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BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM

THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

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Figure 1: Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome)

"The Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) was the only structure left standing in the area where the first atomic bomb exploded on 6 August 1945. Through the efforts of many people, including those of the city of Hiroshima, it has been preserved in the same state as immediately after the bombing. Not only is it a stark and powerful symbol of the most destructive force ever created by humankind; it also expresses the hope for world peace and the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons" (photo: Piotr Sudar; text: UNESCO, 2014, available at: <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/775>).

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ABBREVIATIONS

CD	Conference on Disarmament
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (also referred to as North Korea)
FAS	Federation of American Scientists
GA	(United Nations) General Assembly
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ISIS	Institute for Science and International Security
MAD	Model of Mutual Assured Destruction
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NNWS	non-nuclear-weapon state(s)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (also referred to as Non-Proliferation Treaty)
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
NWS	nuclear-weapon state(s)
PNET	Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
PTBT	Partial-Test-Ban Treaty (also referred to as Limited-Test-Ban Treaty)
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SC	(United Nations) Security Council
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
SSOD	Special Session on Disarmament
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TNT	trinitrotoluene
TTBT	Threshold Test-Ban Treaty
UN	United Nations
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDR	UN Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UK	United Kingdom (also referred to as Great Britain)
UNSCOM	UN Special Commission on Iraq
USA/US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (also referred to as Soviet Union)
WHO	World Health Organization

INTRODUCTION

> *"As you know, since the invention of gunpowder no fortification is impregnable; […] I live in fear that men of science will eventually discover some secret which would offer a faster way to kill people, destroy races, and wipe out entire nations."*
>
> *– "You are afraid, you say, that someone may invent a means of destruction crueller than what is currently in use. No; if such a fatal invention were discovered it would soon be prohibited by international public law, and the nations would unanimously agree to bury this discovery […]" [Montesquieu, Persian Letters, 1721]* [1]

In 1721, more than two centuries before the actual invention of the atomic bomb, Montesquieu wrote one of his principal works, the *Persian Letters*, and let the two fictional characters Rhedi and Usbek have the above mentioned conversation. Montesquieu was right in assuming that men of science would eventually discover some secret which would offer a faster way to kill people, destroy races, and wipe out entire nations. However, he was wrong in believing that if such a fatal invention were discovered it would soon be prohibited by international public law, and that nations would unanimously agree to bury this discovery.

Nuclear weapons are considered the most destructive weapons in history. They not only release immense quantities of heat and energy but also powerful and prolonged radiation. Their destructive capacity has the potential to cause untold human suffering, endanger future generations by illness and genetic defects, and permanently damage the environment. In other words: "The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet".[2] For these reasons, nuclear weapons constitute one of the most serious threats to human rights (in particular to the right to life, the right to physical and psychological integrity and the right to security) and to international humanitarian law (in particular to the protection of civilians and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering in armed conflicts).

On 16 July 1945, the USA carried out the first nuclear test in the world. Less than one month later, they dropped two atomic bombs on Japan: on Hiroshima on 6 August and on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. By doing so, the USA forced the Japanese to surrender and brought the Second World War to an end. However, the consequences of the bombings were horrendous: approximately 200,000 people lost their life and nearly 100,000 people were severely insured; the large majority civilians.

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[1] Cited from: MONTESQUIEU, Charles de, *Persian Letters*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 140, 142.
[2] INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 35 and 36, available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf> *(Note: All links referred to in this thesis were accessible as of 1 September 2014).*

The Second World War not only gave birth to the Nuclear Age but also to the United Nations. On 26 June 1945, just a few weeks before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 60 states, including the USA, signed the Charter of the United Nations. Its aim was to save future generations from war by strengthening international peace and security and promoting fundamental human rights, in particular the dignity and worth of the human being. On 24 October 1945, just a few weeks after the atomic bombings, the Charter came into force.

From the beginning, one of the main objectives of the United Nations was the avoidance of armed force and, for that purpose, the regulation of armaments. The very first resolution of the General Assembly, resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946, specifically demanded the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In spite of that, the USA have never given up their atomic bombs and, on top of that, eight more states, including all permanent members of the Security Council, have joined the 'nuclear club'.

On one hand, there have been gradual achievements concerning the global governance of nuclear weapons: the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, have considerably contributed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, there are still enough nuclear weapons in existence to blow up the entire surface of the earth. Montesquieu's idealist vision, that weapons of mass destruction would be prohibited by international law and that nations would unanimously agree to eliminate them, has been more and more replaced by the realist vision, that global governance is incapable and nations unwilling to make concrete steps towards a nuclear weapons free world.

The second half of the 20th century was – in terms of international peace and security – marked by two contrary developments: on the one side, human rights and international law were increasingly recognized and strengthened by international cooperation, in particular by the rise of the United Nations system; on the other side, human rights and international law were increasingly threatened by the virtually unlimited production and modernization of armaments – *inter alia* nuclear weapons – and their military threat or use.

According to the increasing recognition and strengthening of human rights and international humanitarian law, the elimination of nuclear weapons would be a coherent conclusion. However, according to the virtually unlimited production and modernization of armaments, the elimination of nuclear weapons would be an incoherent conclusion or, in other words, a utopian illusion. Hopes that nuclear weapons will be abolished in the 21st century remain modest. Nuclear powers still invest billions of dollars to maintain and upgrade their nuclear weapons arsenals and, in the face of contemporary international conflicts in East Europe and

the Middle East, deterrence strategies seem to revive. *Why has it not yet been possible to bring the nuclear weapons regime to an end and why are prospects about a nuclear weapon free future so bleak?*

In the following thesis, I will analyze both the achievements and failures of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Before beginning with the analysis, I will define the key terms and concepts of the thesis, namely: *nuclear weapons*, *global governance* and the concepts of *idealism* and *realism*. In the first chapter, I will outline historical backgrounds, which are essential for understanding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the second chapter, I will examine the efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of four global key actors within the United Nations family: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Court of Justice. In the third chapter, I will apply theoretical approaches which serve to explain both, the armament and proliferation of nuclear weapons and the achievements and failures of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These include *Game Theoretic Models*, the *Sagan-Waltz Controversy*, and the *Global Governance Problématique* according to Weiss and Thakur. After the analysis, I will summarize the main results of the thesis and give the conclusions that derive from these.

Why have I chosen this topic? First, believe that the debate on nuclear weapons has become fairly silent in recent years. Some argue that the 'true' weapons of mass destruction have become light arms. Indeed, light arms are killing hundreds of thousands of people each year; nuclear weapons are – as not being used – not killing anyone. However, the explosion of a single nuclear weapon *could* kill hundreds of thousands of people in only one day. History has shown that wars may be unpredictable and sudden. Who can guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again? Second, I also believe that the non-elimination of nuclear weapons is symptomatic for the international system *per se*. Global justice, reason and moral are once again undermined by the so-called *Realpolitik*. The non-elimination of nuclear weapons serves as one of many examples to illustrate this bias.

This thesis is written as part of the interdisciplinary master programme *Human Rights, Democracy and International Justice* at the Law Faculty of the University of Valencia. As a graduate from social science with a focus on international relations, I will combine both, the disciplines of international law and international politics, two concepts that are considered to be strongly interacting, in order to analyze the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Before beginning with the analysis, I will define the key terms and concepts of the thesis, which also form part of the title: *nuclear weapons*, *global governance* and the concepts of *idealism* and *realism*.

1. Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons are explosive devices that are based on nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or a combination of the two processes. Fission weapons are commonly referred to as atomic bombs. Fusion weapons are also referred to as thermonuclear bombs or, more commonly, hydrogen bombs. Nuclear weapons produce enormous explosive energy. The blast of this energy, which is usually described in equivalent weight of the conventional chemical explosive TNT[3], produces a strong shock wave, enormous amounts of heat, and lethal ionizing radiation.[4]

Nuclear fission describes the splitting of a heavy atomic nucleus, such as that of uranium or plutonium, into two or more lighter ones (see Figure 2 on p. 139). Nuclear fission results from either radioactive decay or nuclear reaction. *Radioactive decay* describes the naturally occurring nuclear splitting that takes place without external intervention. This type of fission, which is also referred to as *spontaneous fission*, is very rare. *Radioactive reactions*, however, are artificially triggered either by bombardment of heavy atomic nuclei with particles, such as neutrons or protons, or by electromagnetic radiation in the form of gamma rays. In the fission process, a large quantity of energy is released, radioactive products are formed, and several neutrons are emitted. These neutrons can induce fission in a nearby heavy nucleus and release more neutrons that can repeat the process, causing a chain reaction in which enormous amounts of energy are released.[5]

If controlled in a nuclear reactor, such a chain reaction can provide electricity for society's benefit. If uncontrolled, as in the case of nuclear weapons, it can lead to an explosion of inconceivable destructive force. The complete fission of 1 kg of uranium or plutonium, for example, would produce a blast which is equivalent to about 17.5 kilotons (17,500 tons) of TNT. In comparison: a conventional hand grenade contains about 100 g (0.0001 tons) of TNT. The complete fission of 1 kg of uranium or plutonium would hence create a blast

[3] Trinitrotoluene (TNT) is a pale yellow, solid organic nitrogen compound used chiefly as an explosive. It is the most common chemical explosive, extensively used in munitions and for demolitions.
[4] NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, "nuclear weapon", *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 2014, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421827/nuclear-weapon>.
[5] STEINBERG, Ellis P., "nuclear fission (physics)", *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 2013, available at: <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421629/nuclear-fission>.

equivalent to 175 million (!) hand grenades. Besides the blast, nuclear weapons produce extremely high temperatures (up to 4,000 degrees Celsius) and radiation that causes additional short- and long-term damage (also referred to as "fallout").[6]

Nuclear fusion, which can be considered as the opposite of nuclear fission, describes the joining together of two or more light atomic nuclei, such as that of hydrogen or its isotopes[7] deuterium and tritium, into a heavier one (see Figure 2 on p. 139). In the fusion process, a large quantity of energy is released, even larger than in the fission process. Furthermore, radioactive products such as ionizing radiation are formed and neutrons are emitted, but not in such a significant amount as in the fission process. In nature, fusion occurs in the sun and other stars and makes them radiate high amounts of energy in form of heat and light. In contrast to nuclear fission, nuclear fusion does not trigger chain reaction by itself. Besides, large amounts of energy are needed to produce a fusion reaction.[8]

Until today, controlled fusion has only been used in science, yet the necessary conditions have been largely achieved, suggesting that fusion energy for electric-power production could be possible in the future. Uncontrolled fusion has been used to create thermonuclear weapons, which are usually constructed in a two-stage design, featuring primary, a fission reaction as a trigger, and secondary, the actual fusion reaction. Thermonuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons that currently exist. The complete fusion of 1 kilogram of deuterium, for example, would produce a blast equivalent to about 87 kilotons of TNT or 870 million hand grenades.[9]

The spread of nuclear weapons is also referred to as *nuclear proliferation*. The Indian physicist Homi Jehangir Bhabha proposed the distinction between horizontal and vertical proliferation, whereby *horizontal proliferation* refers to the increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, and *vertical proliferation* to the increase or improvement of nuclear weapons arsenals of countries that already are in possession of nuclear weapons.[10] Correspondingly, the term *nuclear non-proliferation* means the prevention of nuclear proliferation. *Nuclear disarmament*, however, refers to the reduction or complete elimination of already existing nuclear weapons.

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[6] Ibid.
[7] Isotopes are variations of the same element that contain equal numbers of protons and electrons but different numbers of neutrons in their nuclei, and hence differ in relative atomic mass but not in chemical properties. Hydrogen, deuterium and tritium contain each one proton and one electron. However, hydrogen contains no neutron, deuterium one neutron, and tritium two neutrons.
[8] CONN, Robert W., "nuclear fusion (physics)", *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 2013, available at: <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421667/nuclear-fusion>.
[9] Ibid.
[10] GOLDSCHMIDT, B., "The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty", *IAEA Bulletin*, 22:3, 4, 1980, p. 73.

2. Global Governance

The expression *global governance* goes back to the 1992 publication of James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel's "Governance without Government". Within a short time, it became a key term for international relations scholars, who have since then used it in order to examine the theory and practice of international institutions such as the United Nations.[11] Commonly, the term *governance* is used for any "patterns of rules or practices of governing", whereby "governing" means to "conduct the policy, actions, and affairs of a state, organization, or people with authority."[12] However, in recent years, the term has precisely been used to denote the regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of overarching political authority, such as in enterprises (*cooperate governance*) or in the international system (*international or global governance*).

