of economic or social development.

Missing from Heinz’s list is a more general type of conflict based on economic insecurity that has no direct relationship with the counter-narcotics or development programmes implemented. This could include for example popular discontent about the general lack of jobs, economic progress and development in rural areas. Threats relating to economic security at the level of the state (e.g. government control of natural resources and markets) are also missing. These two types of threats could be added as follows:

- 6) conflicts based on popular discontent in rural areas regarding the general lack of economic security in the sense of limited opportunities for economic and social development;
- 7) conflicts arising from the government’s policy to gain or strengthen its control over territories, markets and natural resources to boost economic security at the national level.

Heinz’s second contribution is his recommendation to avoid a scenario in which a project would directly contribute to more conflict, while at the same time trying to maximise the project’s positive contribution to conflict management. To achieve this, Heinz proposes that each new project start with a so-called Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS) based on three central criteria (using the terminology of Heinz, but slightly paraphrased):<sup>352</sup>

- 1) starting with an analysis of the “*local conflict constellations*” before project implementation;
- 2) securing the “*participation of target groups in the planning process*” and making sure the project objectives and mechanisms “*reflect their interests*”;

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<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

- 3) ensuring that project-related measures “*support the stabilisation of the project environment and help defuse conflict constellations*” encountered locally.

Unless criterion 1 is interpreted in very broad terms, what is missing from these criteria is the participation of (or communication with) groups that do not belong directly to the target groups of the interventions, but that nevertheless will be impacted by them. This relates to conflict type 1 above. An obvious example is the group of drug traffickers that perceive alternative development programmes as a direct threat to their own livelihood. A second example is the group of illicit drug cultivating and regular farmers that will not benefit from the rural development interventions. This could be the farmer ‘next door’. A third example could be any kind of anti-government or protest group operating in the area of the interventions. Such external actors could become a source of grievances and potentially of conflict and local instability. Thus, the following could be added to a CIAS:

- 4) predicting and managing the threat from non-participating external or internal actors to drugs-related development interventions at the local level.

### 5.3 Security studies, markets and states

The way the global drugs phenomenon is often described in terms of ‘war on drugs’,<sup>353</sup> ‘combat’, ‘narco-terrorism’,<sup>354</sup> ‘narco-states’,<sup>355</sup> ‘narco-diplomacy’<sup>356</sup> and even ‘narco-

<sup>353</sup> The term ‘war on drugs’ is probably the most contested concept in the study of the global drugs phenomenon. Tom Feiling writes: “(...) *There can be no war on drugs, because drug users and sellers are not an army. They cannot win, nor can they be defeated.*” See: Tom Feiling, *The Candy Machine. How Cocaine Took Over the World* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 100.

<sup>354</sup> R.T. Naylor explores the ‘myth of narco-terrorism’. See: *Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-75. See also the following book review: Jorrit Kamminga, ‘Seeds of terror: how heroin is bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda by Gretchen Peters; Opium: uncovering the politics of the poppy by Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 240-241; and: Rachel Ehrenfeld, *Narcoterrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

<sup>355</sup> There is no standard definition for the contested concept of ‘narco-state’. It seems to be generally used in the context of a ‘failed state’ (another contested concept) in which the illegal drugs economy plays an important role. Despite its contested nature, the concept of ‘narco-state’ has been used extensively, for example, in the context of Afghanistan. An interesting article is: Thomas Schweich, ‘Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?’, *New York Times Magazine* (27 July 2008).

<sup>356</sup> See, for example, H. Richard Friman, *Narco Diplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996).

‘jihadism’<sup>357</sup> is perhaps not helpful to construct a non-political, academic analysis, but it shows how closely related the global drugs phenomenon is with concerns of security related to conflict. In what Stephen Walt has called the “*renaissance of security studies*”,<sup>358</sup> he marks the return of national security analysis to International Relations with the Neo-Realist work of Kenneth Waltz.<sup>359</sup>

Waltz can be said to have reconstituted the Realist paradigm within International Relations by developing a systematic account of international relations between states. In its original version, Waltz’s systemic account means that the international system determines the behaviour of the units, particularly the states that are part of the system.<sup>360</sup> The international system distributes capabilities among the units and this distribution determines the character of the international system.<sup>361</sup> When there is a change in the distribution of these capabilities among the system’s units, the structure of the system changes.<sup>362</sup> Within the system a set of factors completely outside of the control of states determines the way in which states can interact and the possible outcomes of this interaction.<sup>363</sup>

Although Waltz admits that the international system cannot explain everything that goes on within the system,<sup>364</sup> the main weakness of his systemic account is that it completely ignores any “*unit-level causes*” or changes in behaviour caused by the units (the states) themselves.<sup>365</sup> In later analysis, Waltz moves away slightly from the extreme deterministic nature of his systemic account by allowing for explanatory factors related to the internal composition of the units of the system.<sup>366</sup>

In this recent analysis, Waltz is also clear about the continued importance of states as the principle units of the international system, even in the broader framework of international economics:

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<sup>357</sup> See: Ehsan Ahrari, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Louise I. Shelley and Nazia Hussain, ‘Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, *NBR Reports* (December 2009).

<sup>358</sup> Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 211-239; especially p. 219.

<sup>359</sup> *Theory of International Politics*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5, pp. 79-101.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>361</sup> *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 109; *Theory of International Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-99.

<sup>362</sup> *Theory of International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>363</sup> *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>364</sup> Kenneth Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322-45.

<sup>365</sup> A useful discussion can be found in chapter 5 on ‘The International System’ of: *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-118.

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

*“National politics, not international markets, account for many international economic developments. (...) Politics, as usual, prevails over economics.”*<sup>367</sup>

As such, he does not agree with the idea expressed by others (e.g. Susan Strange on non-state authorities, see above section 4.4) that the growing importance of economic interests could result in markets becoming more important than politics or the state. In this sense, Waltz’s opinion conflicts with one of the most interesting applications of his own systemic theory: the systemic explanation of how the behaviour of economic agents such as companies is defined or influenced by (international) markets.

In contrast, Hollis and Smith have tried to explain how markets influence the behaviour of companies. They write that:

*“(…) [G]iven the ordering principles of the market (the laws of supply and demand), one can be sure that successful firms are behaving in ways functional for the working of the market or, to be precise, its tendency to equilibrium.”*<sup>368</sup>

This provides a strong analogy with international illegal drug markets. Perhaps the most interesting question is to what extent the behaviour of illicit production and trafficking actors and networks is determined by the international market of illicit drugs. Beyond theoretical conceptualisation, in practice, a mixed answer is most likely the correct explanation. The behaviour of and decisions made by non-state actors in the illegal drugs economy are not unimportant, but they are strongly influenced by the international laws of supply and demand for controlled substances. Unless drug ‘cartels’ become real cartels in the sense of micro-economics, they have limited influence over the market.

On the one hand, the international market, as indirectly ‘regulated’ by the international drug control regime, determines prices and therefore profitability. However, on the other hand, national laws and law enforcement capabilities also have a significant influence over the possibilities non-state actors have to operate in this market. Nevertheless, in most cases the state is still the most important actor when determining, analysing and countering illegal markets. Mónica Serrano writes:

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<sup>367</sup> Kenneth Waltz, ‘Globalization and Governance’, *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1999), pp. 698 and 700.

<sup>368</sup> *Explaining and Understanding International Relations, op. cit.*, pp. 113-14.

“[T]he state holds the key. Different forms of state organization have different implications for the emergence and evolution of illegal practices and activities.”<sup>369</sup>

That is an important conclusion within the academic field of International Relations which has struggled since at least the 1970s with the question of whether or not states have lost influence. Whether used as an example to test the system theory of Waltz or as more independent system-unit analysis, international economics has been increasingly included in the analysis of international relations. Following Waltz’s initial analysis, a wide range of academic studies have attempted to explain how a state-centred approach (Realism) could deal (or not) with the new realities of the International Political Economy.<sup>370</sup> In other words, efforts have been made to broaden the agenda of security studies with a variety of security-related issues in the fields of *inter alia* economic or environmental security, international human rights considerations or migration issues.<sup>371</sup> Steven Walt refers to the following non-military threats to states and individuals: poverty, HIV and AIDS, environmental risks and drug abuse.<sup>372</sup>

In addition to the changes to the security environment caused by trade liberalisation, revolutions in transport, distribution, communication and information technologies, and economic globalisation in general, the end of the Cold War (1989) can be considered a watershed moment for security studies in the context of international relations. Sayaka Fukumi writes:

“As communism as a threat disappeared from political and security spheres, there have been movements to include unconventional issues into the security sphere, such as the environment, organised crime, and migration.”<sup>373</sup>

Conflicts have changed since the end of the Cold War and the new power structure that developed created new opportunities for transnational organised crime. As a consequence, the study of crime and its role in conflict and therefore relations between states has become more important since this period. Recent work has built to a certain extent on earlier work in

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<sup>369</sup> ‘Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual?’, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>370</sup> ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, p. 219.

<sup>371</sup> Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods’, *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (October 1996), p. 230.

<sup>372</sup> ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

<sup>373</sup> *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

the field of criminology, for example, the noteworthy contribution of Louise Shelley on Russian criminal organisations before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>374</sup> Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union is a prime example of how criminal groups benefited from the privatisation of state companies.<sup>375</sup>

Building on this base, Susan Strange studied international criminal organisations in the context of the increased importance of non-state actors in international relations (see section 4.4 above).<sup>376</sup> In sum, the principal change that has occurred in security studies is that after 1989 some non-traditional security threats to national security became part of the mainstream security agenda.

#### 5.4 'Economics and conflict' literature

The specific issue of illicit drugs falls within the new understanding of criminal networks as manifestations of the non-traditional security threats affecting the security and stability of states. Since the late 1990s Peter Andreas has explored the connections between the illicit global economy and issues such as state power, stability and security.<sup>377</sup> Paul Rexton Kan has directly linked the illegal drugs economy with conflicts and contemporary warfare in the context of international relations.<sup>378</sup> Rexton Kan explains:

*“In some cases, a symbiosis between drug traffickers and warring groups has developed as with Hezbollah and the criminal gangs in Ciudad del Este<sup>379</sup> [Paraguay] or the Taliban and organized crime in Pakistan.”<sup>380</sup>*

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<sup>374</sup> See, for example: Louise I. Shelley, 'Prosecuting Transnational Crimes: Cross-Cultural Insights for the Former Soviet Union', *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce*, Vol. 27, No.1 (2000), pp. 45-57 and Louise I. Shelley, 'The Political-Criminal Nexus: Russian-Ukrainian Case Studies: Transition or Tragedy?', *Trends in Organized Crime*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1999), pp. 81-107. Spring 1999, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 81-107.

<sup>375</sup> Peter Andreas, 'Transnational Crime and Economic Globalization', in: Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano (eds.), *Transnational organized crime and international security: business as usual?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 46.

<sup>376</sup> *The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, *op. cit.*

<sup>377</sup> His most relevant books are: *Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), co-authored with Ethan Nadelmann; *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), co-edited by H. Richard Friman; and *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial*, *op. cit.*, co-authored with Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman and Kenneth Sharpe.

<sup>378</sup> *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare*, *op. cit.*

<sup>379</sup> This connection refers to the base established by Hezbollah militias in Paraguay, allegedly used for terrorist financing, recruiting and training at the heart of the tri-border area where Paraguay connects with Brazil and

His analysis could be considered as part of a well-known and thoroughly examined body of literature that could be called ‘*economics and conflict*’.<sup>381</sup> This literature establishes the link between conflict and illicit drugs (and other licit or illicit resources that can be looted or traded).<sup>382</sup> Mary Kaldor has also explored the symbiosis between the illegal economy and conflicts, focusing not only on the role of the illegal economy as a funding source (in the sense of a “*war economy*”), but also on the economic motivation of parties to conflicts.<sup>383</sup> There are large quantities of literature on the economic motivations of conflict parties.<sup>384</sup> Berdal and Serrano write:

“(…) [T]he study of civil wars and armed conflict in the 1990s has shown that the pursuit of criminal agendas by warring parties is often difficult to distinguish from other objectives, supposedly of a more ‘political’ nature, that are commonly assumed to be driving conflicts.”<sup>385</sup>

In addition, several academic theses have explored the relationship between the illegal cultivation of drug-producing plants and internal conflict.<sup>386</sup>

For the purpose of this research, the literature on economics and conflict addresses two important questions. First, the question of whether the illegal drugs economy is mainly a domestic criminal phenomenon or a serious, transnational threat to the position, stability and power of the state in international relations.<sup>387</sup> Second, the question of whether the illegal drugs economy is cause or symptom of conflict and the instability and insecurity of states.

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Argentina. The presence in Paraguay builds on the community of Lebanese refugees that have moved to Latin America escaping the tensions of the Middle East.

<sup>380</sup> *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>381</sup> ‘The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict’, *op. cit.*, p. 757.

<sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 757.

<sup>383</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), Chapter 5 on ‘The Globalized War Economy’, pp. 90-111.

<sup>384</sup> See, for example: Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.) *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) ; David Malone and Jake Sherman, ‘Economic Factors in Civil Wars—Policy Considerations’, in: I. William Zartman and Cynthia Arnson (eds.), *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); and: Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.), *Beyond Greed and Grievance: Case Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflicts* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

<sup>385</sup> ‘Introduction’, *Transnational organized crime and international security: business as usual?*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>386</sup> See, for example: Ferhat Aslan, *The Relationship between the Illegal Cultivation of Hard-Drug Plants and Revolutionary Wars, Ethnic Conflicts, and Corruption* (Dissertation, Claremont Graduate University, 2011).

<sup>387</sup> *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.



While both questions are mostly beyond the scope of this research, the second question can be partly answered here. In this research, the illegal drugs economy is considered both as a cause and a symptom of the stable or insecure condition of states. There is a vicious circle at play in which instable, fragile conditions of states are both exploited and deepened by drug trafficking networks.

This also means there is an interdependent relationship between conflict and the illegal drugs economy. While the cultivation and production of illicit drug crops are often found in conflict areas with weak state institutions and low levels of rule of law (as a symptom of these conditions), the illegal drugs economy also creates the framework conditions for conflicts to start, continue or deepen because of its role in further undermining the institutions of the state and funding anti-government forces. The illegal drugs economy can thus also be considered as a cause of instability.<sup>388</sup>

### 5.5 ‘Crime terror nexus’ or ‘crime rebellion nexus’ literature

A second, partly overlapping body of academic literature can be termed the ‘*crime terror nexus*’ or ‘*crime rebellion nexus*’.<sup>389</sup> The traditional focus on insurgencies and rebellion movements within countries partly shifted towards terrorist groups during the 1990s after the end of the Cold War, but received a critical impulse after the September 11 attacks in the United States. Authors such as Loretta Napoleoni,<sup>390</sup> Tamara Makarenko,<sup>391</sup> Rachel Ehrenfeld<sup>392</sup> and Jorrit Kamminga<sup>393</sup> began to explore the connections between the illegal drugs economy and the financing of terrorism.

There are three general assumptions in this literature. First, despite their different nature, politically motivated actors and criminal organisations can be analysed within the

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<sup>388</sup> This ‘interdependent relationship’ between conflict and the illegal drugs economy is explained in more detail in: Cornelius Graubner, ‘Drugs and Conflict. How the mutual impact of illicit drug economies and violent conflict influences sustainable development, peace and stability’, *GTZ Development-Oriented Drug Control Programme (DDC) Report* (Eschborn: GTZ, 2007), p. 9.

<sup>389</sup> ‘The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict’, *op. cit.*, p. 757.

<sup>390</sup> See especially: Loretta Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks* (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

<sup>391</sup> See, for example, Tamara Makarenko, ‘The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism’, *Global Crime*, Volume 6, Issue 1 (February 2004), pp. 129-145.

<sup>392</sup> See, for example, Rachel Ehrenfeld, *Funding Evil How Terrorism Is Financed and How to Stop It* (Chicago and Los Angeles: Bonus Books, 2003).

<sup>393</sup> ‘Afghanistan: Linkages Between the Illegal Opium Economy, International Crime and Terrorism’, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-374.

same framework due to a growing set of (partly) overlapping interests, *modus operandi*, objectives and other commonalities.<sup>394</sup> Second, it is evident that the illegal drugs economy and other forms of illegal trade have become important sources of funding for insurgent and terrorist groups. Last, the process of globalisation has affected both sets of actors in similar ways and has increased commonalities between them, reinforcing the need for governments to work together and apply similar law enforcement approaches to confront them, for example related to the controls of the international financial system.

These assumptions do not mean that scholars think that terrorist organisations should be considered as criminal organisations or *vice versa*. That guerrilla organisations and terrorist groups have tapped into the lucrative illegal drugs economy does not necessarily mean they have become criminal drug cartels. Berdal and Serrano give a clear explanation of the main differences:

*“The business of terrorists is terror, or asymmetrical violence; the business of organized criminals is business, albeit in conditions of violence.”*<sup>395</sup>

Similarly, transnational criminal organisations generally do not attach much importance to ideological, political or religious beliefs.<sup>396</sup>

It is not important here to overly stress the intrinsic differences or the growing confluence between political (terrorist) groups and criminal actors. What is important is to understand that connections between crime and illicit activities that cause fear, insecurity and instability – whether real or part of political rhetoric – can be of political significance. The connections can increase the level of priority related to these issues for states and can therefore increase the need for international cooperation to solve them. In other words, states can decide to clearly distinguish between terrorists and criminals, but they may not want to do so for political reasons.<sup>397</sup>

Using perceived threats to national security as a linking device between the two groups, may both increase the sense of political urgency and international support for measures taken to counter these threats. It may also simply be a way to increase the budget

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<sup>394</sup> For a good overview, see: Svante E. Cornell, ‘Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2007), pp. 210–214.

<sup>395</sup> ‘Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: The New Topography’, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

<sup>396</sup> *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>397</sup> ‘Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: The New Topography’, *op. cit.*, pp. 201, 202.

of law enforcement agencies.<sup>398</sup> Eva Herschinger has recently analysed these dynamics by examining how the political discourse of the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’ has been constructed, how both discourses relate to each other, and how their construction has led to a certain type of policy at the international level.<sup>399</sup>

Herschinger’s analysis has strong links with the research on the ‘securitisation’ of terrorism and the global drugs phenomenon, because in her view, it is the construction of the political discourse of the ‘war’ that has turned both issues into international threats to national security. Her analysis describes how ‘hegemonic orders’ are established in the form of internationally accepted, dominant political discourse on the challenges of terrorism and drug use that translate into an authoritative, common understanding of these international problems and a legitimisation of certain policies to address them at the international level.<sup>400</sup> The term ‘hegemonic order’ can be equated to international regime, particularly if international regimes come about as a reflection of the dominant powers. Oran Young has defined this phenomenon as ‘imposed orders’, a category of international regimes that according to him:

*“(...) differ from spontaneous orders in the sense that they are fostered deliberately by dominant powers or consortia of dominant actors. (...) [They] are deliberately established by dominant actors who succeed in getting others to conform to the requirements of these orders through some combination of coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of incentives.”<sup>401</sup>*

For this research, it is important to note that a shared international narrative on security issues will make it easier for states to cooperate and coordinate their action. As already discussed above, international regimes are one way for states to jointly tackle the new or increased challenges related to international concerns such as drug trafficking and transnational crime in general, whether or not linked to terrorism, guerrilla movements or other non-state actors.

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<sup>398</sup> ‘Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual?’, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>399</sup> Eva Herschinger, *Constructing global enemies: hegemony and identity in international discourses on terrorism and drug prohibition* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*, see especially chapter 2, pp. 33-59.

<sup>401</sup> Oran R. Young, ‘Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes’, in: Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 100.

## 5.6 Economic security literature

As described above, the global drugs phenomenon has increasingly been positioned in security studies as consisting of a series of non-traditional threats to national security. However, this has been done through a predominantly negative approach: the idea that the illegal drugs economy represents an ‘anti-state’ that needs to be ‘combated’ or ‘destroyed’ by the government.<sup>402</sup> This is particularly true in the state-centric model of Realism.<sup>403</sup> Evidence for the dominance of such a state response can be found in the ubiquitous use of the ‘war on drugs’ metaphor. The Realist proposition is that the illegal drugs economy weakens the states’ integrity, values and identity, and therefore is able to threaten even its sovereignty and international power.

The need for states to confront a significant anti-state within (and across) its borders would also explain why some states have created large counter-narcotics bureaucracies. Moisés Naim shares this view, but provides a rather negative perspective:

*“The war on drugs (...) has been more successful in spawning immense bureaucracies and winning big budgets and partisan political fights than in ending drug use.”*<sup>404</sup>

Other analysts have even spoken about “*turf wars*” between different drug control and law enforcement agencies to protect and expand their piece of the “*drug budget pie*”.<sup>405</sup> Although adding an interesting layer of thought to the debate, such interpretations do not shed any light on the provision of economic security as a more positive state response.

A link between the illegal drugs economy and the concept of ‘economic security’ as used in this research was not found in the literature review process. Indeed, it would seem that the analysis of the nexus of economics, the illegal drugs trade and security has been limited to the two bodies of academic literature already identified: the ‘*crime terror (or rebellion) nexus*’ literature and the ‘*economics and conflict*’ literature (see sections 5.5 and

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<sup>402</sup> Angela S. Burger, *Conundrum: Illicit Narcotics and Theoretical Approaches in International Politics*, Conference paper, International Studies Association, 40th Annual Convention, Washington, D.C. (February 16–20, 1999).

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>404</sup> Moisés Naim, ‘Why We Can’t Win Wars’, *Foreign Policy* (22 February 2010).

<sup>405</sup> *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial, op. cit.*, p. 130.

5.4). The focus of these areas of research lies in exploring the funding relationship between the illegal drugs economy and a range of non-state actors (e.g. insurgent groups, terrorist organisations, etc.). Again, the research manifests a predominantly negative perspective on the economic relationship between the global drugs phenomenon and international policies designed to tackle it.

Two authors, Danny Kushlick and Emily Crick, have recently examined the connections between the illicit drug phenomenon and security as analysed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde. They both have a background in policy reform advocacy, respectively as Director of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation and former Research Associate at the same Foundation. Emily Crick, currently PhD candidate at Swansea University, is investigating in her doctoral research how the issue of drugs has been securitised at the national and international level, why this securitisation process has been so rapidly accepted, and how the securitisation of the global drugs phenomenon impacts the national and international security situation. Her three case studies are the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the US National Security Directive 221 and Russia's 'Rainbow-2' plan targeting opium production in Afghanistan as a "*threat to global peace and security*" from 2009.<sup>406</sup>

The part of her research that is already published at the time of writing concludes that the securitisation of the issue of drugs functions as a mechanism to increase states' adherence to the global drug control framework and reconfirm their allegiance to the prohibitionist character of this international regime:

*"Instead of looking at how to desecuritize drugs, the international community has introduced new securitizations each time a new threat is identified. It seems the international community continues to be hooked on the 'drugs as a threat' discourse."*<sup>407</sup>

She attempts to trace the evolution of the 'drugs as a threat' discourse internationally, asserting that the Single Convention represented the first global securitisation process of

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<sup>406</sup> See the basic '*Rainbow-2 for the elimination of Afghan drug production*' document in English on the official website of UNODC. Available at:

[http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Events/Russian\\_Plan\\_Rainbow\\_2.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Events/Russian_Plan_Rainbow_2.pdf) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>407</sup> Emily Crick, 'Drugs as an existential threat: An Analysis of the international securitization of drugs', *International Journal of Drug Policy*, Vol, 23, Issue 5 (September 2012), p. 414.

drugs, prohibiting in particular the use of controlled substances.<sup>408</sup> According to her, this first securitisation process, leading to prohibition as established by the Single Convention, created a more serious existential threat (through, for example, corruption and violence related to organised crime), which then needed to be securitised again in a complex vicious circle of securitisation discourse and decision-making.

The second global securitisation process took place when the United States changed the existential threat from drug consumption to drug trafficking, focusing more on the non-state actors who benefited financially from the illegal nature of controlled substances. Crick claims that both securitisation processes have made it more difficult to discuss alternative regulatory frameworks and (similar to the analysis of Naim above) have also created powerful bureaucratic regimes with corresponding vested interests to prevent changing the *status quo*.

Danny Kushlick analyses the global drug control framework in a similar way. By creating and maintaining the image of the global drugs phenomenon as a security problem and a ‘serious evil’ to both the individual and society at large, the current drug control model is reinforced and alternative models are effectively dismissed from the debate at the international level.<sup>409</sup> While the international community has committed to securitising the global drugs phenomenon through prohibition to protect people and states from this ‘existential threat’, he claims this securitisation process has become a source of national and international insecurity in itself.<sup>410</sup>

Despite the important contribution that both of these studies offer to the study of the global drugs phenomenon, they are however, limited to the portrayal of securitisation as a negative approach that reinforces an international regime that the authors have concluded needs to change. In addition, there is no mention of economic security. Securitisation is perceived only as the obstacle to reforms of the current system. In general, the growing body of literature<sup>411</sup> exploring the concept of economic security thus far seems to have largely

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<sup>408</sup> This whole paragraph is based on an email exchange with Emily Crick (November 2012).

<sup>409</sup> Danny Kushlick, ‘International security and the global war on drugs: The tragic irony of drug securitisation’, *OpenDemocracy* (10 August 2011).

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>411</sup> See especially: Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983); *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, *op. cit.*; Czesław Mesjasz, ‘Economic Security’ in: Hans Günter Brauch *et al* (eds.) *Globalization and Environmental Challenges. Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century* (Berlin: Springer, 2008), pp. 569-580; Barry Buzan, ‘The Challenge of International Political Economy and Globalization’ in Alex Bellamy (ed.) *International Society and its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), chapter 6, pp. 115-33; *Transnational organized crime and international security: business as usual?*, *op. cit.*; *Cocaine trafficking in*

omitted the positive connection with countering the illicit part of the (international) economy. Inquiries by email with some of the most prominent academics in this field have not revealed any such literature.<sup>412</sup>

It is important to look at economic security interests from a more positive perspective, as it allows a certain (state) policy to become more than an instrument to merely address a threat to part of the state system or the state's functioning. Instead, in a more positive approach, economic security could become a policy instrument of the state that could promote economic development and economic growth through the protection and strengthening of certain economic assets. For example, in negative terms, the illicit drugs economy is a threat to the tropical forests through deforestation. On the other hand, in positive terms, the protection of the tropical forests or reforestation programmes can be viewed in terms of a direct and indirect source of alternative income for families and communities.

The edited volume of Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano on transnational organised crime was one of the first academic studies to explore the debate of 'securitisation' related to international crime.<sup>413</sup> However, this 2002 study did not concentrate specifically on drug trafficking, but discussed the evolution of transnational crime as a (negative) threat to national security and the integrity of the state, and was rather sceptical about the usefulness of securitising the problem of transnational organised crime. It concluded that:

*"If transnational organized crime is to be singled out as an international security threat, a new consideration of its geographies of operation and migratory localization ought to come to the fore. Policymakers committed to the model of international security will have to start redrawing their own cognitive maps."*<sup>414</sup>

The lack of literature on the positive elements of 'economic security' and 'securitisation' has strengthened the conviction that placing economic security within the context of the global drugs phenomenon in a positive way would be an interesting new focus for this research. This is particularly true because the economic sector (analysed in the economic security

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*Latin America: EU and US policy responses, op. cit.*; and *Constructing global enemies: hegemony and identity in international discourses on terrorism and drug prohibition, op. cit.*

<sup>412</sup> Email correspondence with Barry Buzan (October 2012) and Peter Andreas (October 2012).

<sup>413</sup> *Transnational organized crime and international security: business as usual?, op. cit.*

<sup>414</sup> 'Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: The New Topography', *op. cit.*, p. 199.

literature as an additional area of security study analysis) is so closely related to the illegal economic sector.

The existing literature on economic security can be considered to chiefly provide two levels of analysis: first, the international level of states where economic security determines state security and economic prosperity; and second, the national or sub-national level where economic security is related to a range of non-state actors such as companies, institutions, specific territories of a country, or individuals.<sup>415</sup> Both levels of analysis will be used in this research.

What is broadly missing from the existing body of literature is a focus on potential threats related directly to the illegal drugs economy. The threats to national security are mostly seen in terms of challenges provided by the legal (international) market and by the substantial financial power of some multinational corporations and international financial organisations such as the International Monetary Fund. For example, the following is paraphrased from a list<sup>416</sup> elaborated by Czeslaw Mesjasz of potential, market system-related threats to economic security at the international and national level:

- threats relating to a state's dependence on supplies of natural resources;
- threats relating to the instability of world trade, financial markets and economic crisis in general;
- threats in terms of negative side effects of a potential revival of protectionism and economic nationalist tendencies;
- threats relating to the economics of the military sector and military security in general;
- threats relating to the economics of other sectors; and
- threats to economic security for the individual: the negative impact of the market on the wellbeing of groups and individuals.

According to the narrow definition used by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, only fears about economic or financial crises should actually be considered issues of economic security.<sup>417</sup> This limited perspective results from their assessment that existential threats to the state are so difficult to link directly with economic issues and factors:

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<sup>415</sup> Czeslaw Mesjasz, 'Economic Security', *op. cit.*, p. 571.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 573.

<sup>417</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.



“[W]ithin the economic sector, existential threats constitute a fairly narrow range of conditions.”<sup>418</sup>

However, in this research a wider definition will be used, including threats originating in the economic sector that have direct or indirect consequences for the security or stability of the state or the international system. Within such a broader perspective, the illicit market (both in the domestic and international sense) is the principle focus. Therefore, what can be added to the list of threats above is a focus on the illicit market, its consequences for security and the consequences of economic policies trying to disrupt this market. Based on the analysis of the author, adding the following potential threats could be useful:

- threats relating to the negative impact of the illegal drugs economy on the legal economy in general;
- threats relating to instability in territories where illicit drug cultivation, production or trafficking take place;
- threats relating to the links between farming communities and (transnational) organised criminal, insurgent or terrorist organisations;
- threats to economic security 1: the negative impact of the illegal drug market on the wellbeing and socio-economic development of groups and individuals that are affected by the illegal drugs economy;
- threats to economic security 2: the negative impact of (international) counter-narcotics policies on the wellbeing and socio-economic development of groups and individuals that are affected by the illegal drugs economy; and
- threats to economic security 3: threats relating to the impact of illicit drug production and trafficking on economic infrastructure and other state assets in the legal economy.

Most of these threats are related to domestic stability. In that sense they are different from security concerns under the classic Realist perspective, which would be more concerned with external economic threats to the power, sovereignty or physical survival of the state. Threats

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<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.

to domestic stability become security threats if they jeopardise the ability of the state to properly function.<sup>419</sup> Sayaka Fukumi writes:

*“The threat posed by non-traditional security threats is not directly to the physical survival of the state, but more a threat to the function of the state.”*<sup>420</sup>

Threats to economic security, for example, drug trafficking or money laundering, are considered to challenge the effective functioning of countries or their governments.<sup>421</sup> The threats do not result from attempts of other states (e.g. foreign armies) or external non-state actors (e.g. foreign guerrilla movements or Al Qaeda) to take over territories and natural resources, or gain other material objectives. That is precisely why they are called ‘non-traditional’ security threats, as opposed to more classic military and security challenges within the Realist paradigm of International Relations.

However, despite domestic effects, criminal activities such as cocaine trafficking may still affect the position of a state within the international community.<sup>422</sup> This happens, for example, when domestic threats affect the stability, social fabric or public order of a state in such a way that it undermines the sovereignty of that state.<sup>423</sup> In addition to Kushlick and Crick, Fukumi has been one of the few scholars to have directly studied the issue area of drug trafficking as an economic threat to national security.<sup>424</sup> However, in her work focusing on the economic sphere, the relationship is again analysed in predominantly negative terms, concentrating on the negative effects of drugs-related money laundering, corruption and the control of transnational criminal organisations over economic and financial systems.<sup>425</sup>

Analysing some of the threats and opportunities related to the concept of economic security in Part II, offers increased knowledge of how the concept of economic security operates in a policy framework that contains both the illegal and the legal economy. But adding the above-mentioned group of threats to the existing literature does not go far enough towards identifying the positive aspects of fostering economic security. Therefore, the focus

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<sup>419</sup> One could argue that states become ‘failed states’, but using that disputed term would demand an in-depth discussion of when exactly a ‘failing state’ becomes a ‘failed state’. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this research.

<sup>420</sup> *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>421</sup> Phil Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Organisation and International Society’, *Survival*, Vol. 36, No 1 (Spring 1994), p. 107.

<sup>422</sup> *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, pp. 21-48.

<sup>425</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

of this research will not only be on the negative impact that the illicit drugs economy or counter-narcotics policy can have on economic security. In fact, the question will be turned around: how can a positive, pro-active government approach to economic security help to decrease the size and scope of the illegal drugs economy?

However, using that different approach, the research will not look into the criminal groups and networks that are often the principle focus of security studies and criminology analysis. It is more interesting to look at those rural communities that make it possible for the illicit drug traffickers to make so much money. Moving the focus from drug traffickers to farmers also partly shifts the attention from high profits towards subsistence incomes. An interesting question, therefore, is how economic security can be strengthened by the state to make rural areas less dependent on illegal cultivation for their survival and wellbeing.

With regard to the position of farmers and farming communities involved in illegal cultivation, these actors can often hardly achieve economic security (in the narrow sense of UNDP's human security concept focusing on employment and income) within the illegal economy, despite the fact that this economy offers them a livelihood. The reality is that most coca or poppy growers are relatively poor and often do not get beyond the subsistence level of farming. For example, in Afghanistan, it is often the drug traffickers who own the expensive vehicles and large houses rather than the opium farmers. However, some may be able to achieve a situation of economic security, with a respectable level of human development. David Mares writes:

*“(...) [Some] farmers might still be able to sell illicit crops and purchase electricity, potable water, telephone and television, health care, and education for their children, thereby finding a path out of poverty. (...) [For others] higher prices for illegal crops do not translate into higher standards of living.”<sup>426</sup>*

Very little research has been conducted into the positive economic impact of the illegal drugs economy on countries. Indeed, the provision of thousands of livelihoods, albeit in the illegal economy, could be analysed in terms of economic (and even security and stability) benefits for a country. Francisco Thoumi has, however, analysed the economic benefits of the illegal drug industry for Colombia, concluding that after the illegal economy began to grow in the 1970s and 1980s, the initial effects were positive, but in the medium and long term the

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<sup>426</sup> *Drug Wars and Coffeehouses. The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade, op. cit.*, p. 72.

effects were “*highly negative*”.<sup>427</sup> Peter Andreas has also pointed to the positive aspects of illegal cultivation of drug-producing crops. Referring to Morocco, he stated that:

“*Cannabis is Morocco’s leading export, serving as a major source of foreign exchange and employment in the north of the country.*”<sup>428</sup>

This does not mean that illicit crops are necessarily always more profitable and can never be replaced by (perhaps even more) lucrative licit crops.<sup>429</sup>

However, particularly in the Realist world view, states could consider tolerating the illegal drugs economy because of its positive economic effects on state power.<sup>430</sup> For example, regardless of international repercussions, the Government of Afghanistan could decide to consider its illegal opium economy as an inherent part of its natural comparative advantage, particularly when faced with economic recession and structurally weak economic conditions.<sup>431</sup> However, such a focus clearly goes beyond the scope of this research.

What is important is that there is a very limited body of academic research on the interaction between economic security and the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon in the sense of stimulating economic growth and (alternative) rural development. To bridge this gap in scholarly literature, this research will focus on economic security as a positive development asset. This positive relationship can be established in two ways.

First, a positive relationship can be achieved by supporting diverse actors at the local, regional and national levels to increase their level of economic security (ranging from a stable income for farmers and land labourers within the legal economy, to the economic development of regions to decrease their dependence on illegal drug cultivation or production). At the level of individuals, households, communities or regions, governments can implement development or other public policies that boost economic security through a direct improvement of the living conditions in these regions.

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<sup>427</sup> Francisco E. Thoumi, ‘Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 582, No. 1 (July 2002), p. 110.

<sup>428</sup> ‘Transnational Crime and Economic Globalization’, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>429</sup> *Opium. Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-141.

<sup>430</sup> The case of the Medellín Cartel offering the Colombian government to pay off its national debt is probably the most extreme form of direct benefits provided by organised crime to the state. See: *Conundrum: Illicit Narcotics and Theoretical Approaches in International Politics*, *op. cit.*

<sup>431</sup> The author has not gone so far, but has argued that at least on the short term, it is probably better to leave the farmers’ part of the illegal opium economy in Afghanistan untouched, to slowly prepare for more favourable conditions in which to structurally reduce the industry one step at a time. See: Jorrit Kamminga, ‘Poppy Diplomacy in Afghanistan: Embracing the Benefits of the Illegal Opium Economy’, *The Huffington Post* (3 June 2013).

Second, economic security can become a positive development asset by increasing state control over regions, markets and natural resources to boost the domestic economy. This approach is less focused on people or communities, but more on the economic resources that indirectly make it possible for people to enjoy higher economic security standards and better living conditions. It means boosting regional development to make sure that the people living in those regions have more possibilities to find profitable and sustainable livelihoods in the legal economy.

Beyond the domestic level where these policies play out, the related objectives could also be seen within the broader Realist perception of the essential security objectives of the state; protecting and strengthening territories and economic resources to increase the state's power *vis-à-vis* other states. In other words, addressing domestic sources of instability and insecurity through economic security policy may ultimately be compatible with the theory of (Neo) Realism.

## **5.7 Economic security in drug control**

Although the previous section has already linked the concept of economic security to the global drugs phenomenon, this relationship will be further strengthened in this section. Economic security is the second central theoretical pillar of this research. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate in this section, through further analysis of economic security theory, that it is a) relevant, b) useful and – most importantly – c) possible to establish the link between economic security and development-oriented drug policy.

As seen above, in the interpretation of security studies, the concept of economic security embodies the idea that economic factors increasingly influence the way states define and pursue national security.<sup>432</sup> Before exploring drug control in more detail, it is important to reiterate the links with broader, more traditional threats. The search for economic security as a state response to protect domestic territories, markets and natural resources can be considered an integral part of national security. Such a close relationship between the concepts of national security and economic security is summarised in a report by the National Defense University:

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<sup>432</sup> C.R. Neu and Charles Wolf Jr., *The Economic Dimensions of National Security*, Rand's National Defense Research Institute report (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), p. iii.

*“Economic security is a major element of national security, even as borders are less important than ever. No matter how we look at national security, there can be no question of the need to include the economic viability of our nation. Without capital, there is no business; without business, there is no profit; without profit, there are no jobs. And without jobs, there are no taxes, and there is no military capability.”*<sup>433</sup>

This is an interesting contribution to the academic debate as it does not merely add the economic domain to security studies, but even makes it a precondition for military power. It is the Realist paradigm turned on its head.

Economic security should therefore be understood in the context of national interests and power considerations of states. Viewed as an extension of a state’s national security agenda, economic security is in essence about protecting and advancing economic interests and maximising a country’s economic prosperity.<sup>434</sup> There are two complementary ways of examining the effects of economic security issues. First, there are the effects of economic policies on the state’s national security situation. Second, there are the economic consequences of national security policies.<sup>435</sup>

The latter relationship has two components. On the one hand, military instruments may be applied to produce economic effects, and on the other hand, economic instruments can substitute or complement military instruments to obtain national security goals.<sup>436</sup> Trade and investment boycotts or the restriction of energy supplies to countries are examples of economic instruments complementing military instruments.<sup>437</sup> Such instruments can also be limited to the domestic market, for example in the form of import-related trade barriers or subsidies for domestic producers.<sup>438</sup> On the other hand, military instruments producing economic effects could be considered to be the more classical interpretation of state policy: states securing access to markets and resources through military threats and actions. The liberation of Kuwait in February 1991 can be seen in this light.

Both components are important in understanding the international support policies applied to Plan Colombia, as military and security instruments represented a dominant part of the US-led support apparatus at that time. The focus of the research on the nexus between

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<sup>433</sup> Sheila R. Ronis (ed.), *Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?* (Washington: NDU Press, 2011), p. viii.

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. xi, xii.

<sup>435</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. xviii, xix.

<sup>436</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xix.

<sup>437</sup> ‘What is International Economic Security?’, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

<sup>438</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307.

economic security and alternative development strategies to address the global drugs phenomenon will, however, partially move away from the military perspectives of security. This requires moving towards a concept of economic security that is (partly) disconnected from national security discourse and more aimed at fostering human security and human development, coupled with the protection of territories, markets and resources to increase national welfare and boost the national economy.

As already noted, for the purpose of this research, economic security theory is best described by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde within their new framework for security studies.<sup>439</sup> Their objective was to broaden the analysis of security by including non-traditional sectors such as economic, societal and environmental security.<sup>440</sup> The theory adds an additional dimension to national security, by focusing on the economic sector and including relationships of trade, production and finance.<sup>441</sup> This fits well with International Political Economy theory as it joins the economic security agenda with the more traditional notions of security. Buzan writes:

*“If the state is taken as the referent object, then economic security becomes part of the national security agenda. (...) The simplest view is to equate security with the economic conditions necessary for survival.”*<sup>442</sup>

Although Buzan does not limit his initial analysis of economic security to the narrow Neo-Realist view on the survival of the state, nevertheless the concept seems to be limited in most cases to the dominant analytical framework of the state in the midst of a series of external economic threats related to the international market that could jeopardise the national security of the state.<sup>443</sup>

Framing an issue area as a matter of economic security can be accomplished by politicians or governments through a process of “*securitisation*”. Securitisation is defined by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde as presenting an issue as an existential threat, creating the need for the adoption of emergency measures and actions that go beyond the normal boundaries of

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<sup>439</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.*

<sup>440</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>441</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>442</sup> *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, op. cit.*, p. 241.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter 6, pp. 230-269.

political options states have at their disposal.<sup>444</sup> The existential threat to the state (or a group of states) might not be real, but it is presented in this way.<sup>445</sup> Successful securitisation is achieved when a securitising actor (not necessarily a state actor) presents an issue as an existential threat (the “*securitising move*”) and convinces an audience that the issue indeed presents such a threat.<sup>446</sup> As discussed above, Crick provides an example of this process. She argues that securitisation was initially achieved by the Single Convention and subsequently by a US-led process of focusing on the illegal trade of narcotics; both processes of securitisation that according to her have had negative consequences and have created problems that required their own process of securitisation.

But in the work of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, the concept of economic security is analysed in a much broader context. They explore the concept primarily within the context of economic liberalism.<sup>447</sup> As mentioned above, this approach results in very few options for economic security issues to arise, particularly because existential threats are difficult to identify and substantiate within the economic sector itself.<sup>448</sup> In an earlier study, Barry Buzan already warned against too readily treating economic threats as national security issues:

*“Only occasionally will specific economic threats deserve to be ranked as a national security problem. Attempts to elevate particular economic issues onto the national security agenda should therefore be treated with suspicion as a matter of routine.”*<sup>449</sup>

The remainder of this section will therefore look more closely at this question and will demonstrate how it can still be a relevant theoretical concept to add to the analysis of the global drugs phenomenon within the framework of international cooperation between states.

The global drugs phenomenon and the broader concern of organised crime can be considered one of the ‘grey area’ phenomena of threats to national security.<sup>450</sup> Vincent Cable writes about one concept of economic security that:

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<sup>444</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.*, pp. 23, 24.

<sup>445</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>446</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>447</sup> Buzan first analysed the concept of economic security in both the liberal economic perspective and the mercantilist perspective. See: *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, op. cit.*, pp. 242-248.

<sup>448</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.*, p. 115.

<sup>449</sup> *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>450</sup> ‘What is International Economic Security?’, p. 306.



*“(...) captures the fear of global economic, social and ecological instability. (...) Potential threats include international crime syndicates, pornography traffickers, narcotics smugglers, dumpers of toxic waste [and] peddlers of plutonium.”<sup>451</sup>*

Nevertheless, Cable admits that the concept of economic security is rather vague as different illegal activities have a range of consequences and are treated differently by individual states.<sup>452</sup> The word ‘fear’ here again seems to confirm the negative approach that is usually taken to link (economic) security with the global drugs phenomenon.

It is not always clear that ‘grey area’ phenomena indirectly or directly threaten national security. However, to apply economic security theory in a useful way to the global drugs phenomenon does not necessarily mean that the latter should present direct existential threats to the economic sector governed by states. Although Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde provide a rather strict interpretation of when specific issue areas should effectively be regarded as issues of economic security, there is an important exception they add to their theory:

*“To the extent that clear existential threats arise from (...) economic issues, they do so because of their impact in other sectors rather than their impact within the economic sector itself. (...) What is merely economic or political within the economic sector may have security implications in other sectors.”<sup>453</sup>*

This is very important for the current research as it implies that the term economic security can still be a useful theoretical concept if there are only indirect consequences (“*chain reactions*”<sup>454</sup>) on broader security issues caused by events or issues confined within the economic sector.

In the context of the global drugs phenomenon, a political and legal decision of states (prohibition of certain substances) leads to an economic problem (high mark-up value for illegal substances), creating a lucrative illegal market or shadow economy that has important spill-over effects in different sectors (e.g. political corruption, political instability, violence,

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<sup>451</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307.

<sup>452</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307.

<sup>453</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.*, pp. 105, 106

<sup>454</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

inflation, etc.). A transnational problem creates domestic instability and could therefore, potentially, threaten the integrity, identity and perhaps even the sovereignty of the state.

It can be argued that these effects are particularly threatening for the survival of the state, especially when the state is already relatively weak or suffering from other related threats. A good example is the case of Afghanistan, where structural poverty, underdevelopment, corruption, internal divisions and civil strife come together in an explosive mix. Adding the Afghan illegal opium economy into the mix has led to analysts labelling the country as an emerging ‘narco-state’ or a ‘narco-terror state’.<sup>455</sup>

However, the existence of an illegal market is in itself not enough to threaten the disintegration of the state. The fact that mafias and other organised criminal groups often have a long term presence in many countries is supportive of this idea. Countries such as Italy or the United States have not collapsed despite the fact that they have had a strong mafia presence for decades. In the context of Colombia, Bruce Bagley writes:

*“Their vicious tactics notwithstanding, Colombia's drug lords do not seek to overthrow the state, but rather to reach an accommodation with it. In the final analysis, they want to consolidate their economic position and win social acceptance while insulating themselves from legal prosecution.”*<sup>456</sup>

Nevertheless, the close connection between the FARC and the illegal drugs economy in Colombia creates domestic security concerns that can be directly related to the stability (and perhaps even indirectly the survival) of the state. While the FARC currently only have a strong presence in a few areas of Colombia, they still pose a serious threat to the stability of Colombia and successfully compete with the government for territory.

The economic problems encountered in the issue area of the global drugs phenomenon are related to two broad categories: first, the indirect and direct economic consequences of the illegal drugs economy; and second, the economic consequences of alternative development policies that target the illegal drugs economy. The former category, labelled here the ‘negative category’ because of its predominant focus on negative

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<sup>455</sup> Former UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa stated in 2006 that Afghanistan was moving “*from narco-economy to narco-state*” based in part on the infiltration of government institutions by the illegal opium economy. See: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006* (Vienna: UNODC, October 2006), preface, p. iii. See also: *Seeds of Terror, op. cit.*, chapter 3: ‘Narco-Terror State’, pp. 67-102.

<sup>456</sup> Bruce Michael Bagley, ‘Dateline Drug Wars: Colombia: The Wrong Strategy’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 77 (Winter, 1989-1990), p. 158.

consequences, is predominantly related to the impact of the presence and behaviour of non-state actors (farmers, middlemen, traffickers, drug cartels, groups of drug consumers, etc.) on the security of the state.

By contrast, the consequences of the latter category are concerned with the state's international and national policies to tackle the supply side of the illegal drug phenomenon (e.g. law enforcement and alternative development). This second group is labelled the 'positive category' because of the positive effects that counter-narcotics and related development policies are trying to create at the domestic level in terms of stability, security, development, public health and the fight against crime. This positive focus on economic security means it can be both a relevant and useful concept.

Thus, for the economic security analysis of this research, both these negative and positive ways of looking at the causalities of the global drugs phenomenon have one thing in common. They first approach the security framework predominantly from the domestic setting in terms of internal factors of national stability, instead of the traditional interpretation (Buzan) of economic security which focuses principally on external threats that originate at the international level (e.g. economic shocks related to the international financial system).

Having placed the global drugs phenomenon in the security realm of the economic sector, the next question raised by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde is where the security dynamics are predominantly located.<sup>457</sup> This is divided into the location (local, regional or global) of the causes and effects of the global drugs phenomenon and the location of the securitisation process itself. First, in the context of the global drugs phenomenon, there are many possible causes and effects that overlap in different ways. Some of the relevant cause-effect relationships are the following:

**1. Cause:** prohibition/control of substances (global).

*Effect a:* higher prices (local, regional, global);

*Effect b:* illegal production centres (local);

*Effect c:* illegal trade networks (local, regional, global).

Securitisation: can take place at the global level in the form of the international drug control regime if links to (inter)national security threats are established.

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<sup>457</sup> *Security. A New Framework for Analysis, op. cit.*, p. 17.

**2. Cause:** demand for controlled substances (local, regional and global).

*Effect a:* more cultivation of plant-based drugs (local and regional);

*Effect b:* more trafficking of drugs (local, regional and global).

Securitisation: none, although the US initially started to securitise the challenge of drug use at the local level (Nixon administration, 1971), before shifting this to drug trafficking.

**3. Cause:** availability of controlled substances (local).

*Effect a:* consumption of controlled substances (local);

*Effect b:* negative (side) effects of drug consumption, for example: social nuisance, drugs-related crime, etc. (local).

Securitisation: none, the availability of the drugs themselves is generally not considered the real threat as opposed to their misuse or the related crime their use engenders.

**4. Cause:** international counter-narcotics policy related changes to the supply of drugs in neighbouring countries (regional, global).

*Effect a:* fluctuations of supply of drugs (local, regional).

Securitisation: can take place at the international level when the assessment that drugs are considered a grave threat to (international) society and security leads to the adoption of certain drug control policies.

**5. Cause:** international non-counter-narcotics policy related changes to the supply of drugs in neighbouring countries (regional, global).

*Effect a:* fluctuations of supply of drugs (local, regional).

Securitisation: none. For example, even if a general rural development policy has impact on the illegal drugs economy, there is no direct link established with this policy and a 'drugs as a security threat' discourse.

**6. Cause:** domestic counter-narcotics policy related changes to the supply of drugs (local).

*Effect a:* fluctuations of supply and availability of drugs (local, regional, global).

Securitisation: can take place when drugs are considered a grave threat to society and security at the local level.

**7. Cause:** domestic non-counter-narcotics policy related changes to the supply of drugs (local).

*Effect a:* fluctuations of supply of drugs (local, regional, global).

Securitisation: none. There is no direct link to counter-narcotics policy.

Cause and effect relationship one is the overarching global causal explanation of the global drugs phenomenon. The international decision to prohibit certain types of substances has inflated their price and increased their attractiveness for actors operating in the black market economy. Causes two and three reflect the causal relationship of demand creates supply and *vice versa*. This is a theoretical case of ‘chicken and egg’, but both relationships exist.

Cause and effect relationships four and five reflect the international dynamics resulting from the impact of international counter-narcotics policy or other policy instruments in one country or region *vis-à-vis* another. This includes the relationship dictating that the availability of drugs in the main production centres and along trafficking routes creates consumption in these areas. A clear example is the problem of opium and heroin addiction in Iran and Pakistan; countries located directly at the start of the main drug trafficking routes leading out of Afghanistan.<sup>458</sup>

Effects resulting from international counter-narcotics policy can, for example, be caused by an increase in internationally-driven or supported law enforcement activities (e.g. illicit crop eradication campaigns) or increases in international support for alternative livelihood programmes. Other (indirect) changes related to the supply of drugs could be caused by more general economic development policies, adverse weather conditions or crop diseases affecting illicit crop cultivations. Finally, cause and effect relationships six and seven are similar to four and five but the causal relationship starts at the local or national level.

The cause and effect relationships given above show the complex interconnected character of the global drugs phenomenon. The concern is however, not so much the complex nature of these relationships, but the question of where (and when) securitisation processes take place. Only the cause and effect relationships one, four and six related directly to international and domestic counter-narcotic policies, can be said to have

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<sup>458</sup> UNODC’s World Drug Report 2012 writes: “*The emergence of large-scale heroin trafficking via the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan has also entailed significant increases in heroin consumption in those countries. Prevalence of opiate use, including the smoking of opium, in Pakistan is similar to that in Western Europe, while in the Islamic Republic of Iran it exceeds that of Western Europe by a factor of four or five.*” See: *World Drug Report 2012, op. cit.*, p. 77.

securitisation processes involved, provided that actors (normally states, local governments or international organisations) perceive the causes, effects or both as structural threats to national or local security. These processes can take place at the local level (e.g. the local or national government), regional level (e.g. an international organisation or regional grouping of states) or international level (e.g. the United Nations).

## 5.8 Analysis of the concept of economic security

The challenge for this research is to broaden the concept of economic security in a constructive way, above all at the international level where states cooperate to address the global drugs phenomenon. If economic security at this level mainly relates to “*resources, finance and markets*”,<sup>459</sup> this could reinforce the Realist objective of states to sustain their domestic welfare and state power. When limiting the analysis to that narrow perception, applying the concept of economic security to the global drugs phenomenon could easily lead to approaches based exclusively on national self-interest instead of promoting economic development (support) policies of international coordination and cooperation. If shared responsibility in international drug control is indeed important for states, the concept of economic security should at least include some reciprocal elements and should be about more than boosting or protecting economic power as an essential element of their national (military) power.

At the sub-national and national level, it seems less problematic to look at economic security in the purely economic sense: protecting the welfare of the national population, securing jobs and promoting and protecting export industries of, for example, primary products such as coffee or cacao. However, when such strategies depend on the support of other countries (for example through preferential trade agreements and access to markets) once again a reciprocal approach could be an appropriate or necessary response. Supporting drug producing countries through alternative development programmes does not necessarily have to be a one-way street. The economic benefits could in fact be mutual, for example, by stimulating bilateral trade. Countries could encourage businesses and industry to support alternative development by importing more coffee or cocoa from Colombia, rather than focusing their efforts solely on reducing the supply of Colombian cocaine. This would

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<sup>459</sup> ‘New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century’, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

provide more rationale to cooperate and would add a financial motivation to the principle of shared responsibility.

In the latter reciprocal sense, economic security can be taken out of the often used context of ‘centre-periphery’ analysis where development aid is mostly seen as going from more to less developed countries.<sup>460</sup> This does not mean that core-periphery relations are unimportant within the issue area of the global drugs phenomenon and economic security.<sup>461</sup> Drug producing countries such as Afghanistan and Colombia are less developed than most countries that make up the main illicit drug consumption markets (e.g. Europe and the United States). More attention to global issues at the ‘centre’, for example in the case of international environmental problems, but also directly with regard to illicit drugs, could be beneficial for the periphery, even if this renewed interest is purely based on self interest.<sup>462</sup> In fact, such attention may provide countries such as Bolivia, Colombia or Peru with an important lever they can use to obtain supplementary support in terms of (alternative) development assistance.<sup>463</sup>

What is evident from the research is the growing importance of the economic dimension of security and the need for states to cooperate and coordinate their policies to tackle the supply side of drug control. Taking these factors into account, in what way does the concept of economic security play a role in international support for alternative development? To examine this question, a theoretical world that is neatly divided into producer and consumer countries will be used. What happens when consumer country C1 decides to support alternative development projects in producer country P1?

If the reasons to support country P1 include concerns about the socio-economic conditions and wellbeing of the farming communities in that country, country C1 may be concerned with human development in country P1 (economic security in the more classic sense). But this offers no (direct) linkages with the protection of economic security in country C1 unless illicit cultivation of drugs in country P1 is somehow indirectly harming its economic interests or stability. Thus, to apply economic security analysis to international drug control in a useful manner, a set of conditions is needed under which direct or indirect

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<sup>460</sup> Barry Buzan also analyses economic security in the context of centre-periphery and North-South relations. See: ‘New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century’, *op. cit.*, pp. 445-447; and *People, States and Fear*, *op. cit.*, pp. 240, 241.

<sup>461</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>462</sup> ‘New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century’, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

<sup>463</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 446.

linkages with illicit drug cultivation abroad threaten a country's economic security (abroad or at home).

First, consumer country C1's economic assets and investments abroad could be threatened by drug-fuelled violence or conflict in producer country P1. For example, an insurgent group may blow up an oil pipeline that directly affects the investments of country C1's government or companies. Second, treatment of drug addiction and drugs-related diseases in country C1, partly related to production in country P1, may represent such an economic cost for country C1 that it seriously affects its economy. Third, the illicit drug cultivation in P1 may be indirectly or directly connected to a large black market in country C1, which affects its economy in numerous ways (loss of taxes, loss of consumption in legal markets, negative effects of money laundering, impact on the value of the country's currency, etc.). Last, the violence and insecurity generated by the drugs trade in country C1 may produce large economic costs (e.g. costs related to crime prevention and law enforcement, prison systems and the criminal justice system at large).

These four examples have one thing in common: it is extremely doubtful that these (or other) economic security concerns present a direct threat to the economic stability and therefore the political stability of a country. The failure to deal with the economic impact of the illegal drugs trade at home may mean that a mayor, minister, prime-minister or president is voted out of office, but it is unlikely to threaten the survival of the state. Even in extreme cases such as Afghanistan where the illegal drugs economy represents a relatively large portion of the total economy, the opium economy is probably more symptomatic of the current situation of underdevelopment, weak rule of law, insecurity and political instability than the cause for it to completely fail.

Nevertheless, the illegal economy may be a determining factor behind regime change or state collapse if it finances the opposition or insurgency (as discussed in the 'economics and conflict' literature in section 5.4). Although in such cases, more traditional concepts of (military) security tend to dominate the analysis, the concept of economic security could also be applied. An economic factor (the profits of the illegal drugs economy) has an indirect (but perhaps a decisive) impact on the state's stability, security and perhaps even its survival.

Part II of this research will try to identify whether economic security is a driver behind international support for alternative development and how the concept relates to international cooperation on the basis of shared responsibility. The next chapter will analyse shared responsibility in more detail.



## CHAPTER 6: SHARED RESPONSIBILITY THEORY

This chapter analyses the concept of shared responsibility, the second pillar of the RISE instrument. It first discusses some general literature and theories regarding the concept of shared responsibility, before placing it in the framework of the global drugs phenomenon. The objective of the chapter is to prepare the concept of shared responsibility for its subsequent inclusion in the RISE instrument, as the second key pillar that helps to understand why states (could) decide to cooperate in the issue area of illicit drug supply reduction in source countries. Section 6.3 provides the author's analysis of the principle of shared responsibility.

### 6.1 Shared responsibility literature

Mexico and the United States provide an interesting example of a recently-formed bilateral relationship where the principle of shared responsibility plays an important role. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed on several occasions the “*shared responsibility to combat and defeat organized transnational crime*”<sup>464</sup> in Mexico. She acknowledged at a press briefing in March 2010 that:

*“We know that the demand for drugs drives much of this illicit trade, that guns purchased in the United States (...) are used to facilitate violence here in Mexico.”*<sup>465</sup>

In the fields of philosophy, psychology or sociology, the term shared responsibility has been used to describe ‘collective responsibility’, occurring when people cannot deal with certain problems individually as these require joint action.<sup>466</sup> This understanding of shared responsibility is very similar to its use in the world of states. Examples of situations requiring shared responsibility include world hunger or racial inequality, confirming that

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<sup>464</sup> Andrew Selee, David Shirk and Eric Olson, ‘Five myths about Mexico's drug war’, *The Washington Post* (29 March 2010).

<sup>465</sup> ‘Clinton: U.S. drug use fuels Mexico cartels. Pledges to work with southern neighbor to combat border violence’, *Associated Press* (23 March 2010).

<sup>466</sup> Larry May, ‘Collective Inaction and Shared Responsibility’, *Noûs*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 269-277.

these are often trans-national phenomena.<sup>467</sup> For states, collective inaction – a lack of shared responsibility – leads to a deterioration of a given situation or an increase in the associated harm caused. Shared responsibility is also applied to this collective inaction, thus states are equally responsible for their action and inaction.<sup>468</sup>

Many global issues include such a concept of shared responsibility between states. The example of the shared responsibility of states with regard to global water management not only demands that states jointly secure adequate water supplies for the future, but also refers to their shared responsibility on the current lack of action, caused by a gap in global governance on the issue area of water management.<sup>469</sup> In general, shared responsibility is often linked to environmental problems or other global issues that can (potentially) create or are already creating harmful conditions. In this sense, it is very similar to the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which – in the context of national companies and multinational corporations – is the shared responsibility to respect ethical standards, human rights and other international norms, as well as issues such as the protection of the environment or support for local communities.

The connection with international norms or rules is interesting for this research. It implies that states could have the shared responsibility to jointly act on specific issue areas because of a set of legal and moral obligations. In the context of the global drugs phenomenon, this means that legal or moral obligations could lead to international cooperation to address the harmful effects of the illicit drugs economy (e.g. public health consequences) or even to address the harmful effects of certain counter-narcotics policies (e.g. any possible environmental consequences related to the application of chemical spraying of drug-producing crops).

A legal obligation could be derived directly from the international treaties signed and ratified by states. For example, in signing the Single Convention, states commit to coordinated action and international cooperation to address the global drugs phenomenon.<sup>470</sup> That commitment leads to a number of shared obligations among the states signing up to the Convention. A moral obligation could also be derived from the international treaty system, but is broader, and more difficult to control. Using the same international drug control framework as an example, states could be considered to have the moral obligation to buy

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<sup>467</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 269.

<sup>468</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 273.

<sup>469</sup> See for example: UNESCO, *Water: A Shared Responsibility – The United Nations World Water Development Report 2* (Barcelona: UNESCO and Berghahn Books, 2006).

<sup>470</sup> *Single Convention on Illicit Drugs* (1961), *op. cit.*, Preamble, p. 1.

their raw opium for medicinal use from traditional producer countries India and Turkey, thus supporting legal systems of controlled licensed production to accommodate for the traditional importance of the opium industry in those countries. For example, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution E/RES/1979/8:

*“[c]alls upon importing countries, in so far as their constitutions and legal authority permit, to support the traditional supply countries and give all possible practical assistance in preventing the proliferation of producing and manufacturing sources for export.”<sup>471</sup>*

Not all states do this, but they are ‘morally obliged’ (or at least strongly urged) to do so by the international regime of the global drug control system.<sup>472</sup> The principle of shared responsibility will be further addressed in the next section where it is firmly placed inside the context of the global drugs phenomenon.

## **6.2 Shared responsibility in drug control**

In the context of this work the principle of shared responsibility (one of the guiding principles of this research) can be considered as a motivating link between two key aspects of drug control: first, agreement between states on the need to focus on both supply and demand reduction strategies (the balanced approach) as the only viable way to rein in the complex and internationally driven illegal drugs economy; and second, the actions of the states and the international community at large in the realm of alternative development to counter the supply of illicit drugs at its source.

Returning to the analysis of Chapter 4, it can be argued that the importance of shared responsibility has grown over the past two decades as the distinction between domestic and international concerns has become increasingly blurred due to the processes of globalisation and interdependence.<sup>473</sup> This also holds true for the global drugs phenomenon. For most

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
<sup>471</sup> United Nations, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Resolution 1979/8, ‘Maintenance of a world-wide balance between the supply of narcotic drugs and the legitimate demand for those drugs for medical and scientific purposes’ (9 May 1979).

<sup>472</sup> For a full analysis of the Turkish licensing system, see: Jorrit Kamminga, ‘Opium poppy licensing in Turkey: A model to solve Afghanistan’s illegal opium economy?’, *ICOS Research paper* (January 2011).

<sup>473</sup> *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

states, focusing on the supply of illicit drugs necessarily means cooperating with other countries as the supply source is often outside their borders. In other words, the assumption here is that the common understanding that both supply and demand are important components of the global drugs phenomenon, prompts states to joint (cross-border) action inspired by the principle of shared responsibility. Graph 2 below illustrates this relationship.

**Graph 2: The function of shared responsibility**



*Source: construction of the author.*

The international action and cooperation that results from this relationship can then take place either inside or outside of international regimes, involving different forms of bilateral or multilateral patterns of international cooperation.

As one of the guiding principles of the 1998 Political Declaration mentioned above, the notion of a common or shared responsibility between member states is considered necessary to prompt states to effectively tackle the global drugs phenomenon at the international level. The underlying notion is that what cannot be controlled at home needs to be tackled at the international level through cooperation between states.

However, despite the importance of the Political Declaration and contrary to the shared objectives of the international community as stated in 1998, the ‘drug-free world’<sup>474</sup> that was envisioned for the year 2008 did not come into being. Indeed, by the year 2008 a stable supply and ample availability of illicit drugs prevailed, with corresponding stable or declining price levels, and increased consumption by (for some drugs) ever-younger drug

<sup>474</sup> The slogan ‘A drug free world – We can do it’ was used when world leaders met during the 1998 UNGASS session in New York. In an article published around that time, Pino Arlacchi, then Executive Director of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP, now UNODC), said the drug-free world could become a reality in the year 2008. See: Pino Arlacchi, ‘Towards a Drug-Free World by 2008 - We Can Do It’, *UN Chronicle*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1998).

users.<sup>475</sup> Faced with the limited results achieved in 2008, the international community adopted a new Political Declaration in 2009<sup>476</sup> which wisely did not promise another ‘drug-free world’ in the near future, but reconfirmed the need for a comprehensive or balanced approach, and recognised that:

*“Sustainable crop control strategies targeting the illicit cultivation of crops used for the production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances require international cooperation based on the principle of shared responsibility and an integrated and balanced approach, taking into account the rule of law and, where appropriate, security concerns (...).”<sup>477</sup>*

The unassuming way in which ‘security concerns’ are included indicates that the international community is very cautious about addressing national security concerns in direct relationship to the global drugs phenomenon.

Overall, the international strategy towards supply reduction has barely changed. Alongside crop eradication and law enforcement measures, the crop control strategies once again include “[a]lternative development and, where appropriate, preventive alternative development programmes.”<sup>478</sup> As such, the international community still sees alternative development or alternative livelihood strategies as the key instruments to reduce the supply of illicit drugs through development in source countries.

Echoing the conclusions of the thematic evaluation of alternative development mentioned above, this strategy, however, should be regarded as embedded in or at least coordinated with wider development efforts in order to:

*“(...) contribute to the sustainability of social and economic development and poverty eradication in affected rural areas, taking due account of the traditional licit uses of crops where there is historical evidence of such use (...).”<sup>479</sup>*

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<sup>475</sup> For a review of the ‘UNGASS decade’, see: United Nations, CND, Report by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as a contribution to the review of the twentieth special session of the General Assembly’, Report E/CN.7/2008/CRP.17, ‘Making drug control ‘fit for purpose’: Building on the UNGASS decade’ (7 March 2008).

<sup>476</sup> UNODC, *Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, High-level segment, Vienna, 11-12 March 2009* (New York: United Nations, 2009).