The environmental researcher Adil Najam has defined global governance as "the management of global processes in the absence of global government".[13] The UN researcher Thomas G. Weiss has given a more detailed definition, which describes global governance as:

> "the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate trans-border relations between states, cultures, citizens, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the market. It embraces the totality of institutions, policies, rules, practices, norms, procedures, and initiatives by which states and their citizens (indeed, humanity as a whole) try to bring more predictability, stability, and order to their responses to transnational challenges—such as climate change and environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism—which go beyond the capacity of a single state to solve."[14]

It is also useful to clarify the difference between international governance and global governance, two terms that are likely to be used synonymously. The term *international governance* emphasizes the determinant role of nation-states, while the term *global governance* has a more universal meaning, relating not only to nation-states, but to the entire earth population as a world society. In other words: while the concept of international governance follows the logic of "crossing-borders", the concept of global governance not only follows the logic of "crossing-borders", but also assumes a world without borders. International governance could therefore be seen as a subcategory of global governance.

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[11] WEISS, Thomas G., "The UN's Role in Global Governance", *UN Intellectual History Project*, Briefing Note Number 15, 2009, p. 1.
[12] The definitions of "governance" and "governing" are taken from the *Oxford English Dictionary Online* (OED), available at: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com>.
[13] RIAZATI, Saba, "A Closer Look: Professor seeks stronger U.N.", *Daily Bruin*, 17 October 2006, available at: <http://dailybruin.com/2006/10/17/a-closer-look-professor-seeks>.
[14] WEISS, Thomas G., op. cit., note 11, p. 1f.

3. Idealism and Realism

Idealism and *realism* are two theoretical concepts traditionally used in philosophy. The studies of international relations adopted these concepts in order to examine the causes of war and peace. Both, idealism and realism, can be derived from two key works of modern political and legal philosophy: Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* from 1651 and Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* from 1795.

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes describes the original state of men, the so-called *state of nature*, as a state where there is no common power and all men are equal and free.[15, 16] They are subject to nothing but the right and law of nature. The *right of nature*, which is also referred to as *jus naturale*, is the liberty of each man to use his own power for the preservation of his own life. Consequently, he is free to do anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he conceives as a means for preserving his life, even to oppress or murder one another. The *law of nature*, which is also referred to as *lex naturalis*, is the obligation of each man to refrain from anything that is destructive to his life, even to diminish or omit the means of preserving it.[17]

Consequently, the state of nature is a "condition of war of every one against every one", which not only consists in the actual act of war, but in the omnipresent disposition for starting a war.[18] Therefore, the state of nature is an undesirable state, where there can be no security to anyone, no matter how strong or wise, of living as long as envisioned by nature. It hence would be reasonable "that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war."[19] Out of this *first general rule of reason*, Hobbes deduces the *second general rule of reason*: in order to achieve peace and defence, men should give up their right to everything to such an amount as they would demand from other men: "Whatever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them" or the complementary version in Latin: "Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris."[20]

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[15] HOBBES, Thomas, *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill*, Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought, 1999, p. 76.
[16] Hobbes presumes that men are naturally *equal* and *free*. They are equal, because possible differences in body and mind are not considerable enough that one could significantly benefit from it: "[…] [even] the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others […]" (ibid., p. 76). And they are free, because of the absence of external impediments, which could hinder humans from using their power according to their own judgment and reason (ibid.). Note: The term "men" is used synonymously for human beings, and includes both, men and women.
[17] Ibid., p. 73.
[18] Ibid., p. 77.
[19] Ibid., p. 80.
[20] Ibid., p. 80f.

The right to everything can be either given up by simply renouncing it, or by transferring it to another. According to the state of nature, this is a voluntary act, since any forcible renunciation or transference would be against the right of nature. However, once the right to everything has been renounced or transferred, it cannot be revoked, since revocation would be injustice and injury (*sine jure*) leading back to the undesirable state of nature.[21]

The mutual transferring of rights between men is called a *contract*. The question that follows is: How can compliance of a contract be assured and injustice and injury be prevented in a post-state of nature? On the one hand, a contract may be assured by mutual trust. However, according to the state of nature, mutual trust is void. Therefore, a contract must be assured by a superior "common power […] with right and force sufficient to compel performance."[22] The genesis of such common power is described as follows:

> "The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend [men] from […] the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them […] is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will […] in those things which concern the common peace and safety […]. This is […] made by covenant of every man with every man […]."[23, 24]

In *Perceptual Peace*, Kant adopts Hobbes' theory and applies it to the international system:

> "Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the natural state of society – that is to say, uncontrolled by external law – injure one another through their very proximity. Every state, for the sake of its own security, may – and ought to – demand that its neighbour should submit itself to conditions, similar to those of the civil society where the right of every individual is guaranteed. This would give rise to a federation of nations […]."[25]

Kant suggests that a covenant of peace (*foedus pacificum*) must be created in order to escape the state of nature in the international system and replace it by a state of permanent peace. According to reason, states would have to submit themselves to a world republic with a supreme law-giving power, which could enforce such covenant of peace. However, states are unwilling to give up their sovereignty and therefore, there cannot be a world republic

[21] Ibid., p. 81.
[22] Ibid., p. 106.
[23] Ibid.
[24] He furthermore adds: "This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence" (ibid.).
[25] KANT, Immanuel, *Perceptual Peace*, 3rd ed., London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917, p. 128.

with a supreme law-giving power, but only a free federation between states.[26] Kant summarizes the dilemma between the idealist and realist perception of international cooperation as follows:

> "For states, in their relation to one another, there can be, according to reason, no other way of advancing from that lawless condition which unceasing war implies, than by giving up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual men have done, and yielding to the coercion of public laws. Thus they can form a State of nations (*civitas gentium*) […], which will be ever increasing and would finally embrace all the peoples of the earth. States, however, in accordance with their understanding of the law of nations, by no means desire this, and therefore reject in *hypothesi* what is correct in *thesi*. Hence, instead of the positive idea of a world-republic, if all is not to be lost, only the negative substitute for it, a federation averting war, maintaining its ground and ever extending over the world may stop the current of this tendency to war and shrinking from the control of law. But even then there will be a constant danger that this propensity may break out."[27]

The concepts of both idealism and realism are based on the Kantian assumption that the international system is an anarchic system that originates from the state of nature. In contrast to nation-states, it neither has a monopoly of force, nor authorities which establish comprehensive order. Although there are international institutions such as the United Nations, the decisive actors continue to be nation-states. How can international peace and security be achieved and permanently maintained under these conditions? In answering these questions, idealism and realism suggest different approaches.[28]

Idealism is characterized by the belief in human progress. It assumes that human beings are inherently good or at least endowed with reason. Endowed with reason means that they are accessible to rational arguments and thus capable to learn. On the long run, the capability to learn has to lead to a better world where conflicts can be solved in a cooperative and peaceful manner. Ideals like world peace, the protection of universal human rights, prosperity of all nations, global democracy, and environmental protection can eventually be achieved.[29]

[26] Ibid., p. 134 f.
[27] Ibid., p. 136.
[28] MENZEL, Ulrich, *Zwischen Idealismus und Realismus, Die Lehre von den Internationalen Beziehungen*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001, p. 20f.
[29] Ibid.

Contemporary idealists such as the legal and political philosopher Hans Kelsen stick to the Kantian assumption that permanent international peace and security can only be obtained by means of a world state:

> "The modern State is the most perfect type of a social order establishing a community monopoly of force. Its perfection is due to the centralization of the employment of force […] Within the State, pacification of inter-individual relations – that is, *national* peace – is attained in the highest possible degree. […] When the question arises how to secure *international* peace, how to eliminate the most terrible employment of force – namely, war – from inter-State relations, no answer seems to be more self-evident than this: to unite all individual States or, at least, as many as possible, into a World State, to concentrate all their means of power, their armed forces, and put them at the disposal of a world government under laws created by a world parliament."[30]

In contrast to idealism, realism is characterized by the assumption that human beings are not only inherently good, but also inherently bad. They do not always act by reason, but also by desire. The ability to learn and therefore, the ability to solve conflicts in a cooperative and peaceful manner is severely limited. That is why states pursue their own goals instead of cooperating. They establish their security by increasing their power, especially their military power. Peace, which is understood as a state of non-war, is guaranteed by deterrence. The security dilemma that derives from knowledge gaps about the other states interests and power resources is not solvable, unless one state would accumulate so much power, that it would have absolute hegemony above all other states.[31]

The realist antipode of Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, criticized the idealist vision of world peace as a "fiction" or "normative ideal". [32] According to Schmitt, the decisive entities of the international system are sovereign states, whose very propose is to decide on enemies and, if necessary, fight against them.[33] There cannot be a world state, since there are no possible enemies the humanity as a whole could fight against. The only possible way to escape the present state would be the dissolution of the concept of the state *per se*. However the "inherent reality" is the existence of sovereign states, which fight against each other.[34]

In the following theses, I will analyze how the existence of nuclear weapons and its implications support either the idealist or the realist perspective on the international system. I will come back to this question in the conclusion.

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[30] KELSEN, Hans, *Peace through Law*, 5th ed., Clark, New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange, 2007, p. 4f.
[31] MENZEL, Ulrich, op. cit., note 28, p. 21.
[32] SCHMITT, Carl, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, 3rd ed., Berlin: Duncker & Homblot, 1991, p. 22ff.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., p. 54.

CHAPTER I - HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS

Without studying the past, it is hard to understand the present or make predictions about the future. Therefore, in the following chapter, I will summarize the key events in the history of nuclear weapons. In the first part, I will outline the history of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, beginning with the development of the first atomic bombs. In the second part, I will sum up the history of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, beginning with the foundation of the United Nations. Both parts end with an overview of the present situation.[35]

1. The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1.1 The Development of the Atomic Bomb

The history of nuclear weapons goes back to the end of the 19th century, when French scientists like Antoine Henri Becquerel and Marie and Pierre Curie discovered the principle of radioactivity. The presumption that certain elements could contain large amounts of energy prompted numerous researchers, like Ernest Rutherford and Frederick Soddy, to speculate about the possible uses. Not only scientists, but also writers were inspired by the new discovery. The British author Herbert G. Wells 'invented' the atomic bomb already two decades before scientists did. His 1914 science fiction novel *The World Set Free* deals with the discovery of nuclear energy and its applications: on one hand, the nuclear energy production for civil use and, on the other hand, the development of atomic bombs for military use. A part of the story takes place in 1956, when a second world war breaks out between the Central European powers and their allies. The excessive use of atomic bombs "that would continue to explode indefinitely" and that "were strange even to the men who used them" causes numerous European cities to be completely destroyed.[36, 37]

[35] Recommendable introductions to the history of nuclear proliferation and the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are written by: MORALES Pedraza, Jorge, "La Proliferación de Armas nucleares: Mito o Realidad?", *IAEA Bulletin*, 46:2, 2005, p. 1-21, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull462/Spanish/nuclear_proliferation_sp.pdf; NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, "nuclear weapon", *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 2014, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421827/nuclear-weapon>; and SANDERS, Ben, "A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, *Nuclear Law Bulletin*, 62, 1998, p. 7-24.

[36] WELLS, Herbert George, *The World Set Free*, Las Vegas: Lits, 2010, p. 43.

[37] From the present point of view, it is quite surprising how realistic Wells predictions about the destructive warfare use of nuclear weapons were. Yet, it is also known that Wells had deeply studied the already existing works about radioactivity, in particular those of Frederick Soddy, before writing the novel (STRUB, Erik, "Soddy, Wells und die Atombombe. Eine literarische Fiktion aus physikalischer Sicht", *Physik Journal*, 7, 2005, p. 50.).

In the 1930s, the Austro-Hungarian born physicist Leó Szilárd elaborated the idea of creating nuclear chain reactions in order to release energy and thus laid the foundation for building the atomic bomb. It is said that he had previously read *The World Set Free* and was inspired by it. His studies were later on advanced by German scientists Otto Hahn, Fritz Strassmann, Lise Meitner and Otto Robert Frisch. They experimentally generated nuclear splitting by bombarding a uranium solution with neutrons and gave that process the name 'fission'.