<sup>477</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 24(a), p.12.

<sup>478</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 24(b)(i), p. 12.

<sup>479</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 24(c), p.42.

Taking into consideration the different definitions of alternative development and alternative livelihoods given at the start of this research, this entails a shift from the former to the latter, with more emphasis on embedding counter-narcotics policy into broader rural development programmes. The proceedings of the CND and the contents of official documents, analysed extensively below, will confirm the predominant focus on ‘alternative livelihood’ strategies, although the term used throughout the United Nations documents is ‘alternative development’.

Rather than aiming for another ‘drug free world’, the 2009 Political Declaration set a new target date of 2019 to “*eliminate or reduce significantly and measurably*” *inter alia* “*the illicit cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis plant.*”<sup>480</sup> In order to achieve this, the corresponding Action Plan encourages more international cooperation and more communication between international and regional agencies working on drug supply reduction. It is stressed that the reinforced international response to the global drugs phenomenon should be based on the principle of a:

*“(...) common and shared responsibility, requiring a balanced approach for purposes of international cooperation and the provision of technical assistance.”*<sup>481</sup>

In the same year, a round-table discussion at the CND once again identified shared responsibility as the foundation of strengthening international cooperation.<sup>482</sup> It argued that international cooperation was necessary on the basis that:

*“[p]roducing, transit and destination countries are all links in a chain. All have to work together to achieve results. (...) Since drug trafficking chains transcend regional boundaries, there can be no substitute for global efforts.”*<sup>483</sup>

The incorporation of the concept of shared responsibility in CND sessions in 2011 and 2012 can be seen as a continuation of the trend to encourage this principle as the basis of

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<sup>480</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 36(a).

<sup>481</sup> *Ibid.*, point (g), p.54.

<sup>482</sup> United Nations, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘Round-table discussions of the high-level segment: strengthening international cooperation in countering the world drug problem using shared responsibility as a basis for an integrated, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable approach in the fight against drugs through domestic and international policies’, Document E/CN.7/2009/L.4 (11 March 2009).

<sup>483</sup> *Ibid.*, Articles 2 and 3.

international cooperation to address the global nature of the illegal drugs economy. The overall message is clear: states should increasingly cooperate on this issue area because of shared interests, shared responsibilities and because the dynamics of the global drugs phenomenon have become more globalised.

The need for shared responsibility as the basis for international cooperation does not only result from a connection between major production and major consumption centres for illicit drugs. As discussed in section 4.5, the illicit drugs trade to a certain extent is still south-north' or 'periphery-centre' oriented, but new patterns, trade routes and production centres have emerged. It can also be seen as an answer to the (evolving) cross-border dynamics of the illicit drugs economy, whether related to cultivation, production or trafficking patterns. These cross-border dynamics are related to two effects that have been identified. First, the 'hydra effect': Rexton Kan explains this effect as follows:

*“Named after the mythical animal that could lose a head, only to have two grow back in its place, this dynamic refers to the drug trade’s ability to absorb losses of personnel at any place in the trafficking chain.”*<sup>484</sup>

Given the “*low barriers of entry*” to the market, it is not only the traffickers who can be easily replaced; new farmers can be found in territories if enough economic incentives or pressure is applied, and new trafficking routes can spring up easily if others are compromised.<sup>485</sup> In terms of the potential long-term impact of law enforcement, the hydra effect can be said to further complicate an already difficult mission:

*“The hydra effect heightens the obstacles created by the profit paradox to curbing drug production at the source.”*<sup>486</sup>

The hydra effect<sup>487</sup> is not limited to changes within national borders. The fact that Mexican cartels have now taken over a large part of the drug trafficking role previously assigned to

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<sup>484</sup> *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>485</sup> *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial, op. cit.*, pp. 5, 13 and 21.

<sup>486</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>487</sup> DEA officer David Gaddis uses a snake metaphor instead: “*The head of the mother snake was chopped off, but now we have to chase the baby poisonous snakes, which can be just as venomous.*” He referred to the replacement of the large Cali and Medellín cartels by ‘micro-cartels’. Eliminating a major drug cartel (the ‘mother snake’) simply results in the drug manufactures popping up in other areas (the ‘baby poisonous snakes’). See: Andrew Selsky, ‘Colombia DEA chief targets microcartels’, *Associated Press* (22 January 2004).

the Colombian Cali and Medellín cartels is an example of this effect across borders. But, within Colombia, the decline of the Cali and Medellín cartels has also resulted in a more active role for the FARC and ELN in the illegal cocaine trade, as well as in a proliferation of small-scale ‘Pablito Escobars’ across Colombia.<sup>488</sup> Similar internal shifts can be found elsewhere.

The second effect is the often cited ‘balloon effect’, which is a similar dynamic. Farmers or drug traffickers move all or part of their cultivation or trafficking operations elsewhere following pressure from the government’s law enforcement apparatus in one particular area. Similar to the hydra effect, these shifts in cultivation, production or trafficking patterns can happen both within and between countries. The clearest example of the balloon effect can be found in the shifts in cultivation between coca producing countries such as Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. During the 1990s, the United States used a set of economic carrots and military sticks to support Peru and Bolivia in reducing their supply of cocaine.<sup>489</sup> As a result, Colombian farmers in regions ignored by this foreign support policy started to cultivate coca.<sup>490</sup> Bruce Bagley explains this in the context of the US counter-narcotics policy in the region:

*“The ‘partial victories’ achieved by the U.S.-led ‘war on drugs’ in the southern Andes during the late 1980s and early 1990s rapidly shifted coca cultivation in the region to Colombia in the mid- and late 1990s. The two ‘partial victories’ responsible for the change were the U.S.-financed crop eradication programs in Bolivia’s Chapare region (...) along with Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori’s interruption of the ‘air bridge’ between the Alto Huallaga coca region in Peru and the clandestine cocaine laboratories located in Colombia in the mid-1990s.”*<sup>491</sup>

As this example shows, the balloon effect dictates that an extreme reduction in one country is often offset by increased production in one or two of the other countries.

Another clear example of the balloon effect was the intensive supply reduction effort (a combination of aerial spraying and alternative development) concentrated on the southern Colombian departments of Putumayo and Caquetá between 2000 and 2004. While illicit

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<sup>488</sup> *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>489</sup> *Drug Wars and Coffeehouses. The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade, op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>490</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>491</sup> Bruce Michael Bagley, ‘Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty-First Century’, *Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the Americas* (August 2012), p. 3.



coca cultivation decreased substantially in those areas, cultivation levels in neighbouring department Nariño (and other regions) went up significantly.<sup>492</sup> More recently, in 2010, the International Narcotics Control Board expressed concern that Peru would once again become the world's largest coca producing country following an increase in domestic cultivation levels that offset decreases in Colombia over the previous decade.<sup>493</sup>

Nevertheless, there are serious limitations to the metaphor of a balloon as this implies that states cannot influence the size or scope of the drug phenomenon as these seem to be fixed within the body of the balloon.<sup>494</sup> Yet the metaphor's strength is that it demonstrates that international cooperation and policy coordination between states is the only way to make sustainable inroads against the illegal drugs economy. In the long term, supply reduction in source countries can only work if effective alternative development strategies are used in all areas where illicit cultivation takes place (and preventive alternative development takes place in areas where it may move to).

The cross-border implications of the hydra and balloon effects increase the importance of shared responsibility at the core of international cooperation to address the global drugs phenomenon. The message at the international level is that drugs can enter any country as can – climate permitting – cultivation or production centres. For this research, it is important to assess to what extent the principle of shared responsibility has determined or influenced international support for counter-narcotics policy in Colombia. Part of this assessment will be the vital question of whether a lack of commitment to shared responsibility has limited international support for the supply reduction policies implemented in Colombia.

### **6.3 Analysis of the principle of shared responsibility**

The cross-border nature of the global drugs phenomenon, reinforced by issues such as the balloon effect, may make it more coherent for states to cooperate as an international society of states. However, this does not necessarily mean that policy makers at the national level in fact ever decide to collaborate (even if they are bound by international laws that they signed

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<sup>492</sup> UNODC, *Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey for 2004* (Bogotá, UNODC, 2005), p. 12.

<sup>493</sup> Peru last held the position of main coca producing country in 1996. See: INCB, *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2010* (Vienna: INCB, 2011), p. 72.

<sup>494</sup> *Drug Wars and Coffeehouses. The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade, op. cit.*, p. 13.

and ratified). At the national level, the reasons for collaborating (or not) may in fact reflect the position of a country within the international structure of the global drugs phenomenon (its direct or indirect exposure to illicit drugs and their consequences). Several theoretical cases could shed light on how shared responsibility may work in practice on this level.

The first theoretical case is a country that is not affected at all by the global drugs phenomenon. An example of this would be an isolated island where there are no illicit drugs and no visitors who arrive with drugs. A related, more realistic scenario would be a country which is only slightly affected by the global drugs phenomenon, for example, only when its citizens travel abroad. Such countries would have little direct interest in cooperating on drug control on the basis of shared responsibility, with no major role in the illegal drugs economy as producer, transit or consumer country. Any contribution to addressing the global drugs phenomenon would probably be based on moral grounds or derived from obligations under international law. Beyond such obligations, these countries can hardly be forced to play a significant role in supporting counter-narcotics policies abroad.

The second theoretical case is the division of the world into producer, transit and consumer countries. The classic case of shared responsibility in drug control is very much limited to the vertical relationship between producer and consumer countries. This creates a moral obligation on both sides which is a principle reason for cooperation. Producer country P1 would need consumer country C1 and *vice versa* to make efforts to structurally address the cross-border nature of the global drugs phenomenon. For example, Colombia needs financial support and technical assistance for its domestic counter-narcotics programmes, but it is also obliged to cooperate and make a serious effort to address the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon. The latter obligation can even be enforced using coercive diplomacy such as the US decision in 1996 and 1997 to blacklist Colombia as not fully cooperating with the US counter-narcotics strategy.<sup>495</sup> Transit (or trafficking) countries could also be regarded as part of a vertical relationship that translates into shared responsibility. For example, the US assists Mexico because of its shared responsibility for the supply of drugs to the US market, but it also needs Mexico to address its domestic problems such as the powerful drug cartels.

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<sup>495</sup> Countries blacklisted through this so-called 'de-certification' process face repercussions in the form of possible cuts in development aid and trade preferences. They may be confronted with different types of political and economic sanctions. For more information about the US policy of de-certification, see: Bruce Michael Bagley, 'Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and U.S. Policy in Colombia in the 1990s', *Working Paper* (7 February 2001); and 'The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: U.S. Drug Policy and Colombian State Stability, 1978-1997', *op. cit.*

Shared responsibility in drug control works best in a structure of vertical relationships, as countries make efforts to address what is really an international affair with clear-cut cross-border causes and effects. In contrast, a more nationally confined problem, such as the situation of the indigenous communities in Colombia, does not translate well in terms of shared responsibility, as a solution can be found and can be effective or sustainable at the local level regardless of what other states do. In this sense, the global drugs phenomenon is comparable to truly international problems such as global warming, nuclear proliferation or computer piracy that all demand concerted global action to tackle the problems in a sustainable way at the international level.

Leaving behind the classic case of shared responsibility in drug control, the situation becomes more blurred with regard to horizontal relationships between the different types of countries. In fact, these relationships lead to scenarios in which national interests may play out very differently and actually work against the logic of shared responsibility and international cooperation. This can be demonstrated in the example of the possible relationship between two producer countries, P1 and P2. While they both will try to address their domestic problem of illicit drug cultivation, they have very few incentives to work together. In addition, the balloon effect could mean that success in country P1 may in fact be detrimental for country P2. In practical terms, why would country P2, therefore, support or invest in alternative development projects in country P1 if their very success may worsen the problem at home? The same dilemma can be found in the case of two transit countries, T1 and T2, which equally have few incentives to collaborate with each other as trafficking routes can easily shift across borders.

The case of two consumer countries, C1 and C2 is different, but in theory also undermines the importance of shared responsibility. Beyond sharing some best practices or lessons learned in bilateral or multilateral *fora* on drug addiction, treatment and harm reduction, C1 and C2 have no real reason to cooperate. Whether illicit drug consumption is domestically considered more as a public health or as a criminal justice issue does not matter. In both cases, neither country is likely to welcome international support or interference in its domestic public policies, unless they find themselves in a situation in which they need help, whether financially or in terms of technical assistance. For example, in 2001 Afghanistan had little experience with effective drug treatment and could seriously benefit from foreign assistance.

Third, related to the latter point, countries could also be divided in the classic way into developed and underdeveloped countries. Regardless of their role in the global drugs phenomenon (which in reality is likely to be a combination of two or three of the roles described above), if an underdeveloped country is included in the horizontal or vertical relationships of the global drugs phenomenon, it may increase the incentive for more developed countries to support it on the basis of shared responsibility. It may be a coherent extension to existing patterns of development cooperation, but the contrary may also be true: A country may be less willing to work on drug control in an underdeveloped country if it already has other projects or priorities. Poverty may also mean that some countries are unable to abide by commitments to shared responsibility (whether at home or abroad) as they may have no means to effectively implement or support any kind of drug control programme.

The difficulty in understanding the principle of shared responsibility is that it does not translate into a concrete list of which countries should do what, and under what circumstances. While the principle of shared responsibility is explained in terms of some concrete examples of how states can and are urged to act to support other countries or to tackle their domestic part of the global drugs phenomenon, the obligations (if any) generally do not come with tangible prescriptions for action across borders. Instead, shared responsibility is mostly used in a rather generic sense, without making distinctions between countries with a certain level of income or a certain position within the international patterns of the global drugs phenomenon.

The bottom line is that in reality the reasons why states decide to cooperate or not across borders on the issue of drug control are multiple, and it is therefore challenging to make any predictions on how many states will put the principle of shared responsibility into action (at home or abroad) and for what reason. An examination of the international treaties and the expressed commitment of countries at the international level of the CND, would predict that all countries would abide by the principle of shared responsibility, one way or another. However, at the national level where the real political decisions are taken, many other principles and interests may trump shared responsibility when it comes to international cooperation, including considerations of bilateral trade, maintaining good relations, valuing historical ties or common traditions between countries or the protection of national interests abroad.

## CHAPTER 7: INTERNATIONAL REGIME THEORY

After discussing the two pillars that will sustain the structure of the functional instrument of RISE in Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter will lay the foundations for the RISE. These foundations are based in international regime theory. After exploring literature on international regime theory and connecting the theory with the framework of the global drugs phenomenon, the chapter will address the four elements that constitute international regimes: principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. The chapter will then discuss different types of regimes, before finally linking international regime theory directly with the RISE instrument, allowing the research to commence the actual construction of the instrument in Chapter 8.

### 7.1 International regime literature

No literature published before the 1990s linking international regime theory directly with the global drugs phenomenon has been found. Ethan A. Nadelmann was one of the first scholars to link the concept of ‘international regimes’ to the global drugs phenomenon in a 1990 paper.<sup>496</sup> His principle aim was to criticise what he calls the ‘prohibitionist regime’. One of his main contributions to the academic debate has been the notion that while international regimes reflect the economic and political interests of their dominant members, strong moral and emotional underpinnings of what is wrong or right shape the international prohibition regimes. Herschinger’s work has recently reconfirmed this concept: a powerful state like the US creates the hegemonic order (or ‘imposed order’ following Oran Young’s terminology) that decides why and how states should react to an international (non-traditional) security threat.<sup>497</sup>

Driven by his negative perception of the current prohibitionist regime with regard to illicit drugs, Nadelmann claims moral and emotional judgements can negatively influence the objectives of an international regime. In other words, they can have a strong impact on

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<sup>496</sup> See Ethan A. Nadelmann, ‘Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society’ in *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990).

<sup>497</sup> *Constructing global enemies: hegemony and identity in international discourses on terrorism and drug prohibition, op. cit.*, Chapter 3, pp. 60-98.

the norms that constitute the regime's normative framework. This could lead, for example, to states agreeing to ban drugs for ethical or political reasons rather than basing their decisions on the conclusions of scientific research on the impact of the global drugs phenomenon. In addition, such ethical or political considerations may also prevent states from reconsidering or adapting their policies following a negative impact assessment or evaluation of the existing counter-narcotics policy.

Gabriel Tokatlian and Ivan Briscoe (the latter being a colleague of the author at the Netherlands' Institute of International Relations, Clingendael), have built on Nadelmann's analysis to develop a 'post-prohibition regime'.<sup>498</sup> Acknowledging the existence of an international regime related to the global drugs phenomenon that is "*shaped by prohibitionist policies*", they argue for an alternative international anti-drug regime, based on principles related to public policy on "*justice, equity, health, human rights, education, and employment*".<sup>499</sup> They see the solution to the global drugs phenomenon as follows:

*"(...) [I]t is essential that the drug issue is individually addressed as a public health issue in the main consumption centers, and as a problem of uneven development in the production and trafficking centers."*<sup>500</sup>

The notion of 'uneven development' is particularly interesting as it can be linked to the economic analysis that will figure in Part II of this research (and to the Structuralist theory in International Relations briefly discussed in section 4.8).

However, the analysis of Tokatlian and Briscoe ignores the reality of an increasingly complex system of drug production, trafficking and consumption. Examples of this can be found in the growing importance of synthetic drugs or the constant shifts in production and trafficking hubs. The so-called 'drug consuming country–drug producing country' paradigm can no longer fully explain the illicit drugs trade and has partly been replaced by a new, complex geo-political reality.<sup>501</sup>

Tokatlian and Briscoe – following in the academic footsteps of Nadelmann – call for the prohibition regime to be replaced by a combination of a public health approach, harm reduction strategies and 'modulated regulation' of narcotic and psychotropic substances.

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<sup>498</sup> Juan Gabriel Tokatlian and Ivan Briscoe, 'Drugs: Towards a Post-Prohibitionist Paradigm', *IPG*, Issue 3 (2010), pp.102-110.

<sup>499</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>500</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>501</sup> *Drug Wars and Coffeehouses. The Political Economy of the International Drug Trade*, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

This entails developing a set of regulatory models for individual substances based on the potential harm they bring about.<sup>502</sup> However, Tokatlian and Briscoe do not address the way states should cooperate within such an alternative regime, nor do they take into account the principle of shared responsibility that drives international cooperation. While Tokatlian and Briscoe see the first signs of a different drug control regime in Europe, the road to their ‘model’ seems to be very long. Although there are certainly some developments in Europe towards a European anti-drug model<sup>503</sup> centred on public health approaches, they underestimate the ideological and other differences between states in this issue area, even within the European Union.<sup>504</sup>

More recently, Victoria A. Greenfield, Letizia Paoli and Peter Reuter have explored ways to move away from a supply-reduction dominated counter-narcotics policy towards new ways of addressing the global drugs phenomenon within the international context. In this research they did not, however, address the principle of shared responsibility or the notion of international regimes.<sup>505</sup>

The connection between the international regime model and the current international drug control framework was established by the author during his degree in International Relations at the State University of Groningen in the Netherlands.<sup>506</sup> The results of this initial analysis will be discussed below in this chapter to provide examples of elements of the regime.

In Colombia, a 2005 Master thesis by Ángela Milena Picón of the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana de Bogotá addressed international regimes and the role of shared responsibility in the context of bilateral cooperation between Colombia and the European

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<sup>502</sup> ‘Drugs: Towards a Post-Prohibitionist Paradigm’, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

<sup>503</sup> The EU Drugs Strategy and corresponding Action Plans can be considered the basis for a ‘European model’ of drug policy. The next EU Drugs Strategy covers the period 2013-2020, divided in two four-year Action Plans.

<sup>504</sup> In recent years, especially the European Commission has attempted to create a European model of drug Policy. The assessment with regard to the underestimation of the (ideological) differences is informed by ten years of professional experience working on (European) drug policy for the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS). See also: Raymond Kendall and Jorrit Kamminga, ‘La nueva estrategia mundial contra la droga’, *El País* (25 March 2010).

<sup>505</sup> See: Victoria A. Greenfield and Letizia Paoli, ‘If supply-oriented drug policy is broken, can harm reduction help fix it? Melding disciplines and methods to advance international drug-control policy’, *International Journal of Drug Policy*, Volume 23, Issue 1 (January 2012), pp. 6–15, and Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield, and Peter Reuter, *The World Supply of Heroin: Can Supply Be Cut?* (Oxford University Press 2009). Another interesting article is: Letizia Paoli, Irina Rabkov, Victoria A. Greenfield, and Peter Reuter, ‘Tajikistan: The rise of a Narco-state’, *Journal of Drug Issues*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2007), pp. 951-980.

<sup>506</sup> ‘Het Mondiale Drugsprobleem. De Verenigde Naties en Internationale Regimevorming’, *op. cit.*

Union in the field of drug control.<sup>507</sup> Her thesis is the work that is closest to the scope of this research that was identified during the literature review process. Picón describes international cooperation as an instrument of shared responsibility in a globalising world where problems exceed the capacity of individual states.<sup>508</sup> In her analysis, the EU-Colombia counter-narcotics support agenda is based on three principles: 1) shared responsibility; 2) cooperation (development, police and justice cooperation and trade promotion); and 3) respect for human rights.<sup>509</sup> This fits closely with Fukumi's assessment of the EU's involvement in drug control in the Andes, which she asserts is mainly driven by humanitarian aspects of support (development, human rights and the elimination of poverty).<sup>510</sup>

Perhaps Picón's most relevant contribution for this research is her analysis of European trade promotion measures relating to the EU General system of preferences (GSP) and GSP Plus, analysed in Part II. Picón examines to what extent this preferential trade agreement embodies the principle of shared responsibility.<sup>511</sup> Without going into further details here, she concludes that the EU's GSP system was effectively a form of shared responsibility (granting trade preferences to cope better with the problem of domestic drug production), the European Union weakened its commitment to shared responsibility considerably under the new GSP Plus system (e.g, by creating a more asymmetric relationship of dependence between Colombia and the EU).<sup>512</sup>

As a general rule, most theses do not go beyond an analysis of the current international drug control framework as an international regime. A 2008 Stanford University doctoral thesis, *International narcotics control: Norms, systems and regimes* examines the growth and development of the 'International Drug Control Regime' in a historic context, but does not explore alternative international regimes.<sup>513</sup>

The majority of authors explore alternatives to the prohibitionist framework rather than focusing on regime changes within the current system. One of the few exceptions is

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<sup>507</sup> Angela Milena Picón, 'Desarrollo de las Relaciones de Cooperación entre Colombia y la Unión Europea para la Lucha Contra el Tráfico de Drogas Ilícitas', *Papel Político*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January-June 2006), pp. 353-394.

<sup>508</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 361.

<sup>509</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 375.

<sup>510</sup> *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses*, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

<sup>511</sup> 'Desarrollo de las Relaciones de Cooperación entre Colombia y la Unión Europea para la Lucha Contra el Tráfico de Drogas Ilícitas', *op. cit.*, p. 375.

<sup>512</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 389,390.

<sup>513</sup> Clinton Watson Taylor, *International narcotics control: Norms, systems and regimes*, Dissertation, Stanford University (March 2008).



David Bewley-Taylor who has identified the first possible signs of modest regime change within the international drug control regime:

*“How then do we sum up the UNGASS decade [1998-2008]? It was certainly a period of regime transformation. But rather than a widespread and anterior challenge to the treaty system, this took on the form of a subtle change within the regime whereby a growing number of Parties deviated from the prohibitive norm at its core. In terms of national interest, most states were reluctant to expend political capital and thus incur the various costs associated with working towards a more substantive change of the regime. The resultant process of regime weakening played out in a number of ways at the Commission [on Narcotic Drugs].”*<sup>514</sup>

Bewley-Taylor describes the modest shifts away from prohibition mainly in terms of the increased acceptance of harm reduction among states and alternative national policies on cannabis that deviate from the norms of the international regime.<sup>515</sup> The aforementioned policy shift of Uruguay towards a state controlled regulated market for cannabis is a prime example, as well as the initiatives in some American states such as California, Colorado and Washington towards the legalisation of non-medical cannabis.

Former Secretary General of Interpol, Raymond Kendall and the author also pointed to some first signs of change in an opinion article in *El País*, particularly related to the European Union, the US counter-narcotics policy in the US and the humanitarian approach of the international network of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.<sup>516</sup> All these changes are taking place within the current international drug control regime. Similarly, the creation of an International Economic Security Regime as a (theoretical) sub-regime within the international drug control framework could also be considered partial regime change – within the system.

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<sup>514</sup> ‘The Contemporary International Drug Control System: A History of the UNGASS Decade’, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>515</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>516</sup> ‘La nueva estrategia mundial contra la droga’, *op. cit.*

## 7.2 International regime theory and the global drugs phenomenon

In addition to shared responsibility and economic security, the third central theoretical component of this research is the international regime. Indeed, International Regime theory, developed principally from the 1970s and 1980s onwards, provides the cement for the theoretical foundations of this research. Building on the general (literature) overview provided already, the concept will now be directly applied to the global drugs phenomenon. This will pave the way for the construction of the International Economic Security Regime in Chapter 8.

As discussed above, the theory does not in principle belong to a single paradigm in the field of International Relations, but instead has been included (or neglected) by the core paradigms as an additional tool to help explain the lack of international cooperation in an anarchic international system. Nevertheless, the concept is mostly viewed here from the perspective of the Neo-Realist paradigm of International Relations.

The concept of ‘international regime’ can be traced to academic work of the early 1970s. At the time there was an emergent ‘control gap’ between the aspirations of states and their capabilities.<sup>517</sup> In other words, there was a growing gap between what states wanted to achieve and what they could achieve single-handedly. At the time, the world economy was becoming increasingly interlinked and interdependent, while trade liberalisation expanded, resulting in more issue areas that states could not control independently.

As a consequence, scholars in the International Policy Economy field of study began to explore the different types of institutions governing global (economic) relations.<sup>518</sup> Through the Complex Interdependence theory, Keohane and Nye laid the foundations for ‘international regimes’. The term described institutions related to the cooperation between states that embodied agreement on rules and expectations, and offered states both a vehicle for cooperation and a mechanism of conflict resolution:<sup>519</sup>

*“By creating or accepting procedures, rules or institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations.”*<sup>520</sup>

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<sup>517</sup> *International Political Economy. An Intellectual History, op. cit.*, p. 95.

<sup>518</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>519</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>520</sup> *Power and Independence, op. cit.*, p. 5.

These international regimes are described as an intermediate layer between the power structure of the international system of states, and the political and economic negotiations and decision making taking place between the states that make up the system.<sup>521</sup>

Regime formation is concerned with coordinating states' expectations and behaviour in diverse (economic) issue areas.<sup>522</sup> International regimes can be considered to respond to what the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has described as "*global governance failing to keep pace with economic globalisation.*"<sup>523</sup> To counter this, states increasingly cooperate on (economic) issues through the use of international regimes or international institutions.

As already touched upon in the first chapters of this research, Krasner built on the work of Keohane and Nye by further developing the concept. He offers the following definition of the international regime (repeated here because of its central role in this research):

*"Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice."*<sup>524</sup>

For states, international regimes make it easier to cooperate and realise their shared interests together. The principles and norms of the international regime can be considered the normative framework. This framework determines the nature of the regime. In fact, the normative framework is so important that when the principles and norms underpinning the regime are changed or abandoned by the states involved, the regime is replaced by a new one or ceases to exist.<sup>525</sup>

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<sup>521</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>522</sup> *Constructing the World Polity. Essays on international institutionalization*, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

<sup>523</sup> *The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, *op. cit.*, Preface, p. ii.

<sup>524</sup> *International Regimes*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>525</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

### 7.2.1 Principles

Principles are described by Krasner as “*beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude.*”<sup>526</sup> They reflect what states judge to be (morally) right, how issues are caused and structured, and how they can be tackled. It is useful here to provide some concrete examples related to the issue area at hand. Within the author’s earlier academic study<sup>527</sup> on regime theory in relation to the global drugs phenomenon, the following basic principles were identified in the context of the international drug control framework:<sup>528</sup>

- The global drugs phenomenon is a truly global challenge;
- The global drugs phenomenon has increased in size in recent years;
- Illicit drugs cause serious harm to people’s health, safety and wellbeing;
- Illicit drugs engender a serious threat to the security and development of many countries and nations;
- International coordination and cooperation is needed to address the global drugs phenomenon;
- Finding solutions within the system of the United Nations is desirable;
- Shared responsibility between countries is important;
- States are sovereign actors;
- States have the responsibility to implement the international drug control treaties;
- Respect for human rights is an essential component of counter-narcotics policy;
- There is a causal relationship between poverty and the global drugs phenomenon, especially when it comes to illicit drug cultivation and production.

This non-exhaustive list of examples of shared principles does not mean all countries agree on their importance or see them as priorities. It means that the majority of states adhering to the international regime on drug control have agreed on them, share converging or common views on these issues or have signed and ratified the international treaties in which they can be found.

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<sup>526</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>527</sup> ‘Het Mondiale Drugsprobleem. De Verenigde Naties en Internationale Regimevorming’, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-20.

<sup>528</sup> Elaborating on the findings of this earlier academic study is done for explanatory purposes only. This earlier work should only be considered a first examination of the analysis of international regimes in the context of the global drugs phenomenon.

The principles identified in Chapter 8 relating the International Economic Security Regime are more specific to its role as a sub-regime of the broader international regime of the international drug control framework. An explanation for this is offered below in sections 7.2.6 and 7.2.7.

### 7.2.2 Norms

Norms are described by Krasner as “*standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations*” for states.<sup>529</sup> Part of the same normative framework of international regimes, they are often very similar to principles.<sup>530</sup> In his earlier research, the author found that norms often provide a concrete meaning or shape to principles.<sup>531</sup> They translate principles into meaningful rights and obligations of the states participating in the international regime. Again, it is useful to draw some examples from earlier research of the author into this issue area. The following norms were identified in the context of the international drug control framework:

- The global drugs phenomenon needs to be addressed at the local, national, regional and international levels;
- The global drugs phenomenon should be addressed with respect for the principle of non-intervention between states;
- Measures taken to address the global drugs phenomenon should have an equal impact on women and men;
- Only the medical and scientific use of illicit drugs should be allowed and supported;
- The use of illicit drugs should be tackled through a combination of policies;
- States should cooperate to address the various challenges of the global drugs phenomenon;
- States should respect each other’s sovereignty;
- States should take all necessary legislative and administrative measures to implement the provisions of the three international drug control treaties;

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<sup>529</sup> *International Regimes*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>530</sup> For a discussion on this, see: *From international to world society? English school theory and the social structure of globalisation*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

<sup>531</sup> ‘Het Mondiale Drugsprobleem. De Verenigde Naties en Internationale Regimevorming’, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

- States should support the ‘traditional drug-producing’ countries in their endeavours to reduce or eliminate drug production;
- States should particularly assist developing countries to face their challenges related to the global drugs phenomenon.

Comparing this list of norms with the list of principles confirms that norms can directly result from principles or are strongly related to them. For example, the principle of ‘international coordination and cooperation is needed to address the global drugs phenomenon’ is translated into an international norm that states should effectively cooperate to address the various challenges of the global drugs phenomenon. The list above also shows that norms and principles are often very similar. For example, the principles that ‘states have the responsibility to implement the international drug control treaties’ is very similar to the norm that ‘states should take all necessary legislative and administrative measures to implement the provisions of the three international drug control treaties.’

### 7.2.3 Rules

The rules and decision-making procedures (see 7.2.4 below) can be considered the instrumental framework of the international regime. This framework includes the decisions that states make and the policy instruments they agree to use together. In principle, the rules and decision-making procedures may change, which leads to a change within the regime, not to a completely new regime.<sup>532</sup> The reason for this is that the principles and norms that shape the identity of the regime would still be the same. It is the instrumental framework that determines the strength of the regime and also determines the outcome of the regime in the form of concrete policies of coordination, cooperation or the implementation of joint projects between states.

As the first component of the instrumental framework, rules prescribe how member states of the international regime should act in certain situations. They also provide guidance on how states can overcome differences within the international regime, how they should respect agreements and how the behaviour of states can be controlled. Using Krasner’s definitions, rules may appear to be very similar to norms. However, while rules could be

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<sup>532</sup> *International Regimes, op. cit.*, p. 3.

considered the more formal, written or even legal requirements of states, norms could be considered the “*customs of society*” of states.<sup>533</sup>

With regard to the international drug control framework, it is relatively straightforward to identify rules and decision-making procedures as this international regime can be considered a more formal regime, institutionalised and governed by a specific set of international treaties (see below section 7.2.5 for an explanation on formal and informal regime types). The following types of rules were identified *inter alia*:

- rules on how to amend the provisions of the drug control treaties;
- rules regarding the interaction between the member states and the UN bodies supporting the treaties;
- rules regarding the obligation of member states to report on their national situations;
- rules relating to the licensing of controlled substances for medicinal or scientific purposes;
- rules concerning the control of precursor materials;
- rules concerning legal offences and sanctions;
- rules regarding jurisdiction;
- rules related to the confiscation of controlled substances;
- rules concerning the extradition of suspects;
- rules regarding legal support;
- rules concerning the transport of controlled substances or precursor materials.

In the case of an institutionalised regime such as the international drug control framework, the detailed rules of the international treaties that form the regime also constitute the rules of the instrumental framework of the international regime. They translate the principles and norms of the regime into a concrete set of rules that states must follow if they choose to abide by the international treaties that they have signed up to.

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<sup>533</sup> *From international to world society? English school theory and the social structure of globalisation, op. cit.*, p. 164.

#### 7.2.4 Decision-making procedures

Decision-making procedures, the second component of the international regime's instrumental framework, are described by Krasner as the “*prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice*.”<sup>534</sup> These are the mechanisms of the regime by which states engage in coordination, cooperation or joint action. They can be considered as the devices that lead to the ‘output’ of the international regime.

Even when considering formal international regimes governed by detailed, normative international treaties, decision-making procedures are difficult to identify. If an international regime has a central coordinating body or international secretariat, this body will normally organise and guide the decision-making process by which member states come to joint decisions or undertake joint action (from voting procedures to the drafting of decisions or resolutions).

The author's earlier research on the global drug control regime, proved this to be the case.<sup>535</sup> Most decision-making procedures were related to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the quasi independent ‘watchdog’ organisation within the international regime and the CND, part of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations.<sup>536</sup>

Therefore, within this institutional framework, the only procedures identified were related either to internal decision-making procedures of the INCB or the CND. The CND represents the member states thus can be considered the most relevant decision-making body, placed at the heart of the international drug control system. At the CND, a commission that meets twice a year, resolutions are adopted by 53 member states and decisions are made on amendments to the legal provisions of the international treaties. In addition, it provides member states with a forum to exchange best practices, highlight new developments and prioritise certain measures or interventions. The strength and impact of international cooperation and coordination within an international treaty system depend on the implementation of common principles, norms and rules in the domestic laws of member states. It could be argued therefore, that while decisions on joint international action,

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<sup>534</sup> *International Regimes, op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>535</sup> ‘Het Mondiale Drugsprobleem. De Verenigde Naties en Internationale Regimevorming’, *op. cit.*


<sup>536</sup> In the current research, the INCB will not be included directly in the decision-making framework of the international regime, given the fact that it is more an advisory body that monitors the functioning of (and compliance to) the system, rather than determining, shaping or influencing directly the decisions that member states take at the level of the United Nations drug control system.



coordination or cooperation are taken at the level of the CND, the real decisions to confirm (and abide by) these actions are predominantly taken outside of the collaborative framework of the international regime: at the level of national parliaments where national laws and measures are adopted. This, of course, is the general dual character of most international laws and agreements.

Having explored the four basic elements of the international regime, principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, Graph 3 below summarises the relationship between these elements and depicts the mechanism of the international regime.

**Graph 3: The structure of the international regime**




*Source: construction of the author.*

Within the normative framework of the international regime (the left side of the graph), principles determine norms, and norms can often be directly traced back to principles. The normative framework of the international regime as a whole determines its instrumental framework (the right side of the graph). The instrumental framework, in turn, determines the relative strength of the regime. Through its decision-making procedures, the output of the

regime is produced: decisions on joint actions states take together or commit to at the national level to tackle the global drugs phenomenon.

In the case of a relatively weak international regime, the output could be directly generated by the normative framework, in which case shared principles and norms result in some kind of agreement on common or coordinated action between states, but without the formality of rules and the ability to take joint decisions through its decision-making procedures. Graph 4 below illustrates the case of a weak international regime.

**Graph 4: The structure of a weak international regime**



*Source: construction of the author.*

In this case, the international regime can still be meaningful, but since there are no clear mechanisms to control or enforce the agreements produced, states are at liberty to decide when and whether to abide by the regime's informal provisions. An example of this type of weak regime would be to remove the international treaties, the INCB, and the CND resolutions and decisions from the international drug control regime, turning it into a forum

where countries simply discuss issues related to drug control, exchange information and perhaps agree to coordinate policies or to cooperate in concrete initiatives.

### 7.2.5 Informal and formal regimes

In addition to variations in their relative strength, different types of international regimes can be identified. First, there is a distinction between formal and informal regimes. Formal regimes can be seen as institutionalised regimes, legislated by international organisations, governed by international law and/or monitored by international secretariats or organisations.<sup>537</sup> In comparison, informal regimes are more *ad hoc*<sup>538</sup> regimes, resulting from the agreement among states on certain objectives and without formal institutions or monitoring mechanisms.<sup>539</sup> While international alternative development policies relating to supply reduction strategies operate within the broader regime of the international legal drug control framework, the hypothesis here is that any (specific) international regime arising within the economic domain of supply reduction will be predominantly an informal regime. Such a regime would be chiefly governed by informal processes of convergence of states' expectations and their approaches on how to solve the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon.

### 7.2.6 Specific and diffuse regimes

In addition to the informal-formal divide, international regimes can be very specific (for example limited to a single issue such as global electronic commerce) or more diffuse (governing multiple issues such as, for example, a regime for international maritime security). Taking the examples of principles given above with regard to the international drug control regime, it is clear that this particular international regime is very diffuse, covering issues ranging from border control to painkilling medicines, and from drug treatment to rural development. Puchala and Hopkins provide an additional clarification that

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<sup>537</sup> Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, 'International regimes: lessons from inductive analysis', in: Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 65.

<sup>538</sup> But no temporary or "one shot" arrangements. See: *International Regimes, op. cit.*, pp. 3, 4.

<sup>539</sup> 'International regimes: lessons from inductive analysis', *op. cit.*, p. 65.

supports the concept of the International Economic Security Regime as a specific regime within this broader international drug control system:

*“More specific regimes often tend to be embedded in broader, more diffuse ones – the principles and norms of the more diffuse regimes are taken as givens in the more specific regimes.”*<sup>540</sup>

In this light, the above-mentioned example of global electronic commerce could be seen as embedded in broader international regimes governing international trade and communications.<sup>541</sup> Similarly, a regime on access to maritime ports could be embedded in a broader regime covering international maritime relations.

Building on the above analysis, a second hypothesis of this research is that an International Economic Security Regime will be more specific than diffuse, and can be considered to be part of the broader, formal (and diffuse) international regime of the international drug control system. This relationship suggests that, to a certain extent, the International Economic Security Regime will be influenced or (partly) governed by the same international treaties, decisions and resolutions shaping the international drug control framework, but is not necessarily the case. States may want to use a more specific, partial or sub-regime precisely for the purpose of not being bound by the wide-ranging discussions taking place (or limitations set) within the broader international regime and the complexities of its rules and decision-making procedures. The sub-regime could focus on alternative development, or on even more specific issue areas, such as international market access for alternative development produce.

### **7.2.7 Partial regimes and sub-regimes**

If the interests of states do not converge in a given issue area and they cannot reach agreement on all principles and norms, there is the possibility that a partial regime

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<sup>540</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>541</sup> See: Derrick L. Cogburn, ‘Elite Decision-Making and Epistemic Communities: Implications for Global Information Policy’, in: Sandra Braman (ed.) *The Emergent Global Information Policy Regime* (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 154-178.

evolves.<sup>542</sup> Bessette and Haufler have discussed the concept of partial regimes in the context of the international information regime.<sup>543</sup> While differences of national interests, priorities or preferences exist within the international community, partial regimes can nevertheless lead to cooperation between states on the more limited issue areas where they do agree. This may result in weaker international regimes, with, for example numerous national caveats or diluted agreements. However, it can also be argued that because partial regimes are more specific they are sometimes more relevant or stronger. This would be the case, for example when the issue areas covered by the international regime need to be described in more specific terms for states to agree with them. The hypothesis relating to this research is that the International Economic Security Regime will be both a partial and specific regime as described above, based on shared principles and norms concerning alternative development strategies in source countries.

States may be willing to cooperate even when their interests or expectations do not fully overlap, as the alternative outcome – no cooperation at all on a given issue area – may be worse for all parties involved. For instance, states can cooperate on taking important measures to protect the environment, even if, for example, they do not agree on the importance of carbon dioxide emission reductions or the impact of climate change. Similarly, within the context of the global drugs phenomenon, states may not agree on the need to regulate or legalise certain psychotropic substances, but they can nevertheless cooperate on supply reduction and alternative development.

A sub-regime is different from a partial regime. The existence of a sub-regime means that a (more specific) international regime is part of a broader (more diffuse) international regime. For example, within the international regime on the protection of universal human rights, a sub-regime could be formed around women's rights or the rights of ethnic minorities.<sup>544</sup> Establishing sub-regimes clearly has the advantage of focus.

In the words of Keohane, sub-regimes mean that certain specific agreements are “*nested within more comprehensive agreements*”.<sup>545</sup> The example he provides is how a trilateral negotiation of a particular tariff is nested within the broader regime government by

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<sup>542</sup> Virginia Haufler, ‘Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non-State Actors’, in: Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer (eds.), *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 98.

<sup>543</sup> Randi Bessette and Virginia Haufler, ‘Against All Odds: Why There Is No International Information Regime’, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), pp. 69-92.

<sup>544</sup> The author used this example in: ‘Het Mondiale Drugsprobleem. De Verenigde Naties en Internationale Regimevorming’, *op. cit.*

<sup>545</sup> Robert O. Keohane, ‘The demand for international regimes’, in: Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1995), p. 150.

the rules, norms, principles and procedures of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now WTO). In turn, this trade regime is again nested within a set of other agreements such as monetary relations or foreign investment between states, which again depend on “*military-security relations among the major states.*”<sup>546</sup> Within such “*multi-layered systems*”, international regimes allow states to come to specific agreements within issue areas.<sup>547</sup>

The hypothesis relating to this research is that the International Economic Security Regime can be considered a sub-regime as it will be part of the broader, international regime on international drug control. However, it must be stressed again that the latter is an existing regime based on a set of formal institutions and legislation, while the International Economic Security Regime is (for the moment) a theoretical regime, identified and shaped to help guide international economic cooperation in the specific field of development-oriented supply reduction strategies. In this particular case, the shared principles, norms and rules will cover the specific issue area of alternative development interventions in source countries.

### **7.2.8 International regime theory and the International Economic Security Regime**

The international regime can be considered a connecting device between the powers and interests of states, and common political decisions and joint action.<sup>548</sup> For the purposes of this research, this means that the basis of international regimes is formed by states and the underlying rationale for international cooperation is primarily determined by considerations of national power and interests.<sup>549</sup> This partly confirms the theoretical hypothesis of this research that the paradigm of Neo-Realism would probably be the most relevant to explain international cooperation.

However, Neo-Realism does not necessarily explain why states might cooperate on specific issues within the new dimensions of the economic sector of security related to the global drugs phenomenon. In other words, Neo-Realism explains why states come together in international regimes, but it does not necessarily make clear why they cooperate on an

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<sup>546</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>547</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>548</sup> *International Regimes, op. cit.*, pp. 5-9.

<sup>549</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

increasing number of specific issue areas that fall outside of the non-traditional security threats.

As described by Philip Cerny, the process of globalisation may have changed the logic of (inter-state) collective action (and therefore may have increased the need to form international regimes), but the basic constituents of international regimes are still states, albeit collaborating in a more complex and interdependent system and cooperating on more and more issue areas.<sup>550</sup> Cerny explains this as follows:

*“Despite these changes [caused by economic globalisation] (...) states retain certain vital political and economic functions at both the domestic and international levels. Indeed, some of these have paradoxically been strengthened by globalization. But the character of these functions is changing. New collective action problems undermine the constraining character of previously dominant political and economic games.”*

This process is ongoing, making international regime theory highly relevant for the study of international relations in the contemporary context. Its relevance may even have increased because of the deepening processes of globalisation and interdependence, and the more complex challenges that states must jointly confront (e.g. cyber crime, climate change, etc.).

The remainder of this section will elaborate on the topic of international regime theory in the context of the global drugs phenomenon, and will prepare the concept for use as a theoretical building block of an International Economic Security Regime.

As discussed above, international regime theory has been linked by scholars to the global drugs phenomenon, but the connection has thus far been limited to two approaches: either to investigate (or censure) an international regime based on the prohibition of drugs, or to investigate alternatives in the form of a regime based on the toleration, regulation, liberalisation, or legalisation of drugs. In this research, international regime theory will be used to create a functional instrument, the RISE. As discussed, this instrument will be based on the principle of shared responsibility and the theoretical concept of economic security as related to alternative development. The RISE will be subsequently tested through the field research to explore if it can help explain the (lack of) international cooperation on alternative development.

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<sup>550</sup> ‘Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action’, *op. cit.*, pp. 595-625.

Within the different perspectives of International Regime theory, the most relevant branch for the present research is known as ‘modified structural’ which is used by scholars who, in line with Neo-Realism:

*“[A]ccept the basic analytic assumptions of structural realist approaches, which posit an international system of functionally symmetrical, power-maximising states acting in an anarchic environment. But they maintain that under certain restrictive conditions involving the failure of individual action to secure Pareto-optimal outcomes, international regimes may have a significant impact even in an anarchic world.”*<sup>551</sup>

In other words, confronted with a situation of anarchy, states continue to use international regimes to coordinate their policies and reach common objectives, resulting – if successful – in a more stable and secure international environment. Thus, an issue area such as supply reduction within the global drugs phenomenon can be tackled by states together, given that the international trafficking flows and other cross-border characteristics of the illegal drugs economy make it unfeasible for them to deal with it individually. Krasner writes:

*“The ability of states to control movements across borders and to maintain dominance over all aspects of the international system is limited.”*<sup>552</sup>

In such a global environment, international regimes enable states to coordinate their policies to reach their mutual objectives in particular issue-areas. The theory of Complex Interdependency (see section 4.3), specifies that if there is a general trend towards a more interdependent world, the number of issue areas where states would consider collaborating (through an international regime or not) is likely to increase. In other words, (using Sassen’s terminology, section 4.6) states will build new ‘global projects’ when faced with new circumstances and novel challenges. As former US Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld wrote in a Pentagon memo titled *‘Illustrative New 21st Century Institutions and Approaches’*:

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<sup>551</sup> *International Regimes, op. cit.*, pp. 1, 2.

<sup>552</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9.



*“Today the world requires new international organizations tailored to new circumstances. Many of the more pressing threats are global and transnational in scope. Terrorism proliferation, cyber crime, narcotics, piracy, hostage-taking, criminal gangs, etc. Because they cannot be dealt with successfully by any one nation alone, the cooperation of many nations will be vital. (...) This may require institutions designed for those purposes rather than struggling to reform existing institutions to take on tasks for which they are ill suited.”*<sup>553</sup>

One of those global projects is the sustained search for effective (international) supply reduction policies that can be implemented in countries where illegal drugs are cultivated or produced. Chapter 8 below will demonstrate that this search has been characterised in recent years by an increased focus on identifying best practices and sharing lessons learned in the field of alternative development.

To build the theoretical concept of the International Economic Security Regime and identify its nature, three characteristics of international regimes (discussed above) must be taken into account: first, the distinction between formal and informal regimes; second, the difference between specific and diffuse regimes; and third, the difference between a sub-regime and a regular international regime. The interim conclusion here is that the International Economic Security Regime is probably more informal than formal, more specific than diffuse, and can be considered a sub-regime within the broader international drug control framework. As already analysed above, the latter is already considered an international regime: a more formal, diffuse one; embodied by a number of institutions and governed by international treaties.

The earlier research conducted by the author at the University of Groningen into whether the international drug control legal framework constituted an ‘international regime’, drew the following conclusions:

- 1) An international regime does exist, based primarily on three international conventions with almost universal adherence and an institutional framework within the system of United Nations organisations;

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<sup>553</sup> Bob Woodward refers to a Pentagon memo by Donald Rumsfeld title ‘Illustrative new 21<sup>st</sup> century institutions and approaches: Bob Woodward, ‘the world according to Rummy’, *Washington Post* (8 October 2006).

- 2) The international conventions, CND resolutions and other documents related to the international drug control framework provide a solid normative framework (principles and norms) of this international regime; and
- 3) The international regime is relatively weak because of a limited instrumental framework, characterised by the limited amount of rules and decision-making procedures (predominantly found in the 1988 Trafficking Convention but less elsewhere) and the complex process of implementation of regime provisions through national laws.

The conclusion regarding the relative weakness of this international regime is interesting because it fits with the general expectation of international regime formation under Neo-Realist assumptions. Keohane argues:

*“[In] international politics, binding decisions arrived at through highly institutionalized, rule-oriented processes, are relatively rare and unimportant, and such decisions do not constitute the essence of international regimes.”*<sup>554</sup>

Even when governed by international treaty law, the lack of a “*binding authority*”<sup>555</sup> in international relations means that international regimes will often have a relatively weak instrumental framework. Ultimately, it is up to states to decide whether they continue to be part of the international regime or abandon it, and whether they implement or enforce its rules and decisions in the domestic setting. If international regimes are governed by international treaties, a ‘legislative gap’ can further hamper the strength of the regime: treaty provisions must be ratified by national governments. In addition, the impact they make often depends on the way they are incorporated into national legislation.

Referring to the “*legalisation*” or the legal constraints that international institutions impose on states, Cohen explores three dimensions that could also be applied to the analysis of the relative strength of the international regime.<sup>556</sup> First, the degree to which the rules of the international regime are mandatory for states. Second, the degree to which these rules are described in a precise and detailed way. Last, the degree to which functions of the international regime, such as monitoring or implementation of its norms, are delegated to a

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<sup>554</sup> ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

<sup>555</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331.

<sup>556</sup> *International Political Economy. An Intellectual History*, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

third party (e.g. a secretariat or international organisation). These three dimensions will determine whether an international regime is relatively weak or relatively strong. There is a tendency towards the former given the dependence of international regimes on the compliance and commitment of states.

Despite the description of the international regime as relatively weak, it is important to note that, while states remain part of this regime, they are still limited in their actions to quite a considerable extent. David Bewley-Taylor describes this in the context of the international drug control framework:

*“(...) [F]lexibility is limited. Consequently, while there has long been variation in national policies – a spectrum ranging from quasi-legal coffee shops in the Netherlands to zero-tolerance policing elsewhere – the regime greatly restricts national freedom of action. For example, no member state can create a regulated cannabis market for recreational use and still remain within treaty boundaries.”<sup>557</sup>*

In the case of the above-mentioned regulated cannabis market bill of Uruguay, the INCB has already warned the country that this law is *“in complete contravention to the provisions of the international drug treaties to which Uruguay is party.”*<sup>558</sup> Nonetheless, this means member states have four options to implement policies that do not fall within limits and regulations of the regime:

- 1) They completely opt out of the system (and its international treaties or Conventions) and leave the international regime;
- 2) They change their policies regardless, therefore violating the norms and rules of the international regime, and (potentially) facing rebukes from the other states, leading in the most extreme case to sanctions or expulsion from the international regime;
- 3) They deviate from the regime’s norms and rules, but stay within national reservations they have made when signing up to the international regime or its international treaties or Conventions;
- 4) They opt out of the international regime temporarily and rejoin (if possible) under new conditions or with new national reservations that would allow their deviation or a different interpretation of certain rules and regulations.

<sup>557</sup> ‘The Contemporary International Drug Control System: A History of the UNGASS Decade’, *op.cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>558</sup> ‘UN narcotics body warns Uruguay over marijuana bill’, *BBC News* (1 August 2013).

An example of a state taking the decision to temporarily opt out of the international regime on drug control can be found in the case of Bolivia in 2011. The Bolivian government decided to withdraw from the 1961 Single Convention, a central part of this regime, and to re-accede only if it could make a national reservation that would allow the traditional consumption of coca leaf, a common practice in the country.<sup>559</sup> Although quite a number of countries have national reservations under these Conventions,<sup>560</sup> this was the first time that a country (temporarily) abandoned the international regime based on disagreement over an important norm of the regime:

*“Coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming into force of this Convention (...).”*<sup>561</sup>

This international norm is supported by the inclusion of coca leaf in the lists of controlled substances to which the international regime adheres.

Returning to the earlier discussion on regime change triggered by a modification of its principles and norms, the norm of abolishing coca chewing can probably be considered a minor norm that does not generate regime change, unless all states should agree with Bolivia on this point. A more radical regime change would occur if, for example, states began to question the overall prohibition of controlled substances, without reference to rather specific traditional uses or other exceptions.

The full consequences of Bolivia’s individual decision to make its participation in the international regime dependent on a change to one of the regime’s norms are not yet clear at this stage. Despite the protests of the INCB and a number of countries, Bolivia nonetheless managed to rejoin the Single Convention in January 2013 with a national reservation to those treaty articles that oblige a country to abolish the traditional consumption of coca leaf within its territory.<sup>562</sup> The case therefore shows that a state can in fact decide on the scope of international cooperation under an international regime, whilst agreeing with the majority of its principles and norms. Ostensibly, the main argument against exempting traditional use of

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<sup>559</sup> TNI and WOLA, ‘Bolivia Withdraws from the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs’, press release (30 June 2011).

<sup>560</sup> For example, the Netherlands made a reservation when signing the 1988 (Article 3) to allow for its system of tolerating coffee shops that sell cannabis.

<sup>561</sup> *Single Convention on Illicit Drugs* (1961), *op. cit.*, Article 49.2(e).

<sup>562</sup> TNI and WOLA, ‘Bolivia wins a rightful victory on the coca leaf. Creates a positive example for modernizing the UN drug conventions’, *TNI/WOLA press release* (15 January 2013).

coca from the Single Convention is that this could open the door to more exemptions and thus could jeopardise international consensus on the need for drug control and “*have a domino effect*.”<sup>563</sup> In other words, more exemptions like Bolivia’s could be regarded as cracks in the structure of the international regime on global drug control.

Last, any examination of specific international regimes in the context of the global drugs phenomenon must encompass the analysis of broader, more diffuse regimes in other relevant areas. This is important when the specific regime can be considered a sub-regime within a larger, more diffuse international regime because the principles and norms of two or more existing international regimes may clash or be incompatible. For example, in an international regime based on the principles of free trade and norms of trade liberalisation, the normative framework of this regime may clash with a more specific regime based in part on (government) support for drug producing farmers (e.g. subsidies and other forms of economic incentives). Thus, the strategy of alternative development can be seen as direct market intervention (protecting the farmers from outside competition, offering them favourable loans or increasing their income to make sure they do not return to the illegal drugs economy), and therefore as an exception to the general rule of a liberal trade regime.

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<sup>563</sup> George Jahn, ‘Bolivia: Coca-Leaf Chewing Should Be Legalized’, *Associated Press* (12 March 2012).



## **CHAPTER 8: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY REGIME (RISE)**

This chapter will combine the two pillars of economic security and shared responsibility developed thus far with the instrument's foundation of international regime theory to construct the RISE. It will then identify the regime's components (principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures). While the two pillars determine why states could support and cooperate on alternative development, the regime's components provide the substance of the instrument as they describe on which particular issues states agree (and effectively have agreed at the international level) to cooperate within the framework of alternative development policies in source countries.

### **8.1 Interim conclusions from the theoretical framework**

Some general and some specific theoretical conclusions can be drawn from the analysis in the preceding theoretical chapters, before beginning to construct the RISE within the framework of international cooperation to address the global drugs phenomenon. Direct links with the RISE instrument will be highlighted if relevant.

#### **8.1.1 General theoretical conclusions**

The general theoretical conclusions discussed in this section are divided into five sub-sections: economic security, globalisation, international regime theory, alternative development strategies and shared responsibility.

##### **8.1.1.1 Economic security**

- The global drugs phenomenon can be viewed as a (non-traditional) security-related issue area within the economic sphere or sector;

- Non-state actors have become increasingly important economic players in the illegal drugs economy that is part of this economic sphere;
- Although its focus has primarily been on the legal economy, the concept of economic security allows analysis of both the legal and illegal aspects of the international economy;
- An examination of the illegal economy has been largely missing from past economic security analysis, particularly regarding the (alternative) development aspects of counter-narcotics policy and the positive relationships between counter-narcotics policy and the promotion of economic security that go beyond negative threat-analysis;
- Economic security is not only important at the international level where states (could) aim to sustain and increase their national welfare and power through access to natural resources, finance or markets. It is also important at the national and sub-national level, where economic security is related to companies, institutions, individuals or collectives. In this sense, economic security concerns threats and opportunities related to the domestic stability of states.

#### **8.1.1.2 Globalisation**

- Globalisation has not radically changed the international system, but has intensified the cross-border characteristics of the global drugs phenomenon, further empowering the non-state authorities operating in the illegal drugs economy;
- Despite the wide-ranging factors of globalisation that have changed the environment of international relations, states remain the principle actors, particularly with regard to determining illegal markets and shaping international cooperation to address them;
- States have (partly out of necessity) become involved in an ever greater number of global projects and need to cooperate on an increasing number of issue areas that they do not necessarily control;
- Globalisation has created more analysis on the role of criminal organisations and trafficking networks, but this analysis has often excluded the farmers and farming communities that produce the crops that eventually turn into the huge profits these non-state actors can make within the illegal drugs economy.



### **8.1.1.3 International regime theory**

- The concept of the ‘international regime’ continues to be relevant in a world that is ever-more interdependent, and where states must increasingly build global projects and work together to tackle challenges in an ever greater number of issue areas. Thus, globalisation increases or reinforces the relevance of international regime theory;
- International regime theory has not been linked to the global drugs phenomenon in a significant manner to date. Any links made have principally been in the context of the current international drug control framework, exploring ways to move away from its perceived predominant prohibitive nature or its negative side effects;
- The analysis of international regime theory in connection to the global drugs phenomenon can benefit from a more positive approach with regard to how international cooperation can be improved and strengthened to increase the impact of alternative development strategies.

### **8.1.1.4 Alternative development strategies**

- To address the supply-related challenges of the global drugs phenomenon, states will continue to focus on instruments related to alternative development, whether individually or together in global projects;
- Within the global undertaking of addressing the global drugs phenomenon, alternative development and broader alternative livelihood strategies are highly relevant as key policy instruments of supply reduction. This will probably remain the case as long as plant-based drugs are produced in rural and underdeveloped areas (and demanded elsewhere);
- States are increasingly seeking to identify lessons learned and best practices in alternative development (illustrated, for example through the various international seminars and discussions on alternative development that have taken place in recent years);

- As long as alternative development strategies are implemented by states, it is meaningful to explore the best ways to improve and strengthen international cooperation related to these strategies.

#### **8.1.1.5 Shared responsibility**

- States can be considered to have the shared responsibility to jointly act on specific issue areas because of a set of moral obligations. As such, shared responsibility can be seen as a motivating link between a state's realisation that a problem cannot be dealt with individually and the decision to cooperate or coordinate its policies with other states;
- Shared responsibility can be based on a set of legal obligations, especially in those international regimes that have a strong formal, institutionalised character, including a well-defined instrumental framework. However, it can also be part of a more informal regime, where states have committed to shared principles, norms and rules;
- The importance of the principle of shared responsibility has recently been reinforced at the level of the United Nations (particularly since 2011), increasing its potential importance as a guiding principle within the global undertaking of alternative development in source countries.

#### **8.1.2 Specific theoretical conclusions**

The specific theoretical conclusions discussed in this section are also divided into four sub-sections: economic security; international regime theory; alternative development strategies; and shared responsibility.

##### **8.1.2.1 Economic security and the RISE**

- Securitisation theory has been linked to the global drugs phenomenon prior to this research, but no analysis has been undertaken on positive state policies aimed at fostering economic security (promoting national security through the state's control

over territories, markets and natural resources). Thus far, links made have been negative, focusing primarily on the harmful impact of securitisation processes, connected predominantly to the argument of regime change or economic threats to the stability of the state;

- Economic security need not be directly related to existential or serious threats to the survival of the state: it can apply to indirect causes of insecurity or instability provoked by the impact of the economic sector on other sectors. Domestic instability generated by economic factors of insecurity is equally important as a potential threat to national security;
- The focus on domestic instability need not include direct effects on foreign countries or create security threats with transnational consequences;
- When considering the functional instrument of RISE, the following potential economic security threats can be identified: 1) threats related to the negative impact of the illegal drugs economy on the legal economy in general; 2) threats related to instability in territories where illicit drug cultivation, production or trafficking takes place; 3) threats related to the links between farming communities and (transnational) organised criminal, insurgent or terrorist organisations; and 4) threats related to economic security for individuals and local communities affected by the illegal drugs economy: a) the negative impact of the illegal drug market on the wellbeing of groups and individuals; b) the negative impact of (international) counter-narcotics policies on the wellbeing of groups and individuals; and c) the impact of illicit drug production and trafficking on economic infrastructure and other state assets in the legal economy;
- A useful analysis of international cooperation on alternative development strategies through RISE should, however, not only include mitigation strategies to tackle the risks and challenges (the negative approach), but also examine how an alternative development-driven counter-narcotics policy can positively increase economic security, for example at the level of the local community but also in terms of national objectives of maximising development and welfare (the positive approach);
- When examining the alternative development aspects of Colombia's counter-narcotics policy, economic security must be analysed on two levels: first, the international level of states where support is (or can be) generated for Colombia's counter-narcotics policy; and second, the national or sub-national level where

alternative development is not only related to economic or security objectives, but also to the wellbeing and welfare of non-state actors and individuals in the communities affected by the illegal drugs economy.

#### **8.1.2.2 International regime theory and the RISE**

- The International Economic Security Regime is at present a theoretical regime, developed as part of this research, but states could create or implement such a regime. It is identified, shaped (with a normative and instrumental framework) and tested in Colombia, to help understand and analyse the willingness of states to cooperate in a specific area of the global drugs phenomenon: alternative development as part of supply reduction strategies. The theoretical nature of RISE does not mean that an actual sub-regime on supply reduction strategies could not already be in the making or that one could not materialise in the future. The international expert meetings on alternative development where states come together to discuss best practices and lessons learned may in fact constitute the first step towards such a regime. At present, the process of identifying and analysing the regime consists primarily of a theoretical exercise to help increase understanding of why states cooperate (or not) on drugs-related development strategies;
- In line with its more theoretical nature, the functional instrument of RISE will be more informal than formal, lacking a strong institutionalised character, but perhaps governed to a certain extent by some of the same institutions, rules and laws that are part of the international drug control framework. For example, the expert group meetings taking place on alternative development are the result of discussions and decisions taking place at the heart of the CND;
- The RISE will be more specific than diffuse, focusing on a specific part of the global drugs phenomenon (alternative development policies related to supply reduction) rather than a broader international regime such as the international drug control framework which also tackles areas such as demand reduction;
- Being more specific than this broader international regime, the RISE can nonetheless be considered a sub-regime: part of the broader (and more diffuse) international drug control framework that to a certain extent sets its boundaries;

- Despite the fact that many international regimes tend in general to be relatively weak – either caused by a weak instrumental framework or by the structural dependence of international agreements on national decision-making processes and on the continued commitment by ever-changing national governments – international regimes can nonetheless strongly influence state behaviour and foster international cooperation.

### **8.1.2.3 Alternative development strategies and the RISE**

- At international seminars and workshops on alternative development that took place in 2011 and 2012, the international community has shown increasing interest in finding shared principles and norms for effective and impactful alternative development and alternative livelihood strategies;
- Part of this exercise has been an increased focus in recent years on promoting best practices and sharing lessons learned in the field of alternative development;
- This demonstrates that many states are still firmly committed to supporting alternative development strategies, but suggests that the international community is constantly looking for more effective alternative development interventions or successful models that could be replicated elsewhere (such as the model of the San Martín region in Peru);
- Based on international regime theory, the RISE would allow states to build a global project on very specific supply reduction interventions, for example, related to the linkages between support for alternative development and the protection of the environment, or regarding international market access for alternative development produce.

### **8.1.2.4 Shared responsibility and the RISE**


- The principle of shared responsibility can lead states to engage in a positive cooperation within the RISE, focusing on mutual economic and political interests, or on diverging interests that nonetheless warrant international cooperation on supply reduction strategies between states;

- Shared responsibility can be considered the motivational link between states' realisation that the global drugs phenomenon requires a balanced approach (focusing necessarily on both supply and demand reduction, and therefore on policy elements at both the domestic and international levels) and coordinated action to address this phenomenon based on political and financial commitment;
- In connection to the increased focus on best practices and lessons learned, the growing importance of shared responsibility, noted at the past three CND sessions, may result in a new sub-regime on alternative development, whether through formal or more informal processes.

## **8.2. Towards an International Economic Security Regime for illicit drug supply reduction strategies**

Applying the theoretical concepts of economic security and shared responsibility to International Regime theory, this section will develop a new instrument: an International Economic Security Regime for supply reduction strategies for illicit drugs. In Part II of the research, this new theory will be tested through the case study of three regions in Colombia to evaluate to what extent elements of such a regime are already developed and can be distilled for broader application both inside and outside of Colombia.

The RISE consists of two central pillars or building blocks: 1) economic security and 2) shared responsibility that together determine international cooperation between states on supply reduction strategies. This relationship is depicted in Graph 5 below.

**Graph 5: The structure of the International Economic Security Regime**

*Source: Construction of the author.*

There may of course be other concerns and reasons behind international cooperation in the field of economic development related to drug control in source countries. However, this research is limited to the two pillars outlined above.

### **8.2.1 Building block A: Economic security**

The rationale behind using economic security as one of the building blocks of the International Economic Security Regime is that it would provide states with a positive way of resolving a domestic economic problem with cross border implications. It offers a positive, development-driven approach focusing on the supply side of the global drugs phenomenon, minimising (as far as possible) the need to apply law enforcement measures to disrupt the illegal market.

Economic security will be used as a building block of the RISE structure in two ways, already outlined in Chapter 5. The first understanding of economic security stresses the second part of the term, ‘security’, as discussed in that chapter (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde): economic security is part of the structural security analysis (and calculations) of states. The second understanding of economic security stresses the first part of the phrase, ‘economic’, and is best understood in the more classic tradition of economic welfare, prosperity, income and livelihoods for individuals or local communities. Buzan writes:

*“At the individual level, a basic definition of economic security is in terms of ready access to the means necessary to meet basic human needs (food, water, shelter, education).”*<sup>564</sup>

Within the context of the analysis of economic security as part of International Relations, the second, more traditional definition of economic security is not necessarily more well-established than the first definition. For example, the concept of human security, which includes the economic development and prosperity of individuals and communities, is still relatively recent. As described above, in recent analysis, this perspective on economic security is depicted as a shift from a state-centred to a more individual-centred approach that can be identified. Mesjasz writes:

*“(…) [A]fter the introduction of the concept of economic security into International Relations (IR), and into related areas, security studies, and peace research, discussions about that sector have been extended from state-oriented economic security to the level of individuals, e.g. conditions of living as an essential component of human security.”*<sup>565</sup>

As part of the RISE, economic security will be addressed at two levels of analysis already briefly discussed in section 5.6: the international level of states (including regional cooperation between states) and the national or sub-national level (as part of domestic policy involving a variety of non-state actors such as farmers’ associations, individuals, etc.).