With the rise of Hitler and the imminent outbreak of the Second World War, the development of nuclear weapons became increasingly important. In August 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and expressed his concerns about the possibility that Nazi Germany could be carrying out a nuclear weapons programme. He pointed out the technological advances that could enable the construction of nuclear weapons in the near future and advised the president to drive forward research programmes and develop the atomic bomb before the Germans would do so.[38] However, it was not until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the subsequent US declaration of war upon Japan and Germany, when Roosevelt undertook serious efforts to develop atomic bombs.

At the beginning of 1942, the USA began operating its nuclear weapons programme, the so called *Manhattan Project*, which was located in Los Alamos, New Mexico. The project was supported by the British and the Canadians, but held secret from other states including the allied USSR. The scientific team was led by Robert Oppenheimer, who today is considered the 'father of the atomic bomb'. Oppenheimer was supported by the Austro-Hungarian born physicist Edward Teller, who had just like Szilárd and Einstein fled from Nazi Germany. The Manhattan Project grew to employ more than 130,000 people and cost nearly $ 2 billion, which is equivalent to $ 26 billion in 2014.[39]

After three and a half years, the Manhattan Project achieved to create the first atomic bombs that were fully operational, some containing uranium and others containing plutonium. On 16 July 1945, the USA carried out the first nuclear weapons test in the world. It was called 'Trinity' and tested a plutonium device, codenamed 'Gadget', which created a

[38] *Letter from Albert Einstein to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 2 August 1939, available at: <http://research.archives.gov/description/593374>.
[39] The calculation is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, which is available at: <https://www.minneapolisfed.org>.

blast equivalent to 20 kilotons of TNT, far more than any conventional bomb ever used before. Thus, the USA became the first nuclear power in the world.[40]

1.2 The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

When the USA carried out the Trinity Test, Germany had already surrendered and the war in Europe was over. The Pacific War, however, was still going on. The news of the successful nuclear weapons test reached the newly designated US President Harry S. Truman at the Potsdam Conference[41], where he immediately informed the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin about it. A few days later, on 26 July 1945, Truman, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of the Chinese government, released the so-called 'Potsdam Declaration'[42], which outlined the terms of surrender for the Japanese.[43] It also stated that if Japan did not surrender immediately it would face "prompt and utter destruction".[44]

Nevertheless, the Japanese did not respond to the Potsdam Declaration and Truman decided to use the recently developed nuclear weapons to enforce a quick surrender. It is also assumed that it may have been a way to test the new weapons in real world conditions, to justify the $ 2 bill. costs of the Manhattan Project, to demonstrate military superiority towards the USSR and to take revenge for Pearl Harbor.[45] After intense consideration, Hiroshima was declared to be the primary, Kokura the secondary and Nagasaki the tertiary target. All three cities were industrially and militarily significant port cities in southern Japan with an estimated population of 340,000–350,000 (Hiroshima), 180,000 (Kokura) and 240,000–260,000 (Nagasaki). However, the main criteria of the target selection was not the industrial and military significance of the cities, but the feasibility of the bombings and the "moral effect" they would produce.[46]

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[40] Cf. GOSLING, F.G., *The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb*, rev. ed., Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2010; CTBTO [ed.], "Manhattan Project", *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014a, available at: <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/manhattan-project>; and CTBTO [ed.], "16 July 1945 – 'Trinity': world's first nuclear test", *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014b, available at: <http://ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-july-1945-trinity-worlds-first-nuclear-test>.

[41] The Potsdam Conference was the final World War II conference between the USA, Great Britain and the USSR. It took place from 17 July until 2 August 1945 and discussed further strategies concerning post-war Europe and the Pacific War.

[42] *Potsdam Declaration*, 26 July 1945, available at: <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html>.

[43] The USSR did not sign the declaration because it had not yet declared war on Japan.

[44] *Potsdam Declaration*, op. cit., note 42, 13th clause.

[45] BERNSTEIN, Barton J., "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered", *Foreign Affairs*, 74:1, 1995, p. 135ff.; and DONOHUE, Nathan, "Understanding the Decision to Drop the Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki", *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*, 2012, available at: <http://csis.org/blog/understanding-decision-drop-bomb-hiroshima-and-nagasaki>.

[46] Cf. MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT, the [ed.], *The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, Marston Gate: amazon.co.uk, 2013, p. 16f.

On Monday, 6 August 1945, a single B-29 bomber named ‘Enola Gay’ dropped the first atomic bomb used in warfare, a uranium device called ‘Little Boy’, on the city of Hiroshima. It detonated at an altitude of 580 meters above the ground and created a blast which was later estimated to be equivalent to 13 kilotons of TNT. Three days later, on 9 August 1945, a single another B-29 bomber named ‘Bockscar’ dropped a second and bigger bomb, a plutonium device called ‘Fat Man’ on Nagasaki, because the initial target, Kokura, was obscured by clouds that day and could not be attacked. ‘Fat Man’ detonated at an altitude of 500 meters above the ground and created a blast which was later estimated to be equivalent to 21 kilotons of TNT. A few days later, on 15 August 1945, Japan announced its surrender and the Second World War was brought to an end.[47]

However, the detonation of the atomic bombs caused inconceivable suffering. The blasts and resultant firestorms demolished about two thirds of Hiroshima and half of Nagasaki.[48] In both cities the area of total destruction reached a radius of about 1.5 km and the temperature of the hypocenter rose up to 3000 - 4000 degrees Celsius.[49] Within a radius of 0.5 km, approximately 90 percent of the habitants died immediately; some of them burning to ash and leaving nothing but shadows of their bodies. About 45,000 people in Hiroshima and 22,000 in Nagasaki died throughout the same day. Another 19,000 people in Hiroshima and 17,000 in Nagasaki died during the following four months. The total death toll including long-term consequences such as skin burns, radiation and other severe injuries is estimated to be of 136,000 in Hiroshima and 64,000 in Nagasaki. About 22,000 of the death victims were Korean nationals, who had been forced to come to Japan as laborers. Approximately 75 percent of the Hiroshima and more than 99 percent (!) of the Nagasaki death victims were civilians. Furthermore, 72,000 people in Hiroshima and 25,000 in Nagasaki were severely injured, but survived. Until today, some of the so-called ‘Hibakusha’ (“explosion-affected

[47] Cf. ibid., p. 21ff.; and CTBTO [ed.], “6 and 9 August 1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki”, *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014c, available at:
<http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/6-and-9-august-1945hiroshima-nagasaki>.

[48] NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, “nuclear weapon”, *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 2014, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421827/nuclear-weapon>.

[49] MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT, the [ed.], op. cit., note 46, p. 45; and HARWELL, Christine C., “Experiences and Extrapolations from Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, in Harwell, Mark A. and Thomas C. Hutchinson [ed.], *Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War. Volume II. Ecological and Agricultural Effects*, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1985, p. 432.

people") suffer from long-term consequences such as cancer. These figures do not include prenatal and second generation death and damage.[50, 51, 52]

1.3 The Nuclear Arms Race between the USA and the USSR

The USSR had been carrying out a nuclear weapons programme since 1939, but because of the German invasion in June 1941 and lack of funding, the scale of the programme remained relatively small. However, the Trinity Test and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki urged the USSR to catch up with the USA. Therefore, Stalin increased the capacities and set up a crash programme to develop nuclear weapons as quick as possible. The progress of the programme was highly based on espionage efforts, in particular by Klaus Fuchs, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Theodor A. Hall, who supplied the USSR with information from the Manhattan Project during and shortly after the Second World War.[53] On 29 August 1949, years ahead of American predictions, the USSR carried out their first nuclear weapons test. It was called 'RDS-1' and used a plutonium devise similar to 'Fat Man'. Thus, the USSR became the second nuclear power in the world and brought the atomic hegemony of the USA to an end. From that moment on, the USA and the USSR started a nuclear arms race, which would last for decades.[54]

Because of the successful nuclear weapons test of the USSR, Truman decided to drive forward the development of fusion-based thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bombs that would have even more explosive force than fission-based nuclear (or atomic) bombs. After about three years, the USA achieved to create the first hydrogen bombs and, on 1 November 1952, carried out the first thermonuclear weapons test in the world ('Operation Ivy'). The device they used was codenamed 'Mike' and caused a blast equivalent to 10.4 megatons of TNT; 800 times (!) as much as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Only one and a half years later, on 12 August 1953, the USSR caught up with the USA and also carried out a thermonuclear

[50] OHKITA, Takeshi, "Acute Medical Effects at Hiroshima and Nagasaki", in Chivian, Eric et al. [ed.], *Last Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War*, New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1982a, p. 85f.; and OHKITA, Takeshi, "Delayed Medical Effects at Hiroshima and Nagasaki", in ibid., p. 93f.

[51] The number of victims caused by the detonation of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki spreads depending on the data source.

[52] Figures about fetal and neonatal damage are disputed. The examination of children whose mothers had been exposed to radiation during pregnancy in between 2 kilometers of the hypocenters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has revealed a fetal death toll of 27,7 percent, a neonatal death toll of 30,7 percent, and a neonatal retardation rate of 26,6 percent (OHKITA, Takeshi, 1982b, op. cit., note 50, p. 100f.).

[53] In 1950, Klaus Fuchs as well as the US American couple Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were arrested because of espionage. Fuchs was sentenced to 14 years of prison and released after nine years. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were both sentenced to death and executed in 1953. Espionage efforts of Theodor Hall were only discovered in the 1990s (cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit, note 48).

[54] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit, note 48.

test (‘RDS-6’). In contrast to ‘Mike’, the Soviet device was even deliverable. A few months later, on 1 March 1954, the USA again caught up and tested their first deliverable hydrogen bomb at the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands (‘Castle Bravo Test’). The tested device, which was codenamed ‘Shrimp’, created a blast of 15 megatons, more than twice as much as expected, and created such a great damage that the atoll became uninhabitable for decades.[55]

1.4 Cuban Missile Crisis

With the end of the Second World War, tensions between the USA and the USSR, which had been temporarily concealed by the Second World War, revived. Disagreements about the future of Germany and the future of the international order reinforced the ideological and political divisions between the two states and eventually led to the Cold War. In the 1950s, both, the USA and the USSR, followed a tit-for-tat strategy in order to prevent the other one from acquiring nuclear supremacy and therefore upgraded their nuclear weapons arsenals in terms of quantity and quality. Nuclear weapons tests were used to demonstrate the state of the art and to deter the other one. On 30 October 1961, for example, the USSR tested the largest nuclear device in history, the so-called ‘Tsar Bomba’, which generated a detonation equivalent to 50 Megatons of TNT; almost 4000 times (!) as much as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. However, because of its size and weight it was useless for warfare.[56] At the same time, the USA and the USSR also developed smaller devices and nuclear missiles that could be launched from remote areas far away from the target.

Even though the vertical proliferation in the USA and the USSR increased rapidly, the actual warfare use of (thermo-)nuclear weapons became more and more impracticable. If one state had launched a nuclear first strike, the other one would have reacted with a nuclear second strike. In the end, it would not matter whether the USA first attacked the USSR or the other way around; the outcome would be inconceivable damage on both sides.

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[55] Cf. CTBTO [ed.], “The United States' Nuclear Testing Programme”, *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014d, available at: <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-united-states-nuclear-testing-programme>; CTBTO [ed.], “The Soviet Union's Nuclear Testing Programme”, *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014e, available at: <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-soviet-unionsnuclear-testing-programme>; and CTBTO [ed.], “1 March 1954 - Castle Bravo”, *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014f, available at:
<http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/1-march-1954-castle-bravo>.

[56] Cf. CTBTO [ed.], “The Soviet Union's Nuclear Testing Programme”, *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014e, available at: <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-soviet-unionsnuclear-testing-programme>.

This *Model of Mutually Assured Destruction* (MAD), which was developed by game theorists, emphasized that starting a nuclear war was not only immoral but also irrational in a military sense.[57]

Nevertheless, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the brinkmanship between the USA and the USSR threatened to escalate and almost led to a nuclear war. When in 1961 the USA stationed nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey, the USSR reacted by secretly placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. In October 1962, US reconnaissance aircrafts discovered these missiles. US President John F. Kennedy immediately informed the public about that and requested the USSR to withdrawal the missiles from Cuba. However, USSR General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev refused to do so. In response, the USA set up a naval blockade in order to hinder further nuclear shipments from the USSR to Cuba.