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<sup>564</sup> *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, op. cit.*, p. 237.

<sup>565</sup> Czeslaw Mesjasz, ‘Economic Security’, *op. cit.*, p. 569.



At the international level of states, economic security is mainly concerned with the priority of states to safeguard their economic interests, maximise their economic gain and protect the economic welfare of their citizens through industry protection. At this level, states aim to safeguard their investments (abroad and at home), protect their main export industries and preserve the stability of international markets on which they depend (e.g. the international market for raw materials). At the level of the state, economic security ensures sufficient access to food and natural resources, whether at home or abroad through international trade.<sup>566</sup> This is often a trade-off between investment in self-sufficiency and guaranteeing access to trade.<sup>567</sup>

In the context of an economic process model of regime change, Keohane and Nye stress the importance of domestic economic interests and security at the international level:

*“[G]overnments will be highly responsive to domestic political demands for a rising standard of living. National economic welfare will usually be the dominant political goal and a rising gross national product will be a critical political indicator.”*<sup>568</sup>

At the national or sub-national level, economic security is only partly about the protection of jobs and markets. At this level, the government is concerned with the provision of livelihoods, the safeguarding of local or national investments from internal threats and the protection of infrastructure and other important assets of the state. It is also specifically concerned with protecting and increasing the levels of welfare of citizens (returning to the narrow definition of economic security used by UNDP as part of the broader concept of human security).

Using the terminology of Mesjasz, this latter priority could indeed be considered to include those aspects of economic security that contribute to ‘human security’. However, given that this term is rather broad, the term ‘human security’ will generally be avoided in Part II of this research. Instead, the more general term of human development will be used, aimed at increasing economic and social opportunities for individuals and communities affected by the illegal drugs economy. Graph 6 below depicts the two separate but

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
<sup>566</sup> *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, op. cit.*, p. 242.

<sup>567</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 243

<sup>568</sup> *Power and Interdependence, op. cit.*, p. 34.

reinforcing elements and levels of analysis that are part of the concept of economic security in this research.

**Graph 6: The two sides of economic security**



*Source: construction of the author.*

### **8.2.2 Building block B: Shared Responsibility**

For the purpose of establishing the RISE, the notion of shared responsibility refers to all actions, investments, programmes or initiatives related directly or indirectly to supply reduction that states can implement to support the strategy of source control beyond their borders. It is a moral obligation that states must assist other states that are faced with the challenge of combating a domestic problem of illegal drug cultivation or production. As already addressed above, that moral obligation is the result of the international agreement on the global nature of the drug phenomenon and the need to address this phenomenon through a balanced approach (as codified in international law).

Herschinger would argue that this moral obligation is the result of a hegemonic order that has been established with regard to the global drugs phenomenon on the basis of a dominant political discourse. This dominant narrative has produced agreement among states on the nature of the problem and the correct ways to tackle it, whether individually or by joint action.<sup>569</sup>

In developing the RISE below, it will become clear where shared responsibility is particularly important or useful in the context of international cooperation on supply reduction strategies. Shared responsibility is a cross-cutting theme that relates to all aspects of cooperation between states. It is also one of the key principles of the International Economic Security Regime.

### **8.2.3 Defining the International Economic Security Regime**

This section will begin to define the structure of the RISE by identifying principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that relate to either economic security or shared responsibility. These will be taken in particular from the literature, reports and findings from international conferences on alternative development and alternative livelihoods already discussed in this dissertation. The identified components will be listed in separate subsections below, divided into the normative and instrumental framework of the international regime.

#### **8.2.3.1 Principles and norms of the International Economic Security Regime**


This section lists the principles and norms that have been identified through analysis of the alternative development, alternative livelihoods, and related supply reduction strategies. Using Krasner's definition noted above, principles are "*beliefs of fact, causation, and obligations.*" Norms, often based on (or closely related to) principles are "*standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations.*" The selection of these principles and norms for the RISE has been undertaken using the criterion that these should at least have

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<sup>569</sup> *Constructing global enemies: hegemony and identity in international discourses on terrorism and drug prohibition, op. cit.*, Chapter 2, pp. 33-59.

some form of indirect or direct link with international support or international cooperation between states. Therefore, the more technical, or organisational aspects of how alternative development and similar strategies should be implemented are not included here. Similarly, norms and principles related to the specific local context of projects are also not included here; for example, the need to involve, protect or respect local communities or indigenous people. These can be said to be included in the focus on human rights, but in general these local objectives are not considered as an important explanatory factor behind international support for these strategies. In other words, such local aspects seem to carry few direct international implications.

For each principle and norm, the sources are listed in footnotes to show clearly which principles have been found in more than one source. Also, where possible, each principle is related to a corresponding norm, and *vice versa*. However, while norms are listed numerically, principles are listed with letters to avoid confusion. Last, norms and principles are divided into the following four categories: 1) international cooperation; 2) state building and security; 3) human development and human rights; and 4) market access. These categories have been established after review of the documents used. Using Graph 5 on the structure of the International Economic Security Regime as a starting point, this visualisation can be complemented with these four categories, as seen in Graph 7 below.

**Graph 7: The policy categories of international support within the RISE**

*Source: construction of the author.*

Graph 7 shows that within the International Economic Security Regime, international cooperation on supply reduction is based on the general principle of shared responsibility (the pillar on the left), guided by the principle of economic security (the pillar on the right), and divided into action areas where international support, cooperation and coordination is needed to be able to reach the objectives of supply reduction (the four categories that form the body of the regime).

## **Category 1: International cooperation**

### ***Principle A: Shared responsibility***

A general and foundational principle of the RISE is shared responsibility.<sup>570</sup> This principle is based on the notion that states have a common obligation and responsibility to solve the supply side of the illegal drug phenomenon. Article 8 of the Feldafing Declaration reads:

*“The principle of shared responsibility includes a co-responsibility of such countries for supply-side measures, by which part of the actions and related costs to combat drug abuse are shifted to the source countries.”*<sup>571</sup>

As such, this guiding principle underpins all the following principles and norms as it is the basis for international commitment, coordination and cooperation. The Lima Declaration of 2012 refers directly to the importance of the principle of shared responsibility in the context of alternative development.<sup>572</sup>

### ***Norm 1: Shared responsibility***

Taking into account the international nature of the drug phenomenon and the reinforcing, two-way relationship between supply and demand, states should assist those countries faced with a problem of illicit drug cultivation or production.<sup>573</sup>

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<sup>570</sup> United Nations, UNGASS Resolution, ‘Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem’, Part E: Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and Alternative Development, Document A/RES/S-20/4 (8 September 1998), p 1.

<sup>571</sup> ‘Report on the international conference on The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation’ (Feldafing Report), *op. cit.*, Article 8, p. 5; ‘Declaración de Lima sobre el Desarrollo Alternativo’ (Lima Declaration), final document of the Second High-Level ‘International Conference on Alternative Development’ (ICAD), Lima, Peru (14-16 November 2012), p. 4.

<sup>572</sup> Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>573</sup> UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article II.8; Political Declaration and Plan of Action 2009, *op. cit.*, Actions 22(g) and 45(a), pp. 28 and 42.

***Principle B: Long-term commitment***

Alternative development and related activities require a long-term commitment and vision that is directly related to the socio-economic development situation of drug producing countries.<sup>574</sup> Long-term commitment also means the willingness of states to commit to providing long-term funding, technical support and other resources for alternative development programmes and other supply reduction strategies.<sup>575</sup>

***Norm 2: Long-term commitment***

States should commit to long-term cooperation and coordination on alternative development and other supply reduction policies, departing from a multi-level and multi-sectoral approach.<sup>576</sup> They should also show political commitment and provide long-term funding at the international level for alternative development and other supply reduction interventions.<sup>577</sup>

***Principle C: Trans-border dynamics***

The cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit substances is not necessarily bound by national borders. The patterns of the illegal drugs economy can shift rapidly across borders, whether or not caused by the effects of counter-narcotics or general law enforcement policies. The United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) Action Plan states that:

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<sup>574</sup> ‘Report on the workshop portion of the International Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development (ICAD Report)’, Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai Provinces, Thailand (6 – 11 November 2011), p. 7; Feldafing Declaration, *op. cit.*, Article 8, p. 5; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 7; UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article II.8; UNODC Thematic Evaluation 2005, *op. cit.*, pp. vi, vii; EU Presidency Paper, part of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on ‘international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development’, Document, UNODC/CND/2008/WG.3/CRP.4, (4 July 2008), Article II.7, pp. 4, 5; Main report, open-ended intergovernmental expert working group, Document UNODC/CND/2008/WG.3/3 (23 July 2008), Article IV.52(a) and (b), p. 9.

<sup>575</sup> Feldafing Declaration, *op. cit.*, Article 8; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 11; UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article II.10; Political Declaration and Plan of Action 2009, *op. cit.*, Article 22(a), p. 27.

<sup>576</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 5. Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>577</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Political Declaration and Plan of Action 2009, *op. cit.*, Actions 45(b) and 45(l), pp. 42 and 44.

*“States are exhorted to agree on bilateral mechanisms for cooperation in order to establish and implement eradication and alternative development projects in their frontier areas.”*<sup>578</sup>

States are not only linked through broader chains of supply and demand, but also through the more direct, geographical links of cultivation, production and trafficking centres close to and across borders.

### ***Norm 3: Trans-border dynamics***

Taking into account the trans-border nature of the illicit drugs economy, states should encourage and support alternative development activities that operate across borders.<sup>579</sup> This means that alternative development or alternative livelihood programmes should sometimes be extended to areas beyond the border to help avoid the ‘balloon effect’. It could also mean that communities across the border should also be involved in more indirect ways, for example, as part of the market chain for certain commodities.

### ***Norm 4: South-South and regional cooperation***

In addition to general international cooperation, so-called ‘South-South’ (and regional) cooperation should also be encouraged, especially when it comes to sharing best practices and lessons learned in the field of supply reduction strategies.<sup>580</sup> Because of the transnational character of the drug phenomenon, the regional focus of alternative development should be reinforced through regional institutions such as the *Comité Andino para el Desarrollo Alternativo* in Latin America.<sup>581</sup> This form of cooperation can also be supported financially or technically by states not belonging to the group of ‘South’ countries. Regional mechanisms and bilateral agreements between states are also needed to counter the risk of geographical displacement across borders.<sup>582</sup>

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<sup>578</sup> UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article II.14.

<sup>579</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 6; UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article III.21; Political Declaration and Plan of Action 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 49(i), p. 48.

<sup>580</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Actions, 22(i), 22(j), 45(l) and 45(m), pp. 28 and 44.

<sup>581</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>582</sup> Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 49(i), p. 48.



***Norm 5: Integration into broader agreements***

States should integrate alternative development programmes into broader regional, sub-regional and bilateral agreements related, for example, to economic development cooperation or to environmental protection.<sup>583</sup> They should also improve negotiations, increase cooperation, foster debate and make resources available at international organisations and financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with regard to (rural) development and specific alternative development or alternative livelihood interventions.<sup>584</sup>

What is important here is that several trade distorting measures (e.g. import tariffs, subsidies and other forms of protection the domestic market) are seen as barriers to the successful implementation of supply reduction programmes.<sup>585</sup> In general, at both the global and regional levels, international agencies should improve coordination with regard to common objectives, fostering synergy, cost-effectiveness and information exchange in drugs-related development programmes.<sup>586</sup>

**Category 2: State building and security*****Principle D: Structural transformations***

As a general rule, alternative development and supply reduction require structural transformations in terms of good governance and institution building that promote economic, social and institutional integration and development.<sup>587</sup> For illicit farming communities, this requires that affected individuals have access to basic government services that can help them to generate their own economic, social or environmental progress. In other words, structural changes and strong local institutions are needed that enable an increase in

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<sup>583</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 6; EU Presidency Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 2; Main report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article III.33, p. 7.

<sup>584</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 13; UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article I.5 and Article II.12; Main report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article I.9, p. 4; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Actions 22(h), 45(o) and 47(i), pp. 28, 44 and 46.

<sup>585</sup> Main report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article II.22, p. 6.

<sup>586</sup> Synthesis Report, International Workshop, 'Development in a Drugs Environment: Beyond Alternative Development?' (Berlin Report), 29<sup>th</sup> May-1<sup>st</sup> June, 2006 (Berlin: GTZ, 2006), p. 6.

<sup>587</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Berlin Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 5;

economic security in affected areas. In the context of alternative development, the Feldafing Report states:

*“Success and sustainability of [alternative development] measures depend to a large extent on the capacity of those institutions responsible for delivering services.”*<sup>588</sup>

But while alternative development programmes work better when basic services are already provided by the government, in remote areas, the programmes themselves can also become a first step to stimulate development of infrastructure and basic service networks.<sup>589</sup>

***Norm 6: Structural transformations***

The need for structural transformations often means that states should provide resources for development programmes that are directly earmarked for the development and strengthening of state institutions and infrastructure to provide basic services.<sup>590</sup> The International Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development report links these basic services to poverty, stressing that efforts are needed to:

*“(...) tackle the links between poverty and the lack of essential basic services in the affected communities in a holistic and integrated development approach.”*<sup>591</sup>

In this sense, foreign support can often have a more indirect objective (e.g. institution building, good governance) rather than focusing directly on preventing or reducing illicit drug cultivation or production.<sup>592</sup>

***Norm 7: Institutions should be strengthened or created***

As part of the structural transformations needed, state institutions, capacity and governance structures should be created where these are absent or strengthened where they are weak.<sup>593</sup>

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<sup>588</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>589</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 21; UNODC Thematic Evaluation 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>590</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 21; EU Presidency Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>591</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>592</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

***Principle E: Governance, institution building and the rule of law***

One of the root causes of illicit drug cultivation and production is the lack of rule of law or effective governance in territories of the state.<sup>594</sup> This situation prevents states from being able to effectively counter illegal activities in certain regions, but it often also prevents them from being able to deliver basic economic and social services to the people, a fact that reinforces the negative situation or maintains the *status quo*. One of the additional concerns is that illicit drug supply reduction programmes may even deteriorate the security situation, especially if these are not accompanied by improvements of security and the rule of law.<sup>595</sup>

Experience has shown that improving governance and security are often preconditions for improving human development and reducing illicit drug cultivation.<sup>596</sup> Strengthening governance and building effective state institutions will help increase security and the rule of law. This is the basis for any development and its positive effect on the security situation can enhance the sustainability of alternative development programmes.

***Norm 8: Governance, institution building and the rule of law***

Alternative development should be combined with the need to address inadequate enforcement of the rule of law in areas where drug-producing crops are cultivated.<sup>597</sup> This norm can be seen as the embodiment of the direct link between counter-narcotics (or development policies in general) and security policy.<sup>598</sup> It means that drugs-related development assistance should be undertaken in compliance with broader aims related to conflict resolution, crime prevention, violence reduction or counter-terrorism policies.<sup>599</sup>

Transnational criminal organisations, drug traffickers and other non-state actors represent a threat to the successful implementation of supply reduction programmes.<sup>600</sup>

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<sup>593</sup> Berlin Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 5 and pp. 8-9; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 47(j), p. 46.

<sup>594</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>595</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 17.

<sup>596</sup> EU Presidency Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>597</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7; UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article V.28(a); UNODC Thematic Evaluation 2005, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

<sup>598</sup> Here the concept of security policy includes counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and similar policies related to issue areas where a direct or indirect link with drug profits or the illegal drugs economy in general can be established.

<sup>599</sup> Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7; EU Presidency Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 2; Main Report, Open-Ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article III.45, p. 8.

<sup>600</sup> Main Report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article II.27, p. 6.

However, projects led by the security and other non-development objectives were identified by the UNODC *Thematic Evaluation of 2005* as “*not sustainable*” or even as causing worse situations in terms of insecurity or drug policy related parameters.<sup>601</sup> This means that there should be a positive relationship (with the aim of building trust between the government and the local communities) between law enforcement and development efforts in drug-cultivating areas.<sup>602</sup>

For states where illegal drug cultivation and production takes place, the priority should be investing in governance capabilities to ensure that the rule of law can be effectively strengthened at the local level.<sup>603</sup> Other countries can assist in this process through financial or technical assistance. Investments in good governance also mean that resources aimed at alternative or rural development have a bigger chance of reaching their target populations.

***Norm 9: Development and conflict resolution***

Drug-related development and conflict resolution strategies should not be at odds with each other, but rather should be mutually reinforcing and complementary interventions. In this sense, states should avoid that the implementation of alternative development programmes has a negative impact on the security situation.<sup>604</sup>

***Norm 10: Alternative livelihoods for small-scale traffickers***

Small-scale traffickers, who are engaged in the illegal drugs economy because of conditions of poverty, should also be granted access to alternative development programmes.<sup>605</sup> This is an interesting norm, as it may mean that alternative development programmes may also be relevant in countries where no illicit drug cultivation or production is taking place. It would necessitate providing economic security to those individuals trafficking drugs on the basis of subsistence. One of the challenges, of course, is how to draw the line between ‘subsistence trafficking’ and purely ‘for profit’ trafficking.

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<sup>601</sup> UNODC *Thematic Evaluation 2005*, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

<sup>602</sup> INCB Discussion Note, Open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development, Document UNODC/CND/2008/WG.3/CRP.1 (18 June 2008), Article 8, p. 4.

<sup>603</sup> Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>604</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 17; UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article V.29.

<sup>605</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

### **Category 3: Human development and human rights**

#### ***Principle F: Mainstreaming into broader development programmes***

Alternative development and other supply reduction strategies are only effective if they are embedded or mainstreamed into broader national and international development programmes.<sup>606</sup> This maximises both the development and counter-narcotics impact of the projects, but also makes the most of resources, the advantages of economies of scale and spreads the burden of responsibility across several ministries.<sup>607</sup>

#### ***Norm 11: Mainstreaming into broader development programmes***

Alternative development should be mainstreamed into larger socio-economic development programmes, focusing, for example on poverty reduction.<sup>608</sup> This should also reflect the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, especially those objectives related to income, employment, hunger<sup>609</sup> and general rural development.<sup>610</sup> It underlines the need to go beyond purely counter-narcotics related objectives, incorporating, for example “*social, cultural, economic, political, educational and environmental aspects.*”<sup>611</sup> Using the definitions of this dissertation, this norm thus reflects the conviction that isolated or *ad hoc* alternative development programmes are not useful without a broader alternative livelihood perspective.<sup>612</sup> At the highest level, it also means that alternative development strategies should be part of national development and poverty-reduction strategies.<sup>613</sup> Principle G below is related to this.

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<sup>606</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Berlin Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7; Berlin Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article I6; UNODC Thematic Report, *op. cit.*, p. vii; EU Presidency Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 2; INCB Discussion Note, *op. cit.*, Article I.9, p. 4.

<sup>607</sup> Berlin Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>608</sup> Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Actions 45(c) and 47(a), pp. 42, 43 and 45.

<sup>609</sup> Lima Declaration, p. 10; Main Report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article IV.52(c), p. 9; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 47(a), p. 45.

<sup>610</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Berlin Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Main Report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article II.19, p. 6; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Actions 45(d), 45(h) and 47(n), pp. 43 and 46.

<sup>611</sup> Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 47(m), p. 46.

<sup>612</sup> Berlin Report, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>613</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

***Principle G: Economic and social rights and opportunities***

As part of the overarching importance of the protection of human rights, specific economic and social rights are important components of alternative development interventions. This includes, for example, the right to an adequate standard of living (a person's or family's minimum entitlement to basic needs such as food, clothing and housing at a subsistence level). These needs can be considered as part of economic security at the level of households. Economic security is provided through human development interventions that are directly part of supply reduction strategies.<sup>614</sup>

***Norm 12: Economic and social rights and opportunities***

Alternative development and other supply reduction strategies should not only be measured in terms of reductions in illicit cultivation or production. They should also be measured in terms of human development, for example in relation to the improvement of the living conditions or income of people.<sup>615</sup> International cooperation on alternative development should foster sustainable social and economic opportunities for affected communities through an integrated approach of rural development.<sup>616</sup> The Political Declaration of 2009 offers a clear example of the link between security and drug control objectives. States need to:

*“[I]ntegrate communities in marginalized regions into the economic and political mainstream in order to further drug control efforts and security; if appropriate, such integration should include the possibility of supporting access to roads, schools, primary health-care services, electricity and other services and infrastructure.”<sup>617</sup>*

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<sup>614</sup> UNODC Thematic Evaluation 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>615</sup> Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 4. Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Main Report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article III.36, p. 8 and Article IV52(t), p. 11.

<sup>616</sup> UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article III.18(b).

<sup>617</sup> Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 47(e), p. 45.

In many ways, the provision of economic security in regions affected by illicit drug cultivation is the precondition for any counter-narcotics policy to be successful and sustainable.<sup>618</sup>

***Norm 13: Social entrepreneurship***

Forms of social entrepreneurship, the link between local business profits and social benefits should be encouraged, leading to gains in socio-economic sustainability and social security. This norm is an example of a direct link between supply reduction strategies and economic security for the individuals and communities living in areas where drug crops are cultivated.

***Principle H: Protection of human rights***

It is essential to protect and promote human rights, especially in terms of the vulnerabilities and special needs of individuals (particularly women and children), communities and other target groups that are affected by or involved in the illicit drugs economy.<sup>619</sup> The INCB discussion note to the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group in 2008 recommends that:

*“(...) [G]overnments should broaden the focus of alternative development programmes, paying greater attention to the needs of marginalized and neglected populations in both rural and urban areas.”<sup>620</sup>*

This also means there is no one-size-fits-all policy as communities will have different vulnerabilities when it comes to the protection of human rights.

***Norm 14: Protection of human rights***

Increased interaction between development and security strategies should be subject to the overarching norm relating to the protection of human rights.<sup>621</sup> For example, the synergy

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<sup>618</sup> Personal interviews, Álvaro Balcázar, Former Director, Unidad Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

<sup>619</sup> Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, pp. 4 and 9; Feldafing Report, *op. cit.*, p. 17; ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 8; EU Presidency Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>620</sup> INCB Discussion Note, *op. cit.*, Article 20, p. 5.

between both policies should not lead to a militarisation of a supply reduction policy that could have severe negative consequences for the human rights of communities affected by illicit drug cultivation. Human rights protection should be an objective and human rights instruments should be included in any supply reduction development programme.<sup>622</sup>

#### **Category 4: Market access**

##### ***Principle I: Market access***

Shared responsibility means guaranteeing or increasing market access.<sup>623</sup> Market access is the only way to ensure the sustainability of alternative livelihood programmes, the profitability of its products and the income for farmers and rural communities.<sup>624</sup> This is also the reason why it is included as a separate category of the RISE instrument's structure. Market access relates to both domestic and international markets, but where commodities can be sold abroad, it particularly applies to the facilitation of imports by other countries. At the national level, market access also means foreign investments in infrastructure, for example, building roads connecting farmers to markets, or investing in collection centres.

##### ***Norm 15: Market access***

Countries should open their markets and actively promote the trade of alternative produce from illicit drug producer countries.<sup>625</sup> This norm dates back to the 1998 UNGASS Action Plan stating that:

*“The international community should attempt to provide greater access to domestic and international markets for alternative development products, with a view to overcoming problems relating to prices and marketing resulting from the substitution*

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<sup>621</sup> Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article I.8, p. 4 and Article IV52(v), p. 11.

<sup>622</sup> Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Actions 47(b) and 47(c), p. 45.

<sup>623</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 11; EU Presidency Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Main Report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article I.10, p. 4.

<sup>624</sup> EU Presidency Paper, *op. cit.*, Article II.7, pp. 4, 5.

<sup>625</sup> UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article II.15; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Actions 45(k) and 47(f), pp. 44 and 45.



*of crops cultivated for illicit purposes by production for licit commercial purposes.*<sup>626</sup>

In order to increase market access, states should also support transportation infrastructure (e.g. roads) whether in their own country or abroad.<sup>627</sup> The Political Declaration of 2009 specifically mentions the obligation of states to “*develop market infrastructure*” to support alternative development.<sup>628</sup>

### ***Principle J: Marketing and export enhancement***

Market access alone is not enough. The development of financial institutions and instruments that can effectively support alternative development and similar activities is also needed. This could include technical assistance on how to promote and protect a certain product or brand, for example related to intellectual property rights. It could also mean sharing knowledge on how international financial support could be gathered for the development of certain products or for access to international organic or Fairtrade certification.

### ***Norm 16: Marketing and export enhancement***

States should actively promote and enable activities such as the creation of farmers’ associations, facilitate access to financial instruments such as micro-credit, debt swaps and ensure the possibility to sell alternative produce under existing trade agreements or special marketing regimes, such as those related to Fairtrade or ecological commodities.<sup>629</sup> For example, the Political Declaration of 2009 notes the usefulness for states to support public information campaigns to not only raise awareness about the concept of shared responsibility, but also about “*the added social value of alternative development products.*”<sup>630</sup>

<sup>626</sup> UNGASS Resolution 1998, *op. cit.*, Article II.15.

<sup>627</sup> Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Main Report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article I.10, p. 4.

<sup>628</sup> Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 47(k), p. 46.

<sup>629</sup> ICAD Report, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Lima Declaration, *op. cit.*, p. 12; INCB Discussion Note, *op. cit.*, Article 7, p. 3; Main Report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article IV.52(e), p. 10; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 49(b), p. 47; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 49(d), p. 47.

<sup>630</sup> Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 49(c), p. 47.

***Norm 17: Market demand***

States should focus on products with clearly identified market demand to avoid the case where alternative products are only sustainable in the long term with continued subsidies and government support.<sup>631</sup> If necessary, the focus should initially be only on the domestic market, before exploring possibilities in export markets. The latter does not only reflect a modest approach to the marketing of alternative development produce, but is often also a necessity given the strict quality, sanitary and health regulations that are often found in foreign markets.

**8.2.3.2 Rules of the International Economic Security Regime**

The instrumental framework of the International Economic Security Regime (its rules and decision-making procedures) will be drawn from the broader international drug control regime. This is because at present there is no specific sub-regime or independent regime on supply reduction strategies or alternative development. Rules and decision-making procedures can for the moment only be found in the formal drug control regime that is based on the international drug control conventions and decision-making institutions such as the CND. As already mentioned above, international workshops and expert meetings where consensus on best practices and lessons learned is reached could be a first step towards the creation of a sub-regime on development-oriented supply reduction policies.

Within the international legal framework of the United Nations, the international drug control treaties can be considered to provide states with formal rules and obligations under international law. The CND resolutions, Political Declarations and Action Plans should be considered more as a form of ‘soft law’. These are non-binding agreements or commitments between states that do not have the formal legal character of treaty provisions. It is for this reason that CND resolutions often ‘urge’, ‘recommend’, ‘suggest’ or ‘request’ instead of ‘force’ or ‘oblige’, despite the fact that their provisions are often clear normative<sup>632</sup>

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<sup>631</sup> Main Report, Open-ended expert working group, *op. cit.*, Article IV.52(e), p. 10; Political Declaration 2009, *op. cit.*, Action 49(b), p. 47.

<sup>632</sup> In general, the normative character of the work of the CND in relationship to its member states helps to understand why a regime based on the international drug control system tends to have a strong normative framework (focused especially on policy guidance) and a weaker instrumental framework.

expressions adopted by a majority of member states, and often relate directly to the more formal treaty provisions.

In this section, rules are taken from the relevant international treaties, and from the CND resolutions, Political Declarations and Action Plans. To avoid confusion with more regional cooperative frameworks and regimes, only the international treaties and policy and decision-making bodies of the United Nations system are taken into account (United Nations General Assembly Special Sessions, ECOSOC resolutions and CND resolutions).<sup>633</sup> The documents analysed are from the period 1998-2013, ending with the most recent CND session in March 2013 at the time of writing.

As mentioned above in section 7.2.3, rules are very similar to norms. Using Krasner's definition, rules are "*specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.*" They can be considered as somewhat more formal given that (in this case) they are drawn from official resolutions or treaties that states have committed themselves to. However, sometimes they are little more than elaborations of norms and they often fall short of concrete obligations. The following relevant rules have been identified at the broadest international level of UN treaties and CND resolutions for the RISE. They are again grouped using the same categories as above for the normative framework of the international regime.

### **Category 1: International cooperation**

#### ***Rule 1: General obligation to cooperate***

A general obligation for states to cooperate can be found in the international drug treaties: "*The parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary to (...) co-operate with other States in the execution of the provisions [related to the control of illicit substances] of this Convention*" (Single Convention 1961).<sup>634</sup> And: "*States shall assist each other in the campaign against the illicit traffic in psychotropic substances (...)*" and "[c]o-operate closely with each other and with the competent international organizations of

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<sup>633</sup> Reports by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) are not taken into account as this body is an independent mechanism that controls the implementation of the international drug treaty provisions in member states. Although the INCB has certain enforcement powers to aim to pressure a member state into action, here these rules are not considered to be part of the international drug control regime itself, but more part of its monitoring, control and enforcement mechanisms.

<sup>634</sup> *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* (1961), *op. cit.*, Article 4(b), p. 4.

*which they are members with a view to maintaining a co-ordinated campaign against the illicit traffic*” (Convention on Psychotropic substances 1971).<sup>635</sup> In addition states “(...) *shall co-operate closely with one another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of law enforcement action to suppress the commission of offences (...)*.”<sup>636</sup> These offences include illicit cultivation: “*The cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for the purpose of the production of narcotic drugs contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention.*”<sup>637</sup>

### **Rule 2: Obligation of coordinated action based on shared responsibility**

The 1998 Convention states that the “*eradication of illicit traffic is a collective responsibility of all States and that, to that end, co-ordinated action within the framework of international co-operation is necessary*”.<sup>638</sup> This rule is repeated in many CND resolutions, mostly in the form of states’ obligation to work together to address the global drugs phenomenon because of its underlying “*common and shared responsibility.*”<sup>639</sup> It relates to the principle of shared responsibility, as established by the Political Declaration of 1998.<sup>640</sup> As such, it can essentially be found in all resolutions on alternative development and related issues. CND Resolution 54/12 (2011) calls on states to revitalise the principle of common and shared responsibility, stating that “*international cooperation has been instrumental in reducing illicit drug supply and demand and drug trafficking at the national level.*”<sup>641</sup> This resolution is based on a round-table discussion on shared responsibility during the fifty-fourth session of the CND (2011) that took place again the following year during the fifty-fifth session.<sup>642</sup>

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<sup>635</sup> *Convention on Psychotropic Substances* (1971), *op. cit.*, Article 21(b) and (c), p. 12.

<sup>636</sup> *Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* (1988), *op. cit.*, Article 9.1, p. 10.

<sup>637</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 3(a)ii, p. 3.

<sup>638</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>639</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution A/Res/53/115, ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’ (1 February 1999), Article I.1, p. 3. See also the resolutions in subsequent years with the same name. For example: United Nations, CND Resolution A/RES/62/176, ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’ (17 March 2008).

<sup>640</sup> ‘Political Declaration’ (21 October 1998), *op. cit.*, Article 2.

<sup>641</sup> CND Resolution 54/12, ‘Revitalization of the principle of common and shared responsibility in countering the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*

<sup>642</sup> The results of the round-table discussion on shared responsibility during the fifty-fifth session of the CND (2012) can be found in: CND, Report on the fifty-fifth session (13 December 2011 and 12-16 March 2012), *op. cit.*, Chapter III, p. 37.

**Rule 3: Obligation to support developing countries**

Assistance should be provided in particular to less developed countries, which often play a significant role in the supply side of the illegal drugs economy: “(...) [T]he fulfilment by the developing countries of their obligations under the Convention will be facilitated by adequate technical and financial assistance from the international community” (Single Convention 1961).<sup>643</sup> This is also based on the United Nations Charter where states have committed to promoting “the social and economic progress of all people.”<sup>644</sup> In addition, Article 10 of the 1988 Convention also includes the obligation that states “shall co-operate, directly or through competent international or regional organizations, to assist and support transit States and, in particular, developing countries (...) through programmes of technical co-operation on interdiction and other related activities.”<sup>645</sup>

**Rule 4: Obligation to strengthen international and regional cooperation**

CND Resolution 53/115 specifically mentions the need for states to actively promote effective cooperation at the international and regional levels.<sup>646</sup> At the regional level of neighbouring countries, General Assembly Resolution S-20/4 adds that “[s]tates are exhorted to agree on bilateral mechanisms for cooperation in order to establish and implement eradication and alternative development projects in their frontier areas.”<sup>647</sup> In general, states should “cooperate through bilateral, regional and multilateral means to avoid displacement of illicit cultivation from one area, region or country to another.”<sup>648</sup> As such, the latter rule intends to counter the ‘balloon effect’ that has been described above. CND Resolution 44/11 further urges states to: “to undertake a greater and more determined financial and technical cooperation effort to support and promote alternative development projects (...) on the basis of the principle of shared responsibility as a pillar of international cooperation in countering the world drug problem.”<sup>649</sup>

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<sup>643</sup> *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* (1961), *op. cit.*, Resolution II, Article 2.

<sup>644</sup> *Ibid.*, Resolution II, Paragraph 1.

<sup>645</sup> 1988 Convention, *op. cit.*, Article 10.1, p. 11.

<sup>646</sup> CND Resolution, A/Res/53/115, ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, Article I.2, p. 3.

<sup>647</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution S-20/4, ‘Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem’ (21 October 1998), Article II.14, p. 22.

<sup>648</sup> *Ibid.*, Article III.21, p. 24.

<sup>649</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 44/11, ‘International cooperation on the elimination of illicit drug crops and on alternative development’ (29 March 2001), Article 4.

In less strong terms, in most CND resolutions, states are urged to “*redouble their efforts*” and increase international cooperation on the basis of more political and financial commitment.<sup>650</sup> CND Resolution 51/5 specifically recommends cross-border cooperation, communication and law enforcement coordination for states that share common borders.<sup>651</sup> Last, CND Resolution 52/6 stresses the need to “*strengthen cross-border bilateral, subregional and regional technical assistance and cooperation, including South-South cooperation.*”<sup>652</sup> The need for South-South cooperation has been increasingly stressed in recent CND resolutions. It has resulted in concrete action under the Global Partnership on Alternative Development, when Asian and South American countries came together in 2009 to share best practices and lessons learned<sup>653</sup> with a view to reduce illicit cultivation “*while securing a stable and fair livelihood for farmers.*”<sup>654</sup>

## **Category 2: State building and security**

### ***Rule 5: Obligation to accompany alternative development with institution and capacity building***

The need for broader state building to accompany alternative development interventions is expressed in CND Resolution 48/9. States must focus on “*(...) alternative development programmes within the framework of national policies and international strategies on the basis of an integrated approach that should be accompanied by measures to strengthen the*

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<sup>650</sup> See, for example: United Nations, ECOSOC Resolution 2008/26, ‘Promoting sustainability and integrality in alternative development as an important part of drug control strategy in States where illicit crops are grown to produce drugs’ (2008), Article 5.

<sup>651</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 51/5, ‘Strengthening cross-border cooperation in the area of drug control’ (2008).

<sup>652</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 52/6, ‘Promoting best practices and lessons learned for the sustainability and integrality of alternative development programmes’ (2009), Article 4.

<sup>653</sup> Within the framework of the United Nations, highlighting and searching for lessons learned and best practices of alternative development has become more important in recent years. CND Resolutions 52/6, *op. cit.* (2009) and 53/6, *op. cit.* (2010) are directly related to this objective, as well as the international high-level conferences on alternative development in Thailand (2011) and Peru (2012). The stated aim of the latter conferences was to “*gather inputs and contributions and to assess past and ongoing efforts for the future endeavour of developing a set of international guiding principles to serve as guidelines for more effective alternative development programmes in drug-producing areas*”. See: CND Resolution 54/4, ‘Follow-up on the proposal to organize an international workshop and conference on alternative development’, *op. cit.*, Article 3.

<sup>654</sup> CND Resolution 53/6, ‘Follow-up to the promotion of best practices and lessons learned for the sustainability and integrality of alternative development programmes and the proposal to organize an international workshop and conference on alternative development’, *op. cit.*, Article 3.

*judicial system, the rule of law and good governance.*”<sup>655</sup> However, at all times, this provision is based on the underlying norm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Therefore, international support for any process of internal state transformation is always “*at the request*” of states. This partly explains why no other rules were found relating to international cooperation in terms of institution building and good governance. States are urged to assist other countries in these areas, but are not forced to do so.

***Rule 6: Obligation to balance alternative development and law enforcement***

States should complement alternative development interventions with appropriate law enforcement measures; especially where organised criminal organisations are involved and when viable alternative income opportunities are already available in farming communities.<sup>656</sup>

***Rule 7: Obligation to support law enforcement capacity abroad***

In the context of Afghanistan, CND Resolution 45/10 stresses the need for states to support the creation of an effective legal framework to address illicit drugs, crime and terrorism and develop law enforcement capacity to tackle the (re)emergence of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and its linkages with the “*financing of terrorism and other subversive activities.*”<sup>657</sup> This resolution was adopted following the events of September 11 (2001) in New York and Washington D.C. and the subsequent military invasion of Afghanistan. However, in general, CND resolutions regarding alternative development and trade related economic policies do not specifically mention the link between the proceeds of illegal drug cultivation and the financing of terrorism or subversive movements. Instead, that link is established more directly, through illicit drug trafficking.

This, for example, becomes apparent in General Assembly Resolution 64/182 on ‘international cooperation against the world drug problem’ which mentions the “*urgent need to respond to the serious challenges posed by the increasing links between drug trafficking,*

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<sup>655</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 48/9, ‘Strengthening alternative development as an important drug control strategy and establishing alternative development as a cross-cutting issue’ (March 2005), Paragraph 15.

<sup>656</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution S-20/4, ‘Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, Articles V.28 to V.31, p. 25.

<sup>657</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 45/10, ‘Strengthening international cooperation in the control of opium poppy cultivation’ (15 March 2002), Article 6.

*corruption and other forms of organized crime, including trafficking in human beings, trafficking in firearms, cybercrime and, in some cases, terrorism and money-laundering, including money-laundering in connection with the financing of terrorism.*”<sup>658</sup> This obligation is also part of the integrated, multidisciplinary approach that states have to adopt to jointly address the global drugs phenomenon, but it is mostly dealt with in separate resolutions.<sup>659</sup> The need for states to jointly counter drug trafficking, for example in CND Resolution 55/11 on ‘Follow-up to the Third Ministerial Conference of the Paris Pact Partners on Combating Illicit Traffic in Opiates Originating in Afghanistan’ (2012), is normally not related to efforts in the field of alternative development.<sup>660</sup>

***Rule 8: Obligation to balance alternative development and conflict management***

CND Resolution 48/9 creates an indirect link between alternative development and crisis prevention, conflict management and good governance. This link is established through the contribution of alternative development interventions to poverty reduction in particular, identified as one of the main causes of local conflict.<sup>661</sup> However, similar to the link between alternative development and terrorism, there seem to be no direct rules or obligations that stress linkages with conflict. One of the reasons for this may be the fact that internal conflicts, such as in Colombia, are considered to be internal affairs, not directly related to international support for alternative development strategies. This can be seen from the wording of General Assembly Resolution 64/182 that discusses the need for sustainable crop control strategies to be based on “*an integrated and balanced approach, taking into account the rule of law and, where appropriate, security concerns, with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States [and] the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.*”<sup>662</sup> This significant disclaimer seems to be a common principle when discussing security concerns. Nevertheless, the link between security, the rule of law and legal alternatives to drug-producing crops is made in CND resolutions. For example, in

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<sup>658</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 64/182, ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’ (30 March 2010), Article 9.

<sup>659</sup> See for example: United Nations, CND Resolution 53/8, ‘Strengthening international cooperation in countering the world drug problem focusing on illicit drug trafficking and related offences’ (12 March 2010).

<sup>660</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 55/11, ‘Follow-up to the Third Ministerial Conference of the Paris Pact Partners on Combating Illicit Traffic in Opiates Originating in Afghanistan’ (16 March 2012).

<sup>661</sup> CND Resolution 48/9, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 10.

<sup>662</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 64/182, ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, Article 7(a).



the context of Afghanistan, CND draft resolution E/CN.7/2013/L.8/Rev.1 recognises that “*strengthening security, the rule of law and support for local development may encourage licit alternatives to opium poppy cultivation.*”<sup>663</sup>

### **Category 3: Human development and human rights**

#### ***Rule 9: Obligation to integrate alternative development in broader national development strategies***

General Assembly Resolution S-20/4 states that “[a]lternative development programmes and projects should be consistent with national drug control policies and national sustainable development policies and strategies in the affected rural communities.”<sup>664</sup> CND Resolution 48/9 adds that alternative development interventions should not only be regarded as counter-narcotics instruments, but equally should be considered as means to consolidate “(...) sustainable development in those communities and territories affected by illicit crops and as a part of the strategy against poverty undertaken by States to fulfil the commitments of the United Nations Millennium Declaration.”<sup>665</sup> More resolutions emphasise the importance of mainstreaming alternative development into international and national development programmes.<sup>666</sup> ECOSOC Resolution 2008/26 states that illicit drug production is “*often related to development problems, in particular poverty, poor health conditions and illiteracy, and that it must be tackled in a larger development context through a holistic and integrated approach.*”<sup>667</sup>

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<sup>663</sup> United Nations, CND draft resolution E/CN.7/2013/L.10/Rev.1, ‘Strengthening international cooperation in combating illicit opiates originating in Afghanistan through continuous and reinforced support to the Paris Pact initiative’ (12 March 2013), Paragraph 9.

<sup>664</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution S-20/4, ‘Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, Article I.6, p. 21.

<sup>665</sup> CND Resolution 48/9, ‘Strengthening alternative development as an important drug control strategy and establishing alternative development as a cross-cutting issue’, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 6.

<sup>666</sup> See, for example, United Nations, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Resolution 2006/33, ‘Strengthening international cooperation for alternative development, including preventive alternative development, with due regard for environmental protection’ (27 July 2006), Article 1.

<sup>667</sup> United Nations, ECOSOC Resolution 2008/26, ‘Promoting sustainability and integrality in alternative development as an important part of drug control strategy in States where illicit crops are grown to produce drugs’ (2008), Article 2.

***Rule 10: Obligation to strengthen alternative development in view of human development***

CND Resolution 45/14 directly links alternative development with human development, calling upon states “to exploit more fully the potential of alternative development as an appropriate means of drug control, as well as sustainable human development.”<sup>668</sup> It directly highlights the benefits of alternative development for poverty reduction and the improvement of social conditions of affected people.<sup>669</sup> Part of this is a call on states to develop evaluation mechanisms to assess the impact of alternative development on both human development indicators and in terms of drug control objectives.<sup>670</sup> This resolution establishes alternative development as an embedded practice in broader development, stressing the need to include it as a “major element in social and economic development plans.”<sup>671</sup> Suggestions for broader private development efforts include rural agro-industry, reforestation and tourism, and linkages with the sustainable management of the environment are often found.<sup>672</sup>

***Rule 11: Obligation to respect human rights as the basis for any intervention***

CND Resolution 53/115 states that “respect for all human rights is and must be an essential component of measures taken to address the drug problem.”<sup>673</sup> This rule can be considered a general rule that is also found in other resolutions and in the drug control treaties.

***Rule: 12 Obligation to contribute to alternative development in view of economic security***

Through international cooperation on alternative development, states should contribute to: “the creation of sustainable social and economic opportunities through integrated rural development, including infrastructure development, that will help to improve the living conditions of the communities and population groups affected by the existence of illicit

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<sup>668</sup> CND Resolution 45/14, ‘The role of alternative development in drug control and development cooperation’, *op. cit.*, Article 1.

<sup>669</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 4.

<sup>670</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 10.

<sup>671</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 13.

<sup>672</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 14. See also: CND Resolution 52/6, ‘Promoting best practices and lessons learned for the sustainability and integrality of alternative development programmes’, *op. cit.*, Article 3(i).

<sup>673</sup> General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/53/115: ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

*cultivation.*<sup>674</sup> Similar to Rule 10, this rule relates directly to the obligation of states to foster economic security at the national and sub-national levels. ECOSOC Resolution 2008/26 also reminds member states that alternative development is intended to “*promote lawful and sustainable socio-economic options for those communities and population groups that have resorted to illicit cultivation as their only viable means of obtaining a livelihood (...).*”<sup>675</sup>

#### **Category 4: Market access**

##### ***Rule 13: General obligation to cooperate on alternative livelihood strategies and access to markets***

While the international drug conventions oblige states to cooperate, alternative development and alternative livelihood strategies are only mentioned as a possible (thus not necessarily an obligatory) issue area of this cooperation in the 1988 Convention: “*(...) co-operation may, inter alia, include support, when appropriate, for integrated rural development leading to economically viable alternatives to illicit cultivation. Factors such as access to markets, the availability of resources and prevailing socio-economic conditions should be taken into account before such rural development programmes are implemented.*”<sup>676</sup> Some CND resolutions do urge member states to increase cooperation on alternative development.<sup>677</sup> In recent years, this cooperation has been explicitly requested in the area of alternative development for cannabis growing regions.<sup>678</sup> Access to markets can be found throughout the CND resolutions on alternative development. For example, CND Resolution 52/6 states the need for countries to “*consider measures enabling the products of the [economic*

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<sup>674</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution S-20/4, ‘Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, Article III.18(b), p. 23.

<sup>675</sup> United Nations, ECOSOC Resolution 2008/26, ‘Promoting sustainability and integrity in alternative development as an important part of drug control strategy in States where illicit crops are grown to produce drugs’, *op. cit.*, Article 1.

<sup>676</sup> 1988 Convention, *op. cit.*, Article 14.3(a), p. 14.

<sup>677</sup> See, for example, ECOSOC Resolution 2006/33, ‘Strengthening international cooperation for alternative development, including preventive alternative development, with due regard for environmental protection’, *op. cit.*, Article 3.

<sup>678</sup> See United Nations, CND Resolution 51/6, ‘Combating the illicit cultivation of and trafficking in cannabis’ (2008) and United Nations, ECOSOC Resolution 2006/31, ‘Using alternative development programmes to reduce the cultivation of cannabis plants’ (27 July 2006).

programmes based on best practices and lessons learned] *to have easier access to markets, taking into account applicable multilateral trade rules.*<sup>679</sup>

***Rule 14: Specific obligation to support economic (alternative) development in rural settings***

Stressing the linkages between poverty and illicit drug cultivation, CND Resolution 53/115 calls specifically for international support to promote the economic development of countries where drug cultivation and production takes place, including “*support of alternative and sustainable development activities in the affected areas of those countries.*”<sup>680</sup> General Assembly Resolution S-20/4 adds that support should consist of a long-term political and financial commitment to assist drug cultivating states with their integrated rural development and alternative development efforts.<sup>681</sup>

Specific economic best practices and lessons learned are mentioned in CND Resolution 52/6, including the “*promotion of organizations of producers, such as farmer associations, cooperatives or other organizations*”, the “*diversification of market-driven production, including for export-oriented goods, consistent with multilateral trade rules*”, the “*establishment of public-private partnerships to provide producers with technical and financial support*”, the “*building of producers’ capacities with regard to issues of enterprise management, product quality development, value-added production chains and trade capabilities in national and international markets*” and the “*long-term investment by Governments in the development of social and productive infrastructure for the sustainability of programmes.*”<sup>682</sup>

Last, although principally a responsibility of the Colombian government, countries should try to assist with the protection of land rights and (the restoration of) land titles. Land ownership is stressed as a key element of a comprehensive approach to alternative

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<sup>679</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 52/6, ‘Promoting best practices and lessons learned for the sustainability and integrality of alternative development programmes’, *op. cit.*, Article 5.

<sup>680</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 53/115: ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 3.

<sup>681</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution S-20/4, ‘Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, Articles II.9 and II.10, p. 22.

<sup>682</sup> CND Resolution 52/6, ‘Promoting best practices and lessons learned for the sustainability and integrality of alternative development programmes’, *op. cit.*, Articles 3(c), 3(e), 3(f), 3(g) and 3(h).

development.<sup>683</sup> It is often the basis of (investments in) economic development, social capital and innovation at the micro level of the farm.

***Rule 15: Specific obligation to guarantee market access for alternative development produce***

CND Resolutions are more specific about the obligation of states to guarantee market access for the products that are part of alternative development programmes. General Assembly Resolution S-20/4 states that “[t]he international community should attempt to provide greater access to domestic and international markets for alternative development products, with a view to overcoming problems relating to prices and marketing resulting from the substitution of crops cultivated for illicit purposes by production for licit commercial purposes.”<sup>684</sup>

Resolution 44/11 further “encourages states to open their markets to products that are the object of alternative development programmes, and which are necessary for the creation of employment and the eradication of poverty.”<sup>685</sup> The need to “encourage access to international markets for products and produce from alternative development areas” is repeated in CND Resolution 45/14 and can also be found in CND Resolutions 56/124, 57/174 and ECOSOC Resolution 2006/33.<sup>686</sup> It is part of a general provision included in the annual Resolution on strengthening international cooperation at the international level. In general, states are urged to support drug cultivating and producing countries by creating a “favourable economic environment in accordance with the principle of common and shared responsibility”<sup>687</sup> Furthermore, states should consider “promoting value added products (instead of raw materials) to increase the income for small farmers. Through a market

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<sup>683</sup> CND Resolution 48/9, *op. cit.*, Article 3(c).

<sup>684</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution S-20/4, ‘Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, Article II.15, p. 22.

<sup>685</sup> CND Resolution 44/11, *op. cit.*, Article 5.

<sup>686</sup> CND Resolution 45/14, *op. cit.*, Article 17; United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 57/174, ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’ (28 January 2003), Article 12, p. 5; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 56/124, ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’ (24 January 2002), Article 13, p. 7; ECOSOC Resolution 2006/33, ‘Strengthening international cooperation for alternative development, including preventive alternative development, with due regard for environmental protection’, *op. cit.*, Article 4.

<sup>687</sup> CND Resolution 48/9, ‘Strengthening alternative development as an important drug control strategy and establishing alternative development as a cross-cutting issue’, *op. cit.*, Article 4.

*driven approach, producers of alternative development products should adapt to the current and prospective market demand, or, if possible, create new market niches.*”<sup>688</sup>

***Rule 16: Obligation to help create special marketing regimes to enhance economic security***

A recent CND Resolution, Resolution 55/8 on ‘Follow-up to the Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem with respect to the development of strategies on special marketing regimes for alternative development, including preventive alternative development’ (2012), directly addresses the need for countries to support alternative development with special, preferential marketing mechanisms.<sup>689</sup> The examples given of such special trade regimes are those based on principles of Fairtrade and organic production criteria.<sup>690</sup> The objective of this is to promote “*products of licit origin stemming from alternative development*” with the ultimate aim of “*creating and promoting licit economic options for populations and their territories.*”<sup>691</sup> The latter objective can be considered to contribute directly to economic security.

The source of the rule is ECOSOC Resolution 2003/37 on ‘Strengthening alternative development through trade and socio-environmental preservation’ which stated the need to “*promote an economic environment that is favourable to products from alternative development and that facilitates the access of such products to international markets as an effective and efficient means of eliminating the illicit economy.*”<sup>692</sup> The author’s interest in marketing possibilities for alternative produce dates back to 2001, with the assignment on the marketing of alternative development in Peru which he was given as assistant to the Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement Section of UNODC. One way to strengthen the marketing possibilities for alternative development produce is to create a ‘global stamp’ or label for all products stemming from alternative development programmes (see for more

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<sup>688</sup> United Nations, CND, ‘Informal discussion notes distributed by the Chairs of the round-table discussions’ (20 February 2013), Document E/CN.7/2013/CRP.1, Article 23, p. 7.

<sup>689</sup> United Nations, CND Resolution 55/8, ‘Follow-up to the Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem with respect to the development of strategies on special marketing regimes for alternative development, including preventive alternative development’ (16 March 2012).

<sup>690</sup> *Ibid.*, Paragraph 1.

<sup>691</sup> *Ibid.*, Paragraph 7.

<sup>692</sup> United Nations, ECOSOC, Resolution 2003/37, ‘Strengthening alternative development through trade and socio-environmental preservation’ (22 July 2003), Article 2.

details Box 2 in Chapter 10). This proposal was made by the government of Ecuador during the fifty-fifth session of the CND (2012).<sup>693</sup> Last, it is important to note that when CND resolutions refer to access to markets and trade promotion, it is always accompanied by the disclaimer that such measures should take into account relevant multilateral trade rules.<sup>694</sup>

***Rule 17: Obligation to balance drug control and development***

An interesting rule can be derived from General Assembly Resolution S-20/4, which states that “[a]lternative development programmes should be designed for areas that have a potential for adequate drug control and development.” This appears to suggest that states should only implement alternative development strategies if both objectives are feasible – reducing the supply of illicit drugs and drug-producing plants *and* effectively enhancing rural development in the area. Indeed, alternative development would simply be ‘development’ if there were no drug control objectives attached. However, this condition does not necessarily mean that illicit cultivation is currently taking place in the areas where alternative livelihood interventions are or should be implemented. Most CND resolutions refer to the need to support integrated and sustainable alternative development and “*where appropriate preventive alternative development programmes.*”<sup>695</sup> This phrase can also be found in General Assembly Resolution 64/182.<sup>696</sup> In ECOSOC resolution 2008/26, alternative development is also presented as an “*integrated way to the eradication of poverty*”, directly referencing the General Assembly Resolution S-20/4 E (paragraph 17).<sup>697</sup>

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<sup>693</sup> CND Resolution 55/8, ‘Follow-up to the Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem with respect to the development of strategies on special marketing regimes for alternative development, including preventive alternative development’, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 9.

<sup>694</sup> See, for example: CND Resolution 55/8, *op. cit.*, Article 4.

<sup>695</sup> See, for example, United Nations, CND Resolution 52/6, ‘Promoting best practices and lessons learned for the sustainability and integrality of alternative development programmes’, *op. cit.*, Article 4.

<sup>696</sup> United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 64/182, ‘International cooperation against the world drug problem’, *op. cit.*, Article 7(b).

<sup>697</sup> United Nations, ECOSOC Resolution 2008/26, ‘Promoting sustainability and integrality in alternative development as an important part of drug control strategy in States where illicit crops are grown to produce drugs’, *op. cit.*, Article 1.

### 8.2.3.3 Decision-making procedures of the International Economic Security Regime

Decision-making procedures are defined by Krasner as “*prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.*” Although the International Economic Security Regime is an international regime, decisions for coordinated action can also be taken at the regional level. Theoretically, that means that decision-making procedures are not limited to the international level of the Commission on Narcotics Drugs. However, that would be the level where regional decisions would be transferred if they had relevance for the broader international level. For example, regional groups of countries can take the initiative for CND resolutions on the basis of work prepared elsewhere at regional *fora*.

Given the additional importance of the CND for regional groups of countries, the international character of the RISE, and in particular its underlying patterns of international cooperation based on the universal principle of shared responsibility (regardless of whether or not countries belong to the same region or not), the decision-making procedures are only related to those belonging to the CND. This means that decision-making procedures for regional organisations such as the Comisión Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (CICAD) in the framework of the Organization of American States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are not taken into account here, despite their importance in boosting regional cooperation. This decision is further justified by the fact that the other components of the international regime, principles, norms and rules, are also only taken from events and official documents at the international level.

The decision-making procedures of the Commission on Narcotics Drugs can be found in document E/5975/Rev.1, ‘Rules of Procedures of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council.’<sup>698</sup> This document also includes the rules regarding agenda setting and the establishment of committees and working groups. It explains how proposals come into being and how they are voted by the Commission. A useful additional document can be found on the website of UNODC which explains the entire process of (draft) resolutions and decisions at the CND.<sup>699</sup>

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<sup>698</sup> United Nations, *Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council* (1983).

<sup>699</sup> United Nations, information note, ‘Commission on Narcotic Drugs and Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: General information on draft resolutions and draft decisions (no date). Available online at: [http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/Draft\\_resolutions\\_tips\\_final\\_package19Oct.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/Draft_resolutions_tips_final_package19Oct.pdf) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).



Given the broad-spectrum nature of these decision-making procedures, shown by the fact that they are the same for all functional commissions of ECOSOC, they will not be dealt with in more detail here. What is important in the context of this research is that the body of CND resolutions and decisions represents the outcome of the decision-making procedures of the instrumental framework of the International Economic Security Regime. Although countries take decisions through other channels (e.g. through their national parliaments or through bilateral or regional *fora*), at the international level there is currently no other specialised decision-making body that competes with the CND in terms of its almost universal membership<sup>700</sup> and leading role in setting the global agenda to determine the international patterns of cooperation and coordination of drugs-related policies in priority areas.

### **8.3 Interim conclusions about the RISE**

Before exploring the case study of Colombia, this section first provides a summary of the main findings concerning the theoretical structure of the RISE. Section 8.3.1 will summarise the conclusions regarding the normative framework. Section 8.3.2 will review the instrumental framework.

#### **8.3.1 Conclusions about the normative framework of the RISE**

The normative framework of the RISE is reasonably strong. At the level of the United Nations, shared responsibility is a guiding principle that forms the basis for international commitment. At this level, political and financial commitment is directly related to alternative development and other supply reduction strategies aimed at addressing the global drugs phenomenon at its source. The need to cooperate, whether regionally or internationally does not only stem from the balanced approach (focusing simultaneously on both the demand and supply of illicit drugs through international cooperation), it is also a result of the local and regional cross-border dynamics of illicit crop cultivation.

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<sup>700</sup> The 53 member countries represent all regions of the world, and are elected from all United Nations member states every four years.

It is generally accepted that international support for alternative development should be integrated in broader (rural) development strategies. Broader development does not only mean that the focus is on a wider alternative livelihood approach: it also means incorporating social, cultural, economic, political, educational and environmental factors that may have a direct link to drug control objectives. The importance of economic and social rights and opportunities is particularly stressed as a precondition for a sustainable reduction of illicit crop cultivation. In general, the protection of human rights is considered a basic norm, underpinning these economic and social rights.

The objective of sustainability of development-based supply reduction programmes is also conditioned by a series of economic requirements. States should clearly offer access to their markets for alternative development produce and should accompany these programmes with a number of financial and economic instruments that will increase the profitability and sustainability of alternative development. This can take the form of preferential trade agreements or special marketing regimes, for example, those related to Fairtrade or organic alternative produce.

Within the normative framework of the RISE, broader development has a clear focus on state transformation. States should help each other to create the capacity that will enable effective source control. However, given the overriding principle of sovereignty, the need for structural transformations (e.g. institution building, good governance, etc.) is mainly addressed at the level of the states themselves, and less in terms of international support directly.

Related to state transformation is the requirement to increase the rule of law. To support development-based supply reduction strategies, states should focus on conflict resolution, crime prevention and the reduction of violence. The focus is again principally on the states themselves, less on direct international support to increase law enforcement capacity. Where desired and possible, however, other states are urged to support this essential part of state building.

In sum, considering the normative framework of the RISE, states have a direct and indirect role or obligation with regard to international cooperation and support on the issue area of drug control in foreign countries. States should directly provide financial and political commitment to support source control. In concrete terms, this should be directly achieved through economic and financial support, access to markets and special trade regimes that support the activities of alternative development in drug producing countries.

States fully control this process, as they can decide to what degree they are willing to assist drug producing countries such as Colombia.

Indirectly, broader development and state transformation should be supported, but here the receiving country ultimately decides whether, when and how this support takes place. With regard to the principles and norms of the RISE structure (its normative framework), it is quite clear what is expected from states, how they should help and what they can do to rein in illicit drug cultivation in other countries.

### **8.3.2 Conclusions about the instrumental framework of the RISE**

The instrumental framework of the RISE is weaker than its normative framework, chiefly because it is largely based on the specific rules and obligations of the CND, ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions and decisions (a form of ‘soft law’ as opposed to the provisions of the international drug treaties that do shape the normative framework in terms of international commitment). Nevertheless, the rules and decision-making procedures are all related to the basic treaty obligations for states to cooperate and coordinate their actions and support each other’s supply reduction strategies. In that sense, the instrumental framework does support and strengthen the normative character of the RISE.

A number of direct obligations can be formulated on the basis of the principles and norms that were identified as part of the regime’s structure. States should directly strengthen international and regional cooperation. They should support developing countries that are affected by illegal drug cultivation and should foster South-South cooperation. They are also urged (but not obliged) to assist drug producing countries with state transformation (institution and capacity building) and consider support for alternative development in a broader (rural) development context.

The aim of international support goes beyond purely counter-narcotics objectives and is related to broader human development, poverty reduction, economic development and economic security. Respect for human rights is at all times an obligation. States are obliged to open their markets for alternative development produce and should support supply reduction strategies through a broad range of (economic) development, marketing, and financial instruments. When it comes to law enforcement and conflict resolution, states have

an indirect obligation to provide support to drug producing countries and improve the general conditions in which drug control efforts become effective and sustainable.

Last, considering the decision-making procedures of the RISE, it could be argued that although the identified principles, norms and rules are all debated and discussed in the regional and international workshops and expert meetings, they are, for the moment, decided upon at the level of the CND. This remains the main international forum where international decisions are taken and adopted that affect international support for development-based supply reduction strategies that go beyond the regional level.

## **PART II: ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIA THROUGH THE LENS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY REGIME THEORY**

To become a useful analytical tool, the International Economic Security Regime must first be able to demonstrate international cooperation (or the lack thereof) on the specific issue area of supply reduction within the framework of the global drugs phenomenon. Second, if in practice there proves to be little or no indication of a RISE existing at present, the theoretical concept will need to demonstrate both the opportunities and benefits a RISE would provide in terms of, for example, more (efficient or specific) cooperation or more political and financial commitment to supply reduction at its source.

Part II of the research will address both of these functions of the RISE through the case study of Colombia (1998-2012) and in particular three Colombian regions that together form the core of the case study. Chapter 9 will first provide an overview of all major programmes of alternative development in Colombia between 1998 and 2012, highlighting at each stage the level of international support and the main drivers behind that support. This chapter provides the necessary background and context to better understand the three regional cases.

After providing this context, the three regional case studies will explore the findings of the field research that was conducted as part of this research, focusing on the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in the department of Magdalena (Chapter 10), the Sierra de la Macarena and the village of San Juan de Arama in the department of Meta (Chapter 11) and the region of Tumaco in the department of Nariño (Chapter 12). The complete agenda of the field research can be found in Annex II.

The three regional chapters do not intend to provide a complete catalogue of all alternative development programmes that have been implemented in the region. Rather, they focus on the projects that were visited as part of the research and on the interviews with the project staff, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. While past programmes will be mentioned, the emphasis of the regional case studies will be placed on recent and current programmes and interventions. The information is mostly drawn directly from the field research data, but is supplemented where necessary with information from other sources.

Each regional chapter begins with a short section on how the geographic area fits (historically) within the illegal drugs economy, before providing an analysis of the main

findings related to the projects and programmes visited. It then goes on to discuss three overarching themes which directly correspond to the main research questions: 1) linkages to the international level (divided into international support (at the source) and access to international markets); 2) main drivers behind international cooperation; 3) opportunities for the RISE in the Colombian context. This section is divided into two sub-sections: the first on shared responsibility (including identified gaps of shared responsibility) and the second on economic security.

Footnotes will be used at the beginning of sections to explain from which meetings or field visits the information is drawn. The section that follows can then be considered to be taken from the same source, until a new footnote appears. Comments and quotes are referenced as coming from ‘project staff’, ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘representatives’ of (local) organisations, depending on the role of the individuals in the alternative development programmes. However, the anonymity of the sources is protected and comments are not attributed directly to individuals, excepting the academics and experts quoted in Chapter 9. Last, the field research quotes have been kept in Spanish, but an English translation is provided in footnotes.

## CHAPTER 9: OVERVIEW OF MAIN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT (1998-2012)

This chapter will provide an overview of the main alternative development programmes implemented in Colombia between 1998 and 2012, together with a short summary of the most important programmes before that period. It will also analyse the corresponding international (marketing) support provided for these programmes, and any linkages with the theoretical concepts of shared responsibility and economic security. The chapter focuses on providing a general overview at the national and international level, and is less concerned with the details at the local level which will be addressed in subsequent chapters. For example, when examining a national programme, in most cases a detailed description of the technical aspects of the support offered to farming communities will not be provided, because many current alternative development projects falling under these programmes will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 10, 11 and 12. Together, these chapters will provide examples of the principle types of alternative development projects and products being implemented in Colombia at this time.

### 9.1 General overview of alternative development programmes

Alternative development programmes have been implemented in Colombia for approximately the past three decades. In economic terms, alternative development represented about 10 percent of all Colombian expenditure on drug policy in the period between 1995 and 2004.<sup>701</sup> Crop substitution and alternative development strategies were first developed under the government of President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986).<sup>702</sup> The first alternative development project started in the department of Cauca in 1985 and was

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<sup>701</sup> Carlos Arturo Carvajal, 'Coca, cocaína, conflicto armado y crisis humanitaria', in: Sandro Calvani (ed.), *La Coca. Pasado y presente. Mitos y Realidades* (Bogotá: Aurora, 2007), p. 163.

<sup>702</sup> Carlos Zorro, 'Políticas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia (1982-2009)', in: Alejandro Gaviria Uribe and Daniel Mejía Londoño (eds.), *Políticas antidroga en Colombia: éxitos, fracasos y extravíos* (Bogotá: Universidad de Los Andes, 2011), p. 94.

extended to the department of Nariño in 1989.<sup>703</sup> From 1989 onwards, alternative development projects were implemented through the *Programa Especial de Cooperación* (PEC, Special Cooperation Programme), funded by bilateral and multilateral aid.<sup>704</sup> At the time, financial support was pledged predominantly by the United States (200 million USD; 150 million EUR), the European Union (75.6 million USD; 57 million EUR), Luxembourg (20 million USD; 15 million EUR), Germany (through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 15 million USD; 11 million EUR) and the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP with 36 million USD; 27 million EUR), but these pledges may have been reduced after 1991.<sup>705</sup> Not all projects implemented under the PEC had direct linkages to drug control objectives<sup>706</sup>, but it demonstrates that alternative development programmes in Colombia have been widely supported through international development cooperation, and that from the outset the US has been the biggest donor country.

From 1992 onwards, a more institutional approach to alternative development was developed in Colombia with the establishment of the government's alternative development institute in late 1992<sup>707</sup> and the implementation in 1993 of the *Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo* (PNDA).<sup>708</sup> Under the government of President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), this programme evolved in 1996 into the *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo* (Plante), which received important financial assistance from the United States (through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)) for its implementation.<sup>709</sup> The approach of alternative development was initially overshadowed by a dominant policy of forced crop eradication, but Samper's administration applied a more balanced approach.<sup>710</sup> According to Samper, Plante was a social programme of crop substitution to accompany the manual crop eradication campaigns.<sup>711</sup>

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<sup>703</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, *op. cit.*, p. 345; 'Políticas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia (1982-2009)', *op. cit.*, p. 95.

<sup>704</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

<sup>705</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

<sup>706</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 340, 341.

<sup>707</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 345.

<sup>708</sup> 'Políticas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia (1982-2009)', *op. cit.*, p. 96.

<sup>709</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>710</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>711</sup> *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización. Una nueva propuesta*, *op. cit.*, p. 68.



During this period the strategy was predominantly top-down, with the central government taking full responsibility for alternative development.<sup>712</sup> According to Carlos Zorro, researcher at the University of Los Andes in Bogotá, this top-down strategy was ineffective, but when it was subsequently replaced by a much more bottom-up strategy providing the farmers directly with the resources, this did not function well either as farmers did not receive enough incentives (e.g. through the conditionality of the government support) to proactively switch from illegal to legal cultivation.<sup>713</sup>

During the presidency of Andrés Pastrana (1998 to 2002) – the beginning of the period examined in this research – the Colombian government initially used the same approach as Plante. However, under Pastrana, alternative development was characterised by collective responsibility. A local community would commit as a whole to the voluntarily eradication of illicit coca crops, and in return would receive the government's financial support.<sup>714</sup> The strategy was now not strictly top-down or bottom-up, but involved the municipalities as intermediaries.<sup>715</sup> The support provided consisted of food security measures, technical assistance, marketing information, and broader community support in the areas of basic healthcare, education and electricity.<sup>716</sup>

Stressing the conditionality of support, the government of Pastrana entered into collective agreements or pacts with the local communities rather than with individual farmers. The alternative development projects were also directly defined and implemented with the local communities through farmer and second-tier organisations which would directly receive the funding and other resources. In theory, support was conditioned on the voluntary eradication of coca crops, but in practice this often did not take place.<sup>717</sup>

Between 1998 and 1999, a new national strategy took shape, leading in 1999 to the adoption of Plan Colombia. The initial aim of Plan Colombia was to develop a core alternative development strategy, focusing on rural development, supporting agricultural

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<sup>712</sup> Personal interviews, Carlos Zorro, Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (13 January 2012).

<sup>713</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>714</sup> Financial support would amount to up to 2 million COP per family (around 800 EUR or 1,062 USD in current prices). 'Políticas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia (1982-2009)', *op. cit.*, p. 98.

<sup>715</sup> Personal interviews, Carlos Zorro, Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (13 January 2012).

<sup>716</sup> 'Políticas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia (1982-2009)', *op. cit.*, pp. 98, 99.

<sup>717</sup> Personal interviews, Carlos Zorro, Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (13 January 2012).

production, boosting human capital and improving infrastructure in the main coca growing regions.<sup>718</sup> President Pastrana defined the initial Plan as follows:

*“El Plan Colombia es un conjunto de proyectos de desarrollo alternativo que canalizarán los esfuerzos compartidos de los gobiernos y de los organismos multilaterales con la sociedad colombiana. Sus indicadores de resultados serán la transformación de las zonas donde se cultiva el 80% de la producción mundial de coca y de amapola en desarrollos agrícolas económicamente rentables para nuestros campesinos (...).”*<sup>719</sup>

According to President Pastrana, the aim of Plan Colombia was as a type of Marshall Plan which would accompany Colombia’s peace process – an issue he had already raised during his election campaign.<sup>720</sup> However, to a large extent because of US pressure and commitment, the actual Plan Colombia as implemented partly shifted from rural (alternative) development to counter-insurgency strategy with a strong focus on aerial spraying of illicit crops and military involvement in counter-narcotics operations.<sup>721</sup>

While considered a success by both the American and Colombian government, aerial spraying with chemicals has been widely criticised.<sup>722</sup> Thoumi cites at least five categories of negative effects:

- 1) health and environmental risks related to high doses of glyphosate (the active ingredient of the pesticide);
- 2) negative effects for legal crops that are also sprayed;
- 3) long-term risk of disenfranchised populations because of the government’s spraying campaigns;

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<sup>718</sup> *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización. Una nueva propuesta, op. cit.*, pp. 55, 56; ‘Políticas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia (1982-2009)’, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>719</sup> “Plan Colombia is a set of alternative development projects that will channel the mutual efforts of governments and multilateral agencies to the benefit of Colombian society. The measures of success will be the transformation of the zones where 80 percent of global production of coca and opium poppy is produced, into rural development that is economically profitable for our farmers.” Andrés Pastrana, *La Palabra bajo Fuego* (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2005), p. 116.

<sup>720</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>721</sup> *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización. Una nueva propuesta, op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>722</sup> Francisco E. Thoumi, ‘La politique antidrogue en Colombie au regard des autres pays andins. Enjeux passés et présents’, in: INHES, ‘Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie’. Production et Trafic Illicites, conflit armé, interventions étatiques’, *Les Cahiers de la Sécurité*, No. 59 (2005), p. 29.

- 4) risks related to the internationalisation of the Colombian conflict, for example through the increased presence of non-state actors such as private military companies carrying out the spraying (e.g. DynCorp International) or international NGOs concerned with environmental protection; and
- 5) the increased lack of impact because of herbicide-resistant coca varieties.<sup>723</sup>

However, Thoumi admits that the debate on aerial spraying is also “*confusing and value laden*”<sup>724</sup>:

“[Opponents] *avoid explaining why those negative effects do not appear to be associated with 80 percent of the glisofate [sic] used in modern Colombian agriculture or with its widespread use in the United States, where it is sold under the Roundup brand name (and where it is the most commonly used household herbicide).*”<sup>725</sup>

In any case, the new focus of the Colombian government, which included aerial spraying of coca crops where farmers had mixed cultivation, led to international support for Plan Colombia becoming a largely US affair. The European Union, initially interested in the new strategy, decided to not support it because of its potential harm to human rights and the environment.<sup>726</sup> Although alternative development was one of the components of Plan Colombia, it was only a relatively small pillar in terms of international funding. In total, the US initially allocated 869 million USD to the Plan (around 650 million EUR), of which 123.5 million USD (92 million EUR) were channelled through USAID.<sup>727</sup> Of that USAID budget, only 42.5 million USD (32 million EUR) were earmarked for alternative development programmes in Colombia – less than 5 percent of the total US budget.<sup>728</sup>

With Plan Colombia, the United States strengthened its position as main strategic partner in Colombia’s struggle against the illicit coca economy, further reinforced under the first government of President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2006) when the Bush administration renewed support for the Plan. The government of Uribe tried to improve the alternative

<sup>723</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29-32.

<sup>724</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes, op. cit.*, p. 199.

<sup>725</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

<sup>726</sup> *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización. Una nueva propuesta, op. cit.*, p. 56

<sup>727</sup> Ricardo Vargas Meza, ‘USAID’s Alternative Development policy in Colombia. A critical analysis’, *TNI Drug Policy Briefing Paper*, No. 38 (October 2011), p. 1.

<sup>728</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

development aspects of the Plan, using the conditionality that started under president Pastrana, by now linking government support to effective eradication, and not merely the commitment to eradicate.<sup>729</sup> Under Uribe, crop eradication was also further stepped up. In his first year in office, aerial spraying of illicit coca crops increased by more than 38 percent compared to the last year of Pastrana's term.<sup>730</sup>

President Uribe continued to defend the need for aerial spraying. Later he claimed that the strategy helped to reduce illicit coca cultivation by 68,000 hectares by the end of his second term in 2010.<sup>731</sup> Illicit cultivation indeed decreased from 144,800 hectares at the end of 2001 to 61,812 hectares at the end of 2010.<sup>732</sup> However, to achieve it, an annual spraying campaign of at least 130,000 hectares was needed (and to maintain it, it is still needed today).<sup>733</sup>

To complement manual and aerial eradication campaigns, the Colombian government began two substantial alternative development programmes under the broader *Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo* (2003-2006): The *Programa de Familias Guardabosques* and the *Programa de Proyectos Productivos*.<sup>734</sup> The change of focus under the government of President Uribe consisted mainly of the shift towards more attention on agro-forestry and reforestation.<sup>735</sup>

Launched in 2003, the *Programa de Familias Guardabosques* (PFGB) benefits communities of farmers, indigenous people and Afro-Colombians who work the land in important eco-systems that are directly or indirectly threatened by illicit coca cultivation.<sup>736</sup> It is a conditional programme that at the level of the community rewards farmers who eradicate coca crops or do not replant these crops with an economic incentive of 408,000

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<sup>729</sup> Personal interviews, Carlos Zorro, Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (13 January 2012).

<sup>730</sup> The total area fumigated increased from 94,152 hectares in 2001 to 130,364 hectares in 2002. UNODC, *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009* (Vienna: UNODC, 2010), p. 77.

<sup>731</sup> Álvaro Uribe Vélez, *No hay causa perdida* (New York: Celebra, 2012), p. 322.

<sup>732</sup> UNODC, *Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region. A survey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru* (Vienna: UNODC, 2008), p. 13; UNODC, *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011* (Bogotá: UNODC, 2012), p. 10.

<sup>733</sup> Between 2002 and 2008, aerial spraying was always more than 130,000 hectares, with a record of 172,026 hectares in 2006. UNODC, *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009* (Vienna 2010), p. 77. Only after 2008, aerial spraying levels went down somewhat to stabilise around little over 100,000 hectares each year. *Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>734</sup> A third, complementary programme is called *Grupos Móviles de Eradicación Manual* (GME, Mobile Eradication Groups) was started in 2005. This law enforcement programme focuses particularly on those areas where the first two alternative development programmes cannot be implemented, or where there is no agreement between the Colombian government and the local communities.

<sup>735</sup> Sandro Calvani and Guillermo García, 'Coca, cocaine, propiedad de la tierra, desarrollo agrícola y desarrollo alternativo', in: Sandro Calvani (ed.), *La Coca. Pasado y presente. Mitos y Realidades* (Bogotá: Aurora, 2007), p. 135.

<sup>736</sup> *Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 73.

COP every four months (162 EUR or 216 USD).<sup>737</sup> In addition to a direct subsidy to support agricultural production, the programme offers technical assistance, assistance with food security (for example through small vegetable gardens, so-called *huertas de autoconsumo*), and social development.<sup>738</sup> Through contracts with rural communities, the programme represents a direct link between drug control and environmental protection objectives, as it tries to maintain tropical forests free of coca while farmers supervise the recovery of the forests.<sup>739</sup>

In 2011, the Colombian government invested more than 25 billion COP in the PFGB programme (13.2 million USD or almost 10 million EUR).<sup>740</sup> In 2012, the Colombian government invested another 28 billion COP (1.45 million USD; 1.1 million EUR) in the programme.<sup>741</sup> By the end of 2009, more than 100,000 families had been included in the programme. This had risen to 123,000 by 2011.<sup>742</sup> In 2012, the programme reached out to 14,308 families in 10 departments and 29 municipalities across the country.<sup>743</sup> The programme represents two lines of operation that, especially since President Pastrana, have become the core elements of the Colombian alternative development strategy: 1) implementing projects directly with local communities, and 2) signing pacts with those communities that place clear conditions on the government's support.<sup>744</sup>

Between 2003 and 2011, the programme grew to include a total of 79.496 hectares of oil palm, 58.886 hectares of cocoa (about half of the total Colombian production), 28.439 hectares of coffee (about 10 percent of total production), 11.947 hectares of rubber trees and 61,762 hectares dedicated to the sustainable use of the forest.<sup>745</sup> The total number of projects in that period was 1,193.<sup>746</sup> The overarching focus of the Colombian government is on cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber and forestry as these agricultural and agro-forestry activities have shown to: 1) have an identified (national) market; 2) be economies of scale and 3) be

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<sup>737</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>738</sup> Personal interviews, Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo, Advisor, Directorate of Programmes against Illicit Crops (DPCI), UACT, Bogotá (1 March 2013).

<sup>739</sup> *No hay causa perdida, op. cit.*, p. 522.

<sup>740</sup> *Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>741</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>742</sup> Acción Social and UNODC, *Executive Report. The National Meeting on the Presidential Program on Illicit crops (PCI)* (Bogotá: Acción Social and UNODC, 2009), p. 19; Personal interviews, Juan Diego Cely Barrera, Presidential Program against Illicit Crops (PCI), Acción Social, Bogotá, Colombia (9 December 2011).

<sup>743</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>744</sup> Personal interviews, Carlos Zorro, Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (13 January 2012).

<sup>745</sup> 'De la coca, al cacao....al café, a la palma y al turismo', *El Espectador* (20 July 2011).

<sup>746</sup> *Ibid.*

relatively labour-intensive.<sup>747</sup> Up to 2010, the PFGB programme was able to keep around four million hectares of land coca free.<sup>748</sup>

The second programme, the *Programa de Proyectos Productivos* (PPP) operates through local farmers associations or cooperatives that receive support to implement projects directly related to alternative cultivation or production.<sup>749</sup> Compared to PFGB, the focus on providing technical assistance, training, and improving the production process is even greater.<sup>750</sup> Projects should be feasible in commercial, financial and environmental terms.<sup>751</sup> These projects sometimes complement the PFGB programme as some farming communities switch to PPP after first having received PFGB support for a period of two and a half years.<sup>752</sup> In other words, after receiving some direct income support, they can transition towards more structural forms of sustainable agricultural production.

However, it is not clear how many farmers actually pass from one programme to the other and how (and if) they eventually become self-sustainable without government support, which may put into question the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of the projects.<sup>753</sup> Nevertheless, in 2012, the Colombian government invested a further 11.778 million COP (6.1 million USD; 4.6 million EUR) in the programme, assisting 17,062 families in 21 departments through technical support and strengthening of local institutions.<sup>754</sup> Part of the investment was channelled through the private sector, through the Ministry of Agriculture, and through the government's principle operator UNODC.<sup>755</sup>

Although the Colombian government has continued to pursue PPP and PFGB in recent years, a new drug control model has come into being since 2007. That year, the *Plan de Consolidación Integral de La Macarena* (PCIM) was implemented as a pilot project for what later would become the nationwide *Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial* (PNCRT). The PCIM pilot project considered territory and above

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<sup>747</sup> Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), 'Política Nacional de Eradicación Manual de Cultivos Ilícitos y Desarrollo Alternativo para la Consolidación Territorial', *Conpes 3669* (Bogotá: DNP, 2010), p. 17.

<sup>748</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44

<sup>749</sup> *Executive Report. The National Meeting on the Presidential Program on Illicit crops (PCI)*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>750</sup> Personal interviews, Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo, Advisor, Directorate of Programmes against Illicit Crops (DPCI), UACT, Bogotá (1 March 2013).

<sup>751</sup> *Executive Report. The National Meeting on the Presidential Program on Illicit crops (PCI)*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>752</sup> Personal interviews, Juan Diego Cely Barrera, Presidential Program against Illicit Crops (PCI), Acción Social, Bogotá, Colombia (9 December 2011).

<sup>753</sup> Personal interviews, Carlos Zorro, Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (13 January 2012).

<sup>754</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>755</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

all the control of territory by illegal armed groups as the root of the problem.<sup>756</sup> In areas where there is a lack of state presence and control, these groups can benefit from the power vacuum and use their control over territories in a predatory manner by exploiting illegal economic resources.<sup>757</sup>

This offers a somewhat new understanding of Colombia's problem of illicit drug supply, as it no longer focuses exclusively on factors such as poverty or marginalisation to explain why coca farmers are involved in these illegal activities. It identifies the lack of effective state presence and law enforcement (territorial control) as one of the main causes of illicit cultivation and production, rather than a symptom of the conflict or the illegal drug industry. As a result, since 2007, more attention has been paid to the role of illicit drugs as an instrument used by illegal armed groups to maintain control over territories where the state has no presence.<sup>758</sup> This confirms the growing importance of the 'economics and conflict' literature analysed above.

Part of the rationale behind the new policy in 2007 was the perceived lack of sustainability of both crop eradication and alternative development efforts.<sup>759</sup> The Colombian government deemed in 2010 that these efforts suffered from weak state presence and support, which in turn resulted in the lack of basic services provided by the state.<sup>760</sup> The problem was not so much a result of the ineffectiveness of crop eradication or alternative development in itself, but more due to the fact that citizens were unable to exercise their rights and benefit from basic services of the state.<sup>761</sup> The central argument of the current policy is that without the effective presence of the state, the impact of economic policies such as alternative development will always be weak. Graph 8 shows the strategic focus of the PNCRT.

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<sup>756</sup> Personal interviews, Álvaro Balcázar, Former Director, Unidad Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

<sup>757</sup> *Ibid.*


<sup>758</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>759</sup> *Conpes 3669, op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>760</sup> Personal interviews, Álvaro Balcázar, Former Director, Unidad Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

<sup>761</sup> *Ibid.*

**Graph 8: The strategic focus of the PNCRT**



Source: UACT (translation by the author).

The national strategy of PNCRT is said to be (partly) inspired by US military counter-insurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>762</sup> US-led military operations in places such as Fallujah (Iraq) and Kandahar and Helmand (Afghanistan) have led to the realisation that a military approach is unsustainable without a functioning civilian government to provide basic services. As such, the conceptualisation of PNCRT may have reflected the evolution of US counter-insurgency tactics in recent years that have increasingly called for a so-called ‘clear-hold-build’ approach, stressing the need to (non-militarily) establish domestic institutions which receive their legitimacy directly from the local people (in the ‘build’ phase). In other words, what has become clear is that effective local government control over territories is a precondition for sustainable counter-insurgency. That understanding now seems to have been transposed towards counter-narcotics policy as well. It is difficult to demonstrate how much US influence there has been in developing Colombia’s PNCRT strategy, but it certainly gives an indication of the strong influence Washington has had in shaping Plan Colombia from 1999 onwards.

<sup>762</sup> Personal interviews, Adam Isacson, Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy, Washington Office on Latin America, WOLA (4 June 2013).



As noted above, the pilot project in La Macarena paved the way for the current national strategy of PNCRT which can be considered to be a bottom-up approach. While the state has to establish a presence<sup>763</sup> in territories, the local communities have to support the entry of government institutions to give the process more legitimacy. In other words, they have to show they are willing to fully commit to the legal economy and support the local policies of the state.<sup>764</sup> In return, the state ideally establishes basic security and through a permanent presence it starts to deliver basic services. Only when this territorial control is consolidated, can other policies, such as alternative development programmes be implemented.

Built on the precondition of territorial control and consolidation, the main challenge of this new counter-narcotics model is that both the illegal armed groups and the illegal drugs economy can (still) move to other areas as long as the state does not fully control all territories. Thus, while there has been a considerable decrease in illicit coca cultivation in the area where the PCIM pilot project took place (see Chapter 11), this might not prevent the cultivation from shifting to other areas that are not yet ‘consolidated’ or that fall outside of the PNCRT. It is possible that the decrease so far has more to do with international factors (for example, increased production in Bolivia and Peru) than with the public policies implemented by the Colombian government in La Macarena.<sup>765</sup> Nevertheless, in general, Colombia’s share of illicit coca cultivation has decreased in recent years, experiencing a further 25 percent decrease in 2012 (as compared to the year before) bringing the total level of coca cultivation to around 48,000 hectares.<sup>766</sup>

## 9.2 Linkages with the international level

At the political level, the international community has generally committed to the principle of shared responsibility when assisting Colombia in tackling its part of the global drugs phenomenon. In the period studied, this commitment goes back to an international donor

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<sup>763</sup> Under the PNCRT strategy, state presence is initially often limited to military forces (or planes spraying the area from the air). While the presence is initially mainly military, over time it shifts towards more police, local justice and local government institutions as the territory becomes increasingly ‘consolidated’. The end state is a government presence that combines citizen protection with a focus on providing economic development and the basic needs of the population.

<sup>764</sup> Personal interviews, Álvaro Balcázar, Former Director, Unidad Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

<sup>765</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>766</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit., p. 7.*

conference for Colombia held in London on July 10, 2003 and a follow up conference held in Cartagena on February 3-4, 2005. Involving the G-24 countries, the two conferences started a process (later called the ‘London-Cartagena process’) in which pledged international support for drug control was embedded in broader support to solve Colombia’s internal conflict, focusing particularly on violence mitigation, humanitarian assistance and human rights.<sup>767</sup> Nevertheless, shared responsibility in drug control was stressed throughout this process.<sup>768</sup>

To establish whether the London-Cartagena process and international commitment in general has resulted in actual international support for alternative development in Colombia, two links between local alternative development projects and international donor countries will be examined in the following sections. Section 9.2.1 will examine direct foreign support for alternative development projects in Colombia. This includes financial support and technical assistance and training, whether directly or through the use of local operators. Section 9.2.2 will examine foreign support for alternative development through the provision of market access to alternative development produce (e.g. through special preferential trade agreements).

### 9.2.1 International support

Support for Colombia’s counter-narcotics strategies has mainly come from the United States and the European Union. The United States boosted support under the Bush administration through the Andean Strategy, developed and implemented in 1989. This Strategy was a 2.2 billion USD (1.6 billion EUR) programme to address illicit drug production, trafficking and corruption in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.<sup>769</sup> The objective of this American strategy was to decrease the amount of illicit drugs entering the US by 15 percent within two years and by 60 percent in ten years.<sup>770</sup> The Andean Strategy was predominantly a military support strategy, with basically all funding taking the form of military assistance.<sup>771</sup>

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<sup>767</sup> UNDP, *De Londres, a Cartagena y a Bogotá: La Estrategia de Cooperación Internacional de Colombia* (Bogotá: UNDP, 2007), p. 5.

<sup>768</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>769</sup> ‘The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

<sup>770</sup> Raphael F. Perl, ‘United States Andean Drug Policy: Background And Issues For Decisionmakers’, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 13.

<sup>771</sup> William L. Marcey, *The Politics of Cocaine. How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Industry in Central and South America* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), p. 138.

Under President Clinton, who tried to distance himself somewhat from the Andean Strategy, the US first decreased funding for Colombia's counter-narcotics policy.<sup>772</sup> However, Clinton later boosted support for Plan Colombia and the US started shifting away from supporting the Andean Strategy.<sup>773</sup> At the start of Plan Colombia, the Bush administration had implemented two support programmes in 2001;<sup>774</sup> the Andean Regional initiative (ARI), which was designed to promote democracy, economic development and regional stability, and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which aimed to support Plan Colombia. Between 2000 and 2005, the US supported Plan Colombia with 4 billion USD (around 3 billion EUR).<sup>775</sup>

According to Adam Isacson, around 80 percent of that support was related to the security sector, chiefly in the form of support to the army and police.<sup>776</sup> Alain Labrousse believes this number to be roughly 70 percent, with the amount of US support between 2001 and 2010 totalling more than 6 billion USD (4.5 billion EUR).<sup>777</sup> Whichever figure is closest to reality, alternative development has been a relatively small pillar in the overall strategy.

The support of the European Union has been different from that of the United States. The European Union did not support classic alternative development in Colombia because projects were normally conditioned on previous coca eradication, or were taking place in areas with aerial spraying of illicit coca cultivation; two policies that the European Union did not endorse.<sup>778</sup> Nevertheless, in the year 2000 the European Union earmarked 28.5 percent of its available cooperation budget to alternative development for the period 2001 to 2006, mainly in the form of support to sustainable rural development projects.<sup>779</sup> This amounted to 30 million EUR (39 million USD) out of a total budget of 105 million EUR (138 million USD) of programmable aid.<sup>780</sup> However, the EU Peace Laboratories (a broad-based EU initiative which incorporated alternative development as one of its elements, explained in

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<sup>772</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 208.

<sup>773</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 243.

<sup>774</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 243.

<sup>775</sup> Adam Isacson, 'Le Plan Colombien: bilan négatif', in: INHES, 'Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie'. Production et Trafic Illicites, conflit armé, interventions étatiques', *Les Cahiers de la Sécurité*, No. 59 (2005), p. 171.

<sup>776</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>777</sup> Alain Labrousse, *Geopolítica de las drogas* (Buenos Aires: Marea Editorial, 2011), p. 102.

<sup>778</sup> Personal interviews, Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo, Advisor, Directorate of Programmes against Illicit Crops (DPCI), UACT, Bogotá (1 March 2013).

<sup>779</sup> European Union, *Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006* (no date), pp. 18 and 25.

<sup>780</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18 and 25.

Box 1 below) reportedly did not create much impact in terms of the reduction of illicit crops, mainly because of their much broader focus on conflict resolution and social development.<sup>781</sup>

### Box 1: EU Peace Laboratories

The European Union has so far implemented three Peace Laboratories in Colombia. The first Peace Laboratory began in 2002 in the region of Magdalena Medio in the northern part of the country. The second Laboratory was initiated in 2003 and took place in the departments of Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Cauca and Nariño.<sup>782</sup> The latest and third Laboratory started in 2006, focusing on the region of Montes de María (spread over the departments of Sucre and Bolívar) and the department of Meta. The total EU funding of the third Laboratory is 24.2 million EUR (32.3 million USD).

The Peace Laboratories could be considered to be Europe's response to the US-supported Plan Colombia, which the European Union did not endorse because of its dominant military pillar. This may partly explain the stress on 'peace' in the name, although this also reflects the time of its theoretical conception (2001), when the Colombian government was still engaged in a peace process with the FARC (the Caguán process between 1999 and 2002). While that peace process proved to be unsuccessful, the Laboratories implemented from 2002 onwards kept peace as part of their title.

The EU's strategy is a combination of humanitarian assistance, development cooperation, strengthening of civil society and peace building. The three central pillars of the EU's Peace Laboratory strategy are: 1) implementation of a culture of peace based on strengthening the dialogue of peace, respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and a life of dignity; 2) democratic governance, strengthening of local (government) institutions and citizen participation; and 3) sustainable socio-economic development aimed at improving the living conditions of the target population in harmony with the environment. According to the European Union, the Laboratories make it possible to implement an *“integral approach to tackling the causes of the conflict by unlocking the potential for development, de-intensifying the conflict and reducing the high levels of inequality.”*<sup>783</sup>

Although there is a focus on alternative development in the Peace Laboratories, this is embedded within broader agricultural and rural development. As part of the programme,

<sup>781</sup> Personal interviews, Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo, Advisor, Directorate of Programmes against Illicit Crops (DPCI), UACT, Bogotá (1 March 2013).

<sup>782</sup> More specifically the regions of the Oriente Antioqueño (Antioquia), Norte de Santander, and the region of Macizo Colombiano/Alto Patía covering areas of the departments of Cauca and Nariño.

<sup>783</sup> Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

several initiatives are launched that are directly or indirectly related to the promotion of licit alternatives to coca cultivation.<sup>784</sup> The EU approach to alternative development is generally considered to be different from other (USAID) sponsored (alternative) development programmes by the fact that the latter normally stress *zero coca* as a precondition to start a project. In contrast, the EU model has normally no direct linkages to (forced) crop eradication, but does include connections between illicit coca cultivation, the conflict and opportunities for peace building through local government organisations and civil society.

Since their inception, both the PFGB and PPP programmes of the Colombian government have received international support. However, around 90 percent of the funding for PFGB comes from the Colombian government, while the PPP is much more internationally-driven, through funding from USAID.<sup>785</sup> The lack of international funding for the PFGB programme can perhaps be explained by the fact that this programme is based on direct subsidies to farmers, which may be perceived internationally as a less sustainable or attractive option to sponsor.<sup>786</sup>

The main international donors for the Colombian government programmes of PFGB, PPP and the so-called *Grupos Móviles de Eradicación* (Mobile Eradication Units) were USAID, UNODC, the Autonomous Community of Madrid (CAM) and the Netherlands.<sup>787</sup> Together, they funded approximately half of the above-mentioned programmes during the period 2003-2008: 1 trillion COP (534 million USD or almost 400 million EUR).<sup>788</sup>

While the Colombian government often uses UNODC as an operator of financial and technical resources at the local level, USAID uses a wide range of operators and programmes at this level, including the international development company Chemonics, the private non-profit organisation ACDI-VOCA, the private foundation FUPAD, and the Tetra Tech company, which ran two programmes: 1) the *Áreas de Desarrollo Alternativo*

<sup>784</sup> For example, for the first Peace Laboratory, projects relating to food security, changing ethical attitudes of farmers, improving roads and local governance were implemented. In most cases, the linkages with promoting alternative livelihoods were only indirect. See: Anders Rudqvist and Fred van Sluys, *Informe Final de Evaluación de Medio Término Laboratorio de Paz del Magdalena Medio* (February 2005).

<sup>785</sup> Personal interviews, Guillermo García Miranda, Programme Director, UNODC in Bogotá (23 August 2010); *Executive Report. The National Meeting on the Presidential Program on Illicit crops (PCI)*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6 and 38. The main (international) partners for the PPP programme are almost all USAID operators or programmes: MIDAS, ADAM and FUPAD.

<sup>786</sup> Personal interviews, Juan Diego Cely Barrera, Presidential Program against Illicit Crops (PCI), Acción Social, Bogotá, Colombia (9 December 2011).

<sup>787</sup> *Executive Report. The National Meeting on the Presidential Program on Illicit crops (PCI)*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>788</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

*Municipal* (ADAM, Areas for Municipal Level Alternative Development) programme, and 2) the *Más Inversión Para el Desarrollo Alternativo Sostenible* (MIDAS, More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development). The latter two programmes have been at the heart of USAID's support for alternative development under Plan Colombia.

The ADAM programme consisted of a 184 million USD (140 million EUR) contract under Plan Colombia between October 2005 and September 2010, which worked with 73 municipalities and 1,400 local organisations to promote economic development.<sup>789</sup> ADAM worked directly with these local organisations in eleven departments of Colombia on the promotion of economic (rural) development and infrastructure projects. The focus of the programme was on agricultural production, the marketing of agricultural produce, the strengthening of local governance and the building of infrastructure to accompany social and agricultural development processes.<sup>790</sup> The programme operated on the condition that all beneficiary communities sign an agreement to keep their areas coca free.<sup>791</sup> It is claimed that the programme resulted in more than one million hectares of land being kept free of illicit coca cultivation, focusing in particular on the production of coffee, cocoa, rubber and livestock.<sup>792</sup>

The second programme, MIDAS (2005-2011), complemented the ADAM programme, focusing on vulnerable populations, agricultural and agro-forestry production and promoting investments from the private sector.<sup>793</sup> Again, the basis of cooperation with the local communities lay in their prior commitment to *zero coca*, through the signing of a 'Zero Coca Protocol'.<sup>794</sup> The MIDAS programme benefited at least 287,812 families.<sup>795</sup> It offered beneficiaries a broad range of assistance focusing on the promotion of access to technical assistance, markets and private investment.<sup>796</sup>

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<sup>789</sup> Tetra Tech, 'Colombia: Areas For Municipal Level Alternative Development Program (ADAM)' (no date), Website of Tetra Tech, implementing organization of the ADAM programme. Available online at: [http://www.tetrattechintdev.com/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&id=150%3Acolombia-areas-for-municipal-level-alternative-development-program-adam&Itemid=60&lang=us](http://www.tetrattechintdev.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=150%3Acolombia-areas-for-municipal-level-alternative-development-program-adam&Itemid=60&lang=us) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>790</sup> Tetra Tech, 'USAID Colombia - More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS)', Website of Tetra Tech. Available online at: <http://www.tetrattech.com/es/projects/usaaid-colombia-more-investment-for-sustainable-alternative-development-midas.html> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>791</sup> 'Colombia: Areas For Municipal Level Alternative Development Program (ADAM)', *op. cit.*

<sup>792</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>793</sup> 'USAID Colombia - More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS)', *op. cit.*

<sup>794</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>795</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>796</sup> USAID and ARD, *Más Inversión para el Desarrollo Alternativo Sostenible. Work Plan 2009-2010* (Washington: USAID, 2009), p. 8.

MIDAS focused in particular on the sustainability of agricultural and agro-forestry production, for example, through the promotion of agro-industry, encouraging linkages with the private sector and the certification of agricultural produce. One example of certification is the connection made between the MIDAS beneficiary organisation INDUPALMA and the Rainforest Alliance concerning the certification of palm oil production.<sup>797</sup> In addition to palm oil, the most important agricultural activities supported by MIDAS were cocoa, coffee, rubber, beekeeping, livestock and artisan fishery.<sup>798</sup> In 2009, cocoa production had by far the biggest share, followed by palm oil and speciality coffee.<sup>799</sup>

Last, US support has also had a focus on sustainable forestry, for example through the Commercial Forestry Component, which focuses on both reforestation and the conservation and sustainable management of existing forests.<sup>800</sup> Communities involved in the conservation of forests receive compensation through the delivery of food aid and the promotion of silvopasture (combining animal husbandry with agro-forestry production).<sup>801</sup>

Since 2007, the Netherlands has supported the implementation of the pilot project of territorial consolidation in La Macarena.<sup>802</sup> Although the Dutch support for the current strategy of PNCRT will mostly stop at the end of 2014, it is one of the few examples of non-American bilateral assistance to processes of alternative development. This support will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 11 with regard to the department of Meta.

Based on the concept of shared responsibility, the United States has also supported the pilot project of PCIM since 2007, but the strategy has been chiefly branded as a Colombian-led endeavour, mainly because of the negative connotations of necessary international support for a national territorial consolidation strategy (the perception of “*El estado no es capaz*”, the state is not capable of implementing this on its own).<sup>803</sup> Last, Germany has also supported part of the new strategy, but with a different focus from that of the US and the Netherlands.<sup>804</sup>

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<sup>797</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>798</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 18.

<sup>799</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>800</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>801</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>802</sup> Personal interviews, Berber van de Woude, Second Secretary of the Netherlands Embassy to Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

<sup>803</sup> Personal interviews, Álvaro Balcázar, Former Director, Unidad Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

<sup>804</sup> *Ibid.*

### 9.2.2 International market access

International support for alternative development can also take the form of providing access to international markets. In Chapter 8 this was identified as a principle, norm and rule of RISE. It represents a more indirect way of helping Colombia's processes of alternative production. Through the Andean Strategy, the US first tried to improve the access of Andean former coca growers to US markets. William Marcy writes:

*“By opening up new markets and supporting crop substitution, the Andean Initiative, through the ATPA [Andean Trade Preference Act], was expected to generate economic alternatives that would give Andean campesinos viable alternatives to narcotics cultivation. However, liberalization did not benefit the Andean coca growers because they had few markets for their alternative crops.”*<sup>805</sup>

The Andean Trade Preference Act provided duty-free access to the US market to a wide range of export products from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The Act was amended in October 2002 by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which expired in February 2011, but was (for the moment) extended until July 31, 2013.<sup>806</sup> Both acts were deficient because they were targeting countries with illicit drug production but were not directly related to alternative development produce.<sup>807</sup> In fact, many of the goods produced by Andean farmers were not even included in the acts.<sup>808</sup> In any case, the impact and usefulness of another specific drugs-related preferential trade agreement would have to be reassessed following the new United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, a bilateral free trade agreement with far-reaching consequences for tariffs on goods and services that entered into effect on May 15, 2012.

From 1991 onwards, the four countries of the Andean Community (CAN, consisting of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) also benefited from a special regime of preferential tariffs of the European Union, a trade agreement known as the Generalised Scheme of Tariff

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<sup>805</sup> *The Politics of Cocaine. How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Industry in Central and South America, op. cit.*, p. 242.

<sup>806</sup> At the time of concluding the research in August 2013 it was still unclear whether the ATPDEA would be renewed again.

<sup>807</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>808</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.



Preferences (GSP).<sup>809</sup> This regime was intended to exist for a limited period of time, but was revised and renewed in 2005<sup>810</sup> for the period 2006-2015. Through the application of either the principle of ‘most favoured nation’ (equal trade advantages) or GSP tariff rates, many Colombian exports are exempted from custom duties.<sup>811</sup>

While it provides illicit drug producing countries with access to Europe’s internal market for a range of agricultural and industrial products, the trade support is generally not directly related to alternative development or the (potential) export of alternative development produce (similar to the ATPA and ATPDEA). In other words, it is the embodiment of shared responsibility, but does not directly support alternative development programmes. However, the EU does consider Colombian coffee as an alternative development product and it does benefit from the preferential trade agreement.<sup>812</sup> Around 10 percent of all Colombian coffee is generated by alternative development programmes.<sup>813</sup> Similar to the bilateral trade relationship with the US, Colombia and the European Union recently agreed on a free trade agreement that entered into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August, 2013. This could perhaps make the GSP system in its current form redundant.

In general, alternative development in Colombia seems to benefit from very few connections with international markets. With some exceptions, projects do not tend to integrate strategies to scale up production to reach international buyers.<sup>814</sup> There appears to be a general misconception (perhaps in some cases even turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy) that alternative development projects cannot produce high quality products.<sup>815</sup> Although challenges of quality exist, part of the problem is the lack of agro-industry to add economic value and produce end products for customers abroad.<sup>816</sup> At present, most project beneficiaries of alternative development in Colombia do not have the necessary machines, tools or installations that would permit the processing of raw materials.<sup>817</sup> However, some

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<sup>809</sup> See the website of the Andean Community at: <http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/Exterior/europe.htm> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>810</sup> The preferential trade agreement was changed in 2005 after a ruling of the World Trade Organization (WTO), following official complaints by India that led to a legal case that took place between 2002 and 2005. For a summary of the case, see: WTO, ‘European Communities — Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries’, *Dispute Settlement, Dispute DS246* (20 July 2005).

<sup>811</sup> European Union, *Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>812</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>813</sup> Personal interviews, Guillermo García Miranda, Programme Director, UNODC in Bogotá (23 August 2010).

<sup>814</sup> Personal interviews, Carlos Zorro Sánchez, Professor of Economics and alternative development expert, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia (13 January 2012).

<sup>815</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>816</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>817</sup> ‘Política Nacional de Eradicación Manual de Cultivos Ilícitos y Desarrollo Alternativo para la Consolidación Territorial’, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

alternative development projects have been able to benefit from Fairtrade certification, for example, through international labelling organisations such as FLO International and Max Havelaar.<sup>818</sup> In the next three chapters, this marketing opportunity will be further explored.

At the national level, there are some linkages with (international) supermarket chains such as Éxito and Carrefour, and companies such as Nestlé.<sup>819</sup> But despite existing international linkages, the PPP programme does include a strategy to try and reach out to niche markets for Fairtrade or organic products.<sup>820</sup> In the next three chapters, the research will examine more closely the access to international and niche markets for projects in the three regions visited as part of the field research.

### 9.3 Main drivers behind international cooperation

International support in Colombia can be said to be channelled principally into four broad areas: 1) forests and the environment; 2) peace and conflict-related issues; 3) institution building and governance; and 4) rural and alternative development.<sup>821</sup> Between 2004 and 2006, the majority of support was focused on forced displacement and assistance (34.28 percent), and (alternative) agricultural development (30.79 percent). Concerning the latter, it has been suggested that the US also has some commercial interests, for example, with regard to the coffee industry, but no information has been found to firmly establish this as a driver behind US support.<sup>822</sup> In general, many alternative development products seem unfit for export, which means a commercial interest link is difficult to establish.

For the United States, a clear driver behind its support for Colombia's counter-narcotics strategy is its aim to reduce the supply of drugs reaching US markets. The clearest examples are the support of USAID through the programmes of ADAM and MIDAS, which both had the condition of *zero coca*, and directly contributed to alternative development projects at the local level.

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<sup>818</sup> 'Coca, cocaine, propiedad de la tierra, desarrollo agrícola y desarrollo alternativo', *op. cit.*, p. 136.

<sup>819</sup> *Ibid.* See also: 'Coca, cocaine, propiedad de la tierra, desarrollo agrícola y desarrollo alternativo', *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>820</sup> 'Políticas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia (1982-2009)', *op. cit.*, p. 105.

<sup>821</sup> Colombia, Acción Social, Dirección de Cooperación Internacional, *Informe de Gestión 2002-2006* (Bogotá: Acción Social, 2006), p. 6.

<sup>822</sup> Personal interviews, Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo, Asesor Dirección de Programas contra Cultivos Ilícitos (DPCI), Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

However, US support is also explained by geo-political and economic interests in the region.<sup>823</sup> The US has important military bases in the country<sup>824</sup> and deems it important to have a military presence in Colombia to protect its commercial interests (for example, the American oil companies operating in Colombia or the oil pipeline Caño Limón-Coveñas, running from the north-east of Colombia (bordering Venezuela) to the seaport on the Caribbean Sea).<sup>825</sup> In other words, the US is effectively protecting its economic security abroad. While the US military bases are officially used for support of counter-narcotics operations, using for example, Airborne Warning and Control Systems and reconnaissance aircraft in the fight against drug traffickers, they could also be used to control or intervene in other affairs.<sup>826</sup>

Economic security, in terms of the protection of natural resources, the environment and bio-diversity, can be said to be another important driver behind international cooperation in Colombia. Many countries and international organisations are already supporting Colombia on the issue of environmental protection, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States (through USAID), the European Commission, FAO, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank.<sup>827</sup> As such, support for the environment is much broader than support for alternative development.

President Santos is aware that emphasising the importance of the environment internationally could be part of re-branding the country (moving away from the stigma related to violence and illicit drugs). In a 2010 interview with the *Financial Times*, he said:

“(...) [W]e have what the world needs. We have energy, we have potential to increase food production, we have biodiversity (...) don’t forget, we are the richest bio rich country, per square kilometre, in terms of biodiversity, in the world. (...) We belong to the Amazon Basin. The Amazon Basin is the lung of the world (...)”<sup>828</sup>

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<sup>823</sup> *Geopolítica de las drogas*, op. cit., p. 102.

<sup>824</sup> See: Maurice Lemoine, ‘Basus belli en Colombie’, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (February 2010), p. 17.

<sup>825</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>826</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 104.

<sup>827</sup> European Commission, *Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013* (28 March 2007), p. 61.

<sup>828</sup> Interview with John Paul Rathbone, the *Financial Times*’ Latin America editor on July 6, 2010. Available online at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/40912456-89c6-11df-9ea6-00144feab49a.html#axzz2X9q7fyIH> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

The link between alternative development and the protection of the environment will be further explored in the next three chapters which document the field research.

In addition to illicit drugs and economic security, conflict is the third important driver behind international support for Colombia identified during this research. This support can be understood in the broadest sense, including efforts at peace building, strengthening of civil society, institution building, human rights and support for victims of the violence. Although the previous US support for Plan Colombia and current support for the PNCRT could also be seen in this light, it is the European Union in particular that has focused on this type of support, for example, through the three EU Peace Laboratories (see below for more detail).<sup>829</sup>

Although specific EU support can be associated with, for example, economic and social development, the overarching concerns of the EU are often with regard to respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.<sup>830</sup> These themes are not always directly related to the armed conflict, but can be linked, for example, to the discrimination or social exclusion of certain minorities such as the Afro-Colombian or indigenous communities.<sup>831</sup> In general, EU support for classic alternative development has been much weaker than the support provided by USAID. An important explanation for this is the concern among many EU countries of the negative side effects of aerial spraying and the strict condition of zero coca (thus prior crop eradication) that Colombia and the United States have applied since Plan Colombia.<sup>832</sup>

#### **9.4 Opportunities for RISE**

To explore what opportunities there are for an International Economic Security Regime to reinforce international support for and cooperation in alternative development strategies in Colombia, the following two sections will discuss the principle of shared responsibility, the first pillar of the RISE (section 9.4.1) and economic security, its second pillar (section 9.4.2).

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<sup>829</sup> ‘Desarrollo de las Relaciones de Cooperación entre Colombia y la Unión Europea para la Lucha contra el Tráfico de Drogas Ilícitas’, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

<sup>830</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 370.

<sup>831</sup> Pastor Murillo, *Tercer Laboratorio de Paz y la población afrocolombiana* (2010), pp. 8, 9.

<sup>832</sup> Personal interviews, Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo, Asesor Dirección de Programas contra Cultivos Ilícitos (DPCI), Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

### 9.4.1 Shared responsibility

Shared responsibility in drug control was first stressed by the Colombian government of Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978).<sup>833</sup> Since then, the shared responsibility of the global drugs phenomenon has been used by Colombian presidents as a way of drawing attention to the global character of both the problem and the solution, thus avoiding the stigmatisation for Colombia as a problematic country or the sole source of the problem.<sup>834</sup>

The United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) took place during the same year as the start of President Pastrana's government. This partly explains the emphasis President Pastrana placed on the importance of shared responsibility. Despite the substantial increase of illicit coca cultivation in the country between 1994 and 1998, Pastrana observed at the start of his term that there was not enough shared responsibility at the international level to deal with the problem:

*“Para colmo de males, a pesar del desmedido incremento en el cultivo y la producción de drogas, el país no contaba con el respaldo internacional necesario para combatir integralmente este problema. La ayuda norteamericana se restringía a las acciones de fumigación y no teníamos ningún apoyo de los gobiernos europeos en este tema.”*<sup>835</sup>

Pastrana explains that he promoted shared responsibility throughout his government as the basis for international cooperation and support for Colombia's counter-narcotics strategy:

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<sup>833</sup> *Desarrollo de las Relaciones de Cooperación entre Colombia y la Unión Europea para la Lucha contra el Tráfico de Drogas Ilícitas*, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

<sup>834</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 364.

<sup>835</sup> “To make matters worse, despite the excessive increase in drug cultivation and production, the country did not have the international support necessary to comprehensively combat this problem. The American support was restricted to the actions of fumigation and we did not receive any support from European governments in this matter.” *La Palabra bajo Fuego*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

*“Fundamos nuestros requerimientos de ayuda internacional en la Teoría de la Corresponsabilidad o Responsabilidad Compartida, que promovimos durante todo mi gobierno, la cual postula que la lucha contra las drogas ilícitas debe ser una responsabilidad global y no sólo de Colombia, un país que se ha jugado entero contra este delito y que es, además, su primera víctima (...).”*<sup>836</sup>

Despite the earlier international support for the *Programa Especial de Cooperación*, the start of Plan Colombia could be seen as the first or at least more robust form of shared responsibility in Colombia. Former president Álvaro Uribe writes:

*“(...) [S]e había puesto en marcha el Plan Colombia por parte de los presidentes Clinton y Pastrana. (...) Era el reconocimiento a la corresponsabilidad que deben asumir los países industrializados generadores de alta demanda de narcóticos.”*<sup>837</sup>

Although the shared responsibility within the framework of Plan Colombia was mainly limited to the United States, the European Union also stepped up assistance during this period to support the ongoing Caguán peace process that started in 1999 under President Pastrana. The main programme supported and implemented by the European Union was the Peace Laboratory, which began in the region of Magdalena Medio in 2002 as a way to support the Colombian government's efforts towards peace and stability.<sup>838</sup>

Drugs-related EU support for Colombia had begun in the 1990s. In 1995, the EU started a Specialized Dialogue on Drugs with the four CAN countries and in 1998 the EU-Latin America and Caribbean Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs was established.<sup>839</sup> Both cooperation mechanisms included shared responsibility as a driver for coordination and cooperation. Together, the Specialized Dialogue on Drugs and the EU-Latin American and Caribbean Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs have

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<sup>836</sup> “We based our needs in terms of international assistance on the Theory of Co-Responsibility or Shared Responsibility, which we promoted throughout my government, and which establishes that the fight against illicit drugs should be a global responsibility and not only of Colombia, a country that put everything on the line against this crime and that is, also, its first victim.” *La Palabra bajo Fuego, op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>837</sup> “Plan Colombia had been implemented by presidents Clinton and Pastrana. (...) It was the recognition of the shared responsibility industrialised countries have to assume which generate the high demand for narcotics.” *No hay causa perdida, op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>838</sup> Miguel Barreto Henriques, ‘Peace Laboratory of Magdalena Medio: “a peace laboratory”?’ , *Documentos de CERAC*, No. 6 (December 2007), pp. 4-6.

<sup>839</sup> See the website of the Andean Community at: <http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/Exterior/europe.htm> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

been considered embodiments of shared responsibility.<sup>840</sup> The European Commission stated that it was using the mechanism and action plan to “*assume its share of responsibility in this area*”, supporting alternative development projects in Colombia within the EU Drugs Strategy (2005-2012).<sup>841</sup>

In December 2010, the EU launched a new cooperative framework called the Cooperation Programme between Latin America and the European Union on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD), which aimed to consolidate the previous EU-Latin America and Caribbean Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs.<sup>842</sup> The project is completely funded by the European Union with a total budget of 6 million EUR (8 million USD).<sup>843</sup> One of its four components is related to capacity building in supply reduction, which includes a focus on alternative development.<sup>844</sup> The programme is presented as a ‘third way’ between the ‘War on Drugs’ and a strategy that would help people to simply live with drugs.<sup>845</sup> The programme aims to be non-doctrinal.<sup>846</sup>

The existing support from the EU for alternative development in Colombia does not mean that all 27 EU Member States financially commit to such programmes. Judging from the EU country strategy papers for Colombia, only the following countries had or have separate bilateral support projects in the country: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.<sup>847</sup> Excepting Germany,<sup>848</sup> Italy and the Netherlands (which have all run previous programmes), it is not clear which other EU countries directly support the approach of alternative development in Colombia. For example, Spain focuses principally on conflict and peace building while Sweden focuses on governance, human rights, peace and democracy.<sup>849</sup>

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<sup>840</sup> Juan Carlos Buitrago Arias, ‘La politique du gouvernement colombien contre le trafic de drogue’, in: INHES, ‘Drogues et antidroge en Colombie’. Production et Trafic Illicites, conflit armé, interventions étatiques’, *Les Cahiers de la Sécurité*, No. 59 (2005), p. 167.

<sup>841</sup> *Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>842</sup> See the information on COPOLAD on the European Commission’s EuropeAid website, available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/copolad/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/copolad/index_en.htm) (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>843</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>844</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>845</sup> Teresa Salvador Llivina, ‘Programa de cooperación entre América Latina y la Unión Europea en políticas de drogas’, *COPOLAD presentation at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs* (22 March 2011).

<sup>846</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>847</sup> See, for example, *Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>848</sup> In 2001, Germany (through GTZ) abandoned support for alternative development to focus especially on humanitarian aid and the protection of the environment. This decision was taken partly because of disagreement on the continued use of aerial spraying in the fight against illicit drug cultivation.

<sup>849</sup> Colombia, Acción Social, *Balance en Gestión de Cooperación Internacional para Colombia 2009* (no date), pp. 1, 2.

The Colombian Agency of International Cooperation only mentions Canada, UNODC and USAID as actors directly supporting alternative development and the European Commission, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Inter-American Development Bank as supporting the issue area of ‘drugs’ as of 2009.<sup>850</sup> In 2010, Acción Social (now DPS) stated that international support for their alternative development programmes was limited to the Netherlands, USAID, the *Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid*, UNODC and some smaller international organisations.<sup>851</sup> With an investment of 546.9 million USD (418.2 million EUR) by USAID between 2003 and 2009, the United States by far outweighs these other actors whose joint contribution to alternative development between 2004 and 2010 only amounted to about 9.2 million USD (around 7 million EUR).<sup>852</sup>

Despite the Colombian government’s repeated call for increased shared responsibility with regard to drug supply reduction, it becomes clear that at the national level very few countries seem to directly support alternative development. The next three chapters will examine whether this general pattern is confirmed through the case studies in three regions of Colombia.

#### 9.4.2 Economic security

For Colombia, the challenge of the illegal drugs economy is a matter of national security which requires international support to be resolved. President Santos states:

*“(...) [T]his has to be a multilateral approach. For us, fighting drug trafficking is a matter of national security. It’s the source of all the ills we have security-wise in this nation. So my policy is to fight drug trafficking in all the links in the chain – from the production and consumption of drugs to the assets of the drug traffickers. (...) But we have no alternative than to keep on fighting and to stimulate the whole world to fight this war with us. No one single country can win this war.”*<sup>853</sup>

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<sup>850</sup> *Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>851</sup> *Conpes 3669, op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>852</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>853</sup> Interview with John Paul Rathbone, the Financial Times’ Latin America editor on February 11, 2010. Available online at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/35144d52-3794-11e0-b91a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2X9q7fyIH> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).



Clearly portrayed as a national security concern, it is less clear to what extent this policy represents an issue area of economic security. Between about 1990 and 2010, international support in terms of economic security could be seen as primarily related to the more classic understanding of economic security (human development).<sup>854</sup> Under the *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2006-2010*, the strategy of alternative development was embedded in broader development and security efforts through the coordination of the *Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral* (CCAI). However, the focus of the CCAI-led strategy moved towards territorial consolidation from 2007 onwards, and led to the PNCRT in 2010. It is at this moment that international support for Colombia's counter-narcotics strategy can also be said to have partly moved towards the second definition of economic security (state control over territories, natural resources and markets).<sup>855</sup> For example, support from USAID shifts from Plan Colombia to support for the PNCRT in 2010.<sup>856</sup>

Partly related to this second understanding of economic security, the protection of the environment and natural resources is an integral part of the Colombian government strategy, especially in the PFGB programme, but also in the PPP programme, where each project includes a so-called *Plan de Manejo Ambiental* (Environmental Management Plan).<sup>857</sup>

A first example of economic security related to international support is the importance of (protecting) foreign investments in Colombia. Francisco Thoumi provides an example of why a country, in this case the United Kingdom, would invest in the development of Colombia:

*“The United Kingdom is also skeptical about the effectiveness of some antidrug policies, but its economic interests in Colombia are large and influence its policies toward the country. (...) BP (formerly British Petroleum) is one of the largest oil investors in Colombia. Its investments are located in guerrilla-controlled areas, where its oil pipeline is a continuous victim of terrorist bombings.”*<sup>858</sup>

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<sup>854</sup> Personal interviews, Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo, Asesor Dirección de Programas contra Cultivos Ilícitos (DPCI), Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013).

<sup>855</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>856</sup> Personal interviews, Adam Isacson, Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy, Washington Office on Latin America, WOLA (4 June 2013).

<sup>857</sup> UNODC and Acción Social, *Informe Ejecutivo sobre el Seguimiento a los Programas de Familias Guardabosques y Proyectos Productivos*. Monitoreo, Seguimiento y Evaluación al Desarrollo Alternativo en Colombia (Bogotá, UNODC and Acción Social, 2007), p. 25.

<sup>858</sup> *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

However, this commercial interest did not result in the UK directly supporting alternative development projects, although it did invest in strengthening governance and contributed to rural and mineral development.<sup>859</sup>

The support of the United States, particularly since Plan Colombia, can also be partly seen in light of economic security objectives. For example, following a classical leftist argument, the FARC believed that the US directly used Plan Colombia to protect its economic interests and assets in Colombia and Latin America at large, especially after it pulled out of Panama.<sup>860</sup> The same kind of economic security interests were also observed by Labrousse in the context of protection the American investments in the Colombian oil industry. However, it is difficult to prove that this was an important driver behind US support in addition to their focus on illicit drugs and Colombia's internal conflict.

One way to assess whether or not economic interests were driving US support for Plan Colombia would be to calculate the costs and benefits of the US intervention. However, such a complex calculation is not easy to make. In any case, it is difficult to see how an expenditure of at least 7 billion USD (5.3 billion EUR) can result in gains, other than in the form of (economic) benefits for what is called the US 'military-industrial complex' (including multimillion-dollar contracts for American companies such as DynCorp International, the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation or Bell Helicopter Textron) and possible spill-over effects for American oil companies investing in Colombia. Even if such indirect financial gains were equal to the total value of the investment made by the US government, there would not be an equal direct economic benefit for the government itself beyond tax income.

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<sup>859</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 342.

<sup>860</sup> *The Politics of Cocaine. How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America, op. cit.*, p. 234.





## CHAPTER 10: LA SIERRA NEVADA DE SANTA MARTA, MAGDALENA

This chapter presents and analyses the results of the field research in the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.<sup>861</sup>

### 10.1 The context of the illegal drugs economy

The Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, a mountain range that directly drops into the Caribbean Sea, is mainly located in the department of Magdalena<sup>862</sup>, but also passes through parts of the departments of La Guajira<sup>863</sup> and Cesar<sup>864</sup>. As discussed above, this is part of the area where illicit crop cultivation (cannabis) first appeared in Colombia in the mid 1970s.<sup>865</sup> The local conditions of social isolation and an economy based on subsistence farming suited the illicit drug industry well.<sup>866</sup> The geo-strategic location on the Caribbean coast and a long history of contraband further added to the region's comparative advantages.<sup>867</sup>

The arrival of cannabis and later coca from the 1980s onwards had a profound impact on the region. It resulted in irreparable ecological damage and forced the indigenous communities of the area to higher, less productive areas of the mountains.<sup>868</sup> Nevertheless, the industry was mainly driven by foreigners (e.g. Mexicans and Americans) who helped

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<sup>861</sup> The field research in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta consisted of several visits by the author to alternative development projects in May 2013. A broad range of programmes and projects were discussed in meetings with project staff and beneficiaries. The main projects visited in the region were cocoa and eco-tourism projects in San Rafael, alternative development projects in the municipality of Sitionuevo (including the traditional stilt houses (*palafitos*) in Buena Vista and Nueva Venecia), and several projects of associations belonging to the *Red de Productores Ecológicos de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta* (Red Ecolsierra). The Red Ecolsierra promotes rural development, ecological agriculture, and the interests of farmers in the department of Magdalena through local farmer associations.

<sup>862</sup> Around 1.2 million inhabitants.

<sup>863</sup> Around 900,000 inhabitants.

<sup>864</sup> Around 1 million inhabitants.

<sup>865</sup> The cannabis boom in the region, however, was short-lived, and the industry declined in the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta from 1978 onwards, not only because of external market-related factors, but also due to intense aerial spraying campaigns in the area, which displaced the crop (again an example of the balloon effect) to the department of Cauca. See: *Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes*, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>866</sup> *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>867</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>868</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

farmers to grow cannabis.<sup>869</sup> With the arrival of coca came the violent groups of drug traffickers and the drug money that corrupted local authorities and destroyed many cultural assets.<sup>870</sup> It also both attracted and fuelled the violent struggle between leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups in the area.<sup>871</sup> Essentially, what began in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta later became a pattern that occurred in most of the rest of the country. Former president, Ernesto Samper Pizano writes:

*“La triste historia de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta se podría tomar como una muestra fiel de lo que más tarde le ocurriría a todo el país, enfrentado al desafío formidable e imposible de hacerse cargo del combate mundial contra las drogas.”*<sup>872</sup>

The department of Magdalena now has very little illicit coca cultivation. In 2011 only 46 hectares of cultivation were found.<sup>873</sup> In 2012 illicit cultivation further decreased by 19 percent to 37 hectares.<sup>874</sup> Neighbouring La Guajira, the other department that contains a substantial part of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, has even less coca cultivation, with only sixteen hectares of coca cultivation in 2011 and ten hectares in 2012.<sup>875</sup> In recent years, both regions together have never had more than 1,300 hectares of coca crops (a maximum that was reached in 2004) and since 2009 there has been a trend towards further decrease.<sup>876</sup> The department of Magdalena is also one of the coca growing areas where very little aerial spraying of illicit crops has taken place. Fumigation only took place in 2004 (1,632 hectares) and 2005 (383 hectares).<sup>877</sup>

Nevertheless, some coca cultivation persists in the lower areas of the mountains and on the Caribbean coast.<sup>878</sup> Besides, the area is of special importance to the Colombian government because it is a very important tourist destination and a rich ecological reserve, incorporating two significant national parks (*Parques Nacionales Naturales de Tayrona* and

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<sup>869</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).

<sup>870</sup> *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización, op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>871</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>872</sup> “The sad history of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta can be taken as a reflection of what later would happen to all the country, confronted with the enormous and impossible challenge of dealing with the global fight against drugs.” *Drogas. Prohibición o legalización, op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>873</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>874</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>875</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>876</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009, op. cit.*, p. 35; UNODC, *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011* (Bogotá 2012), p. 10.

<sup>877</sup> *Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region. A survey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, op. cit.*, p. 102.

<sup>878</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009, op. cit.*, p. 35.

*Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta*) with a particularly rich biodiversity.<sup>879</sup> In addition, four indigenous tribes live in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (the Kogui, Arhuacos, Wiwas and Kankuamos), which provides another incentive to protect the area and its natural resources. They live in reservations called *Resguardos Indígenas*,<sup>880</sup> which are also not immune to illicit coca cultivation. They accounted for a total of 27 hectares of illicit coca cultivation in 2011.<sup>881</sup>

The Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta is one of the areas where the national parks and illicit coca cultivation coincide. However, in recent years, the total amount of illicit cultivation within the park has decreased (44 percent in 2009 and a further 78 percent reduction in 2011)<sup>882</sup>. In 2011 an estimated nine hectares of coca were found inside the national parks.<sup>883</sup> For 2012 only five hectares were reported.<sup>884</sup> Despite the declining trend, this indicates that in general the protective status granted to these national parks has not been able to fully contain the spread of illicit coca cultivation inside them.

To address the problem of illicit coca cultivation in the region, several alternative development programmes and initiatives have been started over the years, combined with (and normally conditioned on) the manual eradication of coca crops. In 2011, manual eradication was reported to amount to 286 hectares in Magdalena and 64 hectares in La Guajira.<sup>885</sup> In 2012, these numbers came down significantly to ten and fifteen hectares respectively.<sup>886</sup>

Of the three regions visited, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta is currently by far the most secure region. Colombia's military forces confirmed earlier this year that there is currently no presence of FARC or ELN in the area.<sup>887</sup> That also explains why the region is not among the priority areas (*zonas de consolidación*) of the national strategy of territorial consolidation. However, throughout the department of Magdalena, criminal gangs (*bandas criminales* or *bacrim*) such as los Urabeños and los GiralDOS are competing for control over

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<sup>879</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>880</sup> The total population of indigenous communities in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta may be around 26,500 but no recent data was found to confirm this. For the department of Magdalena, the INCODER projected estimate for 2011 is 8,421.

<sup>881</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>882</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009, op. cit.*, p. 35; *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>883</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>884</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 37

<sup>885</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>886</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>887</sup> 'La Sierra Nevada, sin presencia guerrillera': Ejército', *El Universal* (12 March 2013).

the drugs trade.<sup>888</sup> Overall, the region has traditionally been of strategic importance in terms of illicit drug cultivation, trafficking and presence of FAML.<sup>889</sup>

## 10.2 Overview of alternative development programmes

The Colombian Presidential Programme against Illicit Crops (PCI) began working on alternative development in the region in 2004. One of the biggest changes that took place around that time was that for the first time, the government provided cash to farmers as an incentive for them to shift away from illicit coca cultivation. Every two months, farmers received cash as an encouragement to convert to licit production in different sectors: agriculture (especially coffee and cocoa) and tourism.

However, at present, support is intended to be temporary. The past presence of (and the rural community's dependence on) illicit coca cultivation does not provide the local farmers with a guaranteed subsidised income.<sup>890</sup> The government only provides farmers with initial support (e.g. livestock, plant material, tools, technical assistance and accountancy help) but then the aim is that they use those assets wisely to slowly start making a living in the legal economy.<sup>891</sup> This unfortunately does not always occur. For example, on occasions livestock or tools provided to farmers by the government have been sold rather than used to create legal sources of income.

Although alternative development programmes have purportedly contributed to the significant structural decrease of illicit coca cultivation in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, there is still a strategy of containment in place preventing the (re)planting of coca crops in the region. In other words, there is still a need to focus on (preventive) alternative livelihood programmes despite the fact that illicit coca cultivation has been at structurally low levels for a number of years.

Some of the alternative development programmes in the region currently take place in partnership with the Red Ecolsierra with support of the Colombian government. A beneficiary of the project in the *vereda* (small village or rural district according to the territorial division of the Colombian state) of La Esmeralda explains that they first received

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<sup>888</sup> 'Guerra entre 'bacrim' tiene sitiada a Guachaca, Magdalena', *El Tiempo* (25 December 2012).

<sup>889</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).

<sup>890</sup> Farmers were able to make a living in this area before illicit coca cultivation arrived, and large gains were not made from coca.

<sup>891</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).



support from the Forest Warden Families Programme (2004-2007)<sup>892</sup> and later shifted towards support within the framework of Red Ecolsierra.<sup>893</sup> The support began as a clear alternative development project with the objective of reducing illicit drug cultivation. Under the Red Ecolsierra programme, the focus continued to be on promoting and building local associations. In 2010 this process resulted in the creation of the association *Guardabosques de la Sierra* (Forest Wardens of the Mountains), which continues to receive state support. The programme has evolved and farmers are now associated in smaller groups (in this case 150 families), rather than being automatically associated under the Forest Warden Families Programme (up to around 1,800 families) as they were before.

Between 2007 and 2010, 1,700 families in 30 *veredas* in the region were supported through alternative development, with funding amounting to 19 billion COP (around 7.8 million EUR; 10 million USD).<sup>894</sup> In the area surrounding La Esmeralda, the focus has been mainly on cocoa as the principle cash crop, although the aim has also been to focus on some crop diversification, for example food crops (*pan coger*) such as avocados and plantain, and small livestock (*especies menores*).<sup>895</sup>

As such, a concurrent objective has also been to increase food security; a significant challenge as in the past illicit coca cultivation replaced many food crops. In addition to the production of cocoa, project beneficiaries have also noted the development of a culture of saving (financial) resources, stronger local institutions (the association) and stronger social cohesion (project associates now know the others and their neighbours). For participating families these projects also provide product-related training, accountancy skills and training on water and waste management. One intangible benefit is that farmers feel they are receiving recognition and support from the state institutions. According to project beneficiaries, what is still needed is more support in terms of infrastructure (e.g. a bridge over the river), more investment in local healthcare and more technical assistance (e.g. to fight the plant diseases that affect the fragile cocoa trees).<sup>896</sup>

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<sup>892</sup> The discontinuity is locally mainly explained by a political factor: the end of the first government of President Uribe. A general opinion was found throughout the field research that each government starts its own new projects with new project titles.

<sup>893</sup> Personal interviews, beneficiaries Red Ecolsierra, association Guardabosques de la Sierra, Vereda La Esmeralda (6 May 2013).

<sup>894</sup> Colombia, Acción Social, 'Familias Guardabosques de la Sierra Nevada reciben créditos por más de 273 millones de pesos', news release (14 May 2010).

<sup>895</sup> Personal interviews, beneficiaries Red Ecolsierra, association Guardabosques de la Sierra, Vereda La Esmeralda (6 May 2013).

<sup>896</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, association Guardabosques de la Sierra, Trompito Alto (6 May 2013). This price support is guaranteed until December 2013.

As part of the selection criteria, project beneficiaries must be small farmers, having between one and a half and two hectares of cocoa. However, to enable sustainable production, they would need around four hectares, which means they are currently dependent on state support to break even in cocoa production and make a modest living. A further increase of hectares of cocoa cultivation in the region is considered to be only one of the solutions. Another important solution is increasing productivity, currently relatively low because of a lack of resources, skills or technical support. In Ecuador, farmers produce between 1,500 and 2,000 kilos per hectare per year, while in the region of Santa Marta they only produce approximately 600 kilos – approximately a third of that.