On 27 October, the so called 'Black Saturday', the situation reached its climax when a Soviet fleet which was accompanied by nuclear-equipped submarines was stopped by the naval blockade. US destroyers attacked the Soviet submarine B-59 and forced it to come to the surface. The Soviet crew had official permission to strike back with nuclear weapons in case of attack, but one of the three officers of the submarine, Wassili Alexandrowitsch Archipow, convinced the other two to wait for further order from Moscow. Meanwhile, urgent talks were held between US and Soviet diplomats in order to prevent nuclear warfare. Only a few hours later, Khrushchev surprisingly pulled off the Soviet fleet. Kennedy and Khrushchev had come to an agreement: The USSR would dismantle the nuclear missiles in Cuba and, in return, the USA would dismantle their missiles in Turkey. However, the latter would not be publically announced as part of the resolution.[58]

1.5 Nuclear Armament of Great Britain, France, and China

The first two decades of the Cold War were not only marked by vertical but also by horizontal proliferation. While the USA and the USSR increased their nuclear weapons arsenals, three more countries – Great Britain, France, and China – became nuclear powers.

In 1940, Great Britain started considering the possibility of creating nuclear weapons. During the Second World War, they fully cooperated in the US Manhattan Project and sharply reduced their research programmes at home. However, in 1946, the USA unilaterally

[57] Cf. JERVIS, Robert, "Mutual Assured Destruction", *Foreign Policy*, 133, 2002, p. 40ff.; and MARRERO Rocha, Inmaculada, "La proliferación de armas nucleares en la sociedad internacional actual: elementos de continuidad y cambio", in Universidad del País Vasco [ed.], *Cursos de Derecho Intenacional y Relaciones Internacionales de Vitoria-Gasteiz 2010*, Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2011, p. 387f.
[58] Cf. NATHAN, James A. and Graham Allison, "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited", *Foreign Affairs*, 91:6, 2012, p. 162ff.

terminated the partnership. At that time, the British already had the knowledge, but not the technical equipment to produce nuclear weapons themselves. They needed six more years to develop their first atomic bomb, an improved version of 'Fat Man'. On 3 October 1952, Great Britain carried out its first nuclear weapons test ('Hurricane') and thus became the third nuclear power. Five years later, on 8 November 1957, they eventually carried out their first thermonuclear weapons test ('Grapple X'). Subsequently, the USA and Great Britain restored the nuclear weapons cooperation by the UK–US Mutual Defense Agreement[59], which is still in force today.[60]

Before the Second World War, France was highly involved in nuclear research. However, during and after the Second World War, nuclear research discontinued due to political and financial instability. It was until the mid-1950s, when France resumed its nuclear research and started a secret nuclear weapons programme. Six years later, on 13 February 1960, they carried out their first nuclear weapons test ('Gerboise bleue') and hence became the fourth state to join the nuclear club. Another eight years later, on 24 August 1968, they also carried out their first thermonuclear test ('Canopust').[61]

After the Second World War, the USSR and China became close allies against the NATO states. In 1951, they signed an agreement whereby China supplied uranium to the USSR in exchange for technical assistance in producing nuclear weapons. However, when in the late 1950s the relationship between the two states worsened, the USSR reduced its assistance and, in 1959, rejected the donation of an atomic bomb for copying purposes. Despite of that, the Chinese made progress by themselves and, on 16 October 1964, carried out their first nuclear weapons test ('59-6'). With China becoming the fifth nuclear power in the world, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council had come into the possession of nuclear weapons. Three years later, on 17 June 1967, the Chinese also carried out their first thermonuclear test ('no. 6').[62]

[59] *UK–US Mutual Defense Agreement*, 3 July 1958, available at: <http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/56_4.pdf?_=1316627913>.
[60] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and CTBTO [ed.], "The United Kingdom's Nuclear Testing Programme", *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014g, available at: <http://ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-united-kingdomsnuclear-testing-programme>.
[61] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and CTBTO [ed.], "France's Nuclear Testing Programme", *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014h, available at: <http://ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/frances-nuclear-testing-programme>.
[62] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and CTBTO [ed.], "China's Nuclear Testing Programme", *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014i, available at: <http://ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/chinas-nuclear-testing-programme>.

1.6 Nuclear Armament of Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea

The nuclear armament of Great Britain, France and China, was followed by the nuclear armament of four mores states - Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea-, which developed nuclear weapons outside the context of the Cold War.

Shortly after its foundation in 1948, Israel made strong efforts to quickly achieve atomic bombs. It is not known much about the Israeli nuclear weapons programme because of its secrecy. It is known, however, that Israel was highly supported by the French and British. It is furthermore estimated that Israel built its first nuclear devices at the end of the 1960s. In 1986, whistle blower Mordechai Vanunu sold secret information about the Israeli nuclear weapons programme to a British newspaper, which revealed that Israel was in possession of nuclear weapons and maybe also thermonuclear weapons. Until today, Israel has not officially confirmed or denied that it is a nuclear power and there is no evidence that they have ever carried out a nuclear weapons test. However, based on the information that has come to light, it is widely agreed, that Israel was the sixth state to join the nuclear club.[63]

India's nuclear weapons programme started as early as 1944, but was not too ambitious at the beginning. The 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, in which China and India disputed about the Himalayan frontier, led India's government to accelerate its efforts. When in 1964, China carried out its first nuclear weapons test, India became even more ambitious. Nevertheless, it took ten more years until they achieved to produce their first nuclear devices. On 18 May 1974, India carried out its first nuclear weapons test ('Smiling Buddha') and thus became the seventh nuclear power. Even though they claim also having successfully tested a thermonuclear weapon on 11 May 1998 ('Shakti '98'), experts keep arguing about the size of the yields and whether any of the tested device really was a hydrogen bomb.[64]

Pakistan began to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the early 1970s. When India came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Pakistani government intensified its efforts. Due to espionage efforts of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist, who had been working for a Dutch nuclear fuel company, Pakistan received important information such as blue prints which drove forward the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme

[63] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and
FAS [ed.], "Nuclear Weapons – India Nuclear Forces", *Federation of American Scientists*, 2002a, available at: <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke>.
[64] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and
FAS [ed.], "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons", *Federation of American Scientists*, 2002b, available at: <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke>.

significantly. It is not exactly known, when they achieved to produce their first nuclear devices. However, on 28 May 1998, Pakistan carried out its first nuclear weapons test ('Chagai-I') in response to India's nuclear weapons test 'Shakti '98' and thus became officially the eighth nuclear power.[65]

North Korea has been suspected of operating a nuclear weapons programme since the 1980s. As in the case of Israel, there is little information about the programme because of its secrecy. In 2012, North Korea declared itself to be a nuclear power. According to their own statements, they carried out nuclear weapons tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. The latter was confirmed by foreign institutes and hence it is highly agreed that North Korea became the ninth and most recent nuclear power.[66]

1.7 Other Countries

In total, about 30 countries have sought nuclear weapons, of which ten are known to have succeeded.[67] Before 1945, Germany and Japan had unsuccessfully tried to achieve nuclear weapons and were forced to stop their efforts with the end of the Second World War. In the following decades, several countries had started nuclear weapons programmes but voluntarily decided to end them.[68] The Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which as Soviet successor states inherited nuclear weapons from the USSR, transferred their weapons to Russia. [69]

South Africa started a secret nuclear weapons programme in the late 1970s. In 1985, the government decided to produce seven nuclear devices similar to 'Little Boy'. When in 1989 six of these were completed, the production was ceased due to international pressure. Over the next 18 months the devices were dismantled, the uranium was made unsuitable for weapon use, and all of the components and technical documents were destroyed. [70]

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[65] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and
FAS [ed.], "Israel Nuclear Weapons", *Federation of American Scientists*, 2007, available at: <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke>.

[66] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and FAS [ed.], "Nuclear Weapons Program – North Korea", *Federation of American Scientists*, 2006, available at: <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke>.

[67] The exact number of countries that sought nuclear weapons is difficult to determine because of the secrecy, which often continued after a program has ended.

[68] These include Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Argentina and Spain are suspected of having started nuclear weapons programs, but no evidence exists (cf. ISIS [ed.], "Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview", *Institute for Science and International Security*, 2014, available at: <http://isis-online.org/nuclear-weapons-programs>).

[69] Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and ISIS [ed.], op. cit., note 68.

[70] Cf. ibid.

Libya started a secret nuclear weapons programme in the 1980s. As in the case of Pakistan, it was supported by nuclear scientist Qadeer Khan, who supplied the Libyan government with information and technical equipment. The programme busted in 2003, when the US Navy intercepted and diverted a freighter to Tripoli which was carrying thousands of centrifuge components. In December 2003, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi publicly announced that the programme would be terminated and let inspectors supervise its complete dismantle. [71]

Iraq began a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the 1970s, using the claim of civilian use as a cover. In 1981, Israeli aircrafts bombed the nuclear reactor 'Osirak' and severely set back the Iraqi efforts. Iraq was not able to restore the damage and, subsequent to the First Gulf War in 1990/91, they discontinued their nuclear weapons programme due to international pressure.[72]

Iran has been suspected of having employed a secret nuclear weapons programme since the late 1970s. However, the Islamic Revolution (1979) and the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) interfered with the programme. In the late 1980s, efforts were resumed with the support of Qadeer Khan. In 2002, an Iranian opposition group in Paris denounced the existence of secret uranium enrichment facilities in Iran and called for international action. Until today, officials and experts have been disputing about the actual extent of the Iranian nuclear weapons programme and the future development of it remains to be seen.[73]

1.8 The Present Situation

Today, nine states – the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea – are in possession of atomic bombs and thus make part of the 'nuclear club'. It is assumed that all of them but Pakistan and North Korea are also in possession of hydrogen bombs, whereby the existence of Israeli and Indian hydrogen bombs is not proven.

According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), there are an estimated 16,000 warheads in the world's combined stockpile of nuclear weapons, of which 4,200 are considered operational. The USA and Russia are estimated to possess each between 7,000 and 8,000 devices, which together corresponds to 95 percent (!) of the combined stockpile. The UK, France and China are assumed to hold between 200 and 300 devices each; Israel,

[71] Cf. ibid.
[72] Cf. ibid.
[73] Cf. ibid.

Pakistan, and India about 100 devices each; and North Korea less than 10 devices.[74] Additionally, nuclear weapons are currently stored in five more countries: Under NATO nuclear weapons sharing, the United States has provided Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands with about 10 – 20 devices each and Italy and Turkey with about 60 – 70 devices each.[75]

More than 125,000 nuclear warheads have been produced since 1945. The global peak was reached in 1986 with a total of 64,500 stockpiled warheads. Since then, the number of warheads has permanently decreased (see Figure 3 on p. 139). However, in the ultimate two decades, the pace of reduction has been slowing. The USA, Russia, Britain and France keep decreasing their arsenals, while China, Pakistan, and India keep increasing theirs. Israel maintains a relatively steady level and North Korea – even though trying – lacks the capability to amplify its arsenal.[76] However, none of the nuclear powers appears to be planning the elimination of its nuclear weapons anytime soon. Instead, nuclear stockpiles are constantly modernized and upgraded with billions of dollars.[77]

Furthermore, until today, 2,055 nuclear tests were carried out worldwide. The majority by the USA (1,032) and the USSR (715), followed by France (210), Great Britain and China (45 each), India and North Korea (3 each) and Pakistan (2). Israel is the only nuclear power who has – according to the present knowledge – never carried out a nuclear weapons test. Since 1990, the number of nuclear tests has declined drastically and since 1998, North Korea has been the only state carrying out such (see Figure 4 on p. 140).[78]

The political scientist Inmaculada Marrero Rocha suggests a division between horizontal proliferation in the context of the Cold War (*bipolar proliferation*) and horizontal proliferation outside the context of the Cold War (*post-bipolar proliferation*). The end of the Cold War notwithstanding, Russia and the USA remain by far the most powerful nuclear-weapon states. They still possess thousands of weapons which are kept on high alert. In addition, the world faces a number of regional proliferation challenges, most recently by the North Korean and the presumed Iranian nuclear weapons programme. Moreover, terrorist groups and other non-state actors are increasingly engaging in illegal proliferation activities. According to the

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[74] FAS [ed.], "Status of World Nuclear Forces", *Federation of American Scientists*, 2014, available at: <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html>.
[75] NORRIS, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen, "US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 67:1, 2011, p. 66.
[76] NORRIS, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen, "Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2013", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 69:5, 2013, p. 75ff.
[77] KRISTENSEN, Hans M., "Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?", *Arms Control Today*, 2014, available at: <http://armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-A-Threat-to-the-NPT>.
[78] CTBTO [ed.], "Nuclear Testing 1945 – Today", *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014j, available at: <http://ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today>.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), more than 146 cases of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and radioactive materials were recorded in 2013. Furthermore, instability in the Maghreb and the Middle East has increased nuclear risks. [79]

Gonzalo de Salazar explains the horizontal proliferation by means of six political and strategic functions of nuclear weapons, which motivate states to employ such. These functions, which derive from the concepts of prestige, power and security, are: to ensure state survival; to ensure the defense of national borders against external threats; to dominate and defend state territory; to establish or maintain prestige and a favorable hierarchic position; to maintain the credibility towards (potential) allies; and to reach a hegemonic position, by filling power gaps or competing with other states.[80] It is indeed considerable that the (attempted) proliferation of nuclear weapons is highly connected to international conflicts such as World War II, the Cold War, the Sino-Indian Conflict, the Middle East Conflict(s) and, most recently, the US 'War' against terrorists and 'rogue states'.