The productivity in La Esmeralda is currently at about 50 percent of its potential because most of the cocoa trees are new. The locally produced cocoa is purchased entirely by the *Compañía Nacional de Chocolates* with which the local association has a ten year commercial contract. At present, the current volume of production does not allow the association to look for other buyers, but in two years they believe they will have the additional capacity to look for markets elsewhere. Alternatively, they could also sell much more to the current buyer as there is sufficient domestic market demand. In exchange for the cocoa, the *Compañía Nacional de Chocolates* supports the community in the area of education (e.g. books, notebooks and school bags). Indirectly, the alliance with the well respected company is expected to give the association credibility *vis-à-vis* other potential buyers in the future.

At the national level, Colombia currently imports cocoa to meet domestic demand. The average deficit of cocoa beans between 2008 and 2012 was 6,070 tonnes.<sup>897</sup> Between January and September 2012, the principal cocoa supplier countries were Ecuador (82 percent) and Peru (16 percent), with both import relations falling under the preferential tariffs of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN).<sup>898</sup> At the same time, in 2011 Colombia exported 45 percent of chocolate and chocolate preparations of the total volume required by Ecuador.<sup>899</sup> The paradoxical situation of importing cocoa beans despite domestic production (and exporting end products to the countries where the beans are imported from) is partly brought about by a lack of local supply (for example caused by low productivity or low volumes), but also because other producers such as Ecuador produce cocoa more cheaply.

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<sup>897</sup> Colombia, Departamento de Agricultura, *Perspectivas del Mercado Internacional de Cacao* (November 2012), p. 3.

<sup>898</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>899</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

To further improve local income, become more competitive and explore marketing potential beyond the current market, the association of *Guardabosques de la Sierra* is currently aiming to gain certification of organic production to add value to the product. The association is able to save some funds for marketing purposes, but requires additional support to complete the complex certification process. The organic product certification process requires a fairly significant financial investment and can take up to three years to complete (training, visits to the field, control, audits and the fees of the international certification agencies). These costs cannot be paid by the farmers of the association, which means they need the government or some (international) institutions to cover the costs associated with this process, justifying this support with the need to protect the eco-systems of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.

Even taking into account fluctuating (and possibly low) buying prices for organic production, the benefits of certification would still be twofold: more training and resources for the families, and cleaner production for the environment. The indigenous communities in the area could also benefit from organic certification. In fact, given that they do not use chemicals, these communities would almost immediately qualify for certification, but currently sell their cocoa to the local association, receiving the regular price.

Currently, cocoa farmers in the region benefit from *Alianzas Productivas*, a government supported strategy to link small farmers with (new) markets.<sup>900</sup> At present, however, the price of cocoa in the area is below the level of sustainability, which means the government currently provides price support (through the Ministry of Agriculture) of 800 COP per kilogramme (0.33 EUR or 0.42 USD).<sup>901</sup> For the moment, this gives a total price of 3,800 COP per kilogramme (1.56 EUR or 2 USD).<sup>902</sup> In comparison, as of the week of the 14-18 of May 2013, the *Compañía Nacional de Chocolates* nationally paid between 3,950 and 4,000 COP per kilo of cocoa bean, while *Casa Luker* paid between 3,750 and 3,900 per

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<sup>900</sup> Personal interviews, representative UACT, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (6 May 2013).

<sup>901</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, association Guardabosques de la Sierra, Trompito Alto (6 May 2013). After a national strike of cocoa farmers, the government decided in March 2013 to double the subsidy all farmers receive from 400 to 800 COP per kilogramme of cocoa produced. In the department of Santander, where around fifty percent of Colombia's cocoa is produced, farmers now even receive a total subsidy of 1,200 COP per kilogramme due to an additional 400 COP provided by the departmental government. This price support is guaranteed until December 31, 2013. See: 'Se levantan el paro de Cacaoteros', *El Universal* (4 March 2013). See also: Colombia, Departamento de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, '¡Levantado paro cacaotero!', news release (5 March 2013).

<sup>902</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, association Guardabosques de la Sierra, Trompito Alto (6 May 2013).

kilo.<sup>903</sup> Of the price the farmer receives, 100 COP per kilogramme goes to the local association, and is mainly used for administrative purposes and savings for (future) marketing needs.

Since 2003 there have been initiatives in place in Santa Marta to use Fairtrade branding to add value to alternative development products. However, in concrete terms, this is for the moment mostly limited to coffee, which has been very successful in achieving international certification of Fairtrade and organic production. The lack of a strong national cocoa federation is generally seen as being responsible for the limited incentives at the local level to promote organic or Fairtrade cocoa production.<sup>904</sup> Nevertheless, in the region there are examples of successful Fairtrade banana and cocoa production such as ASOPROBAN, the *Asociación de Parceleros y Pequeños Productores de Banano*, in the department of Magdalena exporting to the European free trade market. ASOPROBAN is supported by the Dutch Fairtrade certification organisation, the Max Havelaar Foundation.

Launched officially in 2002, the Red Ecolsierra is currently working with 22 associated groups in four municipalities (Ciénaga,<sup>905</sup> Fundación,<sup>906</sup> Aracataca<sup>907</sup> and Santa Marta<sup>908</sup>).<sup>909</sup> Their flagship product is organic coffee, but they are also working with honey and cocoa producers. Between four and five hundred families currently benefit from the organic certification of coffee production through the Red Ecolsierra programme. Certification was achieved through Fairtrade International (FLO), USDA Organic and a number of other organic certifying agencies. The certification process was supported by the government (beginning in 2005 through the PFGB programme) and the *Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia* (FNC). Government support has also been provided to establish a coffee quality testing lab located in Santa Marta.

Among the reasons to support the coffee and cocoa farmers of the Sierra Nevada is the need to continue to provide access to alternatives to illicit coca cultivation. The government aims to promote these alternatives by strengthening local production associations and supporting initiatives of added (economic) value such as organic or

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<sup>903</sup> Data taken from the website of the Federación Nacional de Cacaoteros at: <http://www.fedecacao.com.co> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>904</sup> Personal interviews, beneficiaries Red Ecolsierra, association Guardabosques de la Sierra, Vereda La Esmeralda (6 May 2013); Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

<sup>905</sup> Around 111,000 inhabitants.

<sup>906</sup> Around 82,000 inhabitants.

<sup>907</sup> Around 36,000 inhabitants.

<sup>908</sup> Around 455,000 inhabitants.

<sup>909</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

Fairtrade certification. The rationale behind government support is highlighted by a representative of the Red Ecolsierra:

*“La [razón] más fuerte de todas es obteniendo un valor agregado a través del comercio justo, [a través de] de la prima. Si no existiera este comercio justo, pues, creo que no hubiese café en la Sierra.”*<sup>910</sup>

If added economic value cannot be guaranteed, the door to illicit coca cultivation could be opened once again. While coca can essentially be grown right across the Sierra Nevada, the sustainability of alternatives partly depends on the altitude of production. Coffee is particularly important in the higher (colder) areas of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. In lower areas, the cultivation of other crops such as banana and African palm trees is possible. For the intermediate, temperate zones, cacao production is feasible and is slowly being developed and expanded in those areas.

Improvements to the infrastructure are still needed locally to further strengthen production (both at the farm level and in terms of the road network). These improvements would bring down the costs of production, although these will in all probability still be higher than for coffee production elsewhere. Certification through international Fairtrade or organic agencies is only part of the solution. In the end it is the quality of the coffee beans that will determine their marketing potential. In this regard, the organic coffee of the region has already been successful. Starbucks has already purchased two containers of organic coffee through the promotion of the region’s produce at a national congress sponsored by the United Nations. Other promotional activities, related to the local coffee and honey, have also been taking place.

In the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, alternative development also has a strong focus on eco-tourism. There are *posadas* (wooden cabins or lodges) in six *veredas* in the area (including Las Tinajas, Calabazo Sur, Nuevo México, San Rafael and los Naranjos). One project beneficiary who has two cabins explains that eco-tourism is a complementary source of income.<sup>911</sup> Despite having agricultural production as a source of income, (in this case mainly sugar cane production), it is often the case that the head of the family must from

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<sup>910</sup> “The most important [reason] is obtaining the added value [through] fair trade, through the premium. If fair trade did not exist, then I think coffee would not be growing in the Sierra.” Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

<sup>911</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, eco-tourism, Los Naranjos (6 May 2013).

time to time work as a land labourer on other farms. That means the government support is perhaps not sufficient to create sustainable livelihood but at least provides a complementary income. In this case, the government organised the help of architects and provided construction materials and labour to construct the cabins in about four weeks time each. After that, the government support stopped.

The guest register book shows many international visitors from all around the world, but the main downside to the scheme is that the tourism sector is cyclical. At the time of the field research, all of the eco-tourism lodges were vacant. Nevertheless, the main asset of this region is the combination of the sea (beaches), the national parks such as *Parque Tayrona* and the proximity of the popular tourist destination of Santa Marta.

The location on the Caribbean coast also means that alternative development programmes focus on artisanal fisheries, fish farms and related activities.<sup>912</sup> Although in these areas there is no direct connection with the prevention of illegal coca cultivation, the rationale behind the implementation of (alternative) development projects in the coastal area is twofold: these communities have been victims of the armed conflict and they are located on strategic trafficking routes (the corridor that runs from the mountains of the Sierra Nevada through the marshlands of the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta towards the Caribbean Sea) which in some cases has meant that they were forced to help or work for drug traffickers or paramilitary forces.<sup>913</sup> In other words, there is no risk that these fishermen will become coca farmers, but preventive alternative development strategies aim to avoid them being recruited by trafficking or armed groups.

Their skills (knowledge of the area and water, and ability to transport goods) can be very attractive to such groups. A major strategic concern is also the trafficking of precursor materials necessary for the production of coca paste and cocaine.<sup>914</sup> Some of the violence (and massacres<sup>915</sup>) that have occurred in the region concerned local people who (often under pressure) had started to work for some of the trafficking or armed paramilitary groups.

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<sup>912</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, fisheries, Corregimiento Tasajeras, Pueblo Viejo (7 May 2013).

<sup>913</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UNODC (7 May 2013); Personal interviews, representative, UACT, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).

<sup>914</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).

<sup>915</sup> After some first violence in February 2000 (paramilitary forces killing four fishermen), the biggest massacre in the region took place on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November that year in the village of Nueva Venecia, killing around 39 people. This led to the displacement of more than half of the population and the partial dismantling of the village. The violence was the result of a conflict between the AUC and ELN in the area. The AUC accused local fishermen of collaborating with the ELN.

In Tasajera,<sup>916</sup> 34 fishermen (men and women) are associated within the Forest Warden Families Programme.<sup>917</sup> The market for the fish is local (Tasajera), but the ambition is to take it in the future to the regional fish markets of Baranquilla<sup>918</sup> and Santa Marta. Prices are higher there because of significantly higher demands. The next priority is to establish a local collection centre, to enable the group to demand higher prices by negotiating higher prices for higher volumes with the traders. For that, however, they need supplementary financial support. Thus far, they have only organised one local farmers market to promote and market their products.

Part of the support for the project comes in the form of technical assistance, for example through training provided by SENA (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje), a public institution that provides a very broad range of (free) technical training courses in Colombia, and has often been linked to alternative development projects. The programme has technical, social and environment components. Socially, it also fosters sustainability of production and a culture of legality (for example by emphasising the importance of not fishing young fish or fishing illegally). Some of the spill-over effects for the community are joint cleaning campaigns (of both the water and the streets in the village), cultural events and sports (football).

In the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta, several projects falling under the PFGB programme were visited. In the stilt village of Buena Vista, a fishermen's association was visited which benefits two hundred families in the village. The first clear benefit for the beneficiaries is that they are now selling the fish as a cooperative at the local markets.<sup>919</sup> Before, local traders and middlemen would directly buy at the village. The fish that now leaves the village ends up at the market of Santa Marta or Baranquilla. The fishermen receive technical assistance and support relating to accountancy to enable them to properly keep track of production and sales. Currently, in the initial stages of the programme, they focus on three types of fishing activities (including regular fish, shrimp fishing and manta ray).

When asked what else they need in terms of support, except for wishing for more fishing boats, the answers are mainly related to policies that have no relation with their own

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<sup>916</sup> The *corregimiento* Tasajera is part of the municipality of Pueblo Viejo, which has around 27 thousand inhabitants.

<sup>917</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, fisheries, Corregimiento Tasajera, Pueblo Viejo (7 May 2013).

<sup>918</sup> Around 1.2 million inhabitants.

<sup>919</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, association of Buena Vista, Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).

production. Specifically, they would like the government to act more strongly to tackle illegal fishing, and they would like more education and health care services within the village. Those involved in illegal fishing do not only provide unfair competition but are also not concerned with sustainable fishing, which, means that, for example, they also catch young fish.

In general, overfishing of the Ciénaga Grande and a decrease in the quality of the water are key concerns. Problems related to their own production include the lack of a stable electricity supply (for refrigeration of the fish). At the time of the field trip, the erratic electricity supply had recently led to losses of 47 kilogrammes of fish. Clean drinking water is also a problem in the village, causing serious health problems, especially among children.

The fishermen confirm that violence in the area has now decreased. In the past, they were caught in the middle of a turf war between the paramilitary groups. Some villagers did have working relationships with the groups, but in general the violence did not affect Buena Vista as much as neighbouring Nueva Valencia. The general opinion is that the armed paramilitary forces used the fishermen as human shields in the region. They did not often stay in Buena Vista, but passed by to demand fuel or fish.

The effects on the village were nevertheless profound: there was a decline in state presence and the permanent local doctor disappeared after the violence in the year 2000. At present the security situation has improved considerably because the armed groups have disappeared from the area – partly because there is now a military base nearby. Asked about the possible return of these groups, one fisherman says:

*“Qué vuelvan porque aquí les damos palo. Porque lo que nosotros sufrimos... Pasamos hambre. Y cuando me fui a dormir, por la mañana, había sangre en la pared de mi casa.”*<sup>920</sup>

Another fisherman shows the scars on his legs and stomach that are the reminders of that violent episode in 2000. But in general, project beneficiaries are optimistic because of the state presence in the village, the improved security situation, the official support for alternative livelihoods, and the new skills that they learn through the alternative development project.

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<sup>920</sup> “They are welcome to return, as here we will confront them. Because of all we suffered... We suffered from hunger. And when I went to bed, the next morning there was blood on the wall of my house.” Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, association of Buena Vista, Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).



Two poultry farms in the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta are part of another alternative development project in the region, supported by the Colombian government and UNODC.<sup>921</sup> One poultry farm visited was created about eighteen months ago in a new stilt house just outside the village, housing 400 chickens and supporting 22 families. The government support has been the provision of the house itself, food for the chickens, and technical assistance and training (e.g. project accountancy). Six hundred chickens have already been bred and sold.

The market is strictly local. The poultry is sold to the families living in the two stilt villages nearby. There is capacity for at least another 400 chickens, but the local market demand is currently not high enough. The participating families cannot fully sustain themselves with the poultry farm and currently need to combine their poultry breeding activities with fishing. The beneficiaries would like to add another project component, raising ducks to sell the embryos, which are used in cosmetics. That would be an economic activity with marketing opportunities beyond the two villages.

The village of Nueva Venecia also has six fish farms, supported by the government and UNODC through the programme of PFGB.<sup>922</sup> The project began two years ago, farming *tilapia roja* (red tilapia) and helps provide livelihoods for 33 families. Support takes the form of technical assistance, the provision of fish farming cages in various sizes, fish eggs, fish food and regular support in terms of project accountancy. So far, three harvests have been sold.

The harvested fish is taken to the markets of Santa Marta in Baranquilla.<sup>923</sup> The objective is to find better markets, but as the project is recent, other marketing strategies can only develop over time. Taking the fish to Baranquilla currently takes about two and a half to three hours and passes through a local collection centre in the area. For the moment, they depend on intermediaries to take the fish to the market.

Another possibility for developing the project is farming different types of fish, but capacity is currently limited to the amount of cages and the (amount of) fish eggs that can be obtained. Successfully introducing the fish into the water also needs the involvement of a biologist. As a short-term goal, the project beneficiaries would ideally like to see an expansion of the number of fish cages and the direct marketing of their fish in Santa Marta and Baranquilla without the role of intermediaries. In addition to the income provided to the

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<sup>921</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, poultry farm, Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).

<sup>922</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, fish farms, Nueva Venecia (7 May 2013).

<sup>923</sup> Around 1.2 million inhabitants.

participating families, the project has also helped to strengthen the social cohesion in the village and has also resulted in the improvement of some of the housing through direct economic incentives provided to families by the government (subsidies of around 408,000 COP (165 EUR or 215 USD) per family).

However, for many families in the villages, the new livelihoods are not enough, and humanitarian assistance is also provided to them. Poverty is still widespread and not all families in these villages benefit directly from the alternative development programmes. Tourism could be an additional source of income in the future. Tourists already visit the stilt villages in the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta, but for the moment there are no tourist services provided to them (e.g. no souvenir shops or tourist guides). For example, the construction of a tourist information centre in the village was planned, but so far this has not been built. The improved security situation does at least allow for the future development of tourism as a complementary source of income.

### **10.3 Linkages with the international level**

A key advantage of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta is that the region is already an international tourist destination. The beaches of Santa Marta and El Rodadero are popular destinations, along with ecological tourism of the mountains and the national parks. This provides for interesting reverse linkages with the international level, where international ‘customers’ come to Colombia, instead of agricultural or agroforestry products ending up on international markets. Section 10.3.1 discusses the international support provided for alternative development programmes. Section 10.3.2 discusses the opportunities in terms of access to international markets.

#### **10.3.1 International support**

As part of its support to alternative development, USAID has promoted coffee production in the region through its USAID Specialty Coffee Program.<sup>924</sup> The most recent programme was

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<sup>924</sup> For more information about the programme, see the website of ACIDI-VOCA at: <http://www.acdivoca.org/site/ID/colombiaCAFES> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

implemented between 2007 and 2012, but the first specialty coffee programme was started in 2002. In the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, this programme has included support to various indigenous farmer groups as well as to returning farmers whose families had been displaced by the armed conflict.

USAID has also sponsored several alternative development projects in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. For example, through MIDAS, ACDI-VOCA and its *Programa Colombia Forestal* (PCF), it has supported a Red Ecolsierra project to strengthen honey production.<sup>925</sup> USAID also supports organic certification of agricultural production. For example, it provided the technical assistance that enabled the first cocoa farmers in the region to shift towards certified organic production.<sup>926</sup>

Environmental protection in the region has also attracted international funding. The clearest example is the co-financing of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) of several environmental programmes, related for example, to the protection of the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta.<sup>927</sup> In concrete terms, the IADB has provided support to the fishermen in the area of the Ciénaga Grande in the form of boats and outboard motors.<sup>928</sup>

IADB has also directly funded alternative development projects in the region, including a Red Ecolsierra initiative aiming to strengthen agricultural production through marketing and agro-industry.<sup>929</sup> In 2007 the bank also co-financed support for eco-tourism as an alternative livelihood in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and other national parks for a maximum of 150,000 USD (around 112,000 EUR) using a Special Fund provided to the IADB by Japan.<sup>930</sup>

The Red Ecolsierra also received support from the government of Italy (and Acción Social, now DPS) to establish a honey processing plant.<sup>931</sup> This plant converts the honey of the association *Guardabosques de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta* into a brand called *Miel*

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<sup>925</sup> Red Ecolsierra Project: ‘Asistencia técnica para el mejoramiento y sostenimiento de la cadena apícola de la familias guardabosques en el municipio de Santa Marta con énfasis en lo productivo y comercial’ (December 2007 to December 2008); Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

<sup>926</sup> USAID, *Fiscal Year 2009. Agency Financial Report. Partnerships for a Better Life* (Washington: USAID, 2009), p. 8.

<sup>927</sup> For example, in support of the social and environmental recovery programmes launched by the Ministry of Environment between 1998 and 2002.

<sup>928</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UNODC (7 May 2013).

<sup>929</sup> Red Ecolsierra Project: ‘Fortalecimiento a Proyectos Productivos del Desarrollo Alternativo, en el Marco de los Programas Regionales Integrales y Sostenibles en Colombia Dentro del Componente Fortalecimiento Comercial y Agroindustrial de Grupos de productores de Desarrollo Alternativo’ (September 2008 to February 2010).

<sup>930</sup> IADB Project: CO-T1054 : Ecoturismo como Alternativa Desarrollo en Zonas de Sustitución Cultivos Ilícitos (2007).

<sup>931</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

*de Abejas de la Sierra*. This does not mean that international support has always played a strong role in alternative development. For example, despite the focus of support from USAID being on the production of coffee and cocoa, the marketing of the Red Ecolsierra's national coffee brand of *Café Tima* has been mainly supported by the Colombian government (and with Colombian funds through UNODC). This brand has clear direct linkages (on the package) with drug control objectives, sustainable development and environmental protection, but is only sold in local and national markets.<sup>932</sup> Echoing the slogan and objective of the 1998 UNGASS, the package reads:

*“La compra de este producto contribuye a lograr un mundo libre de drogas.”*<sup>933</sup>

As such, it is an interesting example of a form of specialised branding that directly incorporates mention of counter-narcotics objectives. Box 2 below provides more details about the opportunities of alternative development branding.

### **Box 2: Towards global or regional brands of alternative development**

In 2012, Ecuador presented the idea of a global stamp for alternative development produce called a “*Preventive Alternative Development World Stamp*”<sup>934</sup> to the CND. The objective of the concept is to examine possibilities for a worldwide brand for alternative development products to help strengthen international marketing opportunities. The global brand could benefit from special marketing regimes, similar to those for Fairtrade and organic products, stressing the origin of production and the linkages with strategies to address the global drugs phenomenon or its effects on the environment.

In 2001 the author began exploring options for specialised alternative development branding as part of a research assignment for the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in relation to the marketing component of alternative development projects in Peru.<sup>935</sup> The two main obstacles identified at the time were: 1) the large amount

<sup>932</sup> The product package contains the logo of Acción Social and UNODC, and clearly explains the local and international benefits of the product.

<sup>933</sup> “Buying this product helps to bring about a drug-free world.”

<sup>934</sup> Ecuador, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Trade and Integration, press release, ‘The Preventive Alternative Development Stamp Is Launched’ (12 March 2012); CND Resolution 55/8, ‘Follow-up to the Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem with respect to the development of strategies on special marketing regimes for alternative development, including preventive alternative development’, *op. cit.*, Article 5.

<sup>935</sup> ‘The Marketing Component of Alternative Development. UNDCP Projects in Peru’, *op. cit.*

of Fairtrade, organic, environmental and social brands that already exist may already confuse customers and may prevent an alternative development brand from standing out; and 2) potential customers may not like their products such as cocoa or coffee to be associated with negative images of drug production or drug addiction.

During the field research, the author identified three options for alternative development branding: first, the introduction of local or regional brands of alternative development products (some of which already exist, for example, the *Café Tima* brand of organic coffee found in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta which mentions clear linkages with illicit drug cultivation on the package or the more general (unprocessed beans) brand of *Chocolate de Tumaco*); second, the option of branding alternative development products in relation to the conservation of the environment and bio-diversity of Colombia, similar to the Rainforest Alliance certification; and third, the possibility of linking regional alternative development brands to the lifestyles and traditions of a specific group, for example the indigenous or Afro-Colombian communities (in addition to the link with illicit drug cultivation or its effects on the environment).

One of the areas where international support seems to be largely missing in this region is the marketing of fish, agricultural or agro-forestry products. A UNODC representative says:

*“La mayoría de los proyectos se enfocan en el tema de que hay que enseñar a la gente a producir, pero falta el otro eslabón; los proyectos no enseñan la parte de la comercialización.”*<sup>936</sup>

Efforts must be made to generate appreciation for alternative development products that would provide them with access to new and larger markets. This does not necessarily mean that marketing support must go directly to the farmers or fishermen. Intermediaries in the production chain could also be the beneficiaries of support to better market their product internationally.<sup>937</sup> However, part of the overarching objective should be to limit the number of intermediaries in the production chain. The more intermediaries involved, the lower the price the farmer will receive as a percentage of the final selling price. Part of a potential

<sup>936</sup> “The majority of the projects focus on teaching people to produce, but what is missing is the other link; the projects do not teach the marketing part.” Personal interviews, project staff, UNODC (7 May 2013).

<sup>937</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UNODC (7 May 2013).

solution could be granting more marketing capabilities to the local associations, creating second-tier organisations which could connect to more than one association in the region or looking for niche markets that could channel bigger returns back to farmers through the higher mark-up value.

### 10.3.2 International market access

The cacao of the local association visited in the *vereda* La Esmeralda is sold locally. At present, the association has a ten year commercial agreement with the *Compañía Nacional de Chocolates*, one of the two big Colombian chocolate companies.<sup>938</sup> This means that some of this cocoa will ultimately end up on the international market, but only indirectly through processing outside of the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (mostly in Medellín<sup>939</sup>).

It also means that there is currently no brand of ‘Santa Marta’ cocoa that could be promoted and exported. The linkages with the origin of the product disappear through mass processing and mass marketing elsewhere. The representative of the Red Ecolsierra explains that the marketing of local cocoa is only at its very initial stages, which means that international marketing remains a future venture.<sup>940</sup>

The coffee produced within the framework of the Red Ecolsierra has been shown to have more international marketing potential. Coffee from the region has been successfully certified as organic coffee for markets in the United States (National Organic Program (NOP)/USDA organic certification), Japan (Japanese Agricultural Standard (JAS)/Ecocert certification) and internationally through UTZ and FLO. On the national market, it benefits from the so-called *Sello Único Nacional*. In fact, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta accounts for around 71 percent of the total organic coffee production in Colombia.<sup>941</sup>

The coffee grown by producers taking part in the Red Ecolsierra reaches international markets in the form of certified organic coffee beans<sup>942</sup> which are exported to Japan, the United States and Europe. This means once again that the link with the region of origin may

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<sup>938</sup> Personal interviews, beneficiaries Red Ecolsierra, association Guardabosques de la Sierra, Vereda La Esmeralda (6 May 2013).

<sup>939</sup> Around 2.5 million inhabitants.

<sup>940</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

<sup>941</sup> 2011 data, from the website of ACIDI-VOCA at: <http://www.acdivoca.org/site/ID/news-Best-Coffee-Colombia-Sierra-Nevada-de-Santa-Marta> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>942</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

be lost when foreign coffee companies process the beans and market the end product,<sup>943</sup> and an important part of the added economic value disappears abroad, but these are currently necessary evils given that international demand for organic coffee is particularly concentrated on the beans, and not on large volumes of processed organic coffees.<sup>944</sup> Given the costs involved, it is currently more profitable to only export the organic coffee beans.

For the moment, the honey produced only reaches national markets, and is distributed within Colombia through the large supermarket chains such as Éxito and Carrefour, small independent supermarkets and some restaurants. The relatively low volumes of honey produced, lack of funding for international marketing efforts (at the Red Ecolsierra) and the high costs of the process of exporting the product currently prevent the honey from reaching international markets.

#### 10.4 Main drivers behind international cooperation

Addressing the existing levels of illicit coca cultivation (while preventing the return of more coca to the region) is an important driver behind international cooperation. It is an essential element of most projects implemented by USAID, for example through MIDAS or ADAM, which have generally kept the precondition of ‘zero coca’ as the basis of all US-sponsored interventions.<sup>945</sup>

One of the other drivers behind development cooperation is the underdevelopment of the indigenous communities – one of the reasons why the US supports the indigenous communities of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. This support takes place through the USAID Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Program (ACIP), operated locally by the NGO ACIDI-VOCA.<sup>946</sup> Although linked directly to the objective of increasing opportunities for agro-forestry production, the underlying goal of this support is to improve the socio-economic and political inclusion of indigenous communities.<sup>947</sup> The Colombian government has created a specific forest warden families programme for indigenous communities in the

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<sup>943</sup> Nevertheless, the end products will probably still be sold as coffee originating in Colombia.

<sup>944</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

<sup>945</sup> ‘USAID’s Alternative Development policy in Colombia. A critical analysis’, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>946</sup> For more information about the programme, see the website of ACIDI-VOCA at:

<http://www.acdivoca.org/site/ID/Colombia-USAID-Afro-Colombian-Indigenous-Program> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>947</sup> *Ibid.*

Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta called ‘*Guardabosques Corazón del Mundo*’, but the support for this programme has been mostly national.<sup>948</sup>

The socio-economic conditions of the indigenous communities are worse than other groups and 29.5 percent of the indigenous population suffer from chronic malnutrition (compared to an average of 13.2 percent nationwide).<sup>949</sup> To improve the situation in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, USAID is investing 1,907,250 USD (around 1.5 million EUR) between 2011 and 2016.<sup>950</sup> More than half of those funds are earmarked for agricultural production, supporting a total of 1,394 families with coffee cultivation (Kogui, Arhuaco and Kankuamo tribes) and 284 families with cocoa cultivation (Wiwa tribes).<sup>951</sup> The objective is to reinforce local value chains and connect local production to final consumers.

Another specific driver behind general international support for the region is helping victims of forced displacement. Both the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and USAID have been providing technical assistance and financial support for strengthening institutions and national legislation dealing with support for (displaced) victims of the violence, for example through the planned creation of a regional centre for victim support in the city of Santa Marta.<sup>952</sup>

Last, the USAID support has focused specifically on the protection of the forests in the region of Santa Marta. In cooperation with the Colombian government, USAID initiated and funded the PCF programme since September 2003, which incorporated the region of Santa Marta as one of three initial pilot areas.<sup>953</sup> The overall objective of the programme was to promote sustainable management of the forests, combining environmentally sound economic development and forest conservation strategies.<sup>954</sup> The programme has directly supported the Colombian government’s PFGB and provided a direct link between the

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<sup>948</sup> See the official website of the Colombian Government’s Department of Social Prosperity at: <http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=610&conID=5649> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>949</sup> USAID and ACIDI-VOCA, *Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Program. Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta Briefing* (22 December 2012).

<sup>950</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>951</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>952</sup> Colombia, Municipal Government of Santa Marta ‘Santa Marta contará con Centro Regional para Atención Integral a las Víctimas’, news release, (4 March 2013).

<sup>953</sup> USAID, *Programa Colombia Forestal: Apoyo al Plan Familias Guardabosques. Evaluación de Las Condiciones y Oportunidades para Intervención de PCF* (Bogotá: USAID, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>954</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.



reduction of illicit drug cultivation and the conservation of natural resources and the biodiversity that can be found in them.<sup>955</sup>

Part of the programme's objectives has been to strengthen the local and family economy by investing in forestry and agro-forestry, focusing in Santa Marta on the production of cacao and reforestation with local tree species that are profitable in terms of timber production.<sup>956</sup> In other regions the focus has also been on rubber and *achiote*, a tropical fruit tree.<sup>957</sup>

## 10.5 Opportunities for the RISE

This section explores the opportunities for the RISE as found in the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Magdalena. It first addresses the pillar of shared responsibility (10.5.1), followed by the pillar of economic security (10.5.2).

### 10.5.1 Shared responsibility

Direct evidence of shared responsibility in Santa Marta is very limited and is predominantly related to the United States. Most international entities or operators that have been successfully linked with the PFGB in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta region are (financially) connected to USAID (MIDAS, ADAM, FUPAD).<sup>958</sup> Other international operators such as UNODC can be considered to be almost exclusively funded by Colombia itself. USAID initiated the *Programa Colombia Forestal* (PCF) in September 2003 (focusing on timber and other agro-forestry) and has supported it since then, along with several other alternative development programmes. When focusing directly on illicit drug cultivation, the US has often included broader objectives of economic and social development in their interventions, for example related to the indigenous communities. Beyond the direct and indirect support of the United States for alternative development programmes in the region,

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<sup>955</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>956</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>957</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>958</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (7 May 2013).

international support becomes more diffuse and loses many of the direct linkages to alternative development (e.g. focusing more on victims of violence and conflict).

Beyond the bilateral support of the United States, most of the other international cooperation also becomes more multilateral, for example through the support structure of the European Union, the IOM or the IADB. Only a few exceptions were identified in the field research, such as the support of Italy for the honey processing plant at the Red Ecolsierra's facilities in Santa Marta.

The following gaps of shared responsibility have been identified in the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, in terms of priority areas where increased international support is needed:

- 1) international market access and broader marketing support for products other than (organic) coffee, especially cocoa;
- 2) increased support (beyond USAID) for the organic or Fairtrade certification of the region's cocoa (and possibly other produce);
- 3) investments in local transport and product-related infrastructure to support agricultural and agro-forestry production, and fish production.

Without additional support in these three areas, alternative development programmes will probably continue to need subsidies, particularly when faced with low international prices for products such as cocoa. The main comparative advantages of the region (attractive tourist destination, relatively stable security situation, and the already existing programmes of added economic value through certified Fairtrade and organic production) could transform any additional international support (through shared responsibility) into mutually beneficial commercial arrangements.

### **10.5.2 Economic security**

Economic security (as understood to be the economic, social and cultural development at the local level of project beneficiaries, families and communities), has been identified throughout the analysis of the alternative development programmes in the region. It is a central objective of all alternative development interventions in the region of the Sierra

Nevada de Santa Marta. The support that project beneficiaries receive generally aims to increase and improve agricultural production, but always with an overarching objective of raising income levels and indirectly raising the general living conditions of the farming families (either directly through income support or more indirectly through investment in local associations or local government institutions and services).

An overarching objective of many alternative development programmes is that families remain in rural areas. This relates to economic security as understood to be a broader state policy related to the national economy, markets and natural resources. It can be considered as a strategy to retain economic production in the areas where it can be sustainable and profitable rather than losing economic capacity when farmers migrate to the cities, where their skills often do not match labour market needs. One beneficiary explains this objective as follows:

*“Es hacer sostenible el productor. Porque el campesino está migrando a las ciudades. Es buscar que el productor se quede en su parcela y sea productivo, se asocie, sea familiar al entorno, busque alternativas, pueda educar a sus hijos. Podemos mejorar las vías de penetración, porque estamos mejorando la producción. Todo esto viene siempre a mejorar las condiciones de vida del campesino.”<sup>959</sup>*

As such it can be considered a bridge between economic security as a development strategy for local rural communities and economic security as a broader state objective in the region.

The government aims to keep these families in rural areas where they: 1) are less burden on the state (despite the need for support and technical assistance); 2) will create economic value through agro-forestry; and 3) will not end up working for criminal or armed groups outside of the region. However, migration to the cities still takes place, fuelled by poverty, the legacy of illicit cultivation in the region and the continued lack of state presence in some areas. In the past, some families have sold their land, moved to the city, but have had to return a few years later to work (often heavily indebted) as land labourers for other families.

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<sup>959</sup> “It is to make the producer sustainable. It is because the farmer is migrating towards the cities. It is finding ways for the producer to stay on his plot of land, so that he can be productive, so that he can associate himself with others, so that he is familiar with his surroundings, finds alternatives and can educate his children. So that we can improve the access routes, because we are improving production. All that is always working towards improving the living conditions of the farmer.” Personal interviews, beneficiaries Red Ecolsierra, association Guardabosques de la Sierra, Vereda La Esmeralda (6 May 2013).

According to some project beneficiaries in the area these problems are structural throughout Colombia, with the possible exception of the *eje cafetero* (the main coffee producing area in southern and central Colombia). This area has benefited from more than a century of strong institutional support through the FNC, resulting in a well organised sector, a well-known brand of Colombian coffee and a series of important indirect benefits: reasonable housing, education, public health and good access routes to markets.

Another interesting example of economic security in the sense of the protection of natural resources is the objective of protecting the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta as a source of biodiversity (e.g. the mangrove forests) and a source of income for many of the fishing communities around the marshlands.<sup>960</sup> Also, given its role in helping to regulate the climate on a more global scale (e.g. through the absorption of carbon dioxide through its mangrove forests), there are clear links between the protection of the local environment and the global agenda (or global project) against climate change. As a consequence, the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta was recognised in 1998 as a so-called Ramsar site (wetlands of international importance) and in the year 2000 as an UNESCO Biosphere Reserve.<sup>961</sup> At the level of the Colombian state, the deterioration and depletion of the Ciénaga Grande would mean that thousands of people lose their livelihoods. As such, this region provides the clearest link between the protection of the environment and the economic security of the state.

However, it is not clear how much direct international support there is for the preservation of these natural resources. There was initial support from the IADB (since 1994) and Germany (GTZ) since 1992.<sup>962</sup> Later support from the German government led to the Project for the Rehabilitation of the Ciénaga Grande of Santa Marta (*Agenda Común*), but that project was short-lived because of local insecurity and mismanagement. However, the *Agenda Común* was continued as a coordinated strategy of all stakeholders involved and the Colombian government still receives some international support for the protection of the area. At present, the local government is prioritising cleaning up the Ciénaga Grande, protecting the water from industrial waste, and reforestation of the mangroves in the area.<sup>963</sup>

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<sup>960</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UNODC (7 May 2013).

<sup>961</sup> For information about the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, see the official website at: <http://www.ramsar.org> (last accessed on September 13, 2013). For information about UNESCO's biosphere reserves, see the UNESCO website at: <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ecological-sciences/biosphere-reserves/> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>962</sup> Leonor Botero and Horst Salzwedel, 'Rehabilitation of the Cienaga Grande de Santa Marta, a mangrove-estuarine system in the Caribbean coast of Colombia', *Ocean & Coastal Management*, No. 42 (1999), p. 249.

<sup>963</sup> 'Gobernación de Magdalena trabaja en la limpieza de la Ciénaga Grande', *El Tiempo* (18 June 2009).

Another potential economic security driver for increased international support is the combination of promoting organic coffee production and the preservation of the forests in the region. In contrast with the *eje cafetero* (where coffee is basically only intercropped with plantain), coffee production of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta takes place within the forests.<sup>964</sup> This potentially also brings benefits in terms of preserving biodiversity.

Last, illegal mining (of gold) is a recurrent problem in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.<sup>965</sup> The regional government is trying to prevent any mining in the region, with the aim of protecting the environment and the eco-systems in the area.<sup>966</sup> The regional governor of the department of Cesar underlined the importance of the region as a “*fábrica de agua*” (water factory), being the origin of many of the region’s important rivers. Protecting the eco-system is vital because of this.<sup>967</sup> The exploitation of oil and gas only take place in the sea, about 45 kilometres from the coast of Santa Marta.<sup>968</sup>

## 10.6 Conclusions from the region

While there is international support for alternative development programmes in the region, it is clear that the pillar of shared responsibility is quite weak in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. In terms of direct bilateral development cooperation directed at drug control, only US assistance really qualifies as a form of international support based on shared responsibility. If USAID were to withdraw its support from the region, only very few internationally sponsored alternative development projects would remain, further strengthening the already dominant position of the Colombian government as the principle funder and implementing agency (whether or not in cooperation with or through UNODC) of alternative development.

An unexpected finding of the field research is that support for indigenous communities is an important driver for international aid in the region, especially for USAID. This is interesting as the assumption in Chapter 8 was that such aspects of local development could be considered to be more within the realms of government policy and less as important (stand-alone) drivers of international support (see section 8.2.3.1). It was also considered a

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<sup>964</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Red Ecolsierra, Santa Marta (8 May 2013).

<sup>965</sup> ‘Minería ilegal se toma la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta’, *El Heraldo* (16 February 2012).

<sup>966</sup> ‘No más explotaciones mineras en la Sierra Nevada’, *El Picón* (14 June 2012).

<sup>967</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>968</sup> Leonardo Herrera Delghams, ‘Comenzó exploración de pozo petrolero en alta mar, frente a Santa Marta’, *El Tiempo* (24 September 2007).

more problematic form of shared responsibility given the lack of international linkages such issue areas seem to create (see section 6.3). In the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, support for indigenous communities is a very important driver of international aid, which cannot be fully explained by the link between these communities and illegal coca cultivation. While this link exists, the relatively low levels of production inside the *Resguardos Indígenas* in the region suggest that the international support is motivated by much more than the cultivation of illegal drugs alone.

Last, examining economic security as a state policy, the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta represents an interesting case. The government is not only protecting this important eco-system to preserve the bio-diversity and the environment. It protects the area as an important source of livelihoods. In that sense, the RISE instrument could be used by the Colombian government as a means to attract more international support for the protection of the environment, and at the same time livelihoods, in the area. This could also be the case for the national parks. By linking alternative development programmes in the region directly to the objectives of protecting the eco-system, the RISE could lead to more international support in this area.

The region offers scope to combine the protection and preservation of local communities, the national parks and the local eco-systems. However, it appears that international support directed at these objectives is not currently due to a focus on shared responsibility to address the supply of illicit drugs. International support for alternative development in the region is currently very limited, which provides two options related to the RISE instrument: 1) International support for alternative development could be better linked with broader objectives of environmental preservation and the international importance of the local eco-systems; or 2) a RISE instrument could be developed to enhance international development cooperation in the region, but without stressing the importance of illicit drug control (focusing, for example, on livelihoods and not necessarily on ‘alternative’ livelihoods).

Given the relatively low levels of illicit coca cultivation in the region, the latter option of partially delinking international support from supply reduction may be valuable and an interesting strategy to explore. If the trend towards decreasing coca cultivation persists, the rationale behind alternative development may weaken substantially in this region. For both options, the relatively stable and secure situation of the region could be important to attract more international investment, not only from foreign governments but

also from international private donors, (unless, paradoxically, this very stability in fact decreases the sense of urgency to consider the region as a priority for development cooperation). Table 1 below provides an overview of the main findings for the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.

**Table 1: Summary of main findings of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta**

<b>Summary of main findings of the field research in the region of Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Magdalena</b>	
<b>International support</b>	Mostly limited to USAID, with some additional bilateral support (e.g. Italy). Other international support is mainly provided through multilateral channels such as the IADB (e.g. Japan). Locally, UNODC acts more as an operator of resources and only around 10 percent of UNODC's national budget comes from foreign donor countries.
<b>Main drivers of international support</b>	Control of illicit drugs at the source, strong focus on the socio-economic and institutional development of the four indigenous communities, the preservation of Colombia's biodiversity and natural resources (particularly related to the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta), and the conflict and violence that have affected the region and its (displaced) communities.
<b>Products/projects supported internationally in the region</b>	Mainly coffee and cocoa (agro-forestry), fishing, some honey production and eco-tourism, and timber through sustainable reforestation projects.
<b>International market access</b>	Exists directly for organic coffee and indirectly for cocoa through bulk processing in factories outside of the region (mainly the <i>Compañía Nacional de Chocolates</i> ). Other products such as fish and honey are mainly for local markets.
<b>Shared responsibility</b>	In terms of bilateral cooperation mainly limited to the United States through USAID. This can be partly explained by the fact that the US is the principle market for Colombia's

	cocaine. Other countries such as Italy have provided direct bilateral support, but nothing close to the size and scope of the US support.
<b>Economic security in terms of direct human security and socio-economic development</b>	At the basis of all international support for alternative development in the region. Economic security takes the form of food security programmes, income support, socio-economic and cultural development and the strengthening of local institutions to support agricultural production (especially coffee and cocoa) and welfare creation. Furthermore, in this region, added economic value is created at the level of the (coffee) farmers associations through ecological and Fairtrade certification.
<b>Economic security to protect natural resources, markets and other broader objectives of the state</b>	Less visible with regard to international support, but identified in the context of the protection of the region's biodiversity, eco-systems and natural resources, particularly in terms of the marshlands and the mangrove forests of the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta, but also in general for the national parks. Protecting the eco-system of the Ciénaga Grande indirectly means protecting thousands of jobs. Last, the objective of keeping farmers in rural areas can also be considered a form of protecting economic security.
<b>Possibilities in the region for future products and services in the context of the RISE</b>	Further growth of (eco) tourism, organic or Fairtrade production for cocoa and more international support in terms of the conservation of the national parks and the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta which could indirectly benefit alternative development programmes.

*Source: construction of the author*







## CHAPTER 11: LA MACARENA AND SAN JUAN DE ARAMA, META

This chapter presents and analyses the results of the field research in the region of Meta.<sup>969</sup>

### 11.1 The context of the illegal drugs economy

The department of Meta<sup>970</sup> is traditionally one of the largest illicit coca producing departments in Colombia. In 2004 and 2005, record areas of coca were cultivated there (respectively 18,740 and 17,305 hectares).<sup>971</sup> This has since decreased, which may be partly attributed to a pilot programme of the current national territorial consolidation strategy (PNCRT) launched in the region in 2007 by the Colombian government.<sup>972</sup> Out of the ten Colombian municipalities with largest illicit coca cultivation in 2007, three were located in the department of Meta (Vista Hermosa,<sup>973</sup> Puerto Rico<sup>974</sup> and Mapiripan<sup>975</sup>).<sup>976</sup> In 2012 only Puerto Rico made the top ten.<sup>977</sup>

The combination of large scale coca cultivation and high levels of violence in Meta was why in 2007 the Colombian government launched the pilot programme of its new *Plan de Consolidación* in the region of La Macarena (southern Meta).<sup>978</sup> The *Plan de Consolidación Integral de La Macarena* (PCIM) focused on six municipalities, La Macarena<sup>979</sup> and San Juan de Arama<sup>980</sup> (the two areas visited as part of this field research) and Mesetas,<sup>981</sup> Puerto Rico, La Uribe<sup>982</sup> and Vista Hermosa.<sup>983</sup> Illicit coca cultivation in

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<sup>969</sup> The field research in the department of Meta included visits to several alternative development projects in and around the remote municipality of La Macarena (southern Meta) and some projects near the village of San Juan de Arama, in the mid-western part of the department. Other meetings took place at the regional office of UACT in Villavicencio, the capital of Meta.

<sup>970</sup> Around 920,000 inhabitants.

<sup>971</sup> *Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region, op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>972</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>973</sup> Around 21,000 inhabitants.

<sup>974</sup> Around 18,000 inhabitants.

<sup>975</sup> Around 16,000 inhabitants.

<sup>976</sup> *Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region, op. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>977</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>978</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>979</sup> Around 27,000 inhabitants.

<sup>980</sup> Around 8,000 inhabitants.

<sup>981</sup> Around 11,000 inhabitants.

<sup>982</sup> Around 13,000 inhabitants.

<sup>983</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009, op. cit.*, p. 80.

these areas decreased considerably in 2008 (by 62.8 percent) and 2009 (a further decrease of 31 percent).<sup>984</sup> These decreases were significantly larger than the total reductions for the whole department of Meta (respectively 46.8 percent and 22 percent).<sup>985</sup> The policy of PCIM is still in place as Meta remains one of the *zonas de consolidación* under the now geographically expanded strategy of PNCRT.

After a positive evaluation of PCIM in 2010, President Santos scaled-up the pilot project to create the nation-wide territorial consolidation strategy of PNCRT.<sup>986</sup> In the department of Meta, the strategy of territorial consolidation can be seen as the embodiment of an institutional link between the objectives of improving security and reducing the size of the illicit coca industry. One UACT representative explains:

*“El cultivo ilícito está muy ligado al tema de la inseguridad territorial. Donde hay grupos armados ilegales, allí hay cultivos ilícitos. Entonces, a la medida que el estado va recuperando esas zonas en términos de seguridad, los cultivos ilícitos empiezan a reducirse y el estado empieza a hacer presencia.”*<sup>987</sup>

Since the start of PCIM, the total area under illicit coca cultivation in Meta has further decreased, but now seems to be stable at around 3,000 hectares (3,008 hectares in 2010 and 3,040 hectares in 2011).<sup>988</sup> Nevertheless, the year 2012 actually saw a further decrease of 11 percent to 2,699 hectares.<sup>989</sup> With 1,064 hectares in 2012, the municipality of Puerto Rico is currently the country's ninth biggest coca growing municipality.<sup>990</sup>

In recent years, aerial spraying of coca crops had also decreased substantially in the department of Meta (from 5,825 hectares in 2010 to 2,545 in 2011).<sup>991</sup> However, the year 2012 showed an increase in aerial fumigation to 3,152 hectares.<sup>992</sup> Manual eradication had remained more or less stable in recent years (1,096 hectares in 2011, slightly less than in

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<sup>984</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>985</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>986</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>987</sup> “Illicit cultivation is closely related to the issue of territorial insecurity. Where there are illegal armed groups, there are illicit crops. So, as the state is regaining these zones in terms of security, the illicit crops start to decline and the state starts to establish a presence.” Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>988</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>989</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>990</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>991</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>992</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 31.

2010)<sup>993</sup> but in 2012 it was significantly reduced to 319 hectares.<sup>994</sup> Meta is also one of the areas with the strongest presence of illicit coca crops within national parks. The *Parque Nacional Sierra de la Macarena* had 825 hectares of coca cultivation in 2011, 14 percent more than in 2010.<sup>995</sup> In 2012, illicit coca cultivation within the park saw a 50 percent increase from 971 hectares (the adjusted 2011 figure) to 1,466 hectares.<sup>996</sup> This means that more than half of Meta's illicit coca cultivation now takes place within the national park. Compared with the levels of illicit cultivation found in the national park of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (around 5 hectares in 2012, see section 10.1), this is a significant problem.

The department of Meta is one of the areas of Colombia that has been most affected by illicit coca cultivation, but it is also one of the areas where violence and conflict have been most devastating. The department was among the regions that farmers colonised when they fled during the *La Violencia* period in Colombia starting in the late 1940s.<sup>997</sup> *La Violencia*, a long period of great turmoil between 1946 and 1966, was mainly the result of a struggle between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, but the political conflict resulted in extreme violence, the killing of between 200 and 300 thousand people and the displacement of around two million Colombians.<sup>998</sup> The forcefully displaced peasant communities developed self-defence groups that would eventually lead to the creation of the FARC in 1964.<sup>999</sup>

The strong presence of the FARC in the Amazon region of Colombia (including Meta) also attracted the violence of other paramilitary groups such as the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) who declared war on the leftist guerrillas at the end of the 1990s.<sup>1000</sup> Several massacres took place in the department of Meta in 1997 and 1998. Today, the conflict in Meta is mostly limited to the struggle between the FARC and the Colombian army. At the time of the author's visit to La Macarena, helicopters took off several times a day from the military base near the municipality for military operations against the FARC.

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<sup>993</sup> Colombia. *Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011*, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>994</sup> Colombia. *Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012*, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>995</sup> Colombia. *Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011*, op. cit., p. 29. In UNODC's latest 2012 coca survey, the 2011 number is somehow changed to 971 hectares of coca found in the national park of the Sierra de la Macarena.

<sup>996</sup> Colombia. *Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012*, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>997</sup> Ricardo Vargas Meza, 'The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade', *TNI briefing paper* (7 June 1999).

<sup>998</sup> A comprehensive book about this period is: Mary Roldán, *Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946-1953* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

<sup>999</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1000</sup> *Ibid.*

The department is still one of the strongholds of the FARC. One of their strongest divisions, the *Bloque Oriental* operates in the area (e.g. the FARC divisions (*frentes*) 7, 27 and 43 that all operate in areas with large amounts of illicit coca cultivation). The strategic importance of the area was highlighted in recent years by the fact that Mono Jojoy, commander of the *Bloque Oriental*, was killed in La Macarena, Meta in 2010.<sup>1001</sup> The FARC's commander and co-founder Manuel Marulanda also died in the department of Meta in 2008.<sup>1002</sup> Notably, Meta's municipalities of La Uribe, Mesetas, La Macarena and Vista Hermosa formed part of the so-called *zona de despeje* or *zona de distension* (together with San Vicente del Caguán in the department of Caquetá), the large territory that was granted to the FARC as part of the Caguán peace process under the Pastrana administration between 1999 and 2002.<sup>1003</sup>

The inclusion of the municipality of La Macarena in the *zona de despeje* meant that when the FARC took control, the village became one of the collection and trading centres of the local illicit drug market.<sup>1004</sup> These centres can now be found in other areas in Meta and in the department of Guaviare, for example in and around the municipality of San José de Guaviare.<sup>1005</sup>

Currently, as many as half of the total of FARC guerrillas (estimated by the Colombian Ministry of Defence to be approximately 8,500 fighters<sup>1006</sup>) may be operating in the department of Meta.<sup>1007</sup> The week before the author's visit to La Macarena, seven young men were recruited from the village by the FARC.<sup>1008</sup> The strong connection between illicit cultivation and the FARC is what makes this region very different from the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, where mostly *bandas criminales* (criminal groups or 'bacrim's') are currently in charge of the illicit drugs trade.<sup>1009</sup>

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<sup>1001</sup> Salud Hernández-Mora, 'Muere el 'Mono Jojoy', jefe militar de las FARC, en un bombardeo en Colombia', *El Mundo* (23 September 2010).

<sup>1002</sup> Simon Romero, 'Manuel Marulanda, Top Commander of Colombia's Largest Guerrilla Group, Is Dead', *The New York Times* (26 May 2008).

<sup>1003</sup> *The Politics of Cocaine. How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Industry in Central and South America*, p. 233.

<sup>1004</sup> Personal interviews, representative, mayor's office, Municipality of La Macarena (10 May 2013).

<sup>1005</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1006</sup> Juan Carlos Monroy Giraldo and Jorge Iván Posada, 'Aunque lo nieguen, las FARC pasaron de euforias a repliegues', *El Colombiano* (21 October 2012).

<sup>1007</sup> Around fifty-five percent of the armed divisions of the FARC are said to operate in the region. This could mean that around 5,500 armed FARC fighters are in the area, in addition to about 3,000 unarmed militiamen. Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1008</sup> Personal interviews, representative, mayor's office, Municipality of La Macarena (10 May 2013).

<sup>1009</sup> Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

The department of Meta is of key geo-political and geo-strategic interest for the FARC. Geo-politically, the region is relatively close to Bogotá<sup>1010</sup> and therefore important in their efforts to gain political power.<sup>1011</sup> Geo-strategically, it is one of their current strongholds and remaining regional centres of power. The high costs involved in sustaining a presence of around 4,000 armed fighters in the region have increased the importance of the illegal coca economy (and therefore the area of the Sierra de la Macarena) as one of the main sources of funding for the FARC. It also partly explains the heavy fighting in the area, as the FARC are unwilling to give up the territory that provides access to one of their main cash cows.

As what could be considered the epicentre of FARC presence, Meta is also one of the regions that would benefit most from a possible peace agreement with the Colombian government. It could provide a significant boost to the process of territorial consolidation, and as such for alternative livelihood programmes. However, for the moment the conflict continues (with many so-called *zonas rojas* (insecure red zones) in the department of Meta). This means that almost every day there are new victims of the violence and new groups of displaced persons.<sup>1012</sup>

Security in the municipality of La Macarena has improved significantly. Borrowing the words of departmental governor Alan Jara, a local government representative explains this improvement partly by the insurgents' 'fear of cement' – the reason for them leaving the area:

*“A la guerrilla y a la guerra le huye al cemento. Le huye a la civilización. Le huye a las telecomunicaciones. La guerrilla le huye al desarrollo de un pueblo. (...) Su actuar está más en el sector rural, en el campo y en el monte, en donde hay más personas vulnerables para camuflarse, para meterse.”*<sup>1013</sup>

Following this train of thought, the process of territorial consolidation and rural development may further displace the FARC to more remote areas, but that could also mean that illicit

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<sup>1010</sup> Around 7.3 million inhabitants.

<sup>1011</sup> However, some analysis suggests that FARC is increasingly focusing on the city of Cali as their main political objective. See, for example: Mario Fernando Prado, 'Las Farc: objetivo Cali', *El Espectador* (23 February 2012).

<sup>1012</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Colombia Responde, La Macarena (10 May 2013).

<sup>1013</sup> “The guerrillas and the war flee from cement. They flee from civilisation. They flee from telecommunication. The guerrilla flee from the development of a village. (...) Their action is more in the rural areas, the fields and mountains, where there are more vulnerable people to hide behind.” Personal interviews, representative, mayor's office, Municipality of La Macarena (10 May 2013).

coca cultivation will move with them to areas that still have no official state presence and control. Paradoxically, despite their ‘fear of cement’, this is in fact one of the three main commodities that the FARC tax heavily in the region (and elsewhere in Colombia): cement, beer and petrol.<sup>1014</sup>

## 11.2 Overview of alternative development programmes

Following previous national programmes with varying objectives, activities and target groups (Plante, Plan Colombia and PCI), in the department of Meta, the government is now focusing on alternative livelihood strategies within the strategy of territorial consolidation. A general improvement to the basic security conditions in the region means that the state can start to better provide basic services to the people and protect their constitutional rights.<sup>1015</sup> Within this framework, the central government is focusing on the strengthening of local government, land-use planning and the registration of land titles, social services and the promotion and strengthening of economic activities within the legal economy.

Placing territorial consolidation at the beginning of the process, before any major economic development programmes are started, is presented as a change of direction and a new way of looking at alternative development. It makes the provision of alternative livelihoods by the state entirely conditional on 1) a relatively stable security environment and 2) the ability of state institutions to start more sustainable programmes with the local communities based on their commitment and possibility to stay in the area. Alternative development is combined with the provision of basic services by the state. The downside of this approach is that the state is unable to structurally tackle the problem of illicit cultivation in unstable or insecure areas, other than through forced coca eradication (largely carried out by aerial spraying).

Where a state presence has been successfully established and consolidated, the government starts the process of alternative development by identifying sustainable and profitable production chains and carrying out market feasibility studies. Key elements of the selection criteria are available markets, existing technical skills and local traditions (for example related to whether a crop has been traditionally cultivated in the area and could

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<sup>1014</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1015</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).



therefore be accepted more readily by the local communities than other alternatives). When the projects have been decided upon, the support can take the form of provision of planting material, development of plantations, technical assistance, training and some marketing support. All support relating to economic development is geared towards the replacement or prevention of illicit coca cultivation.

The successful transition from illicit coca cultivation to licit alternatives is described as very challenging:

*“El tránsito de las economías ilícitas al principio es un proceso muy complicado, y muy exigente en recursos.”*<sup>1016</sup>

The risk that illicit coca cultivation returns is locally perceived as much higher than in the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. According to one UACT representative, the principle challenge is to try to keep the process of territorial consolidation (and alternative economic development) at such a pace that the former coca farmers are not tempted or compelled to replant with illicit crops.<sup>1017</sup>

In the region of La Macarena, the government (UACT) is focusing on six main licit alternative economic activities:

- 1) livestock breeding (*ganadería de cría y levante*): traditionally the most important economic activity in the region of the *Llanos Orientales*;
- 2) milk production: approximately 500 farmers are associated with projects involving milk production, producing around 20,000 litres of milk per day;
- 3) cocoa production: In the *zona de consolidación* La Macarena, 800 families benefit from alternative development programmes, with 1,600 hectares of cocoa cultivation. (On average, each family has approximately two hectares of cocoa);
- 4) coffee production: UACT supports around 1,000 hectares of coffee production in the consolidation zone La Macarena, benefiting around 900 families. (The average plot of land for these coffee farming families is one hectare);

<sup>1016</sup> “In the beginning, the transition of the illegal economies is a very difficult process, and very demanding in terms of resources.” Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1017</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

- 5) sugar cane production: The production of (raw) sugar cane supports approximately 200 families, including provision of the necessary processing infrastructure (nine sugar cane mills with a high production capacity are installed);
- 6) plantain production: this is mainly limited to La Uribe and Mesetas where about 1,000 hectares of plantain have been planted.

Support for alternative development is mainly concentrated on small farmers, local organisations and on processes of associating farmers through commercial projects at the local level. However, the Achilles heel of alternative development interventions in the region is the fact that the costs of production make the produce almost always more expensive than the regular price on the national or international market.<sup>1018</sup> This is a structural problem, also found in areas of Tumaco, which is especially related to poor infrastructure and long distances to markets (for example by river or on bad roads).

As alternative development products cannot compete in price, the only way to market these products is to explain why the price is higher than for regular products, using alternative development branding: mentioning on the package the characteristics and conditions of the areas where the goods are cultivated and produced, and explaining that they contribute to the reduction of illicit coca cultivation. Although this seems a logical step, it is not clear why no national or regional Colombian brand or label of alternative development products was ever created. Box 2 in the previous chapter analyses the potential of regional or global brands of alternative development in more detail.

For mass marketing even a Colombian alternative development brand may be insufficient as many consumers will simply choose the product with the lowest price. For international markets, the challenge of promoting the ‘alternative development’ story behind products from the (internationally) little-known Macarena region will be significant, because it is likely that potential foreign customers will not have knowledge of the local security and development conditions that generate the need for alternative development interventions in the region.

An additional problem of alternative development in the region is related to scope. The strong presence of FARC means that alternative development interventions cannot be implemented in all areas. In fact, there is very little alternative development in the sectors with most illicit coca cultivation. One government official explains:

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<sup>1018</sup> Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

*“Mal haríamos nosotros en decir ‘oiga FUPAD, venga ménteme un proyecto de caucho en este sector [de La Macarena]’. Es una plata perdida.”*<sup>1019</sup>

Until the process of territorial consolidation can be started, there is very little state presence in those areas of Meta. Where possible, the government has started focusing on a small scale on creating and promoting social capital, thus establishing the organisational basis for future interventions. It has also supported infrastructure development, for example building roads and bridges with the help of the Colombian armed forces. Some of these projects, however, are subject to extortion by the FARC.

The presence of the FARC in the area has also increased the problem of land rights, as the group directly caused the forced displacement of farming communities, creating significant challenges of land restitution and a lack of land titles in the areas where farmers are currently located. In cases where farmers do not own the land and may still be affected by violence and forced displacement in the future, it is difficult to begin a process of alternative development and attract international funding for it.

The current population of the region has not only been displaced by recent violence caused by the FARC, but the initial population of the region was made up of displaced farmers from elsewhere. This helps to explain the weak social capital, social cohesion and organisational skills generally found in the rural communities. The specific history of the region has also brought with it a problem of mentality. In comparison with some other regions such as Antioquia, the farming communities have focused on unsustainable exploitation of natural resources (cutting trees, rubber exploitation, hunting animals, etc.).<sup>1020</sup> In general, the farming communities have very few cultural connections to the areas where they are living and there is no sense or tradition of environmental conservation. In addition, the lack of official land titles also often prevents farmers from really investing in ‘their’ land or being able to apply for credits as they cannot prove that they are the owners of that land.<sup>1021</sup>

At the local level, alternative development is often a process of trial and error. For example, in the municipality of La Macarena three projects that were visited had failed,

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<sup>1019</sup>“We would be doing a bad job in saying to FUPAD ‘come on, start a project of rubber in this sector [of the Macarena]. It is waste of money.” Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1020</sup> Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1021</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

mainly because of the absence of a local market (a project in which women produced sweets and dairy products such as yoghurt through the *Asociación de Familias en Accion de La Macarena* (Asfamiaccioma) and a project to introduce pig farming (Asoporcimac)), or because of a lack of regularity in production (the vegetable project of the *Vivero Agroforestal Oxígeno* failed to deliver enough vegetables for consumption at the local military base in La Macarena).

One product with relative potential in the region is rubber.<sup>1022</sup> At present, there is only one rubber project in La Macarena, supported by the government and USAID since 2008.<sup>1023</sup> Through a local association, the *Asociación de productores de laminas de caucho* (Asoprolaca), 30 farmers receive technical support and have started a cooperative with a shared nursery. The advantages of rubber are the following:

- 1) It is indigenous to the region;
- 2) It can benefit from relatively cheap and large available plots of land that can be used for its production;
- 3) It is labour-intensive and can therefore provide livelihoods to many people;
- 4) The latex harvested is non-perishable;
- 5) There is a deficit on both national and international markets;
- 6) Rubber plantation projects are regarded as a type of reforestation and can therefore benefit from the Colombian government's initiative of *Certificado de Incentivo Forestal* (CIF), which is an economic incentive for farmers to directly support reforestation. It means the government will reimburse between 40 – 60 percent of the costs of investment in the form of subsidies to the rubber farmer.<sup>1024</sup>

As such, rubber may be a product that can overcome some of the structural challenges of alternative development products.

Given the comparative disadvantages the region has (limited transport and other infrastructure, high costs of production, tradition of exploiting and not conserving natural resources, lack of land titles, and the often isolated geographic location, especially for the central and southern parts of Meta), alternative development will in most cases remain a

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<sup>1022</sup> There are even rumours in the region that the FARC is promoting the cultivation of rubber trees locally. Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Asoprolaca, La Macarena (10 May 2013).

<sup>1023</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Asoprolaca, La Macarena (10 May 2013).

<sup>1024</sup> Planting of Acacia trees also falls under the support system of CIF as these trees benefit the soil.

subsidised government policy if national and international markets are not willing to pay the higher price for the products produced in this region. This partly explains why some of the local government staff members are sceptical about the strategy of alternative development. One representative says:

*“Yo soy de los que creen que el desarrollo alternativo se ha agotado. La sustitución de cultivos ilícitos debe pasar obligatoriamente por el tema de desarrollo integral. Y no considerarla como alternativa.”*<sup>1025</sup>

The concern expressed here is that alternative development simply does not work as a stand-alone strategy if the price of cocoa produced in remote areas is three times as high as in other areas such as Acacías<sup>1026</sup> (Meta) or in the department of Santander,<sup>1027</sup> the largest cocoa growing department of Colombia.

This is the reality in many areas, despite discussion of the “*idea romántica*” of a special brand for alternative development products.<sup>1028</sup> Similarly, another interviewee in Bogotá says that alternative development may be “*perdiendo fuerza*” (losing strength) in the international discourse on how to address the problem of illicit crops.<sup>1029</sup> This seems to suggest that alternative development should to a certain extent become regular development, but that could mean that certain vulnerable populations in areas with illicit coca cultivation and conflict will no longer be prioritised by the state or by the international community.

In the region of La Macarena, the main focus of alternative development is on livestock.<sup>1030</sup> This is a logical approach because approximately 90 percent of income comes from livestock breeding. Support takes the form of technical assistance, access to credit<sup>1031</sup> to buy livestock, and marketing assistance. An important ancillary objective is countering deforestation by increasing farmers’ productivity, but within the current perimeters of their

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<sup>1025</sup> “I am among those who believe that alternative development has been exhausted. The substitution of illicit crops should compulsorily be part of the issue of integrated development. And should not be considered as an alternative.” Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1026</sup> Around 66,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1027</sup> Around 2.3 million inhabitants.

<sup>1028</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1029</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Bioredd+ programme (27 May 2013).

<sup>1030</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Junta de Acción Comunal de la vereda La Cristalina, la Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1031</sup> In the municipality of La Macarena, the alternative development programmes enabled around 800 farmers to have access to bank credits worth approximately 2.2 million USD (1.67 million EUR) in order to invest in more livestock and the creation of capital.

plots of land. This means ensuring that farmers have more animals on their lands to avoid them destroying more forests to expand their fields.

The aim of protecting the environment is also evident in the other elements of the government's approach, including encouraging farmers to use less wooden posts for their fences (e.g. instead of a post every two metres, placing them twelve, fifteen or even eighteen metres apart). Also, given the problems of stable electricity in the remote rural areas, there has been a focus on providing solar energy to farmers, including solar powered electric fences to keep the livestock in the fields. In each project, the beneficiaries at the level of the *vereda* determine the priorities and local necessities. Subsequently, when the government delivers the required equipment, there is conditionality that farmers actively participate in the corresponding training and technical assistance guidance courses.