Looking at the history, it can be concluded that horizontal proliferation has taken place slowly but surely. One new state has come into the possession of nuclear weapons approximately every five years since the Second World War and many more states could build nuclear weapons should they choose to do so.[81] Furthermore, the complete nuclear disarmament of nuclear powers is very rare. Out of the ten states that came into possession of nuclear weapons, South Africa has been the only one that subsequently dismantled its programme, and there are few prospects that this will change in the near future. The Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida concludes the development of nuclear proliferation in the last decades as follows:

> "After the Cold War, a nuclear-free world appeared to be within reach. However, the lack of a collective sense of ownership allowed the issue to fade from the public consciousness. Despite the establishment of a peaceful post–Cold War order, proliferation continued. Nuclear risks became more diverse."[82]

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[79] MARRERO Rocha, Inmaculada, op. cit., note 57, p. 379f.; MARRERO Rocha, Inmaculada, "Los actores internacionales en el ámbito de la no proliferación y el desarme nuclear: características e impacto", *Revista española de derecho internacional*, 64, 1, 2012, p. 99ff.; and KISHIDA, Fumio, "Seventy Years After Hiroshima and Nagasaki", *Foreign Affairs*, 2014, available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141943/fumio-kishida/seventy-years-after-hiroshima-and-nagasaki>.

[80] SALAZAR Serantes, Gonzalo de, *El nuevo desafío: la proliferación nuclear en el umbral del siglo XXI*, Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB, 2004.

[81] SAGAN, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*: *An Enduring Debate*, 3rd ed., *New York*, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012, p. ix.

[82] KISHIDA, Fumio, op. cit. note 79.

2. The Global Governance of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

2.1 The Foundation of the United Nations

Concomitant with the Second World War, US President Theodor Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill started to rethink international governance with a view to the future post-war world. On 14 August 1941, they published a joint declaration of their conclusions, the so-called 'Atlantic Charter'[83]. The first five clauses of the declaration affirmed international principles like territorial sovereignty, democracy, economic cooperation, and social welfare. The latter three clauses called for international peace, freedom of seas, and the establishment of a permanent system of general security:

> "[The President of the United States of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston S. Churchill,] believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.".[84]

On 1 January 1942, the USA, Great Britain, the USSR, China and 22 other states signed the 'Declaration by United Nations'[85], and thus pledged adherence to the Atlantic Charter's principles. In the following, several conferences were held in order to realize the ideas of the Atlantic Charter. At the Moscow Conference on 30 October 1943, the USA, Great Britain, the USSR, and China called for the establishment of an international organization to maintain peace and security. The goal was reaffirmed by the USA, Great Britain, and the USSR at the Teheran Conference on 1 December 1943. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference between 21 September and 7 October 1944 and the Yalta Conference on 11 February 1945, the USA, Great Britain, the USSR, and China agreed on the aims, structure and functioning of the organization.

According to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, six principal bodies were to constitute the international organization which would be known as the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The final results of the Conferences

[83] *Atlantic Charter*, 14 August 1941, available at: <http://www.un-documents.net/atl-char.htm>.
[84] Ibid., 8th clause.
[85] *Declaration by United Nations*, 1 January 1942, available at: <http://www.un-documents.net/dec-un.htm>.

were written down in the 'Charter of the United Nations'[86], the constitutive document of the organization. In its preamble it declared as its main goals: to establish international peace and security and prevent future generations from war; to use armed force only in the common interest; to reaffirm the faith in fundamental human rights; to set measures in order to enforce international justice; and to promote economic and social progress.

At the San Francisco Conference on 26 June 1945, just a few weeks before the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 50 states signed the Charter. On 24 October 1945, just a few weeks after the bombings, the Charter was ratified by all signatory states and came into force.[87]

2.2 UN Disarmament Bodies

Since its foundation, the UN has established various bodies that deal with disarmament matters. These include: the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (the Advisory Board), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

The First Committee, which is also referred to as Disarmament and International Security Committee, is one of the six main committees of the General Assembly. It deals with all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter, in particular those concerning the arms control and disarmament, such as the promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments. The Committee works in close cooperation with the UN Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and directly influences the agenda-setting of the GA, including general debate, thematic debate, and action on drafts.[88]

The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was initially established in 1952. It was to work under the Security Council and had a general mandate on all kinds of disarmament questions. However, it met only occasionally after 1959. Subsequent to the General Assembly's first Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) in 1978, the UNDC was transferred to a subsidiary organ of the GA. The UNDC convenes annually and focuses on a limited number of agenda items from the whole range of disarmament issues, including one on nuclear

[86] *Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1945, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter>.
[87] UN [ed.], "History of the United Nations Charter", *United Nations*, 2014a, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/charter_history.shtml>.
[88] UN [ed.], "Disarmament and International Security. First Committee", *United Nations*, 2014b, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/first>.

disarmament. Over the years, the UNDC has formulated consensus principles, guidelines, and recommendations on a number of subjects, which have been endorsed by the GA. However, in the past decade, it has not been able to agree on a substantial outcome.[89]

The GA's first Special Session on Disarmament not only decided on the restructuring of the UN Disarmament Commission, but also the establishment of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the Conference on Disarmament, and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (the Advisory Board) started working in 1978. It has since then served to advise the Secretary-General on matters within the area of arms limitation and disarmament, including on studies and research under the patronage of the UN or institutions within the UN system. The Advisory Board holds two sessions a year, alternating between New York and Geneva.[90]

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) convened its first meeting in 1979. From then on, it has served as the 'single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum' of the international community. The CD is a formally independent body even though highly linked to the UN. It derived from other Geneva-based negotiating fora, which include the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78). The CD deals practically with all multilateral arms control and disarmament problems, in particular with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, prevention of nuclear war, and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Since its foundation, the CD grew from 40 to 65 state members. The CD holds annual sessions in Geneva and conducts all its work by consensus. It is financed by the UN and reports at least once a year to the General Assembly.[91]

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was established as an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations in 1980. It has since then conducted independent research on disarmament and security. The work programme is reviewed annually and approved by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, which also functions as the UNIDIR's Board of Trustees. The Director of UNIDIR reports yearly to the General Assembly.[92]

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[89] UN [ed.], "United Nations Disarmament Commission", *United Nations*, 2014c, available at: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/DisarmamentCommission/UNDiscom.shtml>.
[90] UN [ed.], "Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters", *United Nations*, 2014d, available at: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/AdvisoryBoard/AdvisoryBoard.shtml>.
[91] UN [ed.], "Conference on Disarmament. An Introduction to the Conference", *United Nations*, 2014e available at: <http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument>.
[92] UNIDIR [ed.], "The Institute", *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*, 2014, available at: <http://www.unidir.org/about/the-institute>.

The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was originally established upon the recommendation of the General Assembly's second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-II) in 1982. In 1992, it was renamed to Centre for Disarmament Affairs; in 1997, Department for Disarmament Affairs; and in 2007, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. UNODA provides substantive and organizational support for norm-setting in the area of disarmament, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It also provides information on multilateral disarmament issues to UN member states and state parties to multilateral agreements, intergovernmental organizations and institutions, departments and agencies within the UN system, research and educational institutions, civil society, non-governmental organizations, the media, and the general public.[93, 94]

2.3 The International Agency of Atomic Energy (IAEA)

Besides the various UN disarmament bodies mentioned above, the United Nations also created a body to explicitly deal with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As mentioned before, the very first resolution of the General Assembly 1(I) [95] of 24 January 1946, called for the "establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy", and thus established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). UNAEC was composed of one representative from each member state of the Security Council plus Canada. Its tasks were to make specific proposals for extending international exchange of basic scientific information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy; for control of nuclear energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only; for the elimination of all national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and for effective safeguards such as inspection and other means to protect complying states against possible hazards.[96]

In 1946, the US representative of UNAEC, Bernard Baruch, proposed the so-called 'Baruch Plan'[97], a plan that recommended the establishment of a control system of atomic energy in order to stop the manufacture of atomic bombs; dispose existing bombs according

[93] UN [ed.], "United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)", United Nations, 2014f, available at: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/about/>.
[94] Cf. BOULDEN, Jane et al., "The United Nations and nuclear orders: Context, foundations, actors, tools, and future prospects", in Boulden, Jane et al. [ed.], *The United Nations and nuclear orders*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009, p. 1ff.
[95] UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Resolution 1(I), *Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy*, A/RES/1(1), 24 January 1946, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1%28I%29&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION>.
[96] Ibid., para. 5.
[97] *Baruch Plan*, 14 June 1946, available at: <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml>.

to the terms of the treaty; and access full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy. The USA offered to make its full contribution, but only if the system of control and its possibility to adopt penalties against violations of the treaty would not be subject to the right of veto. However, the plan was criticized for being hypocritical and unrealistic. The Baruch Plan was eventually passed by the Commission, but not agreed to by the USSR who abstained on the vote in the Security Council. Even though efforts to pass the Baruch Plan continued in 1947 and 1948, an agreement became more and more unlikely. When in 1949, the USSR carried out their first nuclear weapons test, the Commission discontinued its work. [98]

Two years later, in 1951, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 502 (VI) [99] of 11 January 1952, which officially disbanded UNAEC and replaced it by the United Nations Commission of Disarmament (UNCD), which was to "prepare proposals to be embodied in a drafty treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only."[100]

In 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower held the so-called 'Atoms for Peace Speech'[101] before the UN General Assembly. He called upon the states "principally involved", namely the USA and the USSR, "to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world." Furthermore, they should "make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency." Such an agency should be set up under the aegis of the United Nations and devise methods to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The speech is assumed to have initiated the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency which succeeded in the following years.[102]

In 1955, governmental representatives from Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, Great Britain, and the USA began to draft the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). One year later, in 1956, four more countries, the USSR,

[98] FISHER, David, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency. *The First Forty Years*, Vienna: IAEA Publications, 1997, p. 19f.
[99] UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Resolution 502 (VI) , *Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; international control of atomic energy*, A/RES/502(VI), 11 January 1952, available at: <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r6_en.shtml>.
[100] Ibid., para. 3.
[101] *Atoms for Peace Speech*, 8 December 1953, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/About/atomsforpeace_speech.html>.
[102] FISHER, David, op. cit. note 98, p. 9f.

Czechoslovakia, India, and Brazil, joined the Drafting Committee. The same year, the Statute of the IAEA[103] was completed and approved by 81 states. It incorporated both, promotions in order to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy and restrictions in order to prevent its military use. On 29 July 1957, the Statute came into force.[104]

2.4 The Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

On 20 November 1959, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 1380 (XIV)[105], which suggested the establishment of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, which was to consider the possibility of an international agreement by which the nuclear-weapon states would agree not to hand over control of those weapons to other states, and non-nuclear-weapon states would agree not to seek such weapons. In the following years, the UN General Assembly adopted further resolutions, which encouraged the drafting of a non-proliferation treaty. In 1967, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee considered two identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty, which were submitted separately by the USSR and the USA, as well as a number of subsequent amendments by other members. [106]

The draft was repeatedly revised by the Committee and eventually recommended by the UN General Assembly. The final version of the so-called 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'[107] was based on three pillars: (1) nuclear non-proliferation, (2) nuclear disarmament and (3) the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Treaty opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. Subsequently, the IAEA established, in accordance with Article III of the NPT, a Safeguards Agreement[108] to ensure the compliance of non-nuclear-weapon states, which had signed the NPT.[109]

As provided by Article VIII (3) of the NPT, there have been five-yearly Review Conferences in order to evaluate and improve the operation of the Treaty. Except for 1980 and 1990, all Review Conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration. The 1995 Review Conference, which according to Article X(2) of the NPT was to decide whether the

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[103] *Statute of the IAEA*, 29 July 1957, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html>.
[104] FISHER, David, op. cit. note 98, p. 30ff.
[105] UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Resolution 1380 (XIV), *Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons*, A/RES/1380(XIV), 20 November 1959, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1380%28XIV%29&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION>.
[106] Cf. GOLDSCHMIDT, B., "The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty", *IAEA Bulletin*, 22:3, 4, 1980, p. 73ff.
[107] *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 1 July 1968, available at: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml>.
[108] IAEA, *The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*, INFCIRC/153(Corrected), June 1972, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf>.
[109] FISHER, David, op. cit. note 98, p. 252ff.

Treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period, opted for the former. Moreover, in 1997, the IAEA approved an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540)[110], which further strengthened the Safeguards System under the NPT.[111]

2.5 Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs)

Since 1959, several international treaties have been launched to create nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). NWFZs are specific regions in which states commit themselves to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons and to develop and use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. They might go beyond the provisions of the NPT since research on and stationing of nuclear weapons as well as the dumping of radioactive waste can also be prohibited.[112]

The first NWFZ was the1959 'Antarctic Treaty'[113]. It was followed by the 1967 'Outer Space Treaty'[114]; the 1967 'Treaty of Tlatelolco'[115] (Latin America and the Caribbean); the '1972 Seabed Treaty'[116]; the 1979 'Moon Agreement'[117]; the 1985 'Treaty of Rarotonga'[118] (South Pacific); the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok[119] (Southeast Asia); the 1996 'Treaty of Pelindaba'[120] (Africa); and the 1998 'Semipalatinsk Treaty'[121] (Central Asia).

According to the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the establishment of NWFZs is to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. Article VII of the NPT explicitly encourages the establishment of NWFZs stating that "nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories".[122]

In its resolution 30/3472[123] of 11 December 1975, the General Assembly defined a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as "any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of

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[110] IAEA, *Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards - INFCIRC/540(Corrected)*, INFCIRC/153(Corrected), September 1997, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf>.
[111] FISHER, David, op. cit. note 98, p. 252ff.
[112] UN [ed.], "Nuclear Weapon Free Zones", *United Nations*, 2014h, available at: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml>.
[113] *Antarctic Treaty*, 1 December 1959, available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/antarctic/text>.
[114] *Outer Space Treaty*, 27 January 1967, available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space/text>.
[115] *Treaty of Tlatelolco*, 14 February 1967, available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tlatelolco/text>.
[116] *Seabed Treaty*, 11 February 1971, available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/sea_bed/text>.
[117] *Moon Agreement*, 18 December 1979, available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/moon/text>.
[118] *Treaty of Rarotonga*, 6 August 1985, available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/rarotonga/text>.
[119] *Treaty of Bangkok*, 15 December 1995, available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bangkok/text>.
[120] *Treaty of Pelindaba*, 11 April 1996, available at: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/pelindaba/text>.
[121] *Semipalatinsk Treaty*, 8 September 2006, available at: < http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/canwfz/text>.
[122] UN [ed.], op. cit., note 112.
[123] UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Resolution 30/3472, *Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects*, A/RES/30/3472, 11 December 1975, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3472%28XXX%29&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION>.

the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby (a) the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined; [and] (b) an international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute." The GA furthermore demands nuclear-weapon states "(a) to respect in all its parts the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone; (b) to refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention; [and] (c) to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the states included in the zone." This should be safeguarded by an "international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol."[124]

All of the NWFZs mentioned above are recognized by the General Assembly. Besides, there is also a number of states that voluntarily or through external pressure declared themselves as NWFZs. New Zealand (1987), the Philippines (1987), Mongolia (1992) and Austria (1999) have voluntarily declared themselves as NWFZs and established legal frameworks to enforce their declaration. Iraq (1991) was pressured to declare itself as a NWFZ by the UN Security Council after the First Gulf War. However, only Mongolia has been officially recognized as a NWFZ by the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, there are ongoing debates about further establishments of NWFZs in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, the Southern Hemisphere, and the Arctic, yet without notable progress.[125]

2.6 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USA and the USSR began to negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements to stop the nuclear arms race they had been pushing on. In this time, several treaties were launched to restrict the testing of nuclear weapons. The 1963 'Partial-Test-Ban Treaty' (PTBT)[126], which was agreed upon by the USA, the USSR and Great Britain, banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater and in space. It was followed by

[124] Ibid.
[125] Cf. TABASSI, Lisa, "National Implementation and Enforcement of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties", *Nuclear Law Bulletin*, 1:2, 2009, p. 29ff.
[126] *Partial Test-Ban Treaty*, 5 August 1963, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm>.

the 1974 'Threshold Test-Ban Treaty' (TTBT)[127] and the 1976 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty' (PNET)[128], both bilateral agreements between the USA and the USSR, which prohibited nuclear testing that exceeded yields of 150 kilotons. However, it lasted until 1990, when the USA and the Russian Federation as the successor state of the Soviet Union agreed on verification protocols and both treaties came into force.[129]

In 1991, the Russian Federation declared a comprehensive moratorium on nuclear testing, which was followed by a US moratorium. During this time, negotiations on a universal and internationally verifiable Test-Ban Treaty were pushed forward. At the 659th Conference on Disarmament (CD) on 10 August 1993, member states adopted the decision to begin negotiations on a 'Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty' (CTBT). The CD created an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate the Treaty, which resulted to be difficult since the interests of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states were widely divergent.[130]

In 1996, after more than two years of intense negotiations, a final draft was presented to the CD. It demanded all state parties "not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control" and to "refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" (Article 1, CTBT).[131] However, India blocked the adoption of the Treaty which – due to the principle of consensus – had to be agreed upon by all CD members. Subsequently, the Treaty was passed to the General Assembly and eventually adopted by resolution 50/245[132] of 10 September 1996. Subsequently, it opened for signature.

After the adoption of the CTBT by the General Assembly, a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was established in order to promote the signing and ratification of the CTBT; to ensure the implementation of its provisions; and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among member states. According to Article XIV of the CTBT, 44 designated states that were listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty had to ratify it before it came into force. These so-called 'Annex 2 States'

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[127] *Threshold Test-Ban Treaty*, 3 July 1974, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5204.htm>.
[128] *Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty*, 28 May 1976, available at: <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/pne1.html>.
[129] CTBTO [ed.], "1963-77: Limits on nuclear testing", *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014k, available at: <http://ctbto.org/the-treaty/history-1945-1993/1963-77-limits-on-nuclear-testing>.
[130] CTBTO [ed.], "1977-94: Renewed test-ban commitment", *CTBTO Preparatory Commission*, 2014l, available at: <http://ctbto.org/the-treaty/history-1945-1993/1977-94-renewed-test-ban-commitments>.
[131] *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*, 10 September 1996, available at: <http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf>.
[132] UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Resolution 50/245, *Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty*, A/RES/50/245, 10 September 1996, available at: <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r50_en.shtml>.

were states which participated in the CTBT's negotiations between 1994 and 1996 and possessed nuclear reactors at that time. However, until today, three of these states – North Korea, India, and Pakistan – have neither signed nor ratified the Treaty. Five more of these states – China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the USA – have signed the Treaty but not ratified it. Although the CTBTO organizes three-yearly 'Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into force of the CTBT' (also referred to as 'Article XIV Conferences') there has been little progress in the ratification process.[133]

2.7 Bilateral Disarmament Agreements between the USA and the USSR

Besides the nuclear test ban treaties, the USA and the USSR also adopted several bilateral disarmament agreements. In 1972, both states signed and ratified two agreements to halt the growth in their strategic arms: the 'Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty'[134] and the 'Interim Agreement'. They are together referred to as the first 'Strategic Arms Limitation Talks'[135] (SALT I) and limited both the number of (defensive) anti-ballistic systems[136] and (offensive) ballistic missiles in each country. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was furthermore strengthened by the 1974 Protocol[137] that allowed the USA and the USSR to deploy only one anti-ballistic missile system each.

In 1979, the USA and the USSR signed the 'Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms'[138], which were also referred to as the second 'Strategic Arms Limitation Talks' (SALT II). The primary goal of SALT II was to replace the temporarily limited Interim Agreement with a long-term comprehensive Treaty providing broad limits on ballistic weapons systems for both sides. Although SALT II had not been ratified neither by the USA nor by the USSR, both states announced that they would comply with the provisions of the Treaty as long as the other one did.

In 1987, the USA and the USSR signed the 'Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty'[139], also referred to as the 'INF Treaty', which entered into force in 1988. It stipulated

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[133] Cf. ASADA, Masahiko, "CTBT: Legal questions arising from its non-entry-into-force", *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, *7*(1), 2002, p. 85ff.
[134] *Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty*, 26 May 1972, available at: <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html>
[135] *Interim Agreement*, 26 May 1972, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4795.htm>.
[136] An anti-ballistic missile system is a weapon system designed to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles. The idea of reducing anti-ballistic missile systems was to make both states vulnerable to nuclear attacks and thus prevent a first strike because of a possible second strike.
[137] *Protocol to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty*, 3 July 1974, available at: <http://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abmprot1.htm>.
[138] *Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, 18 June, 1979, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5195.htm#treaty>.
[139] *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty*, 8 December 1987, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm>.

the complete elimination of all US and Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 kilometers and their infrastructure within 3 years of entry into force.[140]

Four years later, in 1991, the USA and the USSR furthermore signed the 'Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms' (START I)[141], by which the two sides compromised to reduce their strategic offensive arms, including nuclear warheads, as to the level provided in the Treaty within seven years of entry into force. However, five months after the signing, the USSR dissolved and the Treaty had to be renegotiated. In 1992 the Lisbon Protocol[142] was adopted in order to adapt START I to the new situation. According to the Protocol, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine were recognized as the post-Soviet parties to START I, but only Russia was designated a nuclear-weapon state. Two years later, in 1994, the Treaty finally entered into force.

Meanwhile, Russia and the USA had already started negotiations on further reductions. In 1993, both states signed the second 'Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms' (START II)[143]. However, multiple political disaccords between Russia and the USA, particularly concerning the Persian Gulf and the Balkans, delayed the ratification process. Eventually it was ratified by the USA in 1996 and by Russia in 2000. However, it never came into force. In 2002, in spite of strong international criticism, the USA withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to expand their national missile defense system in order to protect the country against nuclear attack. As a reaction, Russia denied to ratify START II.

Notwithstanding the tense situation between Russia and the USA, negotiations on a third 'Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms' (START III) had started as early as 1997. It was to continue START I and START II and further reduce strategic arms. Because of the failure of START II, START III included an 'exit-clause' and had therefore less binding character than START I and START II. The final draft whose name was changed to 'Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty' (SORT)[144] was signed in 2002 and ratified by both states in 2003.[145]

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[140] Cf. MARRERO Rocha, Inmaculada, op. cit., note 57, p. 388ff.
[141] *Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)*, 31 July 1991, available at: <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/start1.html>.
[142] *Lisbon Protocol*, 23 May 1992, available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf>.
[143] *Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)*, 3 January 1993, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102887.htm>.
[144] *Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)*, 24 May 2002, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/10527.htm>.
[145] Cf. MARRERO Rocha, Inmaculada, op. cit., note 57, p. 418ff.

In 2009, the Russia and the USA continued START negotiations. Although they proved to be more difficult than expected, an agreement was reached within a year. In 2010, the 'New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty' (New START)[146] was signed by both parties. The same year, it was ratified by the USA and one year later, in 2011, by Russia. The targets set by New START are some 30 percent below the levels set by SORT in 2002. The new limits are to be reached within seven years after ratification, which is in 2018.[147]

2.8 The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, issued, at the request of the General Assembly, an Advisory Opinion about the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons'[148]. The Court decided that there was in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization or comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (para. 105(2) A/B); that a threat or use of nuclear weapons, which is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter (prohibition of the use of force) and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful (para. 105(2) C); and that the threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons (para. 105(2) D).

By a narrow majority, the Court decided that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake (para. 105(2) E). At last, the Court stated, that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control (para. 105(2) F).

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[146] *New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)*, 8 April, 2010, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm>.
[147] RUSMAN, Paul, "New START, A Preliminary Analysis", *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, 15 (3), 2010, p. 557ff.
[148] INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf>.