Government support is normally temporary. Once the equipment and technical assistance have been delivered and after some periodic controls, the objective is that these farmers become self-sufficient. Generally, the government provides one year of direct assistance<sup>1032</sup> and five years of indirect support and monitoring.<sup>1033</sup> Technical assistance, however, is challenging as the long distances that must be covered (on poor roads) mean that often support comes down to quick visits to only a few farms a day. Especially when organised through third parties, technical assistance can be very costly, often ineffective and take up a large part of the budget available for these projects.<sup>1034</sup>

In the case of the *vereda* La Cristalina, all fifteen of the local farmers were able to enter the programme. However, in other, more populated *veredas* such as Caño Azul and Primavera, the beneficiaries were determined by lot. This indicates that sometimes the whole community cannot benefit directly from alternative development projects. Sometimes, beneficiaries are also selected on the basis of their demands; some farmers do not benefit from the projects because their demands are unrealistic or do not fit the possibilities or priorities of the donor organisation.

For the families that fall outside of the programmes, there are some indirect benefits, for example in terms of investment in infrastructure (e.g. roads or a park for the village), public health, education (e.g. books, improvement of school infrastructure, technical courses,

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<sup>1032</sup> During the first year, farmers are shown on their own fields that they can improve production and productivity.

<sup>1033</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1034</sup> In the past, technical assistance has been offered by private consultancy firms, which resulted in only a few short visits a year at a relatively high cost. At present, with support of the government and the local bank, technical assistance can be directly arranged by the association, which means that they are no longer dependent on third party organisations (that provide poor services).

(for example, through SENA)) and the strengthening of local institutions (e.g. through training on project management, how to use credits and bank accounts, and bookkeeping).<sup>1035</sup> At all times, the objective is to indirectly benefit people at the local level, creating local employment and using local resources. What farmers in the area of La Macarena generally still demand are building materials (concrete) and improved roads.<sup>1036</sup>

In addition to the support of UNODC and UACT, the region also benefits from so-called *Alianzas Productivas*, project proposals that go through the Colombian Chamber of Commerce and the Department of Agriculture. This model often has no direct link with alternative development programmes, but nevertheless partners with Colombia's counter-narcotics strategy under the umbrella of the *Programa Proyectos Productivo*.<sup>1037</sup> It is presented locally as the most comprehensive approach, including all necessary (technical and agricultural) support from the farm to the market.<sup>1038</sup> For example, for livestock breeding, it includes visits of veterinaries and other technical experts to the farm. In terms of marketing, it includes identifying and making contact with the *aliado comercial* (a commercial partner that needs to be found before support can be granted), the direct buyer of the products. This means that most of the intermediaries in the marketing chain are taken out of the process.

The local second-tier association Aggapam in La Macarena has helped local associations to bid for several projects in the calls for proposals of the *Alianza Productiva*.<sup>1039</sup> To date, they have managed to develop two successful bids for the rubber tree projects, but have failed to obtain support for cocoa cultivation and other projects. The total grants to the alliance (benefiting 35 families through rubber production) were around 350,000 EUR (463,000 USD).<sup>1040</sup> The Department of Agriculture contributes around 15 percent and the programme *Colombia Responde* has so far contributed 25 percent of each of the successful proposals.

Last, a relatively new focus of alternative livelihood programmes in the municipality is tourism, which has grown significantly over the past three years.<sup>1041</sup> For the municipality of La Macarena, this has already resulted in the training of 33 *técnicos en guianza turística*

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<sup>1035</sup> Part of the indirect investment in local communities comes from an obligatory contribution by the project participants who have to reinvest part of their earnings in the *vereda*. Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1036</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Junta de Acción Comunal de la vereda La Cristalina, la Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1037</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>1038</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1039</sup> Personal interviews, representative, Aggapam, La Macarena (10 May 2013).

<sup>1040</sup> Colombia, Departamento de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Presentation, 'Proyecto Apoyo Alianzas Productivas' (19 July 2011).

<sup>1041</sup> Personal interviews, tourist guides, La Macarena (10 May 2013).

(tourist guides) with the help of SENA. They provide services for tourists, mainly connected to visits to the region's famous *Caño Cristales*, the so-called 'river of five colours' which during part of the year takes on several bright colours due to the blossoming of a specific type of moss growing on the river bed (*Macarenia clavigera*).

While tourism has the potential to grow significantly in coming years, the main difficulty is the ability to bring in tourists, which is severely limited by the lack of regional flights. The author flew to the region with the standard McDonnell Douglas DC-3, a plane made in 1947, which (like the horse and carriage awaiting the luggage in La Macarena) is a tourist attraction in itself, but not suitable for mass tourism. Also, when during popular weekends a few hundred tourists visit the village of La Macarena, the local supplies of food and drink are soon depleted. An additional problem is that the tourist season is relatively short (June to November). When the river moss is not blossoming and the river area is closed off, the region loses a substantial part of its attraction. The long rainy season, normally accompanied by flooding, further complicates the access of tourists to the region.

At present, roughly 20 percent of the tourists are foreigners. Although there is now enhanced capacity to receive a growing number of tourists and the few local hotels and restaurants have been improved, there is still a need to invest more in the tourism sector and the skills of the tourist guides (e.g. investment in foreign language skills and courses on the historic memory of the region). Further government support for the local tourism sector is expected next year, together with new opportunities for specialised distance learning despite the difficulties of slow internet connections. Among the priorities are to find access to specialised university courses and the promotion of complementary economic activities (e.g. making artisanal products) that tourist guides can engage in outside of the tourist season. Last, the additional benefit of a growing tourism sector is that it will also stimulate local demand for agricultural products and other services, for example through the hotels and restaurants in La Macarena.<sup>1042</sup>

In the municipality of San Juan de Arama, projects visited included fish farms, sugar cane plantations, and fruit and dairy farms. Contrary to the fish farms of the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta, the production in the fish farms of San Juan de Arama takes place in fish cages on plots of land on farms. In 2010, a local association of nineteen fish farmers received international support in the form of fish cages, young fish (*cachamba*) and fish food through

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<sup>1042</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Proyecto Piloto de Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional, La Macarena (11 May 2013).



a Call for Proposals of the European Union's third Peace Laboratory.<sup>1043</sup> The market for the fish is regional with buyers directly in the village and consumers mainly in the department of Meta.

Reaching more attractive markets, such as in Bogotá, would require switching to other fish varieties such as *tilapia roja* (the fish found in the fish farm projects of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta). The markets in Bogotá demand only very limited volumes of *cachamba*. Reaching out to new markets is also limited by the relatively small volumes produced (maximum three to four tonnes). Investigating ways to create more added economic value locally has so far led to two other bids for EU tenders to create a local processing plant (*planta de sacrificio*) which would produce pan-ready fish fillets. However, for the moment, the tenders for a processing facility and another one for refrigeration have not been successful.

Another alternative development project in San Juan de Arama, run by the *Asociación Campesina de La Macarena en Progreso* (Asocampo), focuses on sugar cane and fruit.<sup>1044</sup> This project came about after eradication of illicit crops left a group of farmers with no livelihood in the middle of the armed conflict. As a consequence, in 2006 between 80 and 90 percent of the population of the *vereda* Nuevo Progreso (located within the national park of *La Macarena*) were displaced. In 2008 government support arrived with several Calls for Proposal for the programme of *Progreso* (partly funded by international donors, including USAID).

To start the process of alternative development, initial support was arranged through SENA in the form of capacity building, which helped the local community establish the local association with 64 participating families. Following this, the first real project focused on the production of (raw) sugar cane, supported by the government with seeds, agricultural input and technical assistance. Five or six families also planted orange trees, supported with basic production infrastructure. Other families have livestock, corn, coffee or cocoa. The market for all these products is local.

Although the families now benefit from the basic infrastructure needed for alternative crops, there is still a need for more technical assistance, support and infrastructure such as a storage space. There is also still a risk that families will switch back to illicit coca cultivation. A project beneficiary explains:

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<sup>1043</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, fish farm project, San Juan de Arama (12 May 2013).

<sup>1044</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Asocampo, San Juan de Arama (12 May 2013).

*“Ningún cultivo es más rentable que la coca. Ninguno, porque se siembra una mata de coca y a los seis meses ya empiezas a sacar las hojas. En cambio, se siembra un árbol de naranja y a los cinco años empiezas a sacarla.”*<sup>1045</sup>

Coca also has the advantage of virtually automatic marketing channels as coca leaves are often sold directly at the farm-gate and the distance to processing centres may be relatively short as these are often in rural areas. Even where coca leaves have to travel long distances, the huge mark up (from leave to coca paste) easily accommodates higher transport costs. In contrast, if legal products such as cocoa beans travel the same distance, their inflated price may immediately render them unmarketable.

However, despite the comparative advantages of coca, project beneficiaries generally prefer not to switch back as – although the illegal crops were perhaps more profitable and easier to market – they also required additional payments (e.g. bribes) to many different groups and created food insecurity at the local level. While farmers earned more money with coca, local commodity prices (for example for scarce food crops) were very high. However, not all families in the *vereda* have stopped growing illicit crops.

One of the biggest problems for the local villages is that the process of territorial consolidation has not been started or completed in their area. Increased military presence of the state is needed. Asked whether the FARC would return if this does not happen, one beneficiary simply says: *“No, es que ya están”* (No, they are already there). It means that for this area, the precondition of security is not yet fulfilled, which means the process of territorial consolidation cannot be effectively started, and alternative livelihood interventions could suffer serious setbacks.

A third project visited in San Juan de Arama is called *Fenix del Ariari*.<sup>1046</sup> Project associates voluntarily eradicated their illicit coca cultivation and switched to milk production in 2000. Support from the state is much more recent, and has only been forthcoming since the security situation in the area improved. The main source of added economic value is a collection centre for milk, enabling farmers to distribute the milk collectively. Although more marketing support is needed, the basis of their production model has always been to work with an *aliado comercial* (trading partner).

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<sup>1045</sup> “Not a single crop is more profitable than coca. Not one, because you plant coca bush and six months later you already start to harvest the leaves. In comparison, you plant an orange tree and after five years you can start picking the oranges”. *Ibid.*

<sup>1046</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Fenix del Ariari (12 May 2013).

At present they are working with the Colombian companies *Lacteos El Recreo* and *Alquería*, which means the milk is processed elsewhere and ends up on the national market. The direct link between their local collection centre and these buyers means that many of the intermediaries that were previously part of the marketing chain have disappeared. This has increased their profits considerably and milk production currently provides them with a good income.

Despite the investments in the alternative development projects detailed above, and the possibility of access to *Alianzas Productivas*, in remote areas there is still a so-called risk economy, which means that illegal coca cultivation is still very much an option for many farmers, especially to diversify and hedge bets when confronted with uncertain and volatile markets.<sup>1047</sup> The continued presence of the FARC seriously limits the opportunities for and sustainability of alternative livelihood interventions in the department of Meta.

### 11.3 Linkages with the international level

#### 11.3.1 International support

Links with international cooperation in terms of support for the alternative development programmes implemented by UACT are largely limited to two countries: the United States with USAID (through its local operators ARD Inc. in the context of the programme *Colombia Responde*<sup>1048</sup>); and the Netherlands (through the *Fundación Panamericana para el Desarrollo* (FUPAD)).<sup>1049</sup> USAID is the government's main strategic partner for alternative development, managing about 70 percent of all international support in the region.

Through FUPAD, the resources of the Netherlands have focused in particular on strengthening the socio-entrepreneurial and socio-organisational aspects of production. The Netherlands is currently supporting the programme of *Apoyo a La Macarena Fase II*, which

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<sup>1047</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1048</sup> In the region of La Macarena, the American consulting firm ARD Inc (formally Associates in Rural Development) functions as the local operator for the American public funds for development cooperation. In coordination with the government, they support the process of national consolidation in the area. ARD is part of the company Tetra Tech.

<sup>1049</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

is directly related to the national policy of territorial consolidation.<sup>1050</sup> This programme's action plan has three components: 1) territorial order, property rights and land titling (mainly through the local institutions such as the *Juntas de Acción Comunal* (JAC) and municipal authorities); 2) good governance and strengthening of local institutions (including access to justice, government transparency and citizen participation); and 3) economic development. The latter focuses on supporting projects of agricultural production and strengthening of the entire production (value) chain by providing technical assistance, promoting access to capital and services, and by establishing institutional links (e.g. between the local (departmental or municipal) government and farmer associations) that can foster (alternative) economic development.

Through USAID and its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the United States has sponsored several programmes in the La Macarena and the department of Meta since 2007. Two programmes stand out that have been implemented jointly with the Colombian government. The first programme is *Colombia Responde*, which has focused in particular on small infrastructure projects (e.g. public health, transport, and energy and drainage systems).<sup>1051</sup> The programme works directly with local communities (and community leaders) to establish priorities. After a first diagnostic process, projects are selected and designed on the basis of local needs in the *veredas*. At present, most programme activities aim to improve livestock breeding and promote the combination of livestock and rubber trees. Other crops, (corn, cocoa and vegetables) are currently regarded more in terms of food crops (*pan coger*) and are not considered to be very competitive.<sup>1052</sup> In 2009, *Colombia Responde* included a total of 463 projects in six municipalities in the department of Meta with an overall cost of 28 billion COP (around 11 million EUR; 14.7 million USD).<sup>1053</sup>

The second programme is *Progreso*, an initiative that is more directly related to alternative development, providing farming communities with seeds, other agricultural

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<sup>1050</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, FUPAD, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1051</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Colombia Responde, La Macarena (11 May 2013).

<sup>1052</sup> In terms of food security, these crops may still be very important at the local level. The Colombian government has just started a pilot food security project in twenty municipalities that aims to create so-called *huertas de autoconsumo*, small-scale vegetable and fruit gardens that farmers introduce on their farms to increase their own food security. The food security pilot project is also indirectly linked to drug control as only farmers who have chose to abandon (or have already abandoned) coca cultivation can participate. Personal interviews, project staff, Proyecto Piloto de Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional, La Macarena (11 May 2013).

<sup>1053</sup> Colombia, Centro de Coordinación Regional, Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena, *Avances 2009 Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena* (Bogotá: CCAI, 2009), p. 13.

inputs and technical assistance to help them switch from the illegal to the legal economy.<sup>1054</sup> The programme places particular focus on short-term, rapid responses to farmers' needs.<sup>1055</sup> Between 2008 and 2009, 148 projects were carried out under this programme, for a total amount of 7.5 billion COP (almost 3 million EUR or 4 million USD).<sup>1056</sup> For example, the *Progreso* programme funded the alternative development project of the local association of Asocampro in San Juan de Arama to grow sugar cane and fruit.<sup>1057</sup> In San Juan de Arama, the United States (and other countries such as the Netherlands and Germany), have supported the process of consolidation, not only focusing on agricultural production but also on the issue of land titling.<sup>1058</sup>

The United Nations does not provide direct financial support in terms of development cooperation through UNODC. Locally, it acts more as an operator of resources through contracts with UACT, implementing and monitoring local projects. An example of this is UNODC's partnership with the government through the *Programa de Respuesta Rápida* (PRR, Quick Response Programme) which aims to bridge the trust gap between local communities and the government, by working on fast action projects focusing on the basic needs and priorities of the community. UNODC will also partner locally on a new project called *Proyecto de Contención de Cultivos Ilícitos*, which will work to substitute illicit coca cultivation and strengthen local institutions in the municipalities of La Uribe and Mesetas.

During the field research in the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (Chapter 10), one interviewee explained that UNODC's role as operator in local development projects also has disadvantages *vis-à-vis* the local communities. Although the funding could be coming entirely from the Colombian government, project beneficiaries often see the support of UNODC as a form of foreign development aid and not as support of their own government. This may therefore work at cross-purposes with the strategy of national territorial consolidation (bringing the state back in), as local populations may believe that the government is not really able to provide them with assistance. On the other hand, the opposite may also be true, as expressed by an interviewee in La Macarena. The label of international development cooperation may actually add credibility and neutrality to a

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<sup>1054</sup> USAID, *USAID/OTI's Integrated Governance Response Program in Colombia. A Final Evaluation* (Washington: USAID, 2011), p. 6.

<sup>1055</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Colombia Responde, La Macarena (11 May 2013).

<sup>1056</sup> *Avances 2009 Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena, op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>1057</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Asocampro, San Juan de Arama (12 May 2013).

<sup>1058</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Fenix del Ariari (12 May 2013).

project, because of the negative image of the government that exists in some rural communities.<sup>1059</sup>

The aim of the government is to link more international funding with national consolidation funding at the local level, as can be found in the example of an NGO that receives funding from Canada.<sup>1060</sup> However, at present there is very limited international support that directly or indirectly focuses on the development, strengthening and implementation of alternative livelihood projects. Through UACT, the government is also seeking international support for a proposal for a large collection centre for cocoa that they are currently working on for the Department of Agriculture. One of the areas where international support is particularly needed is to help establish a specialised centre that can guarantee that the end product is of high quality.

It is not clear why there is so little direct international support for processes of agricultural production related to alternative development. Each country sets its own priorities. Canada, for example, is promoting access to basic health care and other humanitarian assistance in four municipalities of Meta through the NGO *Médecins du Monde*. Some EU countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom also support projects in the department of Meta, but although some of these invest in the agricultural sector, during the field research none were found that directly address the challenge of illicit crop cultivation.<sup>1061</sup>

The European Union is also supporting the department of Meta. The department was included in the third EU *Laboratorio de Paz* (Peace Laboratory) and the EU also provided 80 percent of a total contribution of 8,704,677 EUR (around 11.3 million USD) for 40 projects in the region.<sup>1062</sup> However, much of this support is for human rights, governance, citizen participation, environmental preservation, land reform or general economic

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<sup>1059</sup> Personal interviews, representative, Aggapam (10 May 2013).

<sup>1060</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1061</sup> The website of the Information System of European Cooperation in Colombia (SICEC) contains information about the priorities of several EU countries in Colombia. It shows that in addition to the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Germany and Spain also invest in agriculture. Available online at: <http://www.sicec.eu> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>1062</sup> In general, the European Union has included the promotion of sustainable human development, the reduction of illicit crops and drug trafficking as priorities for the period 2007-2013. This does confirm that, at least in theory, the European Union considers drug control to be a key driver behind its support for Colombia. See: European Union, 'EU - Colombia: main areas of development cooperation', *memo*, Document: MEMO/11/743 (28 October 2011).

Reference: MEMO/11/743

development projects.<sup>1063</sup> Nevertheless, the Calls for Proposals of the third Laboratory directly benefited small farmers in the department of Meta, for example, the fish farmers association visited in San Juan de Arama.<sup>1064</sup>

More directly related to alternative development, the European Union is also co-financing a project called *Desarrollo Alternativo Preventivo* in the region of La Macarena within its broader programme Rural Development, Peace and Stability II of the Department of Social Prosperity (DPS).<sup>1065</sup> As of October 2011, in total the EU supported around 10,700 families with agricultural production and alternative development projects in the priority municipalities around the country, including La Macarena.<sup>1066</sup>

### 11.3.2 International market access

As is the case in other regions, international support for alternative development programmes in the department of Meta has been focused on strengthening the *procesos productivos* (the processes of production) and much less on providing marketing support.<sup>1067</sup> For this region, the opportunities to reach international markets are generally described as very weak by both project officers and beneficiaries. According to a UACT regional office representative, one of reasons for their weakness is that the production and marketing chains have too many intermediaries, which inflates the price of the raw materials or the end products.

*“El tema del mercadeo agropecuario nuestro tiene unos niveles de intermediación muy altos. Dentro de la cadena de producción se presentan unos actores que restan rentabilidad al negocio de los productores. (...) En cacao la intermediación es muy fuerte, y también en el café.”*<sup>1068</sup>

<sup>1063</sup> Herley Ramirez Alzate, ‘Embajadores europeos visitan laboratorio de paz del meta’, *Editorial Amazónico* (23 March 2012).

<sup>1064</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, fish farm project, San Juan de Arama (12 May 2013).

<sup>1065</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1066</sup> European Union, memo on ‘EU - Colombia: main areas of development cooperation’, Document: *MEMO/11/74* (28 October 2011).

<sup>1067</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1068</sup> “Our problem with the marketing of agricultural production is the high level of intermediaries. Within the production chain, several actors reduce the profitability of the producer’s trade. (...) With cocoa, intermediation is very strong, and also with coffee.” Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

These intermediaries have so far only been successfully removed from the production chain for a small number of products. Milk production is one of the exceptions with milk producers selling their product directly to processing companies. But even milk does not reach international markets and the production in the region would benefit from better transport infrastructure and better refrigeration.<sup>1069</sup>

One potential solution to the challenge of reaching international markets may be to create more second-tier associations that could directly connect with local producer associations and to sell their products collectively on international markets. However, connecting to international markets is not the only barrier to increasing international trading. Improvements to quality, focusing in particular on improving the post-harvest handling of products would also be of benefit. The produce from the projects sponsored by the Netherlands suffers from three classic marketing problems: *volumen, calidad y periodicidad* (not enough volume, poor quality and unreliable supply).<sup>1070</sup> The projects are working towards improving these deficiencies, but thus far improvements have not been sufficient for them to obtain access to international markets such as, for example, the Netherlands:

*“Hasta el momento, nuestras organizaciones de productores y nuestras producciones no dan para llegar a mercados en Holanda.”*<sup>1071</sup>

This is a generalised pattern found throughout the field research. The countries that do support agricultural production in Colombia do not seem to link this support either directly or indirectly to (potential) imports of raw materials or end products stemming from these alternative development programmes.

So far in Meta there are few initiatives that promote organic production. However, in the consolidation zone of La Macarena there has been an emphasis placed on producing premium coffee. Two producer organisations have already obtained international quality certification. However, despite the existing focus on premium coffees there has so far been no attempt to introduce specific local or regional brands or labels (comparable to the coffee brand of *Café Tima* found in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta or the label of *Chocolate de Tumaco*, which will be discussed in Chapter 12).

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<sup>1069</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (10 May 2013).

<sup>1070</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, FUPAD, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1071</sup> “For the moment, our farmer organisations and our products are not suitable to reach markets in the Netherlands.” Personal interviews, project staff, FUPAD, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).



There are plans to link local cocoa and coffee products to either Fairtrade or *sellos de origen* (certificate of origin) brands which would create more opportunities for international marketing. In 2008, two local premium coffee varieties produced in the municipalities of Cubarral<sup>1072</sup> and Lejanías,<sup>1073</sup> won international quality prizes from the Italian coffee brand *Illy Caffé*.<sup>1074</sup> The difficulty is to find international market niches that are attractive enough for special brands.<sup>1075</sup>

The additional marketing challenge that the region of La Macarena has in comparison with regions such as Tumaco and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta is its geographical isolation, which is exacerbated by inexistent or bad roads<sup>1076</sup> and other weak infrastructure. This increases the costs of transporting both the products and the agricultural inputs. In contrast to Meta, both other regions also have international ports nearby that could potentially take products relatively easily to international markets. But even if infrastructure were to improve, local production generally does not fulfil the marketing criteria of quality, volume and frequency.<sup>1077</sup>

The produce (mostly cows) of the *veredas* around La Macarena normally end up at local livestock markets (e.g. Acacías, San Vicente de Caguán,<sup>1078</sup> Florencia<sup>1079</sup> and Vista Hermosa) from where they are normally taken to regional or national markets in Villavicencio,<sup>1080</sup> Cali<sup>1081</sup> or Bogotá.<sup>1082</sup> They are not exported nor processed locally into meat products.<sup>1083</sup> Milk produced in the area (especially by those farmers close to the village centres or close to roads) is also for the local and national markets. In some regions, farmers or farming cooperatives have been able to secure a contract with the Swiss company *Nestlé* or with national companies.<sup>1084</sup> However, milk production in La Macarena is limited by the

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<sup>1072</sup> Around 5,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1073</sup> Around 9,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1074</sup> 'Seis caficultores del Meta ganan premio 'Taza de la Excelencia' por su café', *El Tiempo* (1 April 2009).

<sup>1075</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1076</sup> Of course roads are not a panacea as providing farmers with a good road to take their produce to the markets also offers competitors the opportunity to use the same roads to bring products to the rural areas that were once isolated.

<sup>1077</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1078</sup> Around 63,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1079</sup> Around 163,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1080</sup> Around 380,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1081</sup> Around 2.3 million inhabitants.

<sup>1082</sup> Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1083</sup> The animals are not butchered before transport, which could save up to fifty-five percent of transport weight. Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (11 May 2013).

<sup>1084</sup> For decades, Nestlé has been involved in (improving) milk production in the region, especially in the department of Caquetá.

lack of stable electricity supply for local processing or to refrigerate the milk before it is sold.

For the region of La Macarena, rubber could be one of the few products with interesting international market opportunities.<sup>1085</sup> The global market for rubber is expected to grow considerably<sup>1086</sup> and there are still no real synthetic alternatives to natural rubber.<sup>1087</sup> Even in the national market there is a huge deficit, with between 80 or 90 percent of the domestic demand currently being imported from Malaysia. However, local production has only recently started and rubber trees only start producing after five to seven years. In addition, the costs of investing in production are relatively high. These disadvantages explain why some local farmers are still hesitant about investing in rubber cultivation, as in comparison the earnings of livestock breeding are almost immediate (in fact very similar to coca cultivation, as cows can be sold at a profit after about six months) and require less investment at the outset.<sup>1088</sup>

In general, the production costs for most alternative development products (partly caused by the large number of intermediaries in the marketing chain), prevent them from being exported or even from reaching national markets. For example, given the high costs of production in Meta, it is currently cheaper to import rice from Ecuador.<sup>1089</sup> These international market dynamics even indirectly affect the (alternative) agricultural development programmes in the area. The low price of rice in Ecuador caused rice programmes in Villavicencio and Vista Hermosa to fail and as a consequence it has not been feasible to apply for more credits for programmes elsewhere in the region.

Last, for the region of La Macarena, the dominance of livestock breeding may also prevent farmers from readily switching to other alternatives. The violence that has affected the region makes many farmers prefer livestock as they consider this as a mobile asset that they can take with them if they have to flee the area again.<sup>1090</sup> This was one of the reasons why livestock breeding boomed after the end of the *zona de despeje* (and the peace process) in 2002. In the midst of uncertainty, farmers preferred livestock to sowing crops they would lose when having to leave the area at short notice.

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<sup>1085</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Colombia Responde, La Macarena (11 May 2013).

<sup>1086</sup> For example benefiting from a growing automotive industry in important consumer markets such as China.

<sup>1087</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1088</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Asoprolaca, La Macarena (10 May 2013).

<sup>1089</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1090</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Asoprolaca, La Macarena (10 May 2013); Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Asocampro, San Juan de Arama (12 May 2013).

In the municipality of San Juan de Arama, no products were found that are exported to international markets. Indeed, the fish production of *cachamba* hardly reaches national markets because as noted above, these normally demand a different type of fish (*tilapia roja*). The milk produced is only for the local and national market, as are the raw sugar cane and fruit produced in the local alternative development projects.

#### 11.4 Main drivers behind international cooperation

While indirectly supporting alternative development initiatives (as a way to reduce illicit drug cultivation), the support to Meta from the Netherlands has had a focus on human rights and conflict management or peace building. Within that operational framework, the support aims to foster security and socio-economic development at the local and regional levels, coupled directly with the protection of human rights, and other issues such as the conservation of the environment.<sup>1091</sup> Since 2000, the conservation of the environment (tropical forests) in the context of climate change has been an important driver of the Netherlands' support for the region and particularly the national park of La Macarena.<sup>1092</sup> This support is locally understood as a win-win situation for both the international community and Colombia: local projects in Colombia gain support for projects that can help to regulate the international problem of global warming.

In the department of Meta, the support of the Netherlands is locally described as focusing on good governance and citizen participation, for example by strengthening local justice systems and local governance through support for the *Juntas de Acción Comunal*. The Dutch Embassy in Bogotá currently lists the following five priorities<sup>1093</sup> of development cooperation in Colombia:

- 1) “*respect for human rights, good governance and social peace building*”;

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<sup>1091</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013); Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1092</sup> Personal interviews, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1093</sup> Taken from the official website of the Netherlands Embassy in Bogotá at: <http://colombia.nlambassade.org/organization/afdelingen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking.html> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

- 2) “*conservation and use of natural resources and eco-systems, aimed at protecting livelihoods and decent living conditions of the indigenous Afro-Colombian and rural communities*”;
- 3) “*development of the private sector as a source of income for the poorest population*”;
- 4) “*development of the formal economy; availability of government services and access to justice in (post) conflict territories*”;
- 5) “*cooperation between universities*”.

This means that indirect support for alternative development falls within broader priority areas such as socio-economic development in rural areas, the protection of indigenous communities or the conservation of the environment or bio-diversity of Colombia. As such, it seems that for the Netherlands, the need for alternative development is linked to either the negative effects of the conflict, for example in terms of human rights violations, or to the negative impact of illicit coca cultivation on the environment. With regard to this last relationship, this means that the overarching objective of protecting the national park of La Macarena results in support for alternative development in and around the park to stop the spread of illicit coca cultivation and deforestation.<sup>1094</sup>

A local project officer confirms that international support, especially from the Netherlands but also from France, has been motivated by the need to protect the environment:

*“Holanda, y Francia también, han hecho inversiones en el tema ambiental, en la protección del medioambiente y la conservación del bosque, por lo que se llama aquí ‘La Macarena, pulmón del mundo’. Como ellos no tienen la oportunidad de conservarlo [en sus países], ellos lo conservan en otros países para que el oxígeno de todo el mundo se conserve.”*<sup>1095</sup>

In the municipality of San Juan de Arama, the same driver behind international support is mentioned:

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<sup>1094</sup> Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1095</sup> “The Netherlands, and France also, have invested in the issue of the environment, the protection of the environment and the conservation of the forests, because what is called here ‘La Macarena, lungs of the earth’. As they do not have the opportunity to protect it [in their own countries], they protect it elsewhere in order to conserve the oxygen of the whole world.” Personal interviews, project staff, Colombia Responde, La Macarena (11 May 2013).

*“Sabemos que nosotros somos muy importantes para el desarrollo del universo. (...) Nosotros sabemos que aquí comienza la fábrica del oxígeno para el mundo. Estamos en una zona estratégica para el tema universal [del cambio climático]. Ellos nos subsidian para retener el carbono y producir oxígeno.”<sup>1096</sup>*

Regardless of whether the majority of the international community considers Colombia to be key in the global struggle against climate change, it is interesting that locally small farmers and project staff immediately make this connection.

Support from the United States is mainly driven by the agenda that was set in motion by the US support for Plan Colombia; to address all parts of the global drugs phenomenon and in particular those elements related to illicit drug cultivation and production at their source.<sup>1097</sup> This means that in Meta US support has had a much more direct link to drug control than the support from the Netherlands. Part of the US assistance is support for law enforcement, interdiction, the fight against precursors and the aerial spraying campaigns.

In the region of La Macarena curbing deforestation is an important driver because of the strong correlation between the economic activity of livestock breeding (or illicit coca cultivation) and cutting down trees. A project beneficiary in La Cristalina explains the typical process:

*“Talamos, quemamos, sembramos el maíz, que es el cultivo a corto plazo, recogemos el maíz. Después sembramos pasto y luego metemos el ganado. Y cuando ya hemos hecho este potrero, ¿qué hacemos? Bajo y tumbamos otros pedazos y empezamos de nuevo. Eso ha sido un ciclo vicioso que está deteriorando el medio ambiente.”<sup>1098</sup>*

The first two, three harvests of corn and manioc sown on the recently burned fields are very good. However, the soil quickly loses its fertility, partly because of soil erosion, and farmers

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<sup>1096</sup> “We know that we are very important for the development of the universe. (...) We know that the production of oxygen for the world begins here. We are located in a strategic zone for a universal issue [of climate change]. They subsidise us to retain carbon and produce oxygen.” Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Fenix del Ariari (12 May 2013).

<sup>1097</sup> Personal interviews, management, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1098</sup> “We cut down trees, burn the area, and sow corn, which is the short term crop, and we harvest the corn. Afterwards, we sow pasture and later we add the animals. And when we have created that pasture, what do we do? Go further down and we cut down other parts of the forest and start again. That has been a vicious circle that has deteriorated the environment.” Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Junta de Acción Comunal de la vereda La Cristalina, la Macarena (9 May 2013).

logically switch to pasture which gives them a guaranteed income when used for livestock breeding.

This process requires that part of the international support is (or should be) motivated indirectly or directly by the need to change the local mentality that it is only possible to increase productivity and income by cutting down more trees and adding new pastures. Locally, there are some nascent ideas to try and convince livestock farmers to dedicate one hectare of their often large plots of land to reforestation and persuade them of the benefits of silvopasture (combining forestry with livestock).<sup>1099</sup>

There is another structural problem in the department of Meta, which could be termed the ‘alternative development/environmental protection trade-off’. While illicit coca cultivation leads to deforestation, legal alternatives such as livestock may actually lead to more deforestation.<sup>1100</sup> Resolving this issue will require more social investments and education to slowly change the attitude of the people. In any case, it demonstrates that local (alternative) development programmes will always have to strike a delicate balance between regional development, environmental protection and the reduction of illicit crops.<sup>1101</sup>

## **11.5 Opportunities for the RISE**

This section examines the opportunities for the RISE as found in the department of Meta. It first addresses the pillar of shared responsibility (11.5.1) and subsequently the pillar of economic security (11.5.2).

### **11.5.1 Shared responsibility**

Evidence of shared responsibility in the department of Meta is very weak and mainly limited to the United States and the Netherlands. With regard to support from USAID, the alternative development programmes supported are about 30 percent dependent on

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<sup>1099</sup> Personal interviews, representative, Aggapam (10 May 2013).

<sup>1100</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiary, Fenix del Ariari (12 May 2013).

<sup>1101</sup> For the national parks, tourism could be added to this delicate balance, which also has both positive and negative effects on the environment and the development of the region. In other areas, the protection of indigenous communities is another ingredient in the mix of regional development policy.

international contributions,<sup>1102</sup> with the remaining 70 percent being provided by the Colombian government. The Netherlands has been a strong supporter of the territorial consolidation process since the early pilot project stages in 2007. However, its bilateral support is being phased out and is planned to be brought to a close by the end of 2014.<sup>1103</sup>

Related directly or indirectly to the illicit drugs economy in the region, the following gaps of shared responsibility have been identified in the department of Meta:

- 1) investment in social capital by further strengthening the local organisations and their capacity to manage processes of production;
- 2) international market access and marketing support;
- 3) investment in infrastructure (roads to markets, but also infrastructure, and information and communication technology);<sup>1104</sup>
- 4) international support to finalise the process of land titling (partly already supported, for example, by the Netherlands);
- 5) more social support and alternative livelihoods for young people to avoid recruitment by the FARC or by criminal groups.

Part of the lack of international investment can perhaps be explained by the insecurity and instability in the area. Some countries (and private investors) may be deterred from investing as long as there is fighting in some areas of the department of Meta. However, on the contrary, for other countries such as Canada and the Netherlands, this instable situation has been among the principle reasons to focus on this region through their development cooperation policy.

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<sup>1102</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1103</sup> Over the past few years, the Netherlands has been phasing out financial assistance to NGOs and the Colombian government. Financial support will decrease from 14,309,000 EUR (18.6 million USD) in 2011 to nothing by end of 2014. This also means that support for FUPAD will normally end in 2014. Nevertheless, Colombia can still be supported through a relatively new programme on public-private partnership related to water management and food security. After 2014, the official support of the Netherlands will be more focused on stimulating relationships ('matchmaking') between Colombian NGOs and Dutch private funding and institutions. See: The Netherlands, Letter of the Secretary of State Ben Knapen to the Parliament: 'Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking', No. 115 (2 November 2012).

<sup>1104</sup> Personal interviews, representative, mayor's office, Municipality of La Macarena (10 May 2013).

### 11.5.2 Economic security

The American and Dutch support for the territorial consolidation process in the department of Meta can be seen as directly related to economic security. At the level of the project beneficiaries, families and local communities, the support helps to establish an effective state presence, improves the provision of basic services and strengthens local institutions. This can be seen as direct support for economic security abroad in the sense of socio-economic development at the local level.

Secondly, at the level of the state, the international support for territorial consolidation in La Macarena can be described in broader objectives of economic security. It indirectly helps the Colombian government to establish, maintain and consolidate control over large parts of its territory. In Meta, this territory has vast amounts of natural resources (e.g. oil and gas) that can directly and indirectly boost the national economy. Oil and gas are found mainly around Puerto Gaitán,<sup>1105</sup> but new oil fields have been discovered elsewhere, for example in Juan de Lozada (La Macarena) and recently by the state company Ecopetrol in the municipality of San Carlos de Guaroa.<sup>1106</sup>

The department of Meta is an important crude oil production centre. It contains the *Rubiales* oilfield – Colombia’s largest – located in Puerto Gaitán, which was discovered in 1982. In 1988, oil production began through a commercial contract with Pacific Rubiales, a Canadian petroleum exploration and production company. That commercial contract runs until 2016. The economic importance of the *Rubiales* oilfield is clear: it produces more than 200,000 barrels a day; about 25 percent of the total national production of Colombia.<sup>1107</sup> Its importance in terms of national economic security is equally evident: in 2011, the company employed 7,900 people in this oilfield alone, of which 600 are direct employees and the rest sub-contractors.<sup>1108</sup> The commercial involvement of Canadian (or US) companies could have a direct relationship with the country’s investments in development cooperation in Colombia, but it is difficult to show such direct linkages.

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<sup>1105</sup> Around 22,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1106</sup> ‘Ecopetrol anuncia otro hallazgo de hidrocarburos en el Meta’, *El Espectador* (27 May 2013). See also: Camila Aristizábal Arango, ‘Hallazgo en Meta estimula leve repunte de acción de Ecopetrol’, *El Colombiano* (28 May 2013).

<sup>1107</sup> ‘Piden que Ecopetrol tome la operación total de Campo Rubiales’, *El Universal* (15 May 2013).

<sup>1108</sup> ‘Actos de violencia encendieron alarmas en Campo Rubiales’, *El Tiempo* (26 October 2011).



Territorial consolidation means bringing territories that have been isolated in political, social and economic terms back within the state structure.<sup>1109</sup> The department of Meta is a prime example. While the principle objective of much support is the promotion of economic development, justice and security of individuals and local communities, the protection of natural resources has grown in importance. For the Netherlands, protecting the natural resources and the national park of the Sierra de la Macarena has been an important driver behind its development cooperation in the region. Indeed, preserving the bio-diversity and carbon dioxide absorption capacity of the various national parks in the region is also an important issue area for the Colombian government.

The presence of three national parks in the region (the two other national parks are the *Parque Nacional Natural Sumapaz* and the *Parque Nacional Natural Tinigua*) could represent an additional driver of international support in terms of economic security. The department of Meta has some unique flora and fauna due to three important eco-systems coming together in the department (the Amazon, the region of Orinoquía and the Andes).

Future investments in rubber plantation can be considered an additional driver of economic security as part of the state's policy to preserve the environment. At the local level, the demand for these investments is currently promoted as a process of reforestation over 25 years.<sup>1110</sup> A local project officer explains the potential to boost international cooperation for such projects:

*“Aquí hay un gran potencial. Porque el medioambiente está de moda, puedes encontrar ONGs, embajadas de países como Holanda que pueden ver que es muy viable, por generar manos de obra, por generar una alternativa de desarrollo sostenible ambiental, para financiar proyectos alrededor de este tema.”*<sup>1111</sup>

USAID has already supported the first phase of the rubber project of *Asociación de productores de laminas de caucho* (Asoprolaca). Although the project perhaps does not fully restore the tropical forests or the biodiversity lost, in terms of carbon dioxide absorption, rubber plantations do present an interesting option for the region, particularly as a partial

<sup>1109</sup> Personal interviews, representative, UACT regional office, Villavicencio (9 May 2013).

<sup>1110</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (9 May 2013).

<sup>1111</sup> “There is a huge potential here. Because the environment is fashionable you can find NGOs, Embassies from countries such as the Netherlands that can see it is a very feasible option, because it generates jobs, because it generates an environmentally sustainable development alternative, to finance projects around this issue.” Personal interviews, project staff, UACT, La Macarena (10 May 2013).

alternative (or at least complementary livelihood strategy) to the environmentally harmful practice of livestock breeding.

Last, similar to the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, the economic security objective of encouraging farmers to remain in their rural areas was identified in La Macarena.

*“Resulta que los temas del conflicto, del narco-trafico, paramilitarismo, y otros conflictos internos, han generado desplazamiento del campesino hacia las ciudades. Lo que quiere el gobierno a través de estos programas es dar estímulos para que se quede en el campo.”*<sup>1112</sup>

In other words, it is in the state’s interests to want to encourage rural communities to remain in areas where they are a lesser burden on the state and can produce most added economic value. However, it is not clear whether this is also a driver behind international support for these programmes. It is seemingly a national strategy that was also found in the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.

## **11.6 Conclusions of the region**

Evidence of shared responsibility is very limited in Meta. Similar to the region of Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, it is mainly limited to the direct bilateral support of the US for alternative development programmes. Based on a political commitment that goes back several decades, the Netherlands can be said to also adhere to the principle of shared responsibility in the department of Meta (particularly in La Macarena). But while it locally supports some alternative development programmes through FUPAD, its objectives are much broader (governance, land rights, human rights, etc.).

The same can be said for the support of the European Union for the department of Meta through the third Peace Laboratory. The EU support of alternative development is

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<sup>1112</sup> “It happens to be that the issues of conflict, drug-trafficking, paramilitarism and other internal conflicts, has generated displacement of the farmer to the cities. What the government wants through these programmes is to give incentives so that they can stay in the rural areas.” Personal interviews, project staff, Proyecto Piloto de Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional, La Macarena (11 May 2013).

currently part of a broader focus on peace and stability.<sup>1113</sup> The EU supports local initiatives in various fields, including economic development, with the overarching objectives that these contribute to peace through local institutions and civil society.<sup>1114</sup> Nevertheless, the EU clearly presents its support for alternative development as part of its shared responsibility to tackle “*the scourge of drugs, the production and the trafficking of which directly feed the conflict.*”<sup>1115</sup> This means that (at least in theory) shared responsibility is established through the indirect impact of illicit drugs on the conflict in Colombia, which is one of the priorities of the EU support strategy in Colombia. However, while drug control is among the priorities of the EU,<sup>1116</sup> in practice in many EU-sponsored projects this driver seems to have less importance than other priorities such as general development, institution building, conflict prevention and the protection of human rights.

In the department of Meta, economic security as a broader state objective can be considered as an integral part of the government’s strategy of territorial consolidation. As the state begins to extend its control over territories, it also increases its control over the use of natural resources and the modes of production in those areas. In addition, the objective of economic security can be found in the importance placed on the protection of the national parks, also a priority for the international development cooperation of, for example, the Netherlands, as an important source of bio-diversity and (possibly) a safeguard against climate change at a more global level.

With regard to the protection of national parks, biodiversity and the environment at large, the department of Meta presents two challenges that set it apart from the other two regions visited. First, the tradition and dominance of the economic activity of livestock breeding presents an immense threat to the environment. Second, the ongoing presence of the FARC and the severity of the conflict in the department of Meta contribute to the abundance of illicit coca cultivation and explain why successful alternative development is unable to reach many areas. Both the legal economic activity of livestock breeding and the illegal economic activity of illicit coca cultivation place serious pressure on the environment through large-scale deforestation.

Using the RISE instrument, states could examine possible ways of dealing with these twin challenges within the framework of international cooperation and explore ways to strike

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<sup>1113</sup> European Commission, *Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>1114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>1115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>1116</sup> ‘EU - Colombia: main areas of development cooperation’, *op. cit.*

a sustainable balance between general rural development, environmental protection and alternative livelihood interventions. The RISE can help international donor states to set the priorities of where support is needed and help the Colombian government to design local alternative development projects that are not completely at odds with the (internationally supported) objective of preserving the region's bio-diversity, environment and capacity to absorb carbon dioxide.

One area identified during the research where more international support could be valuable in terms of economic security is the protection of the national parks in the department of Meta. However, for the moment, the ability of the Colombian government to fully control, access and protect these national parks is seriously limited by the ongoing conflict and the illegal drugs trade. In the department of Meta, the national parks would therefore benefit substantially from a peace agreement with the FARC.<sup>1117</sup> This would open up many more possibilities for international cooperation to protect the bio-diversity and ecosystems of the region. Table 2 below provides an overview of the main findings for the department of Meta.

**Table 2: Summary of main findings in Meta**

<b>Summary of main findings of the field research in the department of Meta</b>	
<b>International support</b>	In terms of bilateral support mainly limited to the United States (USAID) and the Netherlands. Locally, UNODC functions more as an operator of resources and in that sense cannot be considered part of international development cooperation. Multilaterally, the EU is the most important source of international support, mainly through the third Peace Laboratory, but only a small part of these funds are earmarked for alternative development.
<b>Main drivers of international support</b>	Illicit drug production (and general rural development), combined with conflict and violence (e.g. support for victims and displaced populations); promoting rights to land, strengthening of local institutions; and support for

<sup>1117</sup> Daniel Rivera Marín, 'Parques Naturales, beneficiados con la paz', *El Colombiano* (29 November 2012).

	indigenous communities.
<b>Products/projects supported internationally in the region</b>	Mainly livestock, milk, cocoa, coffee, sugar cane and plantain. Rubber is increasingly being promoted but so far production is limited.
<b>International market access</b>	Very limited. In the future perhaps rubber.
<b>Shared responsibility</b>	Only the United States and the Netherlands in terms of direct and indirect linkages between their support programmes and the objective of drug control. Through the EU, other countries could also be said to indirectly adhere to the principle of shared responsibility in relation to alternative development in Colombia.
<b>Economic security in terms of direct human security and socio-economic development</b>	Part of all international support to alternative economic development processes in the region.
<b>Economic security to protect natural resources, markets and other broader objectives of the state</b>	Can be considered to be part of the general international support to the government's strategy of territorial consolidation. More specifically, it has been found in terms of environmental protection as an important driver behind international cooperation in the department of Meta, especially in relation to the national park of La Macarena. Protection of oil production in the region is undoubtedly important, but seems to be more a state policy and less linked to international development cooperation. Last, the economic security objective of keeping people in rural areas was also identified in this region.
<b>Possibilities in the region for future products and services in the context of the RISE</b>	The potential of rubber trees seems to be high in the region. In general, for the department of Meta, private initiatives are seeking investments in the palm oil and bio-diesel sector.

*Source: construction of the author*









## CHAPTER 12: TUMACO, NARIÑO

This chapter presents and analyses the results of the field research in the region of Tumaco in the department of Nariño.<sup>1118</sup>

### 12.1 The context of the illegal drugs economy

In terms of trade, the department of Nariño<sup>1119</sup> is of geo-political importance. It is located in two natural corridors: one that runs from the north to the south (connecting the south of Colombia with Ecuador), and one that runs from the east to the west (connecting the Colombian Amazon with the sea ports on the pacific coast). However, unlike some of the neighbouring departments, these geographical conditions did not necessarily lead to the region becoming a substantial coca growing area.

Both the municipality of San Andrés de Tumaco<sup>1120</sup> (hereafter referred to as the municipality of Tumaco) and the department of Nariño have a relatively short history of illegal coca cultivation. Illegal crops only began to be cultivated in the region in large quantities due to the balloon effect, particularly after 2002 when 40,000 hectares of coca cultivation were destroyed in the neighbouring departments of Putumayo and Caquetá as part of the support for Plan Colombia (that had been launched in 2000).<sup>1121</sup> Not only the crops arrived in Nariño; many coca farmers were displaced from Putumayo by the massive aerial spraying campaigns.<sup>1122</sup> The local population also learned quickly how to grow and process coca.<sup>1123</sup> By 2003, the department of Nariño had become one of the top three of Colombia's

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<sup>1118</sup> The field research in Tumaco consisted of several visits to alternative development projects, mostly in and around the municipality of San Andrés de Tumaco. Although a wide range of programmes and projects were discussed in general terms during meetings, the main projects visited outside of the city were those of Monte Bravo, Palma Sur and the *Consejo Comunitario* (Community Council) of Bajo Mira y Frontera in Descolgado.

<sup>1119</sup> Around 1.7 million inhabitants.

<sup>1120</sup> Around 187,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1121</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>1122</sup> Witness for Peace, Minga and IPS, *An exercise in futility. Nine years of Fumigation in Colombia* (2009), p. 6. For an early paper on the aerial spraying campaigns under Plan Colombia, see: TNI, 'Fumigation and Conflict in Colombia. In the Heat of the Debate', *Drugs & Conflict Debate Papers*, No. 2 (September 2001).

<sup>1123</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

largest coca cultivating areas.<sup>1124</sup> Since 2006, the department has been the biggest coca growing region of Colombia.<sup>1125</sup>

The latest UNODC data shows that in 2011 Nariño's total area of illicit coca cultivation amounted to 17,231 hectares, almost 27 percent of the total cultivation for that year.<sup>1126</sup> Last year, 2012, saw a 38 percent decrease of cultivation, now totalling 10,733 hectares (22 percent of the 2012 total cultivation in Colombia).<sup>1127</sup> In 2011, the department of Nariño saw the aerial spraying of 34,988 hectares of coca (35 percent more than in 2010) and manual eradication of 14,231 hectares (45 percent less than the year before).<sup>1128</sup> In 2012, aerial spraying increased (for a third year in a row) to 37,891 hectares, while reported manual eradication decreased to 14,231 hectares (a 45 percent decrease compared to the year before).<sup>1129</sup> The trend for Nariño clearly seems to be more aerial spraying but less manual eradication. In addition to coca, opium poppy is also cultivated in Nariño – 229 hectares in 2011 and 205 hectares in 2012<sup>1130</sup> – making the department also the largest poppy growing area of the country.<sup>1131</sup>

More specifically, in 2011 and 2012, Tumaco was the municipality with most coca cultivation in Colombia, with a total of 5,771 and 5,065 hectares respectively.<sup>1132</sup> The importance of the municipality in terms of drug control is clear: if the government could somehow halt illicit cultivation in Tumaco, it would theoretically eliminate 10.6 percent of total cultivation in the country.<sup>1133</sup> Coca is grown principally in the area of Alto Mira. The increase in illegal coca cultivation since 2002 has prompted the government to include the region in recent years in the Programme of Productive Projects and the Forest Warden Families Programme (PFGB). In 2009, the department of Nariño ranked third in regions receiving investment in alternative development, with a total investment that year of more than 77 billion COP (32 million EUR or more than 41 million USD).<sup>1134</sup> In general, it

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<sup>1124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>1125</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>1126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>1127</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>1128</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>1129</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>1130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>1131</sup> *Colombia. Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011, op. cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>1132</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13; *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p.15.

<sup>1133</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012, op. cit.*, p.15.

<sup>1134</sup> *Colombia. Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009, op. cit.*, p. 67.

appears that the department of Nariño has attracted more investment in alternative development in recent years.<sup>1135</sup>

That same year, twelve *veredas* in Nariño were included in the PFGB: Belén, Colón, Consacá, La Cruz, La Florida, La Unión, Puerres, San Bernardo, San Pablo, San Pedro de Cartago, Sandoná and Taminango.<sup>1136</sup> As mentioned above, the PFGB strategy focuses on rural, indigenous and afro-Colombian communities in strategic environments that are affected or threatened by the presence of illegal crop cultivation. Nariño is home to several indigenous groups (e.g. the Awá, Inga and Pastos) and Afro-Colombian communities; descendents from African slaves that were sent to Colombia to work in gold mines, on sugar cane plantations or on large cattle farms.

The municipality of Tumaco is the only area in the department of Nariño that was designated as a zone of territorial consolidation within the current National Plan of Political Consolidation (PNCRT).<sup>1137</sup> In the past, it has had a very low state presence, which has made it attractive to armed and criminal groups.<sup>1138</sup> In addition to illegal coca cultivation, right-wing paramilitaries and the national Colombian army expanded their presence in Nariño, leading to more conflict. Today, the armed groups in Nariño are mainly the FARC, ELN, the drug trafficking gang Los Rastrojos and the paramilitary force/criminal group of Los Urabeños, all involved one way or another in drug trafficking.<sup>1139</sup>

In terms of basic development, the region still has many *veredas* with poor housing and no or very limited healthcare, sanitation, electricity and water. The prevalence of malaria is high. There is structural poverty among the Afro-Colombian communities with more than 70 percent living below the poverty line. The limited state presence and structural lack of development have turned illegal coca cultivation not only into an option, but for many families also into a necessity.

The combination of Tumaco's location on the pacific coast and its proximity to the border of Ecuador has increased the area's geo-strategic significance for armed and criminal

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<sup>1135</sup> Colombia. *Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012*, op. cit., p.25.

<sup>1136</sup> Colombia. *Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2009*, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>1137</sup> Colombia. *Censo de Cultivos de Coca 2011.*, pp. 68-71. Personal interviews, regional office UACT, Tumaco (3 May 2013). However, at the time of the field research six other municipalities of Nariño were considered for inclusion in the national strategy of territorial consolidation.

<sup>1138</sup> Personal interviews, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1139</sup> The paramilitary organisation Bloque Central Bolívar, part of the Autodefensas Unidas Colombia (AUC), used to control parts of the coca production and trafficking (south of the river Río Mejicano). The FARC controls the part of the trade north of the river. The ELN is still strong in Ricaurte and Samaniego, its headquarters and the place where it runs many drug laboratories, often in zones protected by the intensive use of landmines. In recent years, the more criminal-oriented groups of the Rastrojos and the Urabeños have taken over part of the drugs trade that was previously under the control of paramilitary forces or other groups.

groups involved in drug trafficking and all types of contraband.<sup>1140</sup> The geography (flood plains, rivers, marshlands and mangrove forests) has favoured the rapid spread of illegal coca cultivation and drug trafficking in Tumaco. The mix of underdevelopment, crime, insecurity, violence and high levels of illicit coca cultivation has turned Tumaco into one of the most challenging consolidation zones.<sup>1141</sup>

## 12.2 Overview of alternative development projects

In general, participants in the alternative development projects agree that the growth of the illegal coca economy in recent years has been one of the main sources of violence and forced displacement in Tumaco.<sup>1142</sup> One project beneficiary clearly states:

*“La violencia llegó a raíz de la coca.”*<sup>1143</sup>

That is also the reason why many coca farmers have been or are willing to abandon the crop. In the past, people were displaced towards the forests by the violence and conflict and had to make a living there, often finding that coca cultivation was the only option. However, coca cultivation has also not offered much more than a subsistence income for the *cocaleros* who harvest the coca leaf at the start of the production chain.<sup>1144</sup> This is very different from the accounts given to the author in the department of Meta where former coca growers state that illicit coca cultivation generated good income despite the many downsides of the activity.<sup>1145</sup>

Alternatives to coca cultivation are currently predominantly found in agro-forestry and (artisanal) fishery, producing timber, coconut, palm oil, cocoa, shrimp (and other fish) and plantain.<sup>1146</sup> Women play an important role in harvesting the *piangua* clam (shellfish), found in the mud among the roots of the mangrove trees, and *piangua ceviche* (raw *piangua*) is popular among the Afro-Colombian communities and in Ecuador.

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<sup>1140</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1141</sup> Personal interviews, regional office UACT, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1142</sup> Personal interviews, beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1143</sup> “Violence arrived on the back of coca cultivation.” Personal interviews, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1144</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1145</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Asocampro, San Juan de Arama (12 May 2013).

<sup>1146</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

For the Community Council ACAPA, consisting of 36 *veredas*, alternative development support focuses on cocoa (150 families), fishing (115 families), and food security<sup>1147</sup> (612 families). The main focus of alternative development here is twofold: reducing coca cultivation (although this is still found in the area) and promoting food security. The latter is important as coca crops replaced many food crops of the farmers, creating a significant problem of food insecurity.

Similar to the regions of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Meta, the author noted the overarching objective to encourage farmers to remain in these rural areas, strengthen the social fabric of the communities through social and cultural development, and provide them with an income within the legal economy. With regard to cocoa, participating families are granted one (additional<sup>1148</sup>) hectare of cocoa, which barely generates a subsistence income for them. A project coordinator of ACAPA says of the support granted:

*“Es suficiente para que el beneficiario pueda garantizarse el desayuno, y de pronto el almuerzo pero no la cena. El impacto es medianamente positivo.”*<sup>1149</sup>

An additional difficulty is that not all *veredas* or families can participate in such programmes because of limited resources, leading to often difficult (random) selection processes. In the case of ACAPA, 30 percent of families cannot participate in the programme for the moment, which means they can only benefit indirectly through some social or cultural development at the community level. According to the project beneficiaries, this has resulted in some of the families that are unable to participate in the programmes continuing or returning to illicit coca cultivation. The same problem was witnessed in the Monte Bravo project, where some families falling outside of the project (for example in Unión Río Chagui) continue to cultivate coca.<sup>1150</sup>

The fact that some families are not included in the projects has not resulted in violence.<sup>1151</sup> Returning to the threat analysis in section 5.6 of this work, there is no direct threat to economic security caused by the alternative development project (threats to economic security type 2), but the social fabric of the community may be at risk (which may

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<sup>1147</sup> Through stimulating the small-scale production of food crops to feed their families.

<sup>1148</sup> Additional to the hectares they may already have.

<sup>1149</sup> “It is enough for the beneficiary to guarantee breakfast, perhaps lunch but not dinner. The impact is fairly positive.” Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1150</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1151</sup> Personal interviews, beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

be weak or even absent in the first place<sup>1152</sup>) if some families abandon coca cultivation while others continue planting coca in the same *vereda* or wider rural area. Continued cultivation of coca could incur the risk of aerial spraying or drugs-related violence in farming communities where the majority of families have voluntarily abandoned illicit crops. It could also prevent the entire community from benefiting from alternative development programmes if these are conditioned on ‘*cero coca*’. In the context of the Monte Bravo project, some families consider it a type of discrimination that they are left out of the project interventions.

Overall, project beneficiaries seem to consider that social development should be stressed in parallel with the development of agro-forestry.<sup>1153</sup> Through the community, social development could make the reduction of coca cultivation sustainable by creating a new culture in which families (despite being faced with fluctuating prices for crops such as cocoa or plantain) do not fall back on coca cultivation. However, this means trying to incorporate all families in alternative development programmes or enabling them to benefit from other (government) programmes.<sup>1154</sup>

The ideal scenario would be for projects and initiatives to complement each other and together cover all Community Councils, and that different agencies help assist the rural communities. For example, the financial support of UACT alone is often not enough to help families plant the one additional hectare of cocoa that the government generally promises to project beneficiaries. The government only provides part of the economic incentive needed to start substituting crops and support is normally only temporary.

The Monte Bravo project began in 2004, working in three Community Councils in the river areas of Ríos Chagüí, Rosario y Mejicano.<sup>1155</sup> The project focuses in particular on sustainable forest management. The forest is presented as a system of traditional livelihoods, providing not only wood for the local communities, but also animals, fruit and (medicinal) herbs. Through the project, the Community Councils involved manage around 22,000 hectares of mangrove forest. Support has taken the form of technical assistance (focusing on

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<sup>1152</sup> It is not only the displacement following violence that has destroyed (part of) the social fabric of these communities. It is also the remoteness of the farmers’ fields that prevents them from having much contact with their neighbours.

<sup>1153</sup> Personal interviews, beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1154</sup> While the aim is to incorporate all *veredas* or families in vulnerable zones of conflict and illicit coca cultivation into alternative development programmes, the lack of resources prevents this from being achieved, often also hindered by the unwillingness of some families to join to programmes or their inability to fulfil the criteria or administrative requirements on time.

<sup>1155</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

socio-entrepreneurial and environmental skills), infrastructure development, and the small-scale marketing of agro-forestry products. Since 2007, the project has been more directly focused on crop substitution and by 2010 around 1,039 hectares of coca had been replaced with cocoa in the three *veredas* involved (benefiting 642 families between 2007 and 2010).

In 2012, the total number of beneficiaries had grown to 896 families, now reaching out to six Community Councils. With regard to the production of tropical wood, project beneficiaries can now sell their processed timber at the local market, whereas before it would be sold in bulk.<sup>1156</sup> As such, tropical wood is actually one of the few alternative products in Tumaco that is processed locally. The project beneficiaries of the *Asociación de Productores Forestales del Río Chagüí* (PROFORCHA) in Monte Bravo also see other benefits. The wood is now removed from the forest by lifting it using cables that were installed. Before, workers had to carry the wood out on their shoulders. The sustainable management of the forests has created employment and there are modest spill-over effects on local healthcare and education. In general, the social fabric of the community has improved. For example, some of the additional earnings are used to organise local bazaars, parties and football matches against other *veredas*.

A USAID-sponsored project of the Community Council of Bajo Mira y Frontera in the *vereda* of Descolgado has developed a large nursery and electrical drying centre to support the planting and replanting of cocoa trees. Almost 800 families benefit from the project, including 350 who are new to cocoa cultivation.<sup>1157</sup> The remaining families have, for a variety of climatic reasons, lost some of their trees or switched to coca in the past. The newly installed electrical drying facility can process five tonnes of cocoa per day.

The families involved in the project, selected by the *juntas veredales* (village councils, part of the broader Community Council structure) receive new trees, financed by the project, and corresponding technical assistance. Cocoa is often intercropped with plantain and cedar trees to provide additional income and (in the case of plantain) food security as *pan coger* (food crops).

Although cocoa is intercropped with other trees, this generally does not mean that cocoa cultivation takes place inside the tropical forests. The mangrove and other tropical forests are considered as a collective good, granted to the Afro-Colombian communities through collective (and not individual) land titles under Law 70 (1993). The collective nature of the land titles makes it difficult to work with the associative model (grouping farmers in

<sup>1156</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries of PROFORCHA (2 May 2013).

<sup>1157</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgado (4 May 2013).

clear product-based associations). So the Colombian government is working through the Community Councils, encouraging families to sign up and commit to the project to prevent them from leaving the area.

The Palma Sur project supports cocoa and oil palm cultivation with the economic security objective of improving the living conditions of farmers.<sup>1158</sup> The association was created to help farmers with the marketing of their products, for example by increasing their bargaining power *vis-à-vis* buyers, but also by lowering the administrative costs of the participating farmers. The organisation has received support from the Colombian government and UNODC, including for example, the creation of a cocoa processing centre. Acción Social (now DPS) and UNODC have also created a fund for the marketing of palm oil. In terms of alternative development objectives, Palma Sur has so far helped to decrease illicit coca cultivation by around 2,700 hectares, mainly by planting palm trees to replace the coca bushes.

Palm oil production is interesting because it has been one of the few successful agro-industrial activities in the municipality of Tumaco. It has generated directly and indirectly approximately 15,000 jobs corresponding to 35,000 hectares of oil palm cultivation. Of this, small and medium size farms occupy approximately 18,000 hectares, while the remaining land is given over to large plantations. The success of palm oil as a (guaranteed) export product was seriously compromised in 2006 with the coming of the *pudrición del cogollo* (PC), a fungal disease that affected virtually all palm oil cultivation in the region.

The disease put an end to palm oil exports, leaving farmers extremely indebted and unable to repay their credits.<sup>1159</sup> It also created the need to replant the entire region.<sup>1160</sup> In the meantime, many farmers have returned to cocoa cultivation or resumed growing illegal coca. If the substantial programmes of reintroduction and replanting of oil palm trees in the region are successful, guaranteed access to quite profitable international markets will normally follow.

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<sup>1158</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1159</sup> Credit is a significant problem, especially in the early stages of cultivation when it can take between four and seven years before the oil palm trees produce enough oil. One project beneficiary says: “Los bancos, pues hombre, los bancos se convierten en los ángeles de salvación o el ángel que se convierte en demonio.” (“Banks, well man, banks can turn into angels of salvation or the angel that turns into the devil.”). Personal interviews, project beneficiaries of the Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1160</sup> Part of the replanting means moving away from the variety *Elaeis guineensis Jacq* towards new, ‘hybrid’ types of oil palm trees that are more resistant to disease. However, replanting new varieties also means uncertainty, and the project beneficiaries visited by the author were still very much in the early stages of adaptation and testing. One of the differences is that the new variety needs more manual pollination. Personal interviews, project beneficiaries of the Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).



In the future, the Palma Sur project aims to increase local added value by enabling the farmers to directly process the palm fruit into crude palm oil. At present this is still undertaken elsewhere (within Colombia). Local processing would require investment, for example, through a fund that could provide the necessary credit needed to establish oil mills or extracting plants. This offers the international community an example of a concrete opportunity to fund an alternative development intervention that would generate an increase in local added economic value within the framework of a guaranteed international market.

### **12.3 Linkages with the international level**

Although the region of Tumaco has attractive beaches, compared to Santa Marta, it is not yet a popular destination for international tourists, partly caused by the low levels of security in the area. In general, the region is less well connected internationally, although the ports on the pacific coast provide plenty of opportunity for international trade. Section 12.3.1 will discuss the international support provided for alternative development programmes in the region, while section 12.3.2 will examine the opportunities for local produce to access international markets.

#### **12.3.1 International support**

The new project that the Community Council ACAPA is starting includes 20 out of a total of 36 *veredas*.<sup>1161</sup> The project is sponsored by USAID through its Bioredd+ programme (*Programa Biodiversidad-Reducción de Emisiones por Deforestación y Degradación*). At present the total investment is 2.445 million COP (around 1.2 million USD or 955 thousand EUR), targeting 3,400 families in 84 *veredas*.<sup>1162</sup> This project demonstrates that drug control is not the only driver of international support for alternative development. USAID support through its Bioredd+ programme can take the form of technical assistance, supply of plant material, and agricultural inputs. Following on from the earlier support for the Community Council of Bajo Mira y Frontera, it is the second community included in the Bioredd+ programme. The overarching objective of the Bioredd+ programme is the protection of

<sup>1161</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1162</sup> Colombia. *Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012*, op. cit., p.76.

biodiversity and vulnerable eco-systems through sustainable social, economic and environmental development.<sup>1163</sup> As such, the focus of the programme remains the support of agro-forestry and agricultural production but within a broader framework of environmental protection. Box 3 below contains more details about the Bioredd+ programme.

### **Box 3: The Bioredd+ programme**

The USAID Bioredd+ programme is a community development initiative that aims to help Colombia protect its biodiversity and eco-systems.<sup>1164</sup> Through Bioredd+, USAID develops and implements Redd+ projects (United Nations initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries). Bioredd+ has three main components. First, it focuses on the conservation of biodiversity through sustainable economic development and sustainable use of natural resources in protected areas. Second, it aims to mitigate the effects of climate change through the conservation of (tropical) forests and increasing access to clean energy sources. Third, it focuses on capacity building of local government and local community organisations to foster the conservation of bio-diversity and eco-systems through the proper and sustainable use of natural resources.

In the region of Tumaco, the programme is currently implemented in the Community Councils of Bajo Mira y Frontera and ACAPA (a total of 84 *veredas*). It was developed in response to the need to find sustainable solutions to solve the problem of deforestation. Earlier projects of sustainable forestry and timber production proved to be unsuccessful due to the high costs of the timber and the competition of the illegal timber industry. Agreements with local communities were reached with regard to the conservation of the forests through direct payments and technical assistance on the sustainable management of the forests. Accompanied by capacity building initiatives, support goes directly to the local Community Councils, who directly manage the resources and decide on project implementation and priorities.

Through the Acción Social (now DPS) programme of PFGB, the Colombian government contributes to the subsidy project beneficiaries get, which represents the direct link with alternative development programmes. To complement the objective of forest conservation (and to diversify from timber production), alternative economic development is promoted locally (e.g. fishing, *piangua*, coconut, cocoa and some eco-tourism). However, to

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<sup>1163</sup> See the website of the programme at: <http://bioredd.org/> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>1164</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Bioredd+ programme (27 May 2013).

enhance the sustainability of these economic development projects, linkages are established with the international market of carbon credits using the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS).

With international technological support (e.g. from NASA), accurate carbon and biomass estimates are established for the project area, and these are then linked to international investors interested in voluntarily compensating or reducing carbon dioxide emissions, for example through mechanisms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Initial linkages established by the programme with international companies (e.g. the agribusiness company Bunge) directly combine the selling of carbon credits with support for local (alternative) agricultural and agro-forestry production such as cocoa in Tumaco.

The component of the ACAPA project related to the protection of the mangrove forests in the area consists of protecting 6,433 hectares. Once the initial support has been received, the projects are connected to international organisations or companies with an interest in trading carbon emissions through the broader network of Redd+ projects, financed and supported by international organisations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). The projects visited in Bajo Mira y Frontera also fall under the USAID Bioredd+ programme.<sup>1165</sup> The programme establishes an indirect link between alternative development and environmental conservation, through the promotion of social and economic development (economic security) as an alternative to illicit cultivation.<sup>1166</sup>

However, it is currently doubtful whether there are more direct linkages between alternative development and these internationally supported programmes focused on environmental protection and climate change. For example, in some ways Bioredd+ can be considered as an evolution of more classic alternative development programmes. Inherent weaknesses of earlier support to agro-forestry production (timber, cocoa) have resulted in the incorporation of broader objectives (and marketing potential related to climate change).<sup>1167</sup> These broader objectives could perhaps trigger more (indirect) international support for alternative development programmes.

However, the Bioredd+ programme seems to be aiming to (partly) move away from classic alternative development, often associated with unsustainable forms of subsidised

<sup>1165</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgado (4 May 2013).

<sup>1166</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1167</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, USAID (27 May 2013).

agricultural production with few marketing possibilities.<sup>1168</sup> In that sense, international support is focused more on general community development, including the exploration of new marketing possibilities related to the international market of carbon credits. Nevertheless, the Bioredd+ programme has great potential if it is able to effectively bridge the gap between traditional alternative development programmes focusing on agricultural production and innovative international (niche) marketing options related to carbon credits.

Projects such as Monte Bravo are part of the territory of the Network of Community Councils of the South Pacific (RECOMPAS), a second-tier organisation that integrates fourteen community councils of Tumaco.<sup>1169</sup> RECOMPAS has benefited from the support of the Embassies of the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, USAID and UNODC, although not all of this support was directly linked to alternative development.

The municipality of Tumaco was included as one of the 75 municipalities (in twelve departments around the country) where the USAID/ADAM programme operated. In Tumaco, ADAM concentrated on cocoa and coconut, working in fourteen Community Councils. It also supported the project of Monte Bravo (coconut, cocoa, plantain, timber and forest replanting), milk projects in other areas of Nariño, and infrastructure projects in Tumaco. Overall, USAID has supported the planting of at least 2,000 hectares of cocoa, demonstrating the huge investments currently being made to revive and strengthen Colombia's position as a cocoa producer and potential exporter.<sup>1170</sup>

Some concrete examples: USAID provided 1,850,000 USD (around 1.4 million EUR) for the first 26 months of operation of project Monte Bravo (May 2004 to June 2006).<sup>1171</sup> Through MIDAS, it also supported the Agri-business Development Corporation in Tumaco (Cordeagropaz<sup>1172</sup>) by establishing 1,481 hectares of oil palm trees in the region for a total cost of more than 6.2 million USD (4.8 million EUR), ending in 2009.<sup>1173</sup> And, through ADAM and MIDAS it has generally supported the production and re-

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<sup>1168</sup> *Ibid.* The support of USAID for the Bioredd+ programme is part of its focus on the environment and climate change, not an integral part of its (earlier) programmes of alternative development.

<sup>1169</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1170</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, USAID (27 May 2013).

<sup>1171</sup> UNODC, *Evaluación Externa Proyecto "Manejo Forestal en la Costa Pacífica de Nariño del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo*, Documento: AD/COL/03/H70 (2006), p. 8.

<sup>1172</sup> Corporación para el desarrollo agro empresarial de Tumaco. This is also the organisation that provides technical support to the beneficiaries of the Palma Sur project.

<sup>1173</sup> USAID/MIDAS and Acción Social, Powerpoint presentation: *Portafolio de Proyectos de Palma de Aceite Apoyados por USAID* (2010).

establishment<sup>1174</sup> of cocoa in Tumaco, planting 3,100 hectares and re-establishing 517 hectares in Tumaco in 2009 and 2010, benefiting 2,100 families with a total investment of around 2.6 million USD (2 million EUR), half the total budget of the project.<sup>1175</sup>

The Palma Sur project is currently in the process of requesting support from the Inter-American Development Bank for the marketing of cocoa, including a fund that would provide working capital (e.g. for necessary investments) and would allow farmers to be paid immediately on delivery of their produce. While the organisation can produce premium cocoa (or so-called *cacao fino de aroma*) in the processing facility that was provided by UNODC, they stopped production as they were making a loss. Contacts are underway with Swisscontact, a Swiss foundation which promotes sustainable development to allow connecting locally produced premium cocoa with international markets. Contacts with other countries including France and Italy are also being explored.

Despite the dominant role of USAID and its operators ADAM and MIDAS, the agency is not the only international donor operating in Nariño. In 2003, the European Union included the department of Nariño in its second Peace Laboratory, co-financed by the World Bank and UNDP. Excluding the municipality of Tumaco, the programme included thirteen municipalities of Nariño, mainly in the north-eastern part of the department.<sup>1176</sup> Sustainable (alternative) development was one of the laboratory's three pillars. The other two were promoting a culture of peace based on dialogue and respect for human rights, and good governance, institution building and citizen participation (see Box 1 in Chapter 9).<sup>1177</sup>

More specifically, the European Union has been sponsoring a project called '*Sí Se Puede*' ('Yes it's possible') since 2008, focusing on voluntary eradication of illicit coca cultivation in the municipalities of El Rosario<sup>1178</sup> and Leiva<sup>1179</sup>.<sup>1180</sup> The support, promoted under the slogan of '*territorios libres de coca*' (territories free of coca) of the Department of Social Prosperity, has consisted primarily of technical assistance, fertilisers, other

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<sup>1174</sup> Particularly in the sense of renovating Colombia's relatively old cocoa cultivations by growing and replanting with new trees.

<sup>1175</sup> 'Millonaria inversión para modernizar cultivos de cacao en Tumaco', *Radio Santa Fe* (5 April 2011).

<sup>1176</sup> Taminango, San Lorenzo, Arboleda, San Pedro de Cartago, La Unión, San Pablo, Leiva, Rosario, Policarpa, Cumbitara, Los Andes, El Tambo and El Peñol. European Union, *II Laboratorio de Paz. Principales resultados y aprendizajes* (9 September 2011), p. 39.

<sup>1177</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 50.

<sup>1178</sup> Around 11,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1179</sup> Around 12,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1180</sup> Colombia, Gobierno del Departamento de Nariño, 'El Programa Sí se Puede inicio la entrega de insumos y abonos agrícolas', news release on the website of the departmental government of Nariño (5 March 2013). Available online at: <http://www.narino.gov.co/index.php/es/sala-de-prensa/2843-el-programa-alternativo-de-sustitucion-de-cultivos-ilicitos-si-se-puede-realizo-la-entrega-de-insumos-y-abonos-agricolas-a-50-familias> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

agricultural inputs and plant material, and has focused primarily on coffee, cocoa, plantain, lulo and other (citrus) fruit, grains and vegetables. The project is attempting to move away from forced crop eradication, instead aiming to rein in illicit coca cultivation through a combination of building trust with the farmers and boosting the leadership of local authorities.<sup>1181</sup> The first phase involved 1,500 families (with an EU contribution of 4.5 million EUR or 6 million USD).<sup>1182</sup> The second phase, which began in 2012 involves 1,930 families (with an EU contribution of 2.3 EUR).<sup>1183</sup> The marketing component of the project focuses predominantly on local markets.<sup>1184</sup> Given the general challenges related to local alternative development projects in Colombia, (low quality and volume, irregular supply, high production costs), *Sí Se Puede* aims to involve (local) businesses as project partners (in some cases directly forming project alliances with farmers in which companies ‘own’ 51 percent of the project and farmers 49 percent). These alliances aim to ensure that specific knowledge of new products and innovative market opportunities is included in the process. For example, *Sí Se Puede* is currently investing in a small-scale processing agro-industry of the product of *sacha inchi*, a nut oil with high omega-3 fatty acids that is suitable for both nutritional products and medicines.<sup>1185</sup>

International support has also come from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) which in Colombia is focusing in particular on displaced populations, but with two current project proposals that would support cacao production. A first project would plant 5,000 hectares of cocoa in the municipalities of Tumaco, Ricaurte<sup>1186</sup> and Barbacoas<sup>1187</sup> in the department of Nariño (with an investment of 16.5 million USD or 12.7 million EUR).<sup>1188</sup> For the same municipalities, a second IOM project would focus on the rehabilitation of an existing 5,000 hectares of cocoa cultivation to produce around 7,500 tons of cocoa (with an investment of 15.3 million USD or 11.8 million EUR).<sup>1189</sup> The two projects combined would

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<sup>1181</sup> Personal interviews, Plinio Pérez, General Director, *Sí Se Puede* Programme, Government of Nariño, Cali (26 July 2013).

<sup>1182</sup> Maria Juliana Torres, ‘Plan piloto para erradicación de coca y violencia en Nariño’, *Semana* (29 October 2008).

<sup>1183</sup> ‘Nariño: “Sí se puede” acabar con cultivos ilícitos’, *El Nuevo Siglo* (14 March 2012).

<sup>1184</sup> Colombia, Departamento de Prosperidad Social, ‘En Leiva y El Rosario, Nariño, “Sí Se Puede” Sustituir Cultivos Ilícitos’, news release on the website of the Department of Social Prosperity (22 March 2012). Available online at: <http://www.dps.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?conID=6491&catID=127> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>1185</sup> Personal interviews, Plinio Pérez, General Director, *Sí Se Puede* Programme, Government of Nariño, Cali (26 July 2013).

<sup>1186</sup> Around 13,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1187</sup> Around 30,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1188</sup> Francisco Javier Arias, ‘Caucho y cacao buscan “doliente\$”’, *El Colombiano* (25 May 2013).

<sup>1189</sup> *Ibid.*

benefit 5,000 families and would generate 10,000 jobs.<sup>1190</sup> Although IOM in Colombia receives support from several countries (Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US), the two new project proposals are mainly seeking funding from private capital funds.<sup>1191</sup>

Lastly, another internationally supported integrated development programme including alternative development objectives is called “*Una Ventana de Paz para Nariño*” (A window of peace for Nariño), focusing on municipalities in the north and south of the department (excluding Tumaco).<sup>1192</sup> This programme is sponsored by a fund for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals set up by the Spanish government and UNDP (with a total contribution of 7 million USD or 5.2 million EUR since 2009). This programme and the IOM-funded project mentioned above demonstrate that there are several international initiatives that will indirectly support alternative development, but that are not specifically branded as alternative livelihood projects, and can be considered more multilateral than bilateral in focus. Also, often they exclude the region of Tumaco.

### 12.3.2 International market access

There is potential to sell to international markets, but at present most alternative development produce from Tumaco does not reach international markets. Volume and quality are a problem, but there is also a lack of concrete international marketing strategies, particularly at the level of the Community Councils which have little knowledge about the possibilities and requirements of international market access.<sup>1193</sup> Investing in international marketing strategies is expensive and complex (e.g. in terms of costs to fulfil the criteria of international certification or EU market access requirements), and given the relatively low volumes of production, in most cases it is simply not worth the investment.

There is also a large knowledge gap between the small farmers and international buyers, and very limited local knowledge about international transport (e.g. how to ship a container abroad). While alternative development projects do intend to strengthen the bargaining position of small farmers *vis-à-vis* buyers (for example through first and second-

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<sup>1190</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1191</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1192</sup> For more information, see the official website of the programme at: <http://www.ventanadepaz.org> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>1193</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

tier agricultural associations), this relationship normally does not include international buyers, and is mostly limited to national middlemen or (in the best case) the national companies that process the raw materials.

The problem partly derives from the fact that international support has been mostly limited to supporting the production stage of the process (technical assistance at the cultivation stage). For example, USAID support until now has in the main included the provision of crops, agricultural inputs, technical assistance and capacity building related to project management, organisational strengthening and environmental management.<sup>1194</sup> Serious support for international marketing that goes beyond the provision of initial marketing feasibility studies is only recently being explored.

One beneficiary simply says:

*“El tema comercial es lo que necesitamos ahora. Porque estamos sembrando y sembrando, pero este tema se queda un poco aislado.”*<sup>1195</sup>

In the next few years, USAID programmes supporting cocoa, by far the flagship crop in Tumaco,<sup>1196</sup> appear to be aimed at international markets with around 5,000 additional hectares of cocoa. For the moment, however, marketing in Tumaco is principally a local and national affair despite the reasonable export potential of some alternative products. In general, some initial contacts are taking place with international foundations and multinational corporations such as Transmar Group to increase the export of Tumaco’s cocoa.<sup>1197</sup>

There is currently very little willingness, possibility or flexibility to incorporate the products from Tumaco’s alternative development programmes into the market of the European Union.<sup>1198</sup> Quality or sanitary regulations often prevent products from being able to enter the international market. In other words, shared responsibility currently stops at the level of international cooperation and support for agro-forestry production and does not include access to international markets.

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<sup>1194</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1195</sup> “We now need to work on the issue of marketing. Because we are planting and planting, but this issue is still a bit left out.” Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1196</sup> At least while the palm oil (export) sector is recovering from the 2006 fungus epidemic.

<sup>1197</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgadero (4 May 2013).

<sup>1198</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).



The focus of USAID (also through Bioredd+) is still mainly on increasing productivity and much less on improving quality. In general, at the level of international cooperation, the primary concern seems to be with how many kilogrammes can be produced for each hectare of land. The overarching goal of international support is that coca cultivation is substituted, and that the legal crop should be as productive as possible. Rather than potentially importing cocoa from Colombia in the future, the overarching objective is still mainly *zero coca*.

Even tropical timber from the area does not reach international markets. This is due to the high costs involved and the large number of intermediaries that need to be accommodated within the market. Thus, while an article about the Monte Bravo project in a 2008 UNODC/Acción Social publication mentions a “*guaranteed market*” and the “*gigantic potential*” of tropical timber (based on global population growth and the restrictions in place that make it difficult to subtract wood from such forests), the reality is very different. Transport problems, quality issues, market access and illegal competition all prevent Tumaco’s tropical timber from reaching international markets.<sup>1199</sup>

Although some of the tropical timber is sold in Bogotá, most of it is processed and sold locally. Expansion to neighbouring Pasto<sup>1200</sup> (Nariño) and Popayan<sup>1201</sup> (Cauca) is foreseen, but currently no outreach is planned to international markets.<sup>1202</sup> Tumaco’s ‘alternative’ tropical wood is not only competing with coca or foreign competitors, but also with a huge illegal timber industry in the region.<sup>1203</sup> While one cubic metre of alternative development timber may cost approximately 259 USD (200 EUR), illegally produced timber is available on the local market for about half that price at approximately 138 USD (107 EUR). In the town of Tumaco, this has resulted in the shop selling the alternative development timber (*La Tienda de Madera*) being located next to a shop selling the illegally sourced variety. It is a symbol of the huge challenges that the Colombian government and UNODC are faced with in Tumaco.

The partial exception to the lack of international marketing opportunities is *piangua*, which has a guaranteed market in Ecuador (and Peru). As much as 85 percent of national

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<sup>1199</sup> UNODC and Acción Social, *Organizaciones que cambian vidas. Programa Familias Guardabosques y Programa Proyectos Productivos* (Bogotá: UNODC and Acción Social, 2008), p. 88.

<sup>1200</sup> Around 417,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1201</sup> Around 268,000 inhabitants.

<sup>1202</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries of PROFORCHA (2 May 2013).

<sup>1203</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

production is said to be exported to Ecuador.<sup>1204</sup> But even for *piangua* there are very few serious strategies to seek new marketing opportunities abroad. An additional problem is that *piangua* may become extinct in the near future if the current rate of harvesting is continued.<sup>1205</sup>

The proximity to Ecuador may provide market opportunities but it also presents a challenge because the country is a substantial producer of cocoa, timber and shrimp.<sup>1206</sup> In the past Colombia exported cocoa, but at present it cannot even meet domestic demand, importing cocoa from Ecuador and Peru.<sup>1207</sup> While Colombia produces around 50,000 tonnes of cocoa each year, most of this is consumed domestically. In contrast, Ecuador produces around 200,000 tonnes and only consumes about 15,000 of it domestically.<sup>1208</sup>

The biggest difficulties in Tumaco seem to be the low yield of cocoa and the subsidies needed to support production, which also decrease competitiveness internationally. Ecuador is about three times more productive. Nevertheless, cocoa is generally considered to be one of Tumaco's potential future exports.<sup>1209</sup> One way to increase the marketing potential for the cocoa has been the creation of a regional brand called *Chocolate de Tumaco* to promote the specificities of the local cocoa, generally considered to be of high quality.<sup>1210</sup> For example, the Colombian company *Casa Luker* has a 'Tumaco region' product (65 percent pure cocoa), but it is not clear whether it is widely available in international markets.<sup>1211</sup> Paradoxically, when visiting Tumaco, it is impossible to buy a cup of chocolate made with local cocoa beans, except in a few places that sell traditionally produced, homemade chocolate.

The discussion of local, regional or international branding of alternative development products is interesting and part of the current debate in Tumaco. On the local and national

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<sup>1204</sup> Mauricio Silva, 'La ruta de la piangua, el molusco del Pacífico', *Revista Carrusel* (17 April 2013).

<sup>1205</sup> Previously, the *piangua* disappeared because of over-fishing in Ecuador and Peru. This means that sustainable harvesting is necessary in Tumaco to avoid depletion of this valuable natural resource. Illegal harvesting is part of the problem. For an interesting documentary about the fishing and *piangua* harvesting traditions of Tumaco, see: 'Tumaco Pacífico', a 2008 documentary of Samuel Córdoba. Available online at: <http://www.fundacionpromedio.com/?p=230> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

<sup>1206</sup> Personal interviews, regional office UACT, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1207</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013); Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1208</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1209</sup> The specific aroma and (potential) high quality of Tumaco's cocoa is mentioned several times during interviews. However, for the moment, Colombia's cocoa growing capital is San Vicente de Chucurí in the department of Santander.

<sup>1210</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013); Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1211</sup> The product can be found online at: <http://msk-ingredients.com/Chocolate/TumacoDark65-3597> (last accessed on September 13, 2013).

markets, it seems that the alternative development brands developed (for example from the department of Putumayo) currently do not provide any competitive advantages.<sup>1212</sup> Colombian consumers select their products on the basis of quality or price and not because of the specific characteristics of the regions where these products originate. But public buyers could provide a solution. For example, the government could stimulate alternative development production of cocoa to supply chocolate to Colombia's armed forces or in public schools or universities. Such a strategy could also apply to international donor governments in the context of the principle of shared responsibility.

Despite the fact that Bolivia is currently supporting the development of an international brand for alternative produce at the level of the CND (see Box 2 in Chapter 10), a local brand of alternative development produce may be preferable, for example, reflecting the specific living conditions and socio-cultural traditions of the Afro-Colombian communities in Tumaco. In other words, these brands could reflect the specific life style and traditions of the communities they originate in.<sup>1213</sup>

Such brands could encompass a specific product (such as *Chocolate de Tumaco*) or a range of products from the region (a brand of *Desarrollo Alternativo de Tumaco*). They could also be linked to the concept of 'slow food', a more expensive but locally produced chocolate of Tumaco, with the above-mentioned linkages to the specific culture of the Afro-Colombian communities that produce the cocoa.

In addition, growers from Tumaco could aim to produce premium quality cocoa, or to obtain organic production or Fairtrade certification. However, international markets for these products are relatively small, and would probably not provide livelihoods for all cocoa growers in Tumaco.<sup>1214</sup> Attempts to showcase chocolate candy (*chocolatinas*) from Tomaco abroad have already been made, but have so far not resulted in concrete export opportunities.<sup>1215</sup> For the foreseeable future, it seems therefore that most of Tumaco's cocoa will continue to feed the bulk production in national factories run by the *Compañía Nacional de Chocolates* and *Casa Luker*, two companies that together buy up as much as 86.7 percent

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<sup>1212</sup> Personal interview, representative, UNODC, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1213</sup> The idea here is that part of the satisfaction of consuming the product is not linked to the consumer enjoying it (e.g. a cup of hot chocolate or eating fresh fish), but is linked rather to the enjoyable or romantic lifestyle of the farmer or fisherman in the rural or coastal areas of Tumaco.

<sup>1214</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1215</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013); Personal interviews, project staff, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgado (4 May 2013).

of the national supply of cocoa.<sup>1216</sup> These also export chocolate-based products, but under national and international brands, therefore losing all connection to the cocoa's region of origin or the specificities of alternative development as a drug control strategy.<sup>1217</sup> The above-mentioned *Casa Luker* 'Tumaco region' brand is linked with the region of origin, but is not an alternative development brand.

One of the project beneficiaries observed in the interviews that it was important to find ways to break the 'monopoly' of the two big national processing companies in favour of regionally processed product varieties.<sup>1218</sup> While there is a certain amount of political rhetoric about the need to increase the control of farmers over the production chain, the market dominance of the two cocoa companies in Colombia does indeed represent a huge obstacle. Despite the virtual oligopoly of the Colombian cocoa market, in total, thirteen companies are said to be involved in the exportation of Colombia's unprocessed cocoa grain.<sup>1219</sup>

With regard to the market for palm oil, in the past the oil was processed in Colombia and exported as crude palm oil to markets in Europe and the United States.<sup>1220</sup> There is worldwide a growing demand for vegetable oils, which means that palm oil does have an interesting export market. However, in Tumaco the fungal disease (PC) decreased production so much that volumes produced are currently insufficient for international buyers. Farmers are starting to recover from the regional disaster and replanting with new varieties, but uncertainty remains. Although this process is supported by USAID, most of the beneficiaries who were interviewed are unaware of this international support or think it is insufficient to recover from the structural production crisis that resulted from the plant disease.<sup>1221</sup> The structural debt of farmers (a twin challenge of old debts that cannot be repaid and new debts needed to finance replanting), a consequence of the PC disease, is still a significant problem in the region.

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<sup>1216</sup> SIC, *Cadena Productiva del Cacao: Diagnóstico de Libre Competencia* (October 2012). Given the combined market share, one can refer to a Colombian oligarchy. In fact, in 2009 both companies were sanctioned for price fixing.

<sup>1217</sup> In fact, in Tumaco it is impossible to find a chocolate-based product that can be directly linked to the region's cocoa, except perhaps for some very small-scale artisan chocolate produce offered by some individual retailers.

<sup>1218</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgadero (4 May 2013).

<sup>1219</sup> *Cadena Productiva del Cacao: Diagnóstico de Libre Competencia, op. cit.*

<sup>1220</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1221</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries of the Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

Last, new international market opportunities may not relate to the alternative development projects themselves, but rather to the international market for carbon credits. USAID-sponsored initiatives within the framework of Bioredd+ are already connecting international companies to local projects in Tumaco.<sup>1222</sup> One interesting example can be found in the case of the multinational corporation Bunge, where international support combines buying carbon credits with support for new cocoa cultivation in Tumaco.<sup>1223</sup> The drawback of this approach is that connecting local projects with the international market for carbon credits requires a substantial amount of technical assistance and the fulfilment of strict criteria, very similar to the complex process of certification of organic or Fairtrade production. For example, projects must fulfil the conditions of the so-called Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), an established criterion to certify, measure and monitor carbon compensation projects. Such complex requirements could again make alternative development projects dependent on perhaps permanent (international) technical assistance and subsidies.

#### **12.4 Main drivers behind international cooperation**

According to the project beneficiaries of the USAID/MIDAS sponsored project in the framework of Bioredd+, one of the key drivers behind US support is the impetus these projects could provide for the protection of biodiversity in the face of climate change.<sup>1224</sup> The protection of the mangrove forests as a major source of biodiversity and oxygen is an additional driver behind international cooperation that can be considered an unexpected outcome of this research. It opens up new possibilities for more international support, whether indirectly or directly related to alternative development. The Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom and France are already working in this field or have shown interest in doing so in Colombia.<sup>1225</sup>

Despite the recent emphasis on deforestation, combating the supply of coca at its source remains a key driver for USAID's interventions in Colombia.<sup>1226</sup> The evidence for

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<sup>1222</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, USAID (27 May 2013).

<sup>1223</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1224</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1225</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, USAID (27 May 2013).

<sup>1226</sup> Personal interviews, regional office UACT, Tumaco (3 May 2013); Personal interviews, USAID (27 May 2013).

this can be found in the fact that support for local associations is still conditional to a commitment from farmers to maintain areas of cultivation free from illicit crops.<sup>1227</sup> Overall, USAID supports the Colombian government's policies, which means that its focus has also partly shifted to territorial consolidation, which includes a focus on illicit drug cultivation, but embedded in broader development efforts and local institution building.

The priority of the United States is not to create new legal markets *per se*, rather to reduce coca supply; the “*core interest*” of the US.<sup>1228</sup> As such, there is no notion of ‘project partners’ at the centre of their support (as opposed to more one-directional development aid), such as in the case of coal mining or oil extraction through multinational corporations. One could argue that in reality the US is not interested in promoting commercial ties with US companies or markets to import alternative produce (e.g. cocoa) produced in Colombia, but only in decreasing the amount of Colombian cocaine that reaches its streets.

The central objective of the US approach is to substitute as much illegal coca cultivation as possible and to increase the productivity (kilogramme per hectare) of the alternative crop, but without directly benefiting from the latter. The dual role of the United States, supporting both alternative development and the aerial spraying of coca crops creates concerns at the local level of the project beneficiaries:

*“De ¿qué nos sirve que nos ayuden con los proyectos productivos, y por otro lado nos ataquen llegando por el aire con glifosato? Llega el glifosato y nos mata el cacao que sembramos.”*<sup>1229</sup>

Many interviewees draw attention to the fact that the same international funding that is used to stimulate agro-forestry production is used to destroy part of it through aerial spraying that not only affects the coca crops, but also the rivers, livestock and legal crops.<sup>1230</sup> From an environmental perspective, spraying crops is considered detrimental, destroying insects, bees and bio-diversity in general. Apart from these environmental effects, it is also regarded as an

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<sup>1227</sup> ARD, IOM and PADF, *Territorios Étnicos Productivos. First Quarter Report Fiscal Year 2009. October to December 2008* (March 2009), p. 24.

<sup>1228</sup> Personal interviews, regional office UACT, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1229</sup> “What use is it to us if they are helping us with projects related to production, when at the same time they are attacking us from the air with glyphosate? The glyphosate arrives and kills the cocoa that we are sowing.” Personal interviews, beneficiaries, Community Council ACAPA, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1230</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013); Meeting regional office of UACT in Tumaco (3 May 2013); project staff, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

ineffective strategy as farmers will simply replant following fumigations if they have no profitable or sustainable alternatives to fall back on.<sup>1231</sup>

In Tumaco, the other main driver behind international support is the conflict and in particular the vulnerable situation of the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in the region. In addition to its concerns regarding conflict and drugs, USAID has a specific commitment towards the socio-economic development of these communities in this region.<sup>1232</sup> They are considered a priority because of their unique situation in terms of poverty, underdevelopment and vulnerability. A central part of this support is institution building and strengthening. This is achieved, for example, by giving direct responsibility and ownership to the communities via the boards of the Community Councils.<sup>1233</sup>

Starting in 2008, USAID financed half of the ‘*Territorios Étnicos Productivos*’ programme presented officially by President Uribe in 2009. The programme, focusing on the departments of Nariño, Cauca and Valle del Cauca, consisted of 36 production-related projects for Afro-Colombian communities with a total investment of 30 million USD (23 million EUR). The overall objectives of the programme were income generation, food security and strengthening of organisational capacity and institutions. For USAID, the primary objective, however, was increased production, and the support for governance and food security was secondary.<sup>1234</sup> In 2008 the promotion of cocoa production had by far the largest share of this programme (28 percent).<sup>1235</sup>

Although specifically related to areas dominated by Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, the programme’s ultimate twin objectives according to Uribe were: 1) zero coca; and 2) zero deforestation of the tropical forests.<sup>1236</sup> However, these two objectives may in fact function at cross purposes. For example, the 2009 evaluation report uses indicators such as the number of families or ethnic territories supported, but does not mention indicators related to the amount of hectares of forest saved.<sup>1237</sup> In what was above called the ‘alternative development/environmental protection trade-off’, alternative cultivation may very well lead to more deforestation.

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<sup>1231</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1232</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgado (4 May 2013).

<sup>1233</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, USAID (27 May 2013).

<sup>1234</sup> *Territorios Étnicos Productivos. First Quarter Report Fiscal Year 2009, op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>1235</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>1236</sup> Colombia, Presidencia de la República, ‘36 proyectos productivos para comunidades afrocolombianas e indígenas del Pacífico’, *Press Secretary of the Colombian government* (9 May 2009).

<sup>1237</sup> *Territorios Étnicos Productivos. First Quarter Report Fiscal Year 2009, op. cit.*, p. 7.

Last, a general driver of support for alternative development in Colombia can be found in future business opportunities.<sup>1238</sup> For Tumaco, one of the business opportunities identified in the field research is the nascent involvement of some multinational companies in the country (Transmar Group, Bunge, etc.). Through national embassies in Colombia or through foreign donor countries in general, such commercial connections could be further stimulated as an indirect form of increasing access to international markets, and fostering commercial partnerships through economic diplomacy.

## **12.5 Opportunities for the RISE**

This section investigates the opportunities for the RISE identified in the region of Tumaco, Nariño. It first addresses the pillar of shared responsibility (12.5.1), followed by the pillar of economic security (12.5.2).

### **12.5.1 Shared responsibility**

International support for alternative development in Tumaco is mainly limited to USAID and a small amount (approximately 10 percent) of funding from the UNODC programmes. Other countries, including Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands are working on different issues in Nariño, for example through NGOs operating in the areas of child development, human rights, support for (displaced) victims of the conflict, armed violence or humanitarian aid.

For alternative products such as cocoa, fish or timber from Tumaco, the barriers to reaching international markets are generally too high.<sup>1239</sup> In addition, the cost of timber or cocoa resulting from alternative development projects will almost always be higher than the international market price. In general, there is a lack of concern about quality, with projects focusing above all on productivity<sup>1240</sup> and selling to local markets. International support for

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<sup>1238</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, USAID (27 May 2013).

<sup>1239</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1240</sup> An example is the general introduction of highly productive cocoa tree clones that grow well in the climatic conditions of Tumaco (CCN-51 from Ecuador; ICS-95 and IMC-67 from Trinidad and Tobago). One project beneficiary comments that the highly productive cloned variety brought in from Ecuador has less flavour and has higher acidic characteristics. That means such cocoa needs to be blended with other varieties to obtain a



the processing of agricultural produce is sometimes provided, but without additional support to provide stable electricity and clean water, the processing of cocoa is normally not feasible. This means that it is cheaper to process Tumaco's cocoa in Cali or Baranquilla than in the region itself.

International commitment to consume minimum levels of alternative produce is required. Donor countries should move away from comparing the prices of alternative development products with the prices established by the international commodities markets, taking into account the social, political and environmental conditions of these areas related to conflict and illegal coca cultivation. One project representative says:

*“La bolsa de Nueva York no nos sirve. Necesitamos que nos ofrezcan un precio más alto para que el agricultor de una manera mejore su calidad, productividad y su ingreso (...). Pero todo se rige al tema de la Bolsa de Nueva York. Nadie paga por encima de esa bolsa”*<sup>1241</sup>

Currently, the higher transport costs alone (e.g. using canoes to move cocoa out of the remote forest areas of Río Chagüí to the first collection centres for cocoa bean in Tumaco<sup>1242</sup>) prevent alternative development produce from being competitive on the international markets.

Therefore, evaluating the benefits of alternative development requires a balance between economic profitability and social profitability. In other words, a project or product can be socially profitable and sustainable even when normal market conditions would render it unprofitable, but only if the (international) market is willing to accommodate the additional costs involved in production and marketing of the produce.<sup>1243</sup>

In practice, shared responsibility could also take the form of more reciprocal economic arrangements between Colombia and partner countries, such as the contracts negotiated for mineral or oil extraction in Colombia (see also below section 12.5.2 on

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marketable end product. Personal interviews, project staff, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgado (4 May 2013).

<sup>1241</sup> “The commodity market of New York does not work for us. They should offer us a higher price so that the farmer in a way can improve his quality, productivity and income (...). But everything is governed by the market in New York. Nobody is paying more than the price of that market.” Personal interviews, beneficiaries, Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1242</sup> Costs of shipping from Río Chagüí to Tumaco costs around 20,000 COP (10.8 USD; 8.4 EUR) for one bag of cocoa (50 kilogrammes). For one person, the costs of that trip are around 30,000 COP (16.2 USD; 12.6 EUR).

<sup>1243</sup> Personal interview, representative, UNODC, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

economic security). This enables a move away from the relationship of dependency model in which Colombia receives aid from a more developed country. It could increase the profits for the international partner while, for example, guaranteeing access to international markets for the local partner. At present, however, without access to niche markets there is little added economic value to work with for products such as fish or cocoa stemming from alternative development programmes.

Last, the following gaps of shared responsibility have been identified in Tumaco, identifying priority areas where (more) international support is needed:

- 1) guaranteed international market access and broader marketing support (to identify and access new markets) over a sustained period of time;
- 2) international investment and support for the implementation of alternative energy (and clean water) sources (increasing coverage of electricity in rural areas, boosting productivity and lowering costs of production);
- 3) international investment and support in transport infrastructure lowering costs of production.

Without additional support in these broad areas, alternative development in Tumaco for the foreseeable future will continue to consist of producing relatively low volumes of mostly raw materials (no agro-industrial processing), with low or medium quality, for mostly local and national markets and will be in permanent need of national subsidies to be sustainable and profitable for the farmer or fisherman.

### **12.5.2 Economic security**

Alternative development programmes in the region focus first and foremost on the first definition of economic security – the benefits in terms of human, economic and social development. To improve their income and living conditions, project beneficiaries are generally provided with food aid and/or with so-called *proyectos productivos*.<sup>1244</sup> The latter provide beneficiaries with an economic incentive (for example an initial loan or subsidy to move from coca cultivation to licit alternatives), a plot of land, technical assistance related to

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<sup>1244</sup> Personal interviews, regional office UACT, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

agricultural production and socio-entrepreneurial skills, some marketing (feasibility) support or agricultural inputs. A palm oil project beneficiary explains the general pattern as follows:

*“Para participar en estos proyectos hay un requisito, y es estar asociados. Y la asociación una vez se convierte en la base, la organización base para hacer todo el proyecto productivo. Y cuando hablamos de asistencia técnica no únicamente se refiere a lo que es campo o el cultivo. Se habla de una asistencia técnica integral, donde se trabaja los componentes [siguientes]: la parte productivo como tal, agronómica, la parte ambiental, la parte socio-empresarial o socio-organizativa e igualmente se trabaja la parte comercial. Dándoles a todos sus beneficiarios los elementos de capacitación para conocer el negocio.”*<sup>1245</sup>

This support does not necessarily increase income substantially but creates human capital and improves the general social and cultural living conditions in the area.<sup>1246</sup> It boosts social profitability.

The shift away from illicit coca cultivation also brings food security, an important part of human security and human development. Indirectly, support for the productive processes of agro-forestry through associations or through the Community Councils should also have some spill-over effects for healthcare, education, social and cultural development, but these effects can be said to be modest, particularly in the early stages of projects.

In terms of the second definition of economic security – the state’s endeavour to protect natural resources or markets - the designation of the municipality of Tumaco as one of the *zonas de consolidación* means that economic security concerns are inherently part of the state’s efforts to increase and maintain control over this part of its territory. However, the process of consolidation in the municipality of Tumaco appears to be in its initial stages, as intimated in a 2012 report by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)<sup>1247</sup> The analysis of WOLA of the consolidation process in the area is very interesting:

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<sup>1245</sup> “To participate in these projects there is a condition, you have to be associated. And the association becomes the basis, the organisation to carry out the whole productive project. And when we talk about technical assistance, it does not only refer to the fields or the crop. We are talking about an integrated technical assistance, in which the [following] components are integrated: the agronomic, the environmental, the socio-entrepreneurial or socio-organisational and equally the marketing issues. Providing all beneficiaries with the training elements necessary to know the trade.” Personal interviews, beneficiaries of the Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1246</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Monte Bravo project, Tumaco (2 May 2013).

<sup>1247</sup> WOLA, Indepaz, Center for International Policy and Minga, *Waiting for Consolidation: Monitoring Colombia’s U.S.-aided counterinsurgency and development program* (February 2012), pp. 2-4.

*“Why has Consolidation stumbled at the starting gate in Tumaco? The main reason is resources. Its far-flung geography makes Tumaco very hard to govern, and its high poverty and indigence rates mean that needs are greater. A proper Consolidation program in Tumaco would require an immense amount of funding – a large multiple of what USAID, other donors and the Colombian treasury are currently providing.”*

This suggests much more international (financial) support is needed to turn the current government strategy into a success in this region.

In terms of the protection of the environment, the approach appears to be more bottom-up than top-down. For example, the conservation of mangrove forests currently seems to take place at the community level through individual projects rather than through a clear, effective national state-driven policy. This is partly a consequence of Law 70 (1993) which placed Afro-Colombian communities at the heart of managing and preserving the fragile ecosystems of the region through the local administrative structures of the Community Councils.<sup>1248</sup> This sets this region apart from the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Meta. At the national level the apparent priority is economic (agricultural) production in these areas (partly to replace coca cultivation), and less the direct conservation of natural resources.

It is interesting that these environmental initiatives (or sub-objectives) are broadly supported at the international level, establishing international linkages with local projects that do not even necessarily need the intervention or involvement of the Colombian government. Projects aiming to protect the environment seem to generate more international support than traditional alternative development programmes based on drug control objectives which, by comparison, attract a very limited number of international donors.

Current support for alternative development in Tumaco is mostly limited to two or three parts of the operational triangle of: 1) the Colombian government (DPS-UACT-PCI<sup>1249</sup>); 2) UNODC (or a different local operator or NGO); and 3) USAID through its operators. This is partly confirmed by the 2011 Operational Plan for Tumaco of the PNCRT which only mentions international support from USAID through ADAM and MIDAS.<sup>1250</sup> As noted above, support from UNODC cannot really be considered as international

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<sup>1248</sup> Colombia, ‘Ley de Comunidades Negras’, No. 70 (27 August 1993).

<sup>1249</sup> The Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial (UACT) is part of the Department for Social Prosperity (PSD) and runs the Programme against Illicit Cultivation (PCI).

<sup>1250</sup> Colombia, Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (CCAI), *Revisión Plan Tumaco. Plan Nacional de Consolidación Territorial. CCR-Tumaco* (Tumaco: CCAI, 2011).

development cooperation, given that most resources for their programmes come from the Colombian government.

The only notable exceptions in the past have been support from Spain/UNDP for the programme ‘Una Ventana de Paz para Nariño’ and European Union programmes such as ‘*Sí Se Puede*’ and the broader operational framework of the three EU Peace Laboratories. These have, however, taken place outside of the municipality of Tumaco. There have been other (smaller) bilateral programmes in Tumaco or Nariño, often only with indirect linkages to alternative development, but they do not match the size and scope of the EU programmes and even less so for the USAID-sponsored programmes.

In terms of large-scale commercial interests (e.g. oil exploitation), the approach is much more top-down than the bottom-up community approach used when implementing alternative development strategies. Large-scale commercial activity normally operates through government contracts with foreign corporations (such as the Canadian *Pacific Rubiales*, mentioned above). But at present, the commercial interests and investments (e.g. in infrastructure) relating to the significant international oil markets cannot be compared in size and scope to the much narrower international interests in Colombia’s biodiversity and the absorption of carbon dioxide by the tropical rainforest. The latter is an emerging interest in economic security at the international level that could in the near future take the form of more trade in carbon credits related to projects in Tumaco. The question is whether it will attract more international state-level funding or other (private) investments.

The conflict in the region is not only the cause of coca cultivation and therefore of deforestation or environmental degradation. It can also be presented as a serious obstacle to the commercial exploitation of the area by international or national companies. An increase in security and stability would allow for more state presence and control, in turn allowing more alternative development and alternative livelihood programmes. This could, however, result in more deforestation, sometimes even directly through the alternative development projects themselves. For example, a project beneficiary could plant plantain and cocoa among the tropical trees, but could also decide to burn down part of the forest to raise livestock. This can be seen as an example of what Mesjasz called economic security threats relating to the economics of other sectors; in this case the value of the economic assets in the

environmental sector (see above section 5.6). Also, while some cocoa tree varieties can be planted among other trees,<sup>1251</sup> oil palm trees require complete deforestation.<sup>1252</sup>

This means that if alternative development interventions incorporate broader objectives of economic security relating to the protection of the environment or biodiversity, the very nature of the project may need to be changed, moving away from certain products or modes of production that would be counter-productive to the protection of the environment.<sup>1253</sup> The threat to economic security is related to broader ecological risks, which directly or indirectly affect all economic production within or outside of the areas where alternative development interventions take place. This means that incorporating broader environmental concerns in the design of alternative development programmes is now necessary.

At present, national programmes and strategies related to biodiversity and the protection of the environment largely fall outside of the scope of the PNCRT. One project representative of UACT in Tumaco comments:

*“En estos temas ya no entramos nosotros. Entra el Ministerio de Ambiente y en los municipios existen las secretarías de gestión ambiental. Entonces estos programas sí existen pero son de otras entes estatales.”*<sup>1254</sup>

Similarly, international mining or oil extraction contracts in Colombia are delivered by the Department of Mines and Energy. The economic benefits generated by the exploitation of oil and mining could indirectly support the government’s efforts in drug control (by increasing territorial control, enhancing economic security and directly supporting alternative livelihoods in the mining areas). However, there is currently no direct link between the national territorial consolidation plan and economic security in terms of protecting, promoting or even trading in natural resources. Nevertheless, at the local level DPS

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<sup>1251</sup> During the first three years cocoa trees require relatively high levels of humidity and about 70 percent shade. Following this, they need much more sun (and air circulation), which means other trees can be ‘in the way’. Personal interviews, project staff, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgadero (4 May 2013).

<sup>1252</sup> Personal interviews, project beneficiaries of the Palma Sur project, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

<sup>1253</sup> However, there is always a trade-off between environmental protection and the promotion of alternative development. Local communities need to have some sort of income and projects related to agriculture and agroforestry will always have some (necessary) negative effect on tropical forests or the environment at large. Personal interviews, project staff, USAID (27 May 2013).

<sup>1254</sup> “In these areas we don’t play a role. It is a task for the Ministry of the Environment and within the municipalities there are the departments of environmental management. So these programmes do exist, but they belong to other state agencies.” Personal interviews, regional office UACT, Tumaco (3 May 2013).

(previously Acción Social) connects with the Bioredd+ project beneficiaries because some government subsidies are allotted to the same project beneficiaries. This is the case for the Community Councils of Bajo Mira and Frontera, and ACAPA.

The lack of a direct link between the national strategy of territorial consolidation and international outreach to protect Colombia's biodiversity and the environment offers a clear window of opportunity for the RISE. While continuing to focus on illicit drug supply reduction (thus without changing the general character of the normative framework of the international regime, which would change the regime altogether) member states could incorporate new principles and norms related to biodiversity and environmental protection that go beyond those already identified in CND resolutions. With such a reinforced focus on the importance of economic security relating to the protection of biodiversity, natural resources and the environment at large, more international support could be garnered for supply reduction in source countries.

Last, as also witnessed in the other two regions, an additional link between broader national economic security policy and alternative development was mentioned during one of the interviews. As a sub-objective, it is in the Colombian government's interest to encourage the (young) rural population to remain in the rural areas.<sup>1255</sup> This not only reduces the need to provide emergency support at a later date (in the form of additional subsidies and food aid in the cities) but also prevents the recruitment of relatively unskilled and uneducated rural youth by the criminal gangs in the cities. This could be an additional driver for supporting alternative development as a national policy of economic security.

## 12.6 Conclusions of the region

Similar to the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, the international support focusing directly on the socio-economic development of the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities was an unexpected finding of the field research. It is an important driver behind the support of the United States for some alternative development projects.

As was the case in the other two regions visited, evidence of the principle of shared responsibility is again relatively weak, mostly limited to the United States. Although the European Union has intervened in some municipalities of Nariño as part of the second Peace

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<sup>1255</sup> Personal interviews, project staff, Community Council Bajo Mira y Frontera, Descolgado (4 May 2013).

Laboratory, this has excluded the municipality of Tumaco. No other countries were identified that directly contribute to alternative development projects in the region.

In theory, the linkages with economic security as a state policy are strong in Tumaco as the region is one of the *zonas de consolidación*. In reality, however, the security challenges in the municipality of Tumaco apparently prevent the process of territorial consolidation from fully completing its cycle and delivering in terms of an increased state presence and the provision of basic services.<sup>1256</sup>

The most interesting example of a connection between international support for alternative development and broader concerns of economic security was found in the USAID-sponsored programme of Bioredd+. While currently only implemented in two areas of Tumaco and still in its initial stages, it provides an example of how support for alternative agricultural production at the local level can be linked with international financial support related to the international market of carbon credits. The linking device is the importance given (both nationally and internationally) to the protection of natural resources and the environment; whether as a local source of income and stability, or as a mechanism to control climate change at the international level.

Through the RISE instrument, it is possible to further promote and strengthen such linkages between international support for environmental protection and local alternative development projects. It does not necessarily mean that states should directly support such projects, but they could play an active role in fostering relationships between private investment (e.g. international companies interested in translating CSR into assistance for programmes such as Bioredd+) and alternative development programmes. The growing importance of economic diplomacy could be significant to help create such relationships. Table 3 below provides an overview of the main findings of the field research in the region of Tumaco.

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<sup>1256</sup> *Waiting for Consolidation: Monitoring Colombia's U.S.-aided counterinsurgency and development program, op. cit.*, p. 4.



**Table 3: Summary of main findings of Tumaco**

<b>Summary of the main findings of the field research in the region of Tumaco, Nariño</b>	
<b>International support</b>	Mostly limited to USAID, with some additional support of UNDP and the European Union. UNODC acts more as a local operator of resources.
<b>Main drivers of international support</b>	Control of illicit drugs at their source, reduction of conflict and violence, increasing food security, socio-economic and institutional development of the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, and the preservation of Colombia's biodiversity and natural resources (through Bioredd+).
<b>Products/projects supported internationally in the region</b>	Chiefly cocoa, coconut, palm oil and timber. To a lesser extent artisanal fishing, sugar cane, rice, plantain, forestry plantations, some other crops, and silvopasture (combining forestry with animal husbandry). The protection of biodiversity and natural resources such as the tropical forests can be considered a relatively new issue area for alternative development support (conservation instead of production).
<b>International market access</b>	Almost inexistent, except for <i>piangua</i> , palm oil (before the fungal disease PC) and indirectly for some cocoa through bulk processing in factories outside of the region (mainly through the companies <i>Compañía Nacional de Chocolates</i> and <i>Casa Luker</i> ).
<b>Shared responsibility</b>	In terms of bilateral cooperation limited to the United States through USAID. This can be partly explained by the fact that the US is the principle market for Colombia's cocaine. Other indirect forms of shared responsibility can be found within the support system of the European Union, but its biggest programme, the Peace Laboratory does not include the municipality of Tumaco.
<b>Economic security in terms of direct human security and socio-</b>	At the basis of all international support for alternative development in the region. Economic security takes the form of programmes to enhance food security, generate income,

<b>economic development</b>	support socio-economic and cultural development and strengthen local institutions to support agricultural production and welfare creation.
<b>Economic security to protect natural resources, markets and other broader objectives of the state</b>	Less visible in terms of general international support, but identified in the context of the protection of Colombia's biodiversity, eco-systems and natural resources. The Bioredd+ projects represent the best examples found of how the protection of the environment at the local level is part of (initial) attempts to protect economic security at the international level. Last, as in the other two regions, the state objective of keeping (young) people in rural areas was identified in Tumaco as a form of protecting economic security (and avoiding threats in other sectors).
<b>Possibilities in the region for future products and services in the context of the RISE</b>	Potential of (eco) tourism, organic or Fairtrade production, and increased linkages to the international market of carbon credits. The potential for further growth of the cocoa sector in Tumaco is also high, for example, reflected in the planned investment by IOM in the sector in Tumaco.

*Source: construction of the author*

## CONCLUSIONS

These conclusions are divided into three parts: 1) a presentation of answers to the four key research questions and corresponding sub-questions; 2) an assessment of the validity of the hypotheses as stated at the beginning of the research and 3) a response to the central argument of the dissertation, including an analysis of the opportunities the RISE can offer to increase and strengthen international support for alternative development.

### **Answering the research questions**

The first research question reads: *To what extent have local and national alternative development projects in Colombia been connected to the international level in terms of support and access to international markets?* International support for alternative development is very limited. Only a handful of countries directly support alternative development programmes in the three regions visited during the field research in Colombia. While the three regions studied are quite different with regard to their general characteristics, the findings in terms of international support for alternative development were remarkably similar. Beyond the support of the United States, there is very little bilateral support. Multilateral support identified is mostly limited to the European Union, but often not directly related to alternative development. While 53 countries annually commit to support alternative development at the CND, there are clearly only a few that directly support these strategies in Colombia. This points to a disconnect between the obligations of states to support alternative development and the reality in Colombia (in general terms, corresponding to rule 4 of the RISE, but specifically corresponding to rules 10, 11 and 12).

Access to international markets is clearly more the exception than the rule. Most alternative development products do not reach international markets, despite the fact that this is another state obligation at the international level of the United Nations (see in particular rules 11, 12 and 13 of the RISE). Only very few alternative development products reach international markets, either because of elements relating to quality-volume-frequency, or because of complex market restrictions. While both the United States and the European Union have implemented special preferential trade regimes for Andean countries, these seem

to be designed exclusively to stimulate agricultural or agro-forestry-led development, and not specifically alternative development. This exposes a second disconnect: while a wide range of products benefit from reduced or zero tariffs, international market access for alternative development products is not guaranteed.

The second research question reads: *What have been the main drivers behind international support for alternative development projects as implemented in Colombia?* While the control of illicit drugs is clearly an important driver behind the support of the US, the European Union and a small number of other countries, there are various other drivers. The additional drivers identified are institution building/strengthening (mostly related to conflict resolution or to general rural development), human rights (often related to conflict, displaced populations and violence) environmental protection, and the socio-economic and institutional development of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. The latter is an unexpected finding of the research. While the support for indigenous communities was expected to be mostly a domestic (public) policy for the Colombian government, several donor organisations (particularly USAID and the European Union) focus specifically on supporting these communities, sometimes in direct relation to support for alternative development.

All of the drivers of international support that were identified can be said to have some (predominantly indirect) links to the global drugs phenomenon and the strategies used to address it. However, bilateral support often appears to draw the line at implementing alternative development programmes. For example, many countries focus on human rights protection and conflict resolution but without making the connection with alternative development. While one of the sub-objectives (or broader drivers) may be related to concerns of donor states with regard to Colombia's illegal drugs economy, this generally does not translate directly into concrete support for alternative development. This means that many countries do not strictly abide by the numerous rules identified that relate directly to international support for alternative development (e.g. rules 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13 of the RISE).

The third research question reads: *To what extent has the principle of shared responsibility been an active component of international support for alternative development projects implemented in Colombia?* Although it is difficult to confirm that shared responsibility is actually occurring in practice (beyond looking at statements of policy-makers), the research has been able to identify some elements of shared responsibility by

answering the first two research questions. First, in bilateral and multilateral terms, international support for alternative development strategies has been identified. Second, drug control has been an important driver behind international cooperation in Colombia.

However, in a more direct, bilateral sense, shared responsibility is mainly limited to the United States, and a small number of other countries such as Italy and the Netherlands, which are among the few which could claim that they abide by the rules relating to international cooperation on the basis of shared responsibility (rules 1, 2 and 4). While the US assistance for alternative development dwarfs that of all other countries, even small contributions such as the Italian support for a honey processing plant in Santa Marta can be considered evidence of shared responsibility. However, it could be argued that without the support of the US there would be virtually no shared responsibility relating directly to alternative development. Most non-US bilateral development cooperation in Colombia is not linked to drug control objectives at all. The reasons for this are unclear, but it may be partly a consequence of the much criticised US support for Plan Colombia, which has perhaps driven a wedge between the US and other countries with regard to development cooperation and drug control efforts in Colombia.

Through multilateral frameworks such as the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank or UNDP, shared responsibility is more broadly identified, but in those cases the principles becomes weaker (except for some concrete cases in which countries such as Japan or Spain support specific programmes within these multilateral structures). And even within multilateral frameworks such as the EU, only a small number of countries contribute directly to alternative development.

This general conclusion also allows the more specific sub-questions of question 3 to be addressed. The first sub-question is: *Is shared responsibility – as the link between the international agreement on a balanced approach and the actual alternative development policies supported by the international community – any more than political rhetoric and is it applied in a rigorous manner?* For a few countries, shared responsibility clearly goes beyond political rhetoric, as demonstrated by their direct support for alternative development strategies in Colombia. As such, these countries can be said to comply with essentially all rules identified as part of the RISE. Others may indirectly contribute through multilateral structures such as the European Union, but in their case it is more difficult to assess whether this means that they firmly commit to shared responsibility for drug control in any way other than through statements made during the annual CND sessions.

The second sub-question reads: *Are there areas where shared responsibility is missing as a guiding principle leading to action?* An important gap of shared responsibility identified by the research relates to international support for (niche) marketing and access to international markets. For example, states should increase the access to their domestic markets for alternative development products from Colombia (rules 13, 15 and 16 of the RISE) and make more effort to support strategies that aim to increase added economic value, for example through the promotion of organic or Fairtrade certification processes (rules 14, 15 and 16 of the RISE). In this context, the central objective of shared responsibility is to improve quality, develop niche products, and lower the costs of agricultural and agroforestry production so that more alternative produce can reach international markets.

A second broad shared responsibility gap identified is related to infrastructure – in terms of transport, information and communication technology, and energy. This could be related to Rule 5 of the RISE, which is concerned with complementing alternative development with broader institution and capacity building. It could also be related in general terms to Rule 13, which is concerned with access to markets. The main objective of shared responsibility in this context would be to lower the costs of transport to help alternative produce to reach international markets. Concerning this second shared responsibility gap, the Colombian government should also play a substantial role in creating and improving the (transport) infrastructure of the country. As such, it is less clearly a domain where the international community should be exclusively responsible in assisting development in Colombia.

A third shared responsibility gap is also linked to institution and capacity building (Rule 5). Increased international investment is needed to develop social capital by further strengthening local agricultural organisations and their capacity to properly manage processes of production. As a prerequisite to improving and stimulating alternative agricultural production, a fourth shared responsibility gap regards the support needed for proper land titling and the protection of land rights (Rule 14). While some international support is already in existence (e.g. from the Netherlands), additional support could improve the land titling system as a sound basis for investment and innovation in agricultural and agro-forestry production.

Last, a gap of shared responsibility to provide more social support and alternative livelihoods targeting young people was identified. If the Colombian strategy to encourage young people to remain in rural areas is to be achieved, more support is needed to design and

implement strategies that specifically focus on the youth as a separate target group for alternative development. This is of particular importance to help prevent young people from being recruited by criminal organisations, the ELN or the FARC when they move to the cities. The very young population and relatively high birth rate of Colombia means that this is something that the international community should take into consideration when supporting alternative development.

Without additional support to bridge the identified gaps (particularly those directly related to agricultural and agro-forestry production), alternative development programmes will probably continue to require state subsidies, especially when faced with the twin challenge of low (international) market prices for products such as cocoa or coffee and relatively high production costs for these as alternative development produce in Colombia. As a general rule, it appears that alternative development projects will need much more support if they are to move away from the current standard of producing relatively low volumes, focusing especially on producing low quality raw materials (as opposed to agroindustrial production) for predominantly local markets and often under subsidised schemes.

The third sub-question of research question 3 reads: *Can shared responsibility and related international principles and norms be regarded as a constituent part of the normative framework of an international regime?* The research concludes that they can be. At the international level of the CND, shared responsibility is widely accepted, strongly promoted and mentioned in virtually all resolutions and decisions dealing with alternative development. Through the international drug control treaties, the political declarations (1998 and 2009) and various CND resolutions, the international community has clearly committed to the norm of supporting drug producing countries with alternative development interventions on the basis of shared responsibility (see above all norms 1, 2, 3, and principles A, B and C).

The fourth research question reads: *To what extent has the principle of economic security been an active component of international support for alternative development projects implemented in Colombia?* Taking the first definition of economic security as human development and the socio-economic development of rural communities, economic security has been an active component of virtually all alternative development strategies supported by the international community in Colombia. As such, all international support seems to abide by Rule 10 (human development) and Rule 12 (economic security).

However, taking the second definition of economic security as a broader state policy to protect markets and natural resources (abroad), the links with international support for alternative development become weaker. The clearest connection between foreign support for alternative development and natural resources is the broadly shared importance given to environmental protection at the international level. In fact, countries appear to more widely and structurally support the protection of the environment and bio-diversity of Colombia than the reduction of illicit drug cultivation.

Although the international concern for environmental protection could be regarded more as ‘environmental security’ than economic security, it is not implausible to consider the protection of the environment abroad (e.g. in the light of climate change) as a direct or indirect way to protect economic interests and assets (abroad and at home). Alternatively, Jaap de Wilde has presented economic problems, for example, related to unsustainable modes of production, as a subcategory of the “*environmental agenda*.”<sup>1257</sup> However, as the importance of the environment as it relates (both in positive and negative terms) to alternative development strategies has been another unexpected finding of the research, a proper analysis of how environmental security relates to economic security, and how alternative development programmes could benefit from this link cannot be undertaken here and must be the subject of further research.

The first sub-question of question 4 is: *To what extent has Colombia established a positive relationship between alternative development policies and the concept of economic security?* The positive relationship is broadly established through the widely implemented strategy of placing human development at the heart of alternative development projects. It has been less clearly found in terms of the protection of markets, national interests and assets abroad, and natural resources. International support for environmental protection as a key strategy to save the ‘lungs of the earth’ or the Andean water systems has provided a first clear relationship. A second, connected relationship was found in the region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, where international support for the preservation of the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta is directly related to the protection of alternative livelihoods for the thousands of fishermen and families dependent on the natural resources it provides. While the first case could be regarded as the protection of economic security at an international level, the latter is limited to the national level of Colombia.

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<sup>1257</sup> Jaap H. de Wilde, ‘Environmental Security Deconstructed’, in: Hans Günter Brauch *et al* (eds.) *Globalization and Environmental Challenges. Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century* (Berlin: Springer, 2008), p. 598.



The second sub-question of question 4 is: *To what extent can support for positive policies to boost economic security in Colombia be found in international and bilateral support programmes?* As already described above, boosting economic security in terms of human development is firmly integrated in most international and bilateral support programmes related to alternative development. When considering the second definition of economic security, it is less visible. This can be partly explained by the fact that the protection of Colombia's markets and natural resources (for example through the conservation of national parks) is primarily a responsibility of the Colombian government.

However, there are some examples of environmental protection programmes linked to alternative development that could be considered a positive economic security policy supported (or even implemented) by donor countries. The USAID-sponsored Bioredd+ programme is the clearest example. While technically not a classic alternative development project, the programme has indirect links with the creation of alternative livelihoods and direct links with the promotion of public-private partnerships to boost private investment for alternative development. In this case, it is an example of the protection of economic security on two levels: in Colombia in the form of human development for cocoa producing communities and at the international level in terms of climate change mitigation.

Last, in this research it has not become clear to what extent international development cooperation is linked with the protection of economic security in the form of commercial interests such as oil and gas exploitation. Even if such linkages are strong, few countries would readily admit that their development cooperation is predominantly motivated by commercial interests abroad.

### **Evaluating the hypotheses**

The research contained eight hypotheses. These will be briefly evaluated below. Hypothesis 1 states that the self-interest of states would be an important driver behind a state's decision to invoke the principle of shared responsibility and collaborate on alternative development. Although it has proved to be difficult to find clear evidence for this through the analysis of local alternative development projects (as opposed to, for example, interviewing policy-makers in the capitals of the donor countries), the importance of drug control as a driver often inherently includes self-interest. This is evident in the case of the United States.

Without the US, there would be practically no shared responsibility relating to alternative development in Colombia and it is clear that this is partly motivated by the domestic interest to curtail the availability of illicit drugs on American streets. Although self-interest is undoubtedly an important (additional) driver for states, it is difficult to say that it is also the primary driver behind support for alternative development. Other important considerations (such as upholding human rights, defending international values or respecting international commitments) also play a role. It is, however, very difficult to establish a hierarchy among them on the basis of this research.

Hypothesis 2 states that the paradigm of Neo-Realism was expected to provide the most accurate explanatory framework for cooperation between states in the context of alternative development. With very limited international support found, this becomes a difficult hypothesis to prove. However, the lack of international cooperation on alternative development strategies could in fact be explained rather well by the paradigms of Realism or Neo-Realism. The main explanatory element would be that states do not really consider it necessary to cooperate with Colombia with support for alternative development as they do not consider the illicit drugs reaching their markets as a serious threat to their survival, economy or power. Applying that line of thought could also explain why there seems to be significant international support for the protection of the environment in Colombia: the risks associated with global climate change may have a more direct relationship with the survival of a state, particularly in recent years when more scientific evidence of climate change has become available.

Hypothesis 3 states that Colombia could function as a benchmark for the international community to improve its support for alternative development policies through an international regime. This is the case, particularly because of the almost 30 years of experience Colombia has with alternative development programmes, and because of the recent change of policy, which integrates alternative development more in broader policies of security, territorial control and governance. The latter shift will undoubtedly be analysed by other countries implementing or supporting alternative development interventions.

Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 are related to the character of the International Economic Security Regime. The RISE was initially expected to be an informal regime (hypothesis 4). This is true in general terms, but if regarded as a sub-regime within the broader international drug control framework, it becomes more formal. The instrumental framework of the international regime has actually proven to be quite specific and strong, containing seventeen

identified rules and linking directly to a concrete set of ten principles and seventeen norms. This means that if states were willing to create the RISE within this broader policy framework, it could become more formal because it would be based on the quite specific norms and rules of the international drug control treaties and CND resolutions.

Hypothesis 5 states that the RISE would be more ‘specific’ than ‘diffuse’. This is indeed the case as the focus would be on only one strategy (alternative development) and perhaps even a more limited or specific issue area within that strategy. For example, states could decide to focus exclusively on reforestation or niche marketing in relation to alternative development.

Hypothesis 6 states that the RISE would also be a ‘partial’ regime in the sense that it would be limited by the consensus of states, thus not including certain (more sensitive) issues. It was complicated to assess the value of this hypothesis in the research as it proved difficult to compare international support for alternative development, mainly because so little was found. Nonetheless, the strategy of aerial spraying of coca crops has clearly prevented the existence of a broad consensus among the international community, and may have directly contributed to less support for alternative development. Any sub-regime that would include the countries of the EU would probably not include a component of support for aerial spraying of drug-producing crops.

Hypothesis 7 states that Colombia’s alternative development driven counter-narcotics policy has very little impact on narcotics control at the global level. An examination of the availability of illicit drugs on international consumer markets demonstrates this indeed to be true. Although there may be long-term effects that are not yet visible, on the basis of the past 30 years, it could be argued that alternative development in Colombia has not actually decreased the supply of cocaine or heroin in international markets, which have proved to be remarkably stable. This does not mean that alternative development in Colombia has been a failure. At the national level, illicit coca cultivation has decreased substantially. Between 2000 and 2012, illicit coca cultivation in Colombia has dropped from 163,000 to around 48,000 hectares, a 70 percent decrease. Nevertheless, although alternative development has undoubtedly played a role in this reduction, it is very difficult to measure its exact contribution, particularly because factors are involved which operate outside of Colombia’s borders (e.g. the balloon effect).

Last, hypothesis 8 relates directly to the previous one. It states that alternative development can currently only work at the national and sub-national level. At the

international level, only the simultaneous implementation of large-scale, effective alternative development programmes (or general rural development) in all drug producing countries could perhaps create some short-term impact, but even then illicit production would eventually move elsewhere as long as the demand for cocaine persists. This does not mean alternative development is a flawed strategy as such; it simply demonstrates that a more concerted, internationally implemented and supported approach is needed. This provides additional support for the case to explore opportunities the RISE could offer the international community of states.

### **Conclusions regarding the main thesis**

The central argument of this research is that Colombia can be considered as a benchmark for the development of an effective international regime on cross-border support for alternative development strategies to address the supply of illicit drugs around the world. This regime – a construction of the author and the key academic contribution of the research – has been called an International Economic Security Regime (RISE, using the Spanish acronym of *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica*). Testing the functional instrument of RISE in three regions in Colombia has indeed provided a strong case for the development of a specific international regime on alternative development. The creation of a RISE would be relevant for states in four ways, explored below.

The first significant contribution of the RISE would be that it could increase international support for alternative development on the basis of shared responsibility. The research has clearly shown that international support for alternative development in Colombia is very limited, and only involves a handful of states. Although not part of this study, this situation could be similar in other illegal drug producing countries such as Afghanistan, Bolivia or Peru.

The second significant contribution of the RISE would be that it allows states to work on very specific issue areas within the framework of alternative development. This is achieved through a positive mechanism of international cooperation, for example, related to the protection of the environment and bio-diversity, the human development of indigenous communities or the promotion of public-private partnerships. It offers the advantage of

focus. The functional instrument could also be used to bridge some of the shared responsibility gaps identified above.