2.9 The Present Situation

Since its foundation, the United Nations have created a whole machinery of bodies which deal with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. On one hand, the UN efforts have been pushing forward nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament significantly: the creation of the International Atomic Energy, the Non-Proliferation-Treaty, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were highly connected to the UN and its subsidiary bodies. On the other hand, the UN has not achieved to establish agreements to impose complete non-proliferation and disarmament for all of its members. That is why, in 2013, the GA set up the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons (the Working Group).

Today, out of the 193 member states of the United Nations, 162 form part of the International Atomic Energy Agency and 189 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All nuclear-weapon states but North Korea form part of the IAEA and all states, including both nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), but North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel form part of the NPT. North Korea, had signed the NPT in 1986 and the Statute of the IAEA in 1974, but withdrew from the NPT in 1993 and from the IAEA 1994. Today, the NWS, which developed nuclear weapons before the NPT came into force – that is China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA – are referred to as *official nuclear-weapon states*, while, the NWS, which developed nuclear weapons after the NPT came into force – that is India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – are referred to as *unofficial nuclear-weapon states*.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) considers the NPT as a "watershed". Before the entry in force of the NPT, many countries considered acquiring nuclear weapons. Some took concrete steps to build them. After 1970, few did so.[149] However, the post-NPT proliferation of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea; the frustrated nuclear weapons programmes of Libya and Iraq; and the suspected nuclear weapons programme of Iran show that horizontal proliferation has not been stopped by the NPT.

[149] ISIS [ed.], "Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview", *Institute for Science and International Security*, 2014, available at: <http://isis-online.org/nuclear-weapons-programs>.

Furthermore, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones today cover more than half of the world's landmass. They encompass 119 states and 18 other territories, where approximately 1.9 billion people live.[150] However, that means, that 77 states are not being part of a NWFZ and that the vast majority of people, approximately 6.1 billion, do not live in NWFZs. The geographical distribution of NWFZ reveals a north-south disparity: While the southern continents including the Antarctica, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Australia, and Oceania are completely covered by NWFZs, Europe and North America are completely free from NWFZs, and less than a fourth of Asia is covered by NWFZs.

Moreover, bilateral and multilateral Test Ban Agreements have decreased the number of nuclear tests drastically since 1990. Even though, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was signed by 183 states and ratified by 162 states, has not yet come into force, there have only been three nuclear weapons tests since 1996.

However, some nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, especially the nuclear disarmament agreements between the USA and the USSR/Russia, which have decreased the number of warheads from approximately 64,500 warheads to 16,000 since 1986, took place beyond the United Nations system. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, by contrast, has so far not displayed any substantial influence on the nuclear weapons regime.

The present time is furthermore marked by a stagnation of nuclear disarmament efforts. The aim of reaching 'global zero' has mainly been replaced by the aim of maintaining the *status quo*. While powerful steps were taken to impede further horizontal proliferation, few steps were taken to impede vertical proliferation or promote nuclear disarmament. The 2004 Secretary-General's High-Level Panel even considered that the international community was "approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."[151]

[150] PRAWITZ, Jan, "A Nuclear Weapon Free Arctic: Arms Control 'On The Rocks'", in Vestergaard, Cindy [ed.]: *Conference on an Arctic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Copenhagen, 10-11 August, 2009*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2009, p. 25-38.
[151] Cited from WEISS, Thomas G. and Rhamesh Thakur, *Global governance and the UN*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010, p. 91.

Marrero Rocha criticized the undermining of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament commitments in a similar way:

> "The proliferation of new nuclear-weapon states and the possibility of nuclear terrorists attacks have converted into useful arguments by means of which international powers justify the reiterated delay in complying their nuclear disarmament commitment with and the non-contribution to alternative solutions which increase an over-all solution to the problem."[152]

Looking at the history of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, two facts can be concluded: First, global governance has created instruments that, in general, significantly helped the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear arms. Second, global governance was neither able to completely disarm existing nuclear powers, nor to prevent the creation of new nuclear powers.

[152] MARRERO Rocha, Inmaculada, "Desarme Nuclear en el Nuevo Contexto de Seguridad", *Tiempo de Paz*, 74, 2004, p. 41.

CHAPTER II - ACTORS AND TOOLS

In the second chapter, I will examine the efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of four key actors within the United Nations family: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Court of Justice. Before doing so, I will briefly refer to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which builds the working basis for these actors. Then, I will describe the structures, functions and powers of the actors, analyze their efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and, at last, give a critical reflection.

1. The Charter of the United Nations

According to Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations[153], its purposes are: to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to international peace and security (para. 1); to develop friendly relations among nations based on the principles of equality and self-determination of the people, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace (para. 2); to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (para. 3); and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends (para. 4).

For these purposes, Article 2 sets certain principles which the United Nations and its members should act upon. On one hand, paragraphs 2 to 5 establish responsibilities of the member states towards the United Nations, which are: to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter (para. 2); to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security, and justice, are not endangered (para. 3); to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (para. 4); to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action (para. 5). The United Nations may also force non-members to comply these principles if necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security (para. 6).

[153] *Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1945, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter>.

On the other hand, paragraphs 1 and 7 establish, in accordance with Article 1 paragraph 2 of the UN Charter, the principle of state sovereignty. They claim that all members are sovereign and equal (para. 1) and that nothing contained in the Charter authorizes the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; except for the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression) (para. 7).

Thus, we can determine a possible area of tension between the purposes of the United Nations on one side and the principle of state sovereignty on the other side

2. The General Assembly

2.1 Structure, Functions and Powers

The General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. It consists of all 193 Members of the UN, which are represented by up to five delegates. The GA has the competence to discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the UN Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the UN Charter, and – except of any questions on which the Security Council is acting upon – may make recommendations to the members of the UN or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.[154]

According to Article 11 of the UN Charter, the GA may in particular: consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, which include the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (para. 1); discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a member of the United Nations (para. 2); and call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security (para. 3). Furthermore, the GA has, as any principle organ, the competence to establish subsidiary organs in accordance with the UN Charter.[155]

[154] Cf. *Charter of the United Nations*, op. cit. note 153.
[155] Cf. ibid., Article 7 paragraph 2 and Article 22.

The GA meets in regular annual sessions and in special sessions that can be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the members of the UN. Each member state has one vote. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions are made by a two-thirds majority of the member states present and voting. These questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. Decisions on less important questions, are made by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions of the General Assembly are not binding. Member states are not obliged to carry out the decisions of the GA.[156]

2.2 Disarmament Bodies

The GA was the first UN actor to take concrete steps in terms of nuclear weapons. As mentioned before, the very first resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946[157] called for the "establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy" and triggered the foundation of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC).

Not only UNAEC, but all (!) UN disarmament bodies described in Chapter 1.2.2, namely the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee), the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR), and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) were established by the General Assembly.[158]

Moreover, the foundation of the IAEA was strongly influenced by the GA: The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), which was established by the GA in 1946 but suspended in 1951, can be seen as the predecessor of the IAEA; Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Speech, which was held in the General Assembly in 1953, drove forward the negotiations that eventually led to the foundation of the IAEA; and resolution 810(IX)[A] of 4 December 1954 "Concerning an International Atomic Agency" explicitly encouraged the UN

[156] Cf. ibid, Aricle 18 and 20.
[157] Note: Complete reference information of all resolutions and official documents cited in this chapter can be consulted from the section 'References' and from Table 1 on p. 113.
[158] The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee) was set up by document 71/Rev. 1 of 1 May 1947, confirmed by document 388 of 23 September 1947 and approved by resolution 173(II) of 17 November 1947; the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was initially founded by resolution 502(VI) of 11 January 1952 and transformed to a subsidiary organ of the GA by resolution S-10/2 paragraph 118 of 30 June 1978; the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (the Advisory Board) were adopted by resolution S-10/2 paragraph 122, 123 and 124 of 30 June 1978; and the Department for Disarmament Affairs was built upon decision S-12/32, Chapter VI, paragraph 12, 13 of 10 July 1982, adopted by resolution 37/99K of 13 December 1982 and renamed to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) by resolution 61/257 of 22 March 2007.

member states to establish the IAEA as quick as possible. After the foundation of the IAEA, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1145(XII) of 14 November 1957, which described the IAEA as an "autonomous international organization in the working relationship with the United Nations" and defined the relationship between the two organizations.

Furthermore, the most recent UN body in terms of nuclear weapons, the 'Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons', was established by resolution 67/56 of 4 January 2013.

2.2 Special Sessions on Disarmament

In 1978, in 1982 and in 1988, the General Assembly held three special sessions on disarmament. Only the first special session on disarmament (SSOD-I), which took place from 23 May to 30 June 1978, succeeded in a final document (S-10/2 of 30 June 1978). The main focus of SSOD-I, which was highly influenced by the US-Soviet nuclear arms race, was on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the foreword of the final document, the General Assembly stated that it was "alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race" and that it was "convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, [was] essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security."[159]

In the subsequent declaration the GA described nuclear weapons as "an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced" and noted that "existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone [were] more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth" (para. 11). The GA therefore demanded a 'programme of action' in order to achieve "the general and complete disarmament under effective international control", in particular of nuclear weapons (para. 43 and 47). It proposed: the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; a comprehensive programme for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles

[159] GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Document S-10/2, *Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its Tenth Special Session*, A/S-10/2, 30 June 1978, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/S-10/2>.

of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time; the cessation of nuclear weapons testing by all states; the timely conclusion of the strategic arms limitation talks between the USA and the USSR; the protection of NNWS against the use and threat of nuclear weapons; and the assurance and further establishment of NWFZs (para. 50-52, 59 and 60).[160]

The final document also emphasized the role of the General Assembly, which "[had] been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures" and therefore proposed the strengthening of the 'disarmament machinery', by restructuring the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the creating the UN Conference on Disarmament, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (para. 115) (see Chapter 1.2.2).[161]

SSOD-I was considered an event of historic significance. However, the hopes that were raised by it would not to be fulfilled. SSOD-II, which took place from 7 June to 10 July 1982, was unable to agree on a final document. Though the concluding document of SSOD-II, S-12/32 of 9 July 1982[162], reaffirmed the final document of SSOD-I, it observed that the recommendations of SSOD-I had remained largely unimplemented. A number of important negotiations had either not yet begun or already been suspended, and efforts of the Committee on Disarmament and other disarmament bodies had produced little results:

> "The arms race, however, in particular the nuclear-arms race, has assumed more dangerous proportions and global military expenditures have increased sharply. In short, since the adoption of the Final Document in 1978, there has been no significant progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and the seriousness of the situation has increased" (para. 59).[163]

Even though the international climate had considerably improved in the late 1980s, SSOD-III, which took place from 31 May to 26 June 1988, could not agree on a final document either. Since 1995, the General Assembly has been calling for a fourth session on disarmament. It established a working group in 2003 and another one in 2007 to discuss the agenda and the possibility of establishing a preparatory committee. However, the realization of SSOD-IV is not yet in sight.[164]

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[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.
[162] GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Document S-12/32, *Report of the Adhoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session*, A/S-12/32, 9 July 1982, available at: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/S-12/32>.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Cf. UN [ed.] "Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament", *United Nations*, 2014, available at: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SSOD/>.

2.3 Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

The GA has – not only in their special sessions on disarmament but also in their regular sessions – intensely dealt with nuclear weapons. Until today, it has adopted hundreds (!) of resolutions referring to all aspects of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Searching GA resolutions in the United Nations Bibliographic System under the key words "atomic" and "nuclear" in the category "Subject (All)" leads to 942 results.[165] Out of these results, 73 can be regarded as irrelevant to nuclear weapons, leaving 869 relevant results.[166] Since 1946 there has been a steady increase in resolutions, with an average of 1.4 resolutions per year in the first ten sessions to an average of 18.3 resolutions in the last ten sessions. Notably, there has been a slight downturn of resolutions during the critical years of the Cold War (first half of the 1960s) and a boom of resolutions at the end of the Cold War (during the 1980s) (see Figure 5 on p. 141).

The resolutions can broadly be divided into twelve categories: (1) non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in general, (2) the International Atomic Energy Agency, (3) the Non-Proliferation Treaty, (4) nuclear weapon free zones, (5) nuclear test banning, (6) bilateral nuclear arms agreements between the USA and the USSR/Russia, (7) protection of NNWS against the use or threat of nuclear weapons, (8) the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, (9) case-based resolutions, (10) the prohibition of fission material commerce for nuclear weapons, (11) investigation and public awareness, and (12) peaceful uses of nuclear energy; whereby some resolutions relate to more than one category.