Third, an unexpected finding of this research has been that the threat relating to the supply of natural resources is not only important for individual states, but also for the international community of states, which undertakes to boost economic security at the international level through the protection of natural resources (and biodiversity) around the world. This is particularly the case with regard to the interests of international companies involved in mining or oil exploitation, but can also be applied to environmental concerns. The RISE would offer a framework to connect the protection of this type of economic security to alternative development in a positive way. Through the RISE, states can link policies of environmental protection abroad to drug-control objectives in alternative development programmes or to other strategies such as conflict prevention or human rights promotion. At present, the clearest example of such a link is the USAID-sponsored Bioredd+ programme, but this is currently limited to the US and only implemented in two Community Councils in Tumaco. The functional framework of the RISE could open up such programmes to more international support, regardless of whether countries are driven more by economic security or by (related) environmental security.

Last, by incorporating concerns about environmental protection and bio-diversity within alternative development, the functional instrument of the RISE could potentially increase international support as states may consider this to be a much more important driver behind (alternative) development cooperation. As the research has shown, globalisation has apparently not had any significant impact on the broad patterns of the illegal drugs trade. The evidence for this can, for example be found in the fact that Colombia still supplies substantial amounts of illicit cocaine to the US about four decades after Colombian trafficking networks began to do this.

However, a new global challenge can be found in climate change, reflected by the increase in international attention to this issue. States could use the RISE to ‘rebrand’ the need to support alternative development by increasing a focus on economic (or environmental) security, related, for example, to the preservation of the environment or of bio-diversity. The current focus on the supply of illicit drugs and linkages with the conflict in Colombia seems to be unable to generate sufficient international support for alternative development. It is not clear why. Alternative development may simply not be appealing enough for foreign policy-makers to ‘sell’ at the domestic level, or the strategy may suffer

from the lack of clear success stories that prove its effectiveness and impact. As long as the supply of illicit drugs at the international level remains ‘sticky’(resistant to change), local alternative development programmes may seem like taking oranges to Valencia (and therefore may continue to attract little international support).

Nevertheless, as long as states continue to stress the importance of alternative development, and the importance of shared responsibility as a principle that should strengthen international support for this supply reduction strategy, there is a need to explore ways to increase international cooperation (which is rather limited in the case of Colombia). The RISE could offer states a structure to rally more support, particularly when focusing on:

- a) the protection of tropical forests as a source of oxygen/carbon dioxide absorption;
- b) the protection of the mountain eco-systems as an important source of water;
- c) the protection of the environment in relation to alternative development interventions that may in themselves be a source of environmental degradation.

While in principle a theoretical construct, a RISE could already be in the making given the frequent discussions currently underway at international expert groups, and the continued stress on the need to identify best practices and share lessons learned on alternative development. However, the (unexpected) missing link of environmental protection related to climate change, may be a key element to unlock the true potential of the RISE.

## FURTHER RESEARCH

### **1. Combining alternative development and economic security with the protection of biodiversity and natural resources**

The unexpected findings of this research in terms of the links between alternative development and international interest in the conservation of Colombia's natural resources and its capacity to absorb carbon dioxide open up new avenues of research. Indeed, further research to examine how alternative development programmes could benefit from the establishment of direct links between alternative development and the protection of the environment would be highly beneficial. Could more international political and financial support be garnered by more clearly incorporating the rationale of environmental protection to alternative development programmes? Could international interests related to climate change and carbon dioxide emissions be a more important driver for international support than the focus on the supply of illicit drugs to foreign markets? This analysis does not have to be limited to states alone. Citizens or companies could also be drawn more towards alternative development products if a link is established with the environment. Tom Feiling has already touched upon this latter scenario:

*“Since Western consumers have largely deemed the poverty, violence and injustice that the cocaine trade generates either irrelevant or inevitable, perhaps they will be more prepared to listen to the environmentalists’ perspective.”<sup>1258</sup>*

Regardless of the motive for action or inaction, the reality is that environmental degradation and deforestation are huge problems in Colombia, and that the illegal drugs economy (and sometimes the very counter-narcotics policies designed to address it) plays an important role in aggravating these problems.

### **2. The novel borderings of coca growing countries**

Following Saskia Sassen's analysis of 'novel borderings', an interesting follow-up research would be to investigate to what degree the climatic conditions necessary for illicit coca

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<sup>1258</sup> *The Candy Machine. How Cocaine Took Over the World, op. cit.*, pp. 152, 153.

cultivation and the control of non-state actors over the illegal drugs trade give rise to new territories, for example encompassing parts of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. The research could investigate if these cross-border dynamics create new bordered spaces, for example in terms of territorial control and protection provided by criminal, paramilitary or guerrilla organisations to coca growers. Do national policies, for example in terms of military or law enforcement operations, affect (or even promote) the constitution of these new bordered territories? Do the combined coca-growing areas of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru together constitute a new bordered space? And, if they do, what would be the implications for joint law enforcement and counter-narcotics policies?

### **3. Alternative development and the peace dialogue**

Given the considerable weight of agricultural reforms, rural development and counter-narcotics issues in the current peace dialogue with the FARC (to be concluded in November 2013), further investigation of how alternative development programmes could benefit from a peace agreement could be beneficial. If the current peace dialogue is transformed into a concrete peace agreement, alternative development (and general territorial consolidation) programmes can be extended to other areas that are currently beyond the reach and institutional control of the government. Following a peace deal, an investigation of if and how more (international) resources and commitment could be generated to engage in alternative development programmes in more remote areas of the country would be valuable.

### **4. Colombian cocoa**

In terms of potential for the expansion of Colombia's alternative development programmes, cocoa is an interesting crop. Around 50 percent of the total Colombian production is linked to alternative livelihood programmes, a percentage that is not found for other crops or produce. Given the very limited access to international markets and the limited production of premium cocoa in Colombia at present, more research into how to reap the full benefits of cocoa production within alternative development strategies (for example, investigating new forms of specialised branding or connecting current brands such as *Chocolate de Tumaco* with international markets) would be a valuable exercise. The current solid investments in



increasing cocoa production in Colombia merit more research into how these could boost support for alternative development programmes as well.

### **5. Evaluating local access and capacity to apply to international Calls for Tender**

Part of the available international support for alternative development and agricultural production processes comes in the form of Calls for Tender. An investigation into whether local organisations in Colombia have enough access to such Calls for Tender and an evaluation of their capacity and skill to apply for these funding programmes would be of relevance. If their capacity to apply is lacking, this means that part of the available international funds are perhaps not used to support local alternative development and related agricultural or agro-forestry projects.



## ANNEX I: OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH TRAJECTORY

The research started in 2010 at the University of Valencia. It gathered speed after the finalisation of the ‘Trabajo de Investigación’ (*‘la tesina’*, a second-year obligatory research paper) in September 2010 and passing the ‘Diploma de Estudios Avanzados’ (DEA) oral exam in December 2010. After working on the initial research proposal, a six month period (January to June 2011) was spent as a Visiting Ph.D. Research Scholar at the Department of Sociology of the London School of Economics (LSE). At the LSE, work was undertaken to fine-tune the theoretical framework of this research, benefiting significantly from my enrolment in a Ph.D. peer review course (SO500 ‘Aims and Methods’) given by Dr Nigel Dodd and Dr Paddy Rawlinson). Within this period, important meetings also took place in Vienna on the occasion of the fifty-fourth session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). At the CND, the author was invited to speak about the concept of shared responsibility.

After the start of the research in Valencia, in total, three research trips to Colombia were organised for preparatory meetings and some initial field research. Those trips served especially to gather information, limit the scope of the research, and find opportunities for a field visit. The outcome of meetings held in Medellín in April 2012 was a position as Visiting Ph.D. Research Scholar at the Institute of Political Studies at the University of Antioquia (July 2012 until December 2013). This provided me with a desk at the university to work from, plan the field research and write the chapters that form the literature review of the dissertation. It also gave me access to the library and to feedback from the Institute’s professors. While in Medellín I finalised Part I of the dissertation.

After several months of preparations (e.g. through meetings with the Colombian government) the field research took place in May 2013. With support of the Colombian government the regions of Tumaco, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Meta were visited. The months following the field research were used to write the final chapters of the research (Part II) and the conclusion. The first complete draft of the dissertation was finished on July 3, 2013 and a second draft on September 13, 2013. Table 4 below contains the milestones of the research trajectory since August 2010.

**Table 4: Milestones of the research trajectory**

<b>Milestones of the research trajectory (August 2010 to September 2013)</b>	
<b>August/September 2010</b>	First research trip to Colombia (visit of Bogotá, the <i>eje cafetero</i> and Medellín)
<b>September 2010</b>	Thesis defence of the ‘trabajo de investigación’, the obligatory second-year thesis in Valencia
<b>December 2010</b>	DEA exam in Valencia
<b>December 2010</b>	Meetings in Washington D.C.
<b>January 2011</b>	Start of six month Visiting Ph.D. Research Fellowship at the LSE in London
<b>March 2011</b>	Meetings on the occasion of the CND in Vienna and opportunity to address the CND on the topic of shared responsibility
<b>December 2011/January 2012</b>	Second research trip to Colombia (Visit of Bogotá and Medellín)
<b>April 2012</b>	Third research trip to Colombia (Visit of Medellín)
<b>August 2012</b>	Start of eighteen-month Visiting Ph.D. Research Fellowship at the Institute of Political Studies of the University of Antioquia
<b>May 2013</b>	Field research in Tumaco, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Meta
<b>July 2013</b>	Completion of first draft dissertation
<b>September 2013</b>	Completion of second draft dissertation

*Source: construction of the author*

## Overview of meetings and correspondence

In chronological order, the details of the meetings, Skype conversations and email correspondence that took place since August 2010 are provided below:

- Meeting with Andrés Nuñez Rincón, Coordinator of Impunity and Corruption Project, and Carlos Medina Ramírez, Justice and Security Area Coordinator, of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Bogotá (23 August 2010);
- Meeting with Guillermo García Miranda, Programme Director, UNODC in Bogotá (23 August 2010 and 2 September 2010);
- Meeting with Mr Walter Reithebuch, Deputy Head of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Country Office, Bogotá, Colombia (2 September 2010);
- Meeting with Mr John Walsh, Senior Associate and Geoff Thale, Programme Director, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Washington D.C. (14 December 2010);
- Meeting with Anja Korenblik, Programme Manager, Research and Analysis Section, UNODC (21 March 2011);
- Meeting with Juan Diego Cely Barrera, Acción Social, Vienna, Austria (21 March 2011);
- Meeting with Aldo Lale Demoz, UNODC Country Representative to Colombia, Vienna, Austria (21 March 2011);
- Meeting with Carlos Rodriguez Bocanegra, Representative of the Colombian Mission to the United Nations, Vienna, Austria (21 March 2011);
- Email exchange with Saskia Sassen, Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology and Co-Chair, Committee on Global Thought, Columbia University, New York (August 2011);
- Meeting with Juan Diego Cely Barrera, Presidential Program against Illicit Crops (PCI), Acción Social, Bogotá, Colombia (9 December 2011);
- Meeting with Ricardo Andres Lozado, Regional Development Specialist, Bogotá, Colombia (13 December 2011);
- Meeting with Angelika Rettberg Beil, Director, Political Science Department, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia (13 December 2011);

- Meeting with Jeremy McDermott, Managing Director of Insight Crime, Medellín, Colombia (16 December 2011);
- Meeting with Javier Molina, Consultant, Medellín, Colombia (3 January 2012);
- Email exchange with Arlene Tickner, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes (January 2012);
- Meeting with Carlos Zorro Sánchez, Professor of Economics and alternative development expert, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia (13 January 2012).
- Meeting with Adriana González Gil, Director of the Political Studies Institute, Universidad de Antioquia, Medellín Colombia (27 April 2012);
- Meeting with Adrián Restrepo Parra, Coordinator of the Political Studies Institute, Universidad de Antioquia, Medellín Colombia (27 April 2012);
- Skype conversation with Alejandro Arbeláez Arango, former Deputy Minister of Defence, Medellín, Colombia (21 September 2012);
- Meeting with Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle, former Commander General of the Colombian Army between 2004 and 2007, Washington D.C., United States (28 September 2012);
- Email exchange with Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of Political Science, Stanford University (October 2012);
- Email exchange with Peter Andreas, Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Brown University (October 2012);
- Email exchange with Barry Buzan, Montague Burton Professor, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics (October 2012);
- Email exchange with Dr. Tamara Makarenko, Senior Partner, West Sands Advisory LLP (October, November 2012);
- Email exchange with Emily Crick, Doctoral Candidate drugs and international security (International Relations) at Swansea University (November 2012);
- Email exchange with Prof. Dr. Jaap de Wilde, Professor of International Relations and World Politics, State University of Groningen, The Netherlands (January 2013);
- Meeting with Álvaro Balcázar, Former Director, Unidad Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013);

- Meeting with Ricardo Alfonso Guerrero Pardo, Asesor Dirección de Programas contra Cultivos Ilícitos (DPCI), Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013);
- Meeting with Berber van de Woude, Second Secretary of the Netherlands Embassy to Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia (1 March 2013);
- Skype conversation with Daniel López, Environment Officer responsible for the Bioredd+ project, USAID, Colombia (27 May 2013);
- Email exchange with Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of Political Science, Stanford University (May 2013);
- Email exchange with Barry Buzan, Montague Burton Professor, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics (May 2013);
- Email exchange with Daniel Brombacher, Sectorial Programme “Rural Development”, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (May 2013);
- Email exchange with Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Geographer and CNRS Research Fellow (May 2013);
- Email exchange with Saskia Sassen, Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology and Co-Chair, Committee on Global Thought, Columbia University, New York (May 2013);
- Skype conversation with Adam Isacson, Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy, Washington Office on Latin America, WOLA (4 June 2013);
- Skype conversation with Francisco Thoumi, member of the International Narcotics Control Board, INCB (5 June 2013);
- Meeting with Plinio Pérez, General Director, Sí Se Puede Programme, Government of Nariño (26 July 2013).





## ANNEX II: FIELD RESEARCH AGENDA (MAY 2013)



### *Agenda para la visita de campo*

#### *Tesis Doctoral sobre Seguridad Económica y Desarrollo*

##### *Alternativo*

*Investigador: Jorrit Kamminga*

*Colombia, 1-12 de mayo de 2013*

De manera reiterada, el investigador Jorrit Kamminga viene adelantando gestiones con la Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial – UACT, para adelantar visitas de campo a las zonas de intervención de los programas contra cultivos ilícitos – PCI con el ánimo de recolectar información a partir de fuentes primarias para el desarrollo de un trabajo doctoral en temas de seguridad económica y desarrollo alternativo.

Para el desarrollo de las visitas de campo, se ha identificado 3 zonas atendidas por la UACT en el territorio nacional. La primera corresponde a Tumaco, territorio donde la problemática de seguridad y cultivos ilícitos tiene características únicas que hacen de este territorio un gran reto para la implementación de la PNCRT. El segundo es Santa Marta, donde se ha alcanzado éxito en la implementación de iniciativas de desarrollo alternativo, y finalmente Macarena, zona donde se desarrolló el piloto de la PNCRT y que cuenta con los mayores avances en cuanto a la implementación de la Política.

A continuación se presenta la agenda propuesta para la visita de campo que solicitó el investigador, una agenda flexible con la identificación de actividades gruesas, entendiendo que se requiere esta flexibilidad para alcanzar los objetivos planteados por el investigador durante las visitas de campo y éste tenga la oportunidad de compartir y entrevistarse con organizaciones y productores, así como también, con otros actores en el territorio.

**Coordinador General de la Visita en Bogotá:** Ricardo Guerrero: 3132519125; email: ricardo.guerrero@consolidacion.gov.co.

**Gira por la Zona de Tumaco**

El propósito de esta visita es conocer la evolución de la intervención en desarrollo alternativo con la implementación de la Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial – PNCRT.

**Persona de contacto para Nariño/Tumaco:** Harry Wilson Valencia Hurtado (teléfono: 3166 285 850; email: Harry.Valencia@consolidacion.gov.co).

**Día 1. Miércoles 1 de mayo**

- Viaje Medellín a Cali: AV9369 (20:22-21:25).

**Día 2. Jueves 2 de mayo**

- Viaje Cali a Tumaco: AV9419 (6:05-7:15).
- Hotel Porto Bello, dirección: Calle Mosquer., teléfono: (032) 7273674.
- Llamada con la Oficina local de Consolidación a las 8:00.
- Visita a la Oficina Regional de Consolidación Tumaco, reunión con Harry Wilson Valencia: 8:15-10:00.
- Visita a la Oficina del Consejo Comunitario ACAPA, Bajo Mira y Fontera. Reunión con beneficiarios del proyecto, moderada por Mercy Dalila España Solis.: 10:00-12:00.
- Visita a la oficina y a los proyectos de sustitución de cultivos – complejo Monte Bravo: 14:00-15:30.
- Reunión con Bolivar Santander Castillo y Nefra Coima Quiñona, representantes de la Asociación de Productores Forestales del Río Chagüí (PROFORCHA): 15:30-16:00.
- Visita a la Tienda de la Madera del complejo Monte Bravo: 16:00-16:30.

**Día 3. Viernes 3 de mayo**

- Reunión con Gerencia Regional de Consolidación Tumaco, Edgar Rodrigo Yepes, Gerente de UACT: 10:00-11:00.
- Visita a una organización de base, Palma Sur, oficina en Tumaco. Reunión con Celso Tenorio Escobar, Gerente de Palma Sur: 14:00-14:30.
- Visita al proyecto de Palma Sur en el campo, visitando los cultivos de cacao y de palma, y el centro de acopio para el cacao premio. Visita con Julio Sevillano Rodriguez, Plan de Renovación, Palma Sur: 14:30-17:30.

#### Día 4. Sábado 4 de mayo

- Visita al Consejo Comunitario Bajo Mira en Descolgado, visitando el nuevo centro para secar el cacao, los viveros y los cultivos de cacao: 8:00-13:00.

#### Día 5. Domingo 5 de mayo

- Regreso a la ciudad de Cali: AV9420: Tumaco – Cali (07:40-8:45).
- Viaje Cali a Santa Marta: VVC8050 (18:20-19:55).

#### *Gira por la zona de Santa Marta y Sierra Nevada*

El propósito de esta visita es conocer la intervención en desarrollo alternativo en un territorio que no ha sido focalizado por la PNCRT y que lleva siendo atendido con programas contra cultivos ilícitos por varios años.

**Persona de contacto para Magdalena, Santa Marta:** Ever Enrique Cuello Daza (teléfono 3013 666 788; email: Ever.Cuello@consolidacion.gov.co).

#### Día 1. Domingo 5 de mayo

- Viaje Cali a Santa Marta: VVC8050 (18:20-19:55).
- Hotel: Hotel El Delfin - Cra 3 N° 5-185; El Rodadero, Santa Marta; Teléfono(s): (57) (5) 4229152.

#### Día 2. Lunes 6 de mayo

- Visita a los proyectos productivos de sustitución de cultivos ilícitos en las veredas La Esmeralda, Trompito Alto, San Rafael y Los Naranjos: posadas, ecoturismo y cacao, oportunidad de dialogo con los beneficiarios (7:00-14:00).
- Reunión por la tarde con Ever Enrique Cuello Daza, coordinador regional de UACT sobre los programas implementados desde el año 2004 (14:00-15:00).

### Día 3. Martes 7 de mayo

- Visita al pueblo de pescadores, Corregimiento Tasajeras, Pueblo Viejo. Entrevista con Ramon Esmeral, beneficiario de proyecto de Programa Familias Guardabosques (9:00-10:00).
- Visita en lancha al proyecto de los palafitos, una iniciativa de generación de ingresos a víctimas del conflicto ubicados en una ruta estratégica de narcotráfico, oportunidad de diálogo con beneficiarios. Visita al Municipio de Sitionuevo, los corregimientos de Buena Vista y Nueva Venecia – El Morro. Proyectos de pesca artesanal, piscicultura y granjas avícolas: (10:00-16:00).

### Día 4. Miércoles 8 de mayo

- Visita en Santa Marta a la organización de segundo nivel Red Ecolsierra (Red de Productores Ecológicos de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta); productos principales: café, miel. Reunión con Jhonny Carmona, coordinador gestión ambiental Red Ecolsierra. *Dirección:* Carrera 32A Nro. 12B-50; Santa Marta (teléfono: 0057 (5) 433 4641).
- Viaje Santa Marta (Simon Bolivar) a Bogotá: CM7495 (20:09-21:37).
- Hotel Casa Deco, Calle 12C #2-36 – La Candelaria.

### **Gira por la zona de Macarena/Meta**

Esta visita tiene como propósito brindar al investigador la oportunidad de conocer el origen de la Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial – PNCRT y todo su enfoque conceptual y operativo. Con esta visita se le permite conocer los avances del Gobierno Nacional en implementación de la política y sus contenidos en materia de atención a comunidades vinculadas con cultivos ilícitos, con enfoque territorial y en el marco de un conflicto interno.

**Persona de contacto para Meta/Macarena:** Wilmar Alfredo Alvarez Beltran (3112 829 916; email: wilmar.alvarez@consolidacion.gov.co) y Alejandro Osorio (3112 939 744; email: aleososa2@gmail.com). El gerente regional de UACT es Carlos Alberto Ávila Cerrón.

#### Día 1. Jueves 9 de mayo

- Transporte, puerta a puerta, a Villavicencio desde el hotel Casa Deco a la oficina de la Unidad de Consolidación en Villavicencio, Meta.
- Reunión con Hermann Orjuela Lozano, coordinador de desarrollo económico de Consolidación (10:00-10:30).
- Reunión con Claudia Milena Durán, coordinadora de desarrollo económico de FUPAD (10:30-11:00).
- Reunión con la Gerencia Regional Macarena: Carlos Alberto Ávila Cerón, con Claudia Milena Durán (FUPAD) y con Miguel Antonio Galvis, Coordinador Local de IKV Pax Christi: 12:00-13:00.
- Viaje en Douglas DC-3 a La Macarena desde el Aeropuerto Vanguardia (15:00-16:00)
- Reunión con beneficiarios de la Junta de Acción Comunal de la Cristalina (16:00-17:00).
- Visita a la clase de capacitación para técnicos en caucho, bajo la dirección del Sena.
- Visita a la asociación de segundo nivel, Asociación Aggapam.
- Hotel: Punto Verde, La Macarena.

#### Día 2. Viernes 10 de mayo

- Visitas a varios programas de consolidación en el municipio de La Macarena.
- Reunión con Samantha Murillo Lozano, psicóloga, Colombia Responde sobre el tema de las víctimas (9:00-9:30).
- Visita a la Alcaldía, reunión con Norberto Ruiz Guiza, Secretario de Gobierno (10:00-11:00).
- Visita al proyecto de caucho, presentación de Alejandro Osorio, Asociación Asoprolaca.
- Entrevista, representante Josefina Uribe Nuñez, Asociación Aggapam.

- Reunión con dos guías turísticos, capacitados dentro de la estrategia de consolidación y el fomento del turismo en el municipio de La Macarena.


#### Día 3. Sábado 11 de mayo

- Reunión con Cesar Augusto Sánchez Castillo, enlace local Agroparques La Macarena y enlace del programa Colombia Responde en la zona (11:00-11:30).
- Visita al proyecto piloto de seguridad alimentaria, reunión con técnicos Jesús Mendieta y Juan Ricardo Díaz (12:00-12:30).
- Regreso a Villavicencio en avioneta (15:00-16:00).
- Hotel: Hotel Savoy (Calle 41 # 31 – 02; Villavicencio, Meta; teléfono: (8) 662 2666 o (8) 662 5007).

#### Día 4. Domingo 12 de mayo

- Visita al municipio de San Juan de Arama, la "puerta de entrada a la Sierra de la Macarena". Reunión con Betty Páez, representante de Asocampro (proyecto de caña y frutos), reunión con Raúl Velasco (proyecto de piscicultura); y Saúl Neira Parra, productor de leche en San Juan de Arama y miembro de la Asociación campesina Asoproleche Fenix del Ariari.
- Transporte, puerta-a-puerta de regreso a Bogotá.
- Viaje Bogotá a Medellín: CM7508 (21:12) desde Eldorado (BOG).

**ANNEX III: GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF INTERVIEW GUIDE**







**ANNEX IV: RESUMEN DE LA TESIS EN ESPAÑOL****ÍNDICE**

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## 1. Resumen de la tesis

Esta investigación explora los aspectos de la reducción de la oferta dentro del contexto del fenómeno global de las drogas ilícitas. Tiene un enfoque especial en las políticas nacionales e internacionales del desarrollo alternativo y de comercio que pretenden reducir la oferta de plantas narcóticas, drogas y sustancias psicotrópicas a través de políticas de desarrollo económico en países productores.

El argumento central de la investigación es que se podría considerar Colombia como un punto de referencia para establecer un régimen internacional eficaz de apoyo transfronterizo para estrategias de desarrollo alternativo para abordar la oferta de drogas ilícitas por el mundo. Este régimen –una construcción nueva del autor– se llamaría un *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica* (RISE).

La primera parte de la investigación coloca el campo del fenómeno global de las drogas ilícitas firmemente dentro de los estudios de las Relaciones Internacionales (una segunda contribución académica importante de la investigación), sobre todo dentro de la rama de la Economía Política Internacional. Dentro de ese campo, la investigación se podría considerar como una contribución al sub-campo relativamente nuevo de la Economía Política Internacional Ilícita.

Posteriormente, explorando este argumento principal con más profundidad, la investigación construyó la nueva herramienta funcional del *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica*, utilizando conceptos teóricos analizados durante el periodo de investigación. La nueva herramienta combina la teoría del régimen internacional de Stephen Krasner con los conceptos teóricos de ‘la seguridad económica’ y ‘la responsabilidad compartida’ (o corresponsabilidad). Como primer pilar fundamental del nuevo régimen RISE, la responsabilidad compartida es considerada como un factor principal de motivación detrás de la cooperación entre estados dentro del régimen internacional. Como segundo pilar fundamental de la estructura teórica, la seguridad económica es utilizada en dos sentidos: Primero, con énfasis en la palabra ‘económica’, concentrándose en el bienestar económico, la prosperidad, los ingresos y sustentos dentro de la economía legal. Segundo, con énfasis en la palabra ‘seguridad’, explorando los vínculos entre seguridad y las políticas de desarrollo alternativo implementadas a los dos niveles de análisis de la investigación: a) el nivel nacional y sub-nacional, y b) el nivel internacional.

La segunda parte de la investigación incluye el estudio de caso de Colombia, explorando particularmente los resultados de tres estudios de campo regionales en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta al norte de Colombia, la Sierra de la Macarena y San Juan de Arama en el departamento central de Meta, y la región de Tumaco en el departamento de Nariño al suroeste del país. Los tres estudios regionales apuntan a analizar la política antidroga de Colombia –sobre todo la parte basada en la estrategia del desarrollo alternativo– y su posición dentro del marco internacional legal y político más amplio. En este sentido, se utilizan los tres estudios de caso para poner a prueba la construcción teórica del *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica* y para explorar su alcance y potencial.

La primera región, la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, fue identificada como una región donde se implementó una política de drogas clásica, enfocada en proyectos con un planteamiento que se centra en el desarrollo social y económico. Incluye proyectos importantes de eco-turismo (o agroturismo), y de producción agrícola como el café, la miel y la pesca. La segunda región, la Sierra de la Macarena, fue seleccionada porque el gobierno colombiano la utilizó para desarrollar un nuevo enfoque de la política de drogas, enfocándose en la creación de instituciones, gobernanza local, estabilidad y seguridad como precondiciones del desarrollo de sustentos alternativos y otras intervenciones antidrogas. A través de la implementación de un proyecto piloto, este modelo estableció la política actual del estado de la consolidación territorial. Parecida a la Sierra de la Macarena, la tercera y última región visitada –Tumaco– también está incluida como una ‘zona de consolidación’ dentro de la nueva estrategia de la consolidación territorial.

A través de la investigación sobre el terreno, el instrumento funcional del RISE ha sido puesto a prueba para ver qué tipo de oportunidades puede crear para la cooperación internacional entre los estados en el campo de desarrollo alternativo. En resumen, la investigación reveló que la creación de un RISE sería particularmente relevante en cuatro sentidos. La primera contribución importante es que podría incrementar el apoyo internacional para el desarrollo alternativo a base de la responsabilidad compartida. La segunda contribución significativa del RISE es que permitiría que estados pudiesen colaborar en asuntos muy específicos dentro del contexto de desarrollo alternativo. En tercer lugar, la estructura del RISE ofrece un marco en que se podría conectar el concepto de la seguridad económica con el desarrollo alternativo de una manera positiva. Por último, a través del RISE, estados pueden vincular políticas de protección medioambiental al nivel internacional con objetivos antidrogas dentro de programas de desarrollo alternativo.

## 2. Argumento central

Concentrándose en el desarrollo alternativo – parte del lado del suministro del fenómeno de las drogas ilícitas – el argumento central de esta investigación es que se podría considerar a Colombia como un punto de referencia para establecer un régimen internacional eficaz de apoyo transfronterizo para estrategias de desarrollo alternativo con el fin de abordar la oferta de drogas ilícitas por el mundo. Este régimen internacional, elaborado por el autor durante la investigación, se llamará un *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica* o RISE. La base teórica fue elaborada por vía de una combinación de los conceptos teóricos ‘seguridad económica’ y ‘responsabilidad compartida’, y la teoría de régimen internacional. Estos tres elementos teóricos forman parte del estudio de Relaciones Internacionales y su subdisciplina Economía Política Internacional.

En otras palabras, a través del prisma de los dos pilares teóricos de la ‘corresponsabilidad’ y la ‘seguridad económica’, esta investigación examina el fundamento, los objetivos y las características del apoyo internacional para el desarrollo alternativo. Dicha investigación apunta a ofrecer un análisis de la pertinencia de estos dos conceptos teóricos como partes integrantes de un régimen internacional para estrategias antidrogas de reducción de la oferta, basadas en el desarrollo y apoyadas internacionalmente.

Se puede considerar regímenes internacionales como medios que los estados pueden usar conjuntamente para colaborar y resolver los complejos asuntos globales que no pueden solucionar individualmente. En este sentido, el *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica* se considera como una parte integral del régimen internacional más amplio del marco internacional de la fiscalización de las drogas, enfocándose especialmente en el asunto de la reducción de la oferta de drogas ilícitas. Mientras en la realidad un RISE no existe, su creación como construcción teórica es útil para fomentar el debate académico, aumentar el conocimiento y ayudar a analizar la cooperación internacional para la reducción del suministro en países productores. En este sentido, la cooperación internacional en políticas de reducción de oferta se puede considerar como reflejo del carácter del RISE, pero no necesariamente como la materialización del régimen en la práctica. Sin embargo, la creación de éste puede ser el primer paso para un debate científico serio sobre cómo el apoyo internacional ahora está funcionando.

Dentro del contexto del RISE, el papel de consideraciones de seguridad económica en las decisiones de estados de cooperar en temas de desarrollo alternativo a nivel

internacional se analizará con un estudio de caso de Colombia. La investigación se llevará a cabo en dos distintos niveles de análisis: 1) el nivel nacional y sub-nacional, y 2) el nivel internacional. Por ejemplo, al nivel nacional la seguridad económica se puede entender en términos de la provisión de unos ingresos sostenibles y la satisfacción de necesidades básicas (suficiente comida, agua, ropa, un techo, educación, etc.) de una población. Esta definición de seguridad económica se puede considerar como la interpretación clásica del concepto, incorporando todos los instrumentos y estrategias de desarrollo humano que pretenden mejorar los derechos y oportunidades económicas y sociales.

Al nivel internacional, la seguridad económica podría significar el fortalecimiento de la economía, la protección de empresas (de exportación), el aumento del control del Estado sobre territorio o el amparo de recursos naturales, mientras éste intenta protegerse del llamado “*lado oscuro del capitalismo y el orden comercial mundial abierto en términos de tráfico ilegal.*” A este nivel, la seguridad económica está más preocupada con factores económicos y mercados internacionales que directamente o indirectamente puedan tener un impacto en la seguridad y estabilidad del Estado – sin que dichas amenazas necesariamente pongan en jaque la supervivencia del mismo.

En el corazón de la estructura del RISE yace el principio de la responsabilidad compartida (o corresponsabilidad), la idea de que los estados comparten una responsabilidad para abordar el fenómeno global de las drogas porque el consumo, el tráfico y la producción ilícita de drogas están estrechamente relacionados a nivel internacional y no pueden ser aislados o abordados dentro del territorio de un solo país. Este principio es de interés especial cuando uno analiza la parte de la oferta del fenómeno global de drogas porque los cultivos ilícitos, la producción y las rutas de tráfico pueden cambiar rápido de lugar tanto dentro como a través de fronteras internacionales. Por lo tanto, la corresponsabilidad y la seguridad económica se considerarán como los dos pilares principales del *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica*.

### **3. Objetivo de la investigación**

El objetivo central de la investigación es explorar si se puede considerar a Colombia como punto de referencia para establecer un *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica* (RISE) para reducir la oferta global de drogas ilícitas a través del desarrollo alternativo. Para alcanzar este objetivo, la investigación analizó la práctica de las políticas antidrogas en

Colombia a través de tres estudios de caso regionales, con el fin de identificar elementos existentes de apoyo transfronterizo y examinar oportunidades desaprovechadas de la cooperación internacional que pueden justificar un RISE. La investigación examina los esfuerzos nacionales e internacionales para reducir la oferta de drogas ilícitas a través de políticas de desarrollo alternativo en el contexto colombiano. En Colombia, el desarrollo alternativo (y el apoyo internacional para dicha estrategia) forman un pilar central de los esfuerzos para reducir la oferta de drogas. Asimismo, instrumentos de desarrollo rural más amplios y de comercio también han sido aplicados al caso de Colombia en los últimos años y algunos todavía están en vigor hoy en día. Éstos de igual manera se analizaron en el contexto del RISE.

Utilizando el estudio de caso de Colombia y los resultados de los tres estudios de campo regionales, la investigación identifica el entorno (teórico) del RISE, basado en principios y normas compartidos, acciones y programas conjuntas para abordar el suministro de drogas ilícitas.

#### **4. Preguntas clave de la investigación**

Esta sección describe las preguntas clave de esta tesis. Estas preguntas fueron desarrolladas y perfeccionadas durante la investigación, sobre todo durante la investigación inicial, llevada a cabo en la *London School of Economics* (LSE) en Londres.

*Pregunta 1: ¿En qué medida los proyectos locales y nacionales de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia han sido vinculados con el nivel internacional en términos de apoyo y acceso a mercados internacionales?*

En general, la hipótesis aquí es que los esfuerzos antidroga nacionales sólo tienen sentido si tienen vínculos con el nivel internacional. El carácter internacional y transfronterizo del reto de las drogas ilícitas dicta que un enfoque puramente local o nacional no pueda tener éxito a la hora de cambiar significadamente las dinámicas negativas del fenómeno global de drogas. Eso quiere decir que políticas de desarrollo alternativo tienen que ser analizadas dentro del marco más amplio de la cooperación, la coordinación y el apoyo internacional. Esta primera pregunta de la tesis apunta a revelar qué sería el alcance y la fortaleza de un *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica*. Analizando el carácter de las pautas de la

cooperación internacional en la fiscalización de las drogas en Colombia, revelará información útil sobre el alcance del marco instrumental de un posible RISE.

*Pregunta 2: ¿Cuáles han sido los principales motores detrás del apoyo internacional para proyectos de desarrollo alternativo implementados en Colombia?*

Es importante entender las razones principales detrás de la cooperación internacional en temas de desarrollo alternativo operando dentro del marco de la política antidroga de Colombia. Esto incluye un análisis de los argumentos políticos utilizados por distintos gobiernos en el contexto internacional para apoyar una estrategia de reducción de oferta en el extranjero. Esta segunda pregunta clave de la investigación tiene como objetivo definir los principales principios y normas del RISE. En otras palabras, intenta revelar cómo podría ser el marco institucional del *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica*.

*Pregunta 3: ¿En qué medida el principio de la responsabilidad compartida ha sido un componente activo del apoyo internacional para proyectos de desarrollo alternativo implementados en Colombia?*

Relacionada a la pregunta sobre por qué los estados (y otros actores internacionales) han apoyado programas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia, la investigación utiliza los tres estudios de caso regionales para evaluar en qué medida el principio de la corresponsabilidad ha sido un componente activo de las pautas de cooperación internacional. Enfocándose en el principio de la responsabilidad compartida, este análisis pretende encontrar las respuestas a tres sub-preguntas:

3.1: *Entendida la responsabilidad compartida como un vínculo entre el acuerdo internacional sobre la necesidad de un enfoque equilibrado y las actuales políticas de desarrollo alternativo apoyadas por la comunidad internacional, ¿va más allá de la retórica política, y está aplicada de forma rigurosa?* Esta pregunta es importante: Una de las hipótesis de la investigación es que sería imposible resolver la dimensión colombiana del fenómeno global de las drogas sin acción internacional basada en una corresponsabilidad significativa y al menos algunos objetivos compartidos basados en principios y normas comunes.

3.2: *¿Existen áreas donde la corresponsabilidad está ausente como principio rector que se traduce en acción?* La investigación identifica áreas donde existe margen para

mejorar la situación y recomienda pasos para incrementar la eficacia respecto a la coordinación y cooperación internacional en el campo de la reducción de la oferta en Colombia y otros países.

3.3: *¿Se puede considerar la corresponsabilidad y principios y normas internacionales relacionados como una parte integrante del marco normativo de un régimen internacional?* La investigación pondrá a prueba si a nivel internacional el principio de la responsabilidad compartida es utilizado por los estados para fundamentar o justificar la necesidad de apoyar a los países productores de drogas ilícitas.

Pregunta 4: *¿En qué medida el principio de la seguridad económica ha sido un componente activo del apoyo internacional para proyectos de desarrollo alternativo implementados en Colombia?*

Se llevará a cabo un análisis del papel de consideraciones relacionadas con el concepto de la seguridad económica dentro del marco del apoyo internacional para políticas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia. Este análisis se realizará en los niveles sub-nacionales, nacionales e internacionales. Por ejemplo, al nivel sub-nacional, la seguridad económica está relacionada con la provisión de unos ingresos sostenibles y unas necesidades básicas. Al nivel nacional, la seguridad económica podría significar la protección de la infraestructura económica e industrias nacionales de los efectos negativos de la economía ilegal. También podría implicar que el gobierno colombiano en parte utilice las políticas antidroga y políticas de desarrollo rural más amplias para proteger o aumentar el acceso del estado a importantes recursos naturales.

Por último, al nivel internacional, la seguridad económica puede significar fortalecer la economía nacional a través de la protección de inversiones y empresas nacionales en el extranjero del negocio ilegal de las drogas. Como mencionado arriba, a este nivel, los estados protegen sus intereses económicos y su economía nacional de lo que Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, y Jaap de Wilde llamaron “*el lado oscuro del capitalismo y el orden comercial mundial abierto en términos de tráfico ilegal.*” Esta cuarta pregunta de la investigación incorpora dos importantes sub-preguntas:

4.1: *¿En qué medida Colombia ha establecido una relación positiva entre políticas de desarrollo alternativo y el concepto de seguridad económica?* En este sentido, la sub-pregunta no sólo abordará el análisis de seguridad económica en términos de amenazas que



impactan la estabilidad del Estado, pero también las políticas positivas que éste puede implementar para reforzar la seguridad económica.

4.2: *¿En qué medida se puede encontrar apoyo para políticas positivas que fortalecen la seguridad económica en los programas bilaterales e internacionales de cooperación?* Esta sub-pregunta examinará si la cooperación (al desarrollo) internacional también incluye aspectos que tienen relación con, por ejemplo, la protección de mercados y recursos naturales en Colombia.

## 5. Metodología

La metodología de la investigación consiste de tres fases distintas 1) la construcción del encaje teórico, la revisión bibliográfica y la planificación de la investigación sobre el terreno; 2) la visita al campo y reuniones en Colombia; y 3) el análisis de los datos y la redacción de la tesis. A continuación se detallan estos tres componentes.

### 5.1 Fase I: encaje teórico, revisión bibliográfica y la planificación de la investigación sobre el terreno

Utilizando fuentes secundarias sobre la economía política del negocio internacional de las drogas, y literatura general sobre las relaciones internacionales, el desarrollo económico y las teorías del comercio internacional, el autor construyó el marco teórico. Este marco pretende posicionar el fenómeno global de las drogas firmemente dentro del ámbito de las relaciones internacionales y la sub-disciplina de la Economía Política Internacional. Para reforzar el encaje teórico, se recabó información sobre presentes y pasados proyectos y programas en Colombia, y datos (históricos) generales relacionados a la investigación.

Un elemento clave de la planificación de doce meses de investigación sobre el terreno ha sido la identificación de los datos fundamentales necesarios para conocer y evaluar mejor la estructura de la política de apoyo en temas de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia. La investigación sobre el terreno incluyó dos componentes: 1) Reuniones generales y específicas en Bogotá, Cali y Medellín con académicos, expertos y oficiales; 2) Una concreta visita al campo en las tres regiones colombianas. Las preparaciones para la visita al campo incluyeron la elaboración de una serie de entrevistas cualitativas y semi-

estructuradas que fueron utilizadas para recoger información de campesinos, representantes de los relevantes programas implementados en las regiones, expertos y académicos. Estos datos fueron utilizados para evaluar las hipótesis y contestar a las cuatro preguntas centrales de esta investigación. Las entrevistas semi-estructuradas fueron adaptadas a los distintos grupos destinatarios involucrados en la investigación.

### **Fuentes secundarias utilizadas en la Fase I:**

Las siguientes fuentes secundarias (a veces superpuestas) fueron utilizadas en la investigación:

- 1) Literatura sobre la teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales;
- 2) Literatura sobre la Economía Política Internacional;
- 3) Literatura sobre la Economía Política Internacional Ilícita;
- 4) Literatura sobre el fenómeno internacional de las drogas en general;
- 5) Literatura sobre el contexto colombiano del fenómeno de las drogas (por ejemplo los informes del gobierno colombiano u organizaciones internacionales como la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito (UNODC));
- 6) Literatura específica sobre el desarrollo alternativo en el contexto de proyectos antidroga en Colombia.

### **5.2 Fase II: investigación sobre el terreno y reuniones en Colombia**

La segunda fase de la investigación consistió de la investigación sobre el terreno en Colombia. Esta etapa duró más o menos doce meses en total. Los costos asociados fueron financiados en su totalidad por el autor, al igual que todos los otros costos relacionados con la trayectoria del doctorado (2008-2013). La investigación sobre el terreno en Colombia se concentró en tres niveles: el nivel sub-nacional, el nivel nacional y el nivel internacional.

Al nivel sub-nacional, la investigación examinó cómo políticas e instrumentos nacionales e internacionales de desarrollo alternativo funcionan en las zonas locales donde están implementados. Tras reuniones con la Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial (UACT) del gobierno colombiano –liderada por el Departamento de Prosperidad Social (DPS) y responsable para los programas enfocados en los cultivos ilícitos– tres

regiones fueron seleccionadas por el autor para la visita al campo: a) la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, b) la Sierra de la Macarena y el municipio de San Juan de Arama en el departamento de Meta y c) Tumaco en el departamento de Nariño. Durante la visita al campo, se llevaron a cabo entrevistas (cualitativas) semi-estructuradas con todos los actores relevantes para la investigación.

El autor construyó una guía de entrevistas que contenía todas las preguntas básicas y los temas principales que las entrevistas tenían que abarcar. Utilizando esta guía (vease Anexo III), las entrevistas empezaron con preguntas generales sobre el puesto, el trabajo y el papel del entrevistado en los programas o estrategias de la reducción de la oferta. Después continuaron preguntas introductorias para recabar opiniones y datos sobre las cuatro preguntas principales de la investigación: 1) Percepciones sobre los vínculos entre los proyectos locales y el nivel internacional; 2) Percepciones sobre los motores principales detrás de la cooperación internacional y bilateral, y el apoyo a este tipo de proyectos; 3) Percepciones sobre el principio de la responsabilidad compartida; y 4) Percepciones sobre los dos conceptos distintos de la seguridad económica que se usan en esta investigación.

El método de muestreo seleccionado fue una combinación del ‘muestreo de oportunidad’ y ‘muestreo de la bola de nieve’, empezando cada serie de reuniones en las regiones con aquellas que habían sido organizadas previamente por UACT y añadiendo entrevistados a media que estuvieran disponibles o fueran sugeridos al autor mientras estaba en el campo. El objetivo no fue entrevistar una muestra grande de individuos pero más bien incluir en cada región al menos un representante de los varios grupos de las partes interesadas en el tema del desarrollo alternativo. Por consiguiente, en cada de las tres regiones el objetivo fue entrevistar a campesinos u otros beneficiarios directos de los programas, representantes del gobierno local, expertos locales y otro personal técnico involucrado en la implementación de los proyectos de desarrollo alternativo.

Por último, las entrevistas fueron grabadas y luego transcritas. Por dicha razón fue posible incluir unas citas directas de los entrevistados en la tesis. La amplitud de la información recogida de este modo también servirá para futuras investigaciones complementarias o para artículos científicos sobre el papel de la seguridad económica en la fiscalización de las drogas ilícitas o el desarrollo alternativo en general.

Al nivel nacional, la investigación examinó cómo actuales políticas de desarrollo alternativo están conectadas con los esfuerzos al nivel nacional para reducir la oferta de la cocaína. Entrevistas cualitativas con expertos y representantes de los departamentos y organizaciones internacionales relevantes fueron el enfoque principal en este nivel. En esta

investigación se considera los niveles sub-nacionales y nacionales como parte del mismo nivel de análisis.

Finalmente, a nivel internacional, la investigación exploró la estructura de políticas de desarrollo alternativo y su posición dentro 1) del marco más amplio de la política de drogas internacional; y 2) el marco del sistema de comercio internacional. Para este nivel de análisis el autor no sólo contó con los datos recogidos a nivel nacional sino también con información de reuniones con expertos y personal de organizaciones de fuera de Colombia. Esto requirió unas reuniones en Estados Unidos, pero por lo general fueron organizadas a través de Skype o correo electrónico.

### **5.3 Fase III: análisis de datos y redacción de la tesis**

Después de la visita al campo, un periodo de análisis de datos concluyó con la última etapa de la redacción de la tesis, terminado el primer borrador el 3 de julio de 2013 y el segundo el 13 de septiembre de 2013, antes de que la tesis fuera depositada por el Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Carlos Flores Juberías, director de la tesis.

## **6. Conclusiones**

### **6.1 Contestando las preguntas clave de la investigación**

Estas conclusiones están divididas en tres partes. Primero, una presentación de respuestas a las cuatro preguntas clave de esta investigación y las sub-preguntas correspondientes. Segundo, una evaluación de la validez de las hipótesis planteadas al principio de la investigación. Y tercero, se ofrece una respuesta al argumento central de la tesis, incluyendo el análisis de las oportunidades del RISE como instrumento para aumentar y reforzar el apoyo internacional para el desarrollo alternativo.

La primera pregunta clave de la investigación es: *¿En qué medida los proyectos locales y nacionales de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia han sido vinculados con el nivel internacional en términos de apoyo y acceso a mercados internacionales?* El apoyo internacional al desarrollo alternativo es muy limitado. Sólo unos cuantos países apoyan

directamente los programas de desarrollo alternativo en las tres regiones visitadas durante la investigación sobre el terreno en Colombia. Aunque las tres regiones estudiadas sean muy diferentes en cuanto a sus características generales, los resultados de la investigación en términos de respaldo internacional para el desarrollo alternativo fueron muy parecidos. Más allá del apoyo de los Estados Unidos, existe muy poco apoyo bilateral.

El apoyo multilateral identificado normalmente está limitado a la Unión Europea, pero frecuentemente no tiene una relación directa con el desarrollo alternativo. Aunque haya cincuenta y tres países miembros de la ONU que cada año reafirman en la Comisión de Estupefacientes (CND por sus siglas en inglés) su compromiso al respaldo del desarrollo alternativo, sólo un par de países realmente apoyan esta estrategia de una forma directa en Colombia. Esta conclusión apunta hacia una clara desconexión entre las obligaciones de los estados para apoyar el desarrollo alternativo y la realidad en Colombia (en términos generales correspondiendo con la Regla 4 del RISE, pero específicamente con referencia a las Reglas 10, 11 y 12).

El acceso a mercados internacionales es claramente más una excepción que la regla. La mayoría de los productos de desarrollo alternativo no llegan a mercados internacionales, a pesar del hecho que dicho acceso representa otra obligación de estados al nivel de la ONU (vease sobre todo las Reglas 11, 12 y 13 del RISE). Sólo muy pocos productos del desarrollo alternativo llegan a mercados internacionales, bien por aspectos relacionados con la calidad, el volumen y la frecuencia del suministro, o por restricciones complejas en los mercados internacionales. A pesar de que tanto los Estados Unidos como la Unión Europea implementaron especiales regímenes de comercio preferencial para los países andinos, éstos parecen ser diseñados exclusivamente para estimular el desarrollo económico en general –y no específicamente el desarrollo alternativo. Esta conclusión revela una segunda desconexión: Mientras una amplia gama de productos andinos se benefician de aranceles bajos o nulos, el acceso a mercados internacionales para productos de desarrollo alternativo no está garantizado.

La segunda pregunta clave de la investigación es: *¿Cuáles han sido los principales motores detrás del apoyo internacional para proyectos de desarrollo alternativo implementados en Colombia?* Aunque la fiscalización de drogas ilícitas es claramente un motor importante detrás del apoyo de Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y un número muy reducido de otros países, existen varios otros motivos para estados de apoyar a Colombia. Los otros factores determinantes encontrados son la creación y la consolidación de instituciones (sobre todo en relación con la resolución del conflicto o con el desarrollo rural

en general), los derechos humanos (frecuentemente relacionados con el conflicto, las poblaciones desplazadas y la violencia), la protección del medioambiente, y el desarrollo socio-económico e institucional de las comunidades indígenas y Afro-Colombianos. Este último fue un resultado inesperado de la investigación. Mientras se esperaba que el apoyo a las comunidades indígenas o de Afro-Colombianos fuera más una cuestión interna para la política (pública) del estado colombiano, varias organizaciones donantes (sobre todo USAID y la Unión Europea) concentran parte de su apoyo específicamente en el apoyo de estas comunidades, algunas veces en relación con el respaldo del desarrollo alternativo.

Se puede decir que todos los motivos principales del apoyo internacional identificados tienen algún vínculo (principalmente indirecto) con el fenómeno global de las drogas y las estrategias adoptadas para abordarlo. Sin embargo, el apoyo bilateral muchas veces no llega a incluir respaldo a programas de desarrollo alternativo. Por ejemplo, muchos países se concentran en la protección de los derechos humanos o la resolución del conflicto en Colombia sin establecer un vínculo con el desarrollo alternativo para reducir la oferta de las drogas ilícitas. Aunque uno de los objetivos secundarios (o motores más amplios) aún pueda estar relacionado con las preocupaciones de los estados donantes sobre la economía ilícita de drogas de Colombia, esto generalmente no se traduce directamente en más apoyo concreto para el desarrollo alternativo. Eso quiere decir que muchos países no respetan estrictamente las varias reglas identificadas en esta investigación que tienen que ver directamente con el apoyo internacional para el desarrollo alternativo (por ejemplo las Reglas 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 y 12 del RISE).

La tercera pregunta clave de esta investigación es: *¿En qué medida el principio de la responsabilidad compartida ha sido un componente activo del apoyo internacional para proyectos de desarrollo alternativo implementados en Colombia?* Aunque sea difícil confirmar que la responsabilidad compartida está realmente puesta en práctica (más allá de estudiar las declaraciones de los políticos involucrados), la investigación pudo identificar algunos elementos de la corresponsabilidad por vía de la contestación de las dos primeras preguntas clave de la tesis. Primero, en términos bilaterales y multilaterales, el respaldo internacional para estrategias de desarrollo alternativo fue identificado. Segundo, la fiscalización de las drogas ha sido un motor importante detrás de la cooperación internacional (al desarrollo) en Colombia.

Sin embargo, en el sentido más directo del apoyo bilateral, la corresponsabilidad básicamente está limitada a los Estados Unidos, y un par de otros países como Italia y los Países Bajos, que están entre los pocos estados que podrían decir que cumplan con las reglas

de la cooperación internacional a base de la corresponsabilidad (por ejemplo las Reglas 1, 2 y 4). Mientras la asistencia de los Estados Unidos para el desarrollo alternativo eclipsa el apoyo de todos los otros países juntos, incluso las pequeñas contribuciones como el respaldo italiano a la planta de procesamiento de miel en Santa Marta se podrían considerar como pruebas de corresponsabilidad. Sin embargo, se podría argumentar que sin el apoyo de los Estados Unidos no existiera prácticamente ninguna evidencia de la responsabilidad compartida relacionada de una forma directa con el desarrollo alternativo. La gran parte de la cooperación al desarrollo bilateral en Colombia no está vinculada a objetivos de la fiscalización de drogas ilícitas.

A través de marcos multilaterales como la Unión Europea, el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo o el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), se identificaron formas de corresponsabilidad en el sentido más amplio, pero en todos estos casos el principio pierde fuerza (menos en algunos casos donde países concretos como Japón o España apoyan un programa especial dentro de estas estructuras multilaterales). Además, incluso dentro de los marcos multilaterales como la Unión Europea, sólo un par de países apoyan directamente al desarrollo alternativo.

Esta conclusión general ahora permite contestar a las tres sub-preguntas de la tercera pregunta clave. La primera sub-pregunta es: *Entendida la responsabilidad compartida como un vínculo entre el acuerdo internacional sobre la necesidad de un enfoque equilibrado y las actuales políticas de desarrollo alternativo apoyadas por la comunidad internacional, ¿va más allá de la retórica política, y está aplicada de forma rigurosa?* Para algunos países la corresponsabilidad claramente va más allá de la retórica política, como lo demuestra el respaldo directo a las estrategias de desarrollo alternativo en Colombia. En este sentido, se puede decir que estos países cumplen con básicamente todas las reglas identificadas en el contexto del RISE. Otros países tal vez contribuyen de forma indirecta a través de estructuras multilaterales, pero en estos casos es difícil evaluar si eso significaría un compromiso firme con la corresponsabilidad más allá de declaraciones al nivel de la ONU.

La segunda sub-pregunta es: *¿Existen áreas donde la corresponsabilidad está ausente como principio rector que se traduce en acción?* Una de las áreas identificadas en la investigación donde la corresponsabilidad está ausente tiene que ver con el apoyo internacional a las estrategias de mercadeo y el acceso a (nuevos) mercados (especializados). Por ejemplo, los estados podrían aumentar el acceso de productos de desarrollo alternativo de Colombia a sus mercados internos y poner más énfasis en la búsqueda de valor económico agregado, por ejemplo, a través de la promoción de procesos de certificación de

productos orgánicos o de comercio justo. Tiene que ver con las obligaciones de los estados bajo Reglas 13, 14, 15 y 16 del RISE. En este contexto, el objetivo central de la corresponsabilidad es mejorar la calidad y bajar los costos de la producción agrícola y agroforestal para ayudar a que los productos de los campesinos puedan llegar a mercados internacionales.

Una segunda área donde los estados donantes podrían hacer más es en la infraestructura en términos de transporte, tecnologías de información y comunicación (TIC), y energía. Esto está relacionado con la Regla 5 del RISE, que requiere complementar el desarrollo alternativo con estrategias más amplias como la creación de instituciones y capacidad a nivel local. También puede estar relacionado con la Regla 13 que aborda el acceso a mercados. En estos ámbitos, el gobierno colombiano también tiene una tarea importante a la hora de crear y mejorar la infraestructura, sobre todo del transporte.

Una tercera área también está vinculada con la creación de instituciones y capacidad. Se necesitaría más inversiones extranjeras para la creación del capital social, reforzando las organizaciones agrícolas y sus capacidades para gestionar bien los procesos de la producción.

Como requisito para poder mejorar y estimular la producción agrícola alternativa, una cuarta área está relacionada con el apoyo necesario para la titulación de tierras y la protección de derechos a la tierra (Regla 14 del RISE). Aunque algunos países hayan aportado en esta área (por ejemplo los Países Bajos), más apoyo podría mejorar el sistema de la titulación de tierras como una base sólida para la inversión y la innovación relacionadas con la producción agrícola y agroforestal.

Por último, más corresponsabilidad es necesaria en el área del respaldo para los jóvenes, tanto en términos sociales como económicos (oportunidades alternativas para ganarse la vida los jóvenes) Para que funcione la estrategia colombiana de estimular a los jóvenes que se queden en las zonas rurales, hace falta más apoyo en el diseño y la implementación de estrategias de desarrollo alternativo enfocadas específicamente en la gente joven. Esto es especialmente importante para evitar el reclutamiento de los jóvenes por las bandas criminales o las FARC. La población joven de Colombia y la tasa relativamente alta de natalidad requieren que la comunidad internacional incluya a las poblaciones jóvenes entre las prioridades del respaldo al desarrollo económico y social (alternativo).

Sin más apoyo para las áreas identificadas en la investigación (sobre todo aquellas que tienen que ver directamente con la producción agrícola y agroforestal) es probable que los programas de desarrollo alternativo vayan a seguir necesitando subsidios del Estado,



especialmente enfrentados por el doble desafío de bajos precios en el mercado internacional para productos como el café o el cacao y relativamente altos costos de producción de estos productos alternativos de Colombia. Por regla general, parece que los proyectos de desarrollo alternativo necesitarán mucho más apoyo si quieren evolucionar más allá de los actuales estándares de producción de volúmenes relativamente bajos, materias primas de baja o media calidad, destinados casi exclusivamente a mercados locales y bajo sistemas permanentes de subsidios.

La tercera sub-pregunta es: *¿Se puede considerar la corresponsabilidad y principios y normas internacionales relacionados como una parte integrante del marco normativo de un régimen internacional?* La investigación concluyó que es así. Al nivel internacional de la Comisión de Estupefacientes (CND), la responsabilidad compartida es ampliamente reconocida, fuertemente promocionada y mencionada en casi todas las resoluciones y decisiones relacionadas con el desarrollo alternativo. A través de los tratados internacionales sobre la fiscalización de las drogas, las declaraciones políticas de 1998 y 2009 y varias resoluciones del CND, la comunidad internacional se ha comprometido claramente con la norma de apoyar a los países productores de drogas ilícitas a través del respaldo de intervenciones de desarrollo alternativo a base de la corresponsabilidad.

La cuarta pregunta clave de la investigación es: *¿En qué medida el principio de la seguridad económica ha sido un componente activo del apoyo internacional para proyectos de desarrollo alternativo implementados en Colombia?* En cuanto se refiere a la primera definición de la seguridad económica como desarrollo humano y el desarrollo socio-económico de comunidades rurales, la seguridad económica ha sido un componente activo en básicamente todas las estrategias de desarrollo alternativo apoyadas por la comunidad internacional en Colombia. En este sentido, todo el apoyo internacional parece respetar las reglas relacionadas con el desarrollo humano identificadas en esta investigación (Reglas 9, 10 y 12).

Sin embargo, cuando se refiere a la segunda definición de seguridad económica como una política más amplia del Estado para proteger mercados y recursos naturales, el vínculo con el apoyo internacional para el desarrollo alternativo pierde fuerza. La conexión más clara entre el apoyo internacional en este campo y los recursos naturales es la importancia ampliamente compartida que estados otorgan a la protección del medioambiente a nivel internacional. De hecho, parece que los países generalmente dan más apoyo estructural a la protección del medioambiente y la biodiversidad en Colombia que a la lucha contra los cultivos ilícitos.

Aunque se pueda considerarse las preocupaciones internacionales por la protección del medioambiente más un ejemplo de ‘seguridad medioambiental’ que seguridad económica, no es improbable imaginar que la protección del medioambiente en el extranjero (sobre todo a la luz del cambio climático) como una manera directa o indirecta de proteger intereses económicos. No obstante, la importancia del medioambiente en relación con las estrategias de desarrollo alternativo ha sido otro resultado inesperado de la investigación. Por esta razón, un análisis adecuado sobre cómo la seguridad medioambiental está relacionada con la seguridad económica y cómo los programas de desarrollo alternativo pueden beneficiarse de tal vínculo va más allá del alcance de esta tesis.

La primera sub-pregunta de la cuarta pregunta es: *¿En qué medida Colombia ha establecido una relación positiva entre políticas de desarrollo alternativo y el concepto de seguridad económica?* Dicha relación positiva se establece ampliamente a través de la estrategia implementada de colocar el desarrollo humano en el seno de los proyectos de desarrollo alternativo. Sin embargo, no ha sido encontrada tan claramente en términos de la protección de mercados o recursos naturales. El apoyo internacional para la protección medioambiental como una estrategia clave para salvaguardar los ‘pulmones de la tierra’ o los sistemas andinos de agua ha revelado una primera relación positiva. Una segunda relación positiva, en parte relacionada con la primera, ha sido encontrada en la región de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta donde apoyo internacional para la conservación de la Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta está vinculado directamente con la protección de los sustentos (alternativos) de miles de pescadores y familias dependientes de los recursos naturales que proporciona.

La segunda sub-pregunta es: *¿En qué medida se puede encontrar apoyo para políticas positivas que fortalecen la seguridad económica en los programas bilaterales e internacionales de cooperación?* Como ya se señaló antes, el impulso de la seguridad económica en el sentido del desarrollo humano está plenamente integrado en los programas de cooperación internacional y bilateral para el desarrollo alternativo.

Al considerar la segunda definición de la seguridad económica, al apoyo para políticas positivas de seguridad económica es menos visible. Parcialmente se podría explicar esta falta de apoyo internacional por la responsabilidad principal que tiene el Gobierno colombiano en la protección de mercados internos, los recursos naturales en tierra colombiana o los parques nacionales. Sin embargo, existen algunos ejemplos de programas de protección medioambiental vinculados al desarrollo alternativo que se podrían considerar políticas positivas de seguridad económica apoyadas o incluso implementadas por países

donantes. El programa Bioredd+, financiado por USAID, es el ejemplo más claro. Aunque técnicamente no sea un proyecto clásico de desarrollo alternativo, el programa tiene vínculos indirectos con los sustentos alternativos y relaciones directas con la promoción de alianzas público-privada para fomentar la inversión privada en el desarrollo alternativo.

## 6.2 Conclusión sobre el argumento central de la tesis

El argumento central de la tesis es que se podría considerar a Colombia como un punto de referencia para establecer un régimen internacional eficaz de apoyo transfronterizo para estrategias de desarrollo alternativo para abordar la oferta de drogas ilícitas en el mundo. Este régimen –una propuesta nueva del autor– se llama un *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica* (RISE). Puesto a prueba en tres regiones de Colombia, el instrumento funcional del RISE efectivamente ha brindado argumentos sólidos para la creación de un régimen internacional específico para el desarrollo alternativo. La creación de un RISE sería significativa en cuatro sentidos:

La primera contribución significativa del RISE sería que pudiera aumentar el apoyo internacional para el desarrollo alternativo a base de la corresponsabilidad. La investigación ha demostrado claramente que el respaldo internacional para desarrollo alternativo en Colombia está muy limitado y sólo involucra unos pocos estados.

La segunda contribución significativa del RISE sería que permitiera que los estados trabajasen conjuntamente en asuntos muy específicos dentro del marco del desarrollo alternativo. Esto se logra a través del mecanismo positivo de la cooperación internacional, por ejemplo en relación con la protección del medioambiente y la biodiversidad, el desarrollo humano de las comunidades indígenas o la promoción de alianzas público-privada. El instrumento funcional se podría utilizar para tender puentes entre el actual apoyo internacional y las necesidades en las áreas identificadas donde la cooperación internacional ahora está ausente.

La tercera contribución significativa del RISE sería que ofreciera a los estados un marco para conectar la protección de formas de seguridad económica con el desarrollo alternativo de una manera positiva. Como resultado inesperado de la investigación, se ha demostrado que las amenazas al suministro de recursos naturales no sólo serían importantes para el Estado mismo, sino también para la comunidad internacional como argumento para colaborar a nivel internacional. Es especialmente importante cuando se refiere a los intereses

de compañías internacionales en sectores de minería o la explotación de petróleo, pero también aplica a las preocupaciones medioambientales. A través del RISE, los estados podían vincular políticas de protección medioambiental en el extranjero con el objetivo de la fiscalización de drogas dentro de programas de desarrollo alternativo. El ejemplo más claro de tal vínculo es el mencionado programa Bioredd+, financiado por USAID, y por el momento limitado a apoyo estadounidense. El marco funcional de RISE podría abrir este tipo de programas a más respaldo internacional.

Por último, a través de la incorporación de preocupaciones compartidas internacionalmente sobre el medio ambiente y la biodiversidad, el instrumento funcional del RISE potencialmente podría incrementar el apoyo al desarrollo alternativo si los estados consideran este tipo de preocupaciones un motor más importante para colaborar en el tema del desarrollo (alternativo) que la fiscalización de las drogas por si sola. La investigación ha mostrado que la globalización no cambió las pautas generales del negocio ilegal de las drogas. Las pruebas para dicha conclusión se podrían encontrar por ejemplo en el hecho que Colombia todavía suministra grandes cantidades de cocaína a los Estados Unidos, más de cuarenta años después de que las redes colombianas de narcotraficantes empezaran a hacerlo. Sin embargo, uno de los nuevos retos globales es el cambio climático que cada vez parece preocupar más a la comunidad internacional.

Por eso, los estados podrían utilizar el RISE para renovar la necesidad del respaldo a desarrollo alternativo a través del incremento de la importancia de la seguridad económica (o seguridad ecológica), enfocada en la conservación del medioambiente y la biodiversidad que se puede encontrar en muchos países productores de drogas ilícitas. La justificación de apoyo internacional, actualmente basada sobre todo en la oferta de drogas ilícitas y los vínculos con el conflicto interno de Colombia, no parece generar suficiente apoyo internacional para una estrategia eficaz de desarrollo alternativo.

Mientras los estados siguen poniendo énfasis en la importancia del desarrollo alternativo, y la corresponsabilidad como base principal para fortalecer la cooperación internacional en temas de la reducción drogas, existe la necesidad de explorar maneras de aumentar la cooperación internacional (actualmente muy escasa en el caso de Colombia). El RISE ofrecería a los estados una estructura dentro de cual se puede generar más respaldo internacional por vía de la inclusión de un enfoque en:

- a) la protección de bosques tropicales como una fuente importante de oxígeno y absorción del dióxido de carbono;

- b) la protección de los ecosistemas montañosos como una fuente importante de agua;
- c) la protección del medioambiente en relación con las intervenciones de desarrollo alternativo que por sí mismos pueden ser una fuente de degradación ambiental.

En principio una construcción teórica, un *Régimen Internacional de Seguridad Económica* ya puede estar a punto de convertirse en realidad, dadas las discusiones que se producen en los grupos internacionales de expertos y el enfoque continuado en la necesidad de encontrar buenas prácticas y lecciones aprendidas para el desarrollo alternativo. No obstante, el eslabón perdido de la protección medioambiental relacionado con el cambio climático podría ser un elemento clave para destapar el verdadero potencial de este régimen.



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