(1) Resolutions on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in general represent the largest share. Since the above mentioned first resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946 to the present, the GA has constantly adopted resolutions that demand the complete disarmament of all nuclear weapons, *inter alia*: resolution 41/59F "General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament" of 3 December 1986, which was reiterated in 1987 and 1988[167]; resolution 39/148[K] "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war" of 17 December 1984, which was reiterated four times between 1985 and 1990; resolution 44/116D "Nuclear disarmament" of 15 December 1989, which

[165] Investigation as of 1 September 2014.
[166] A listing of all GA resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is annexed on page 113. Note: It might not a complete listing since not all resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament may be tagged with the key words "atomic" or "nuclear". A comprehensive analysis of all resolutions goes beyond the scope of this thesis and appears an interesting subject for further investigation.
[167] Titles of reiterated resolutions might slightly change.

was reiterated 20 times (!) between 1990 and 2013; resolution 49/75H "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons" of 15 December 1994, which was reiterated five times between 1995 and 1999; resolution 55/33[R] "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" of 20 November 2000, which was reiterated four times between 2001 and 2004; resolution 60/56 "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" of 8 December 2005, which was reiterated eight times between 2006 and 2013; and resolution 65/72 "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" of 8 December 2010, which was reiterated three times between 2011 and 2013.

(2) There are, as already mentioned in Chapter 2.2.2, several GA resolutions related to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The GA triggered the foundation of the IAEA by resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946 and resolution 810(IX)[A] and established a cooperation relationship between the UN and the IAEA by resolution 1145(XII) of 14 November 1957, which *inter alia* tasks the IAEA to report annually to the GA.[168]

(3) The GA adopted various resolutions on the genesis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its aftermath. It pushed negotiations of the NPT by resolution 1380 (XIV) "Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons" of 20 November 1959, which was reiterated in 1960 and 1961, and by resolution 2028(XX) "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" of 19 November 1965, which was reiterated in 1966 and 1967. When the negotiations on the NPT had been accomplished, the GA adopted the NPT by resolution 2373(XXII) of 12 June 1968 and recommended it to its members. Until today, the GA convenes the NPT Review Conferences and adopts resolutions on their outcomes.[169]

(4) The GA has furthermore adopted scores of resolutions both on the establishment and the implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). It defined the terms and conditions of NWFZs by resolution 3472(XXX)[B] of 11 December 1975 and, in accordance with resolution 3472(XXX)[B], recommended: the Outer Space Treaty[170], the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Carribean)[171], the Seabed Treaty[172], the Moon Agreement[173], the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific)[174] and the Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa)[175]. The GA has also adopted resolutions, which support Mongolia's self-declared

[168] Most recently by resolution A/RES/68/10 of 6 November 2013.
[169] Most recently by resolution A/RES/68/35 of 5 December 2013.
[170] Resolution 2222(XXI) of 19 December 1966.
[171] Resolution 2286(XXII) of 5 December 1967.
[172] Resolution 2660(XXV) of 7 December 1970.
[173] Resolution 34/68 of 14 December 1979.
[174] Resolution 3477(XXX) of 11 December 1975.
[175] Resolution A/RES/50/78 of 12 December 1995.

nuclear-weapon-free status[176], the Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia)[177], the Semipalatinsk Treaty (Central Asia)[178] and, in general, a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere.[179] Moreover, the GA has demanded the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.[180]

(5) As early as 1958, the GA demanded the complete suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the negotiation of a treaty insuring such suspension.[181] Since then, it has adopted scores of resolutions recalling this demand, for example resolution 1649(XVI) "The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control" of 8 November 1961, which was reiterated 25 times between 1962 and 1990, and resolution 35/145A "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons" of 12 December 1980, which was reiterated ten times between 1981 and 1990. The GA furthermore urged the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by resolution 46/29 of 6 December 1991, which was reiterated four times between 1992 and 1995. After the negotiations had been concluded, the GA adopted the CTBT by resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996 and called on all states to sign it. Since 1999, the GA has been pushing the signing and ratification of the CTBT in order to achieve its entry in force.[182] For this purpose the GA has also created a cooperation relationship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).[183]

(6) Since the early 1980s, the GA has also encouraged bilateral nuclear arms negotiations between the USA and the USSR/Russia, for example by resolution 37/78A "Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations" of 9 December 1982, which was reiterated 20 times between 1983 and 2010. These resolutions called on both states to sign bilateral treaties, particularly, on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, such as SALT and START.

(7) As early as 1948, the GA demanded the prohibition of nuclear weapons.[184] In 1962, it officially declared the prohibition of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and regarded

[176] Initially by resolution 53/77D of 4 December 1998, which was reiterated seven times between 2000 and 2012.
[177] Initially by resolution 62/31of 5 December 2007, which was reiterated three times between 2009 and 2013.
[178] Initially by resolution 65/49of 8 December 2010, which was reiterated in 2012.
[179] Initially by resolution 51/45B of 10 December 1996, which was reiterated 15 times between 1997 and 2012.
[180] Initally be resolution 3263(XXIX) of 9 December 1974, which was reiterated 39 times (!) between 1975 and 2013.
[181] Resolution 1252(XIII)[A-B] of 4 November 1958.
[182] Most recently by A/RES/68/68 of 5 December 2013.
[183] Resolution 3477(XXX) of 11 December 1975.
[184] Resolution 192(III) of 19 November 1948.

the use of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons as a direct violation of the UN Charter.[185] Simultaneously, the GA started demanding the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.[186] However, in the following years, there had been little progress. Therefore, in 1978, the GA additionally started calling for the conclusion of an international convention to at least assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.[187] Until today, the GA has been requesting negotiations on both, an international convention universally prohibiting the use or threat of nuclear weapons and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.[188]

(8) The GA furthermore requested the International Court of Justice on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons by resolution 49/75K and adopted 18 follow-up resolutions on the advisory opinion[189], which urge nuclear weapon states to fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

(9) The GA has also adopted some case-based resolutions. Between 1977 and 1991, for example, it adopted resolutions on the South African nuclear weapons programme[190], and between 1978 and 1993, on the Israeli nuclear weapons programme[191], calling upon both states to renounce their nuclear weapons arsenals and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2005 and 2007 it has furthermore adopted resolutions on nuclear terrorism[192].

(10) Resolutions referring to investigation include general studies on nuclear weapons[193], studies on the effects of atomic radiation[194] and studies on the climatic effects of nuclear war[195]. So far, there had been only one resolution referring to public awareness calling for the "informing and enlightening of the world society as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons"[196].

[185] Resolution 1653(XVI) of 14 December 1962.
[186] Resolution 1801(XVII) of 14 December 1962.
[187] Resolution 33/72[A-B] of 14 December 1978.
[188] Most recently by resolution 68/58 and A/RES/68/28 both of 5 December 2013.
[189] Most recently by resolution 68/42 "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" of 5 December 2013.
[190] Resolution 32/105[F] of 14 December 1977, which was reiterated six times between 1979 and 1983 resolution 34/76B of 11 December 1979, which was reiterated eleven times between 1980 and 1991.
[191] Resolution 33/71[A] of 14 December 1978 and resolution 34/89 of 11 December 1979, which was reiterated 14 times between 1980 and 1993.
[192] A/RES/59/290 of 13 April 2005 and A/RES/62/46 of 5 December 2007.
[193] Resolution A/RES/33/91[D] of 16 December 1987, resolution 35/156F of 12 December 1980, and resolution 43/75N of 7 December 1988.
[194] Resolution 913(X) of 3 December 1955, reiterated 56 times between 1957 and 2013.
[195] Resolution 39/148[F] of 17 December 1984, which was reiterated in 1985 and 1986.
[196] Resolution 1149(XII) of 14 November 1957.

(11) Moreover, since 1993, the GA has adopted a number of resolutions in which it encourages the negotiation of an international treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons use[197].

(12) Besides, it has adopted several resolutions on the peaceful use of atomic energy for civil purposes[198].

2.4 Critical Reflections

The efforts of the General Assembly in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are considerable. The establishment of several disarmament bodies, the holding of three special sessions on disarmament and the adoption of numerous resolutions, which cover all aspects of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, emphasize its high level of dedication towards a nuclear weapons free world.

However, the General Assembly has no enforcement power. It is only able to make non-binding recommendations to the members of the UN or to the Security Council. Yet, resolutions against the nuclear weapons regime are precisely addressed to nuclear-weapon states who oppose and reject to implement these. The same occurs with the Security Council whose five permanent members are such nuclear-weapon states. Therefore, many of the above mentioned resolutions, even if adopted by large majorities and reiterated several times, are not becoming reality.

Resolution 68/39 "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" of 5 December 2013, for example, was adopted by 171 against 7 votes with 5 abstentions. It might not be surprising that the 7 votes against the resolutions were from nuclear-weapon states (France, Great Britain, India, Israel, North Korea, Russia, and the United States) as well as 2 of the 5 abstentions (China and Pakistan).

In spite of the fact that the General Assembly has no enforcement power, it has significantly contributed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by establishing an intergovernmental discussion platform which has been constantly pushed by GA based disarmament bodies. The creation of important international institutions and treaties in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, such as the IAEA and the NPT, were strongly influenced by General Assembly efforts.

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[197] Resolution 48/75L of 16 December 1993, resolution 53/77I of 4 December 1998, which was reiterated five times between 2000 and 2005, and resolution 64/29 of 2 December 2009, which was reiterated three times between 2010 and 2012.

[198] For example resolution 912(X) of 3 December 1955 and resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, which was reiterated three times between 1978 and 1980.

The political scientist M.J. Peterson furthermore hints at critics that characterize General Assembly resolutions as complicated, incomprehensible and "outpaced by real-world events". Yet he objects, that the GA has the greatest potential in agenda-setting, issue and problem definition, policy design, and norm development. The GA permits first, the introduction of new ideas and its transmission to public authorities and the social society, and second, the debate and change of existent ideas through a multi-perspective deliberative process.[199] According to Peterson, this is one of the most important features of global governance:

> "When the members can get beyond least-common-denominator sentiments or employing language so vague that governments are free to interpret resolutions in different even directly opposite ways, the Assembly can still provide the global endorsement or condemnation that Inis Claude long-ago identified as one of the primary functions of the United Nations."[200]

He concludes that GA resolutions have been important in keeping nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on the global agenda. Yet, the domestic politics of states are more constitutive for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament than international pressure.[201]

3. The Security Council

3.1 Structure, Functions and Powers

The Security Council (SC) has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent members. The five permanent members are China, France, Russia as successor of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the USA. The ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for terms of two years. The SC takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the international peace and security and may, if found necessary, adopt peaceful or forcible measures to counter possible threats.[202]

According to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the SC calls upon disputing parties to settle their conflicts by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. According to Chapter VII, it can also impose sanctions or authorize the use of force

[199] PETERSON, M.J., "General Assembly majorities on the preferred nuclear order", in Boulden, Jane et al. [ed.], *The United Nations and nuclear orders*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009, p. 65f.
[200] Ibid., p. 67f.
[201] Ibid., p. 69.
[202] Cf. *Charter of the United Nations*, op. cit., note 153, Chapter V, 24 October 1945.
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to maintain or restore international peace and security. The SC is also responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. As well as the GA, the SC may establish subsidiary organs in accordance with the UN Charter.[203]

Each member of the SC is represented by one delegate and has one vote. Decisions of the SC on procedural matters require the vote of at least nine members. Decisions on all other matters require the vote of at least nine members including the votes of all permanent members. That is why the permanent members are also referred to as "veto powers", since they are able to prevent the adoption of any substantive draft resolution, regardless of the level of international support for the draft. In contrast to the General Assembly, decisions of the Security Council are binding. All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter.[204]

3.2 Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Compared to the GA, the SC has only adopted a few resolutions relating to nuclear weapons. Searching SC resolutions in the United Nations Bibliographic System under the key words "atomic" and "nuclear" in the category "Subject (All)", as done before with the GA resolutions, leads to 37 results. Out of these results, one can be regarded as irrelevant to nuclear weapons, leaving 36 relevant results. Notably, only eight resolutions were adopted before 2003; the majority of 28 resolutions has been adopted afterwards (see Figure 6 on p. 141).[205, 206]

The SC resolutions can be divided into two categories: (1) Non-Proliferation in general and (2) case-based resolutions, whereby the first group consists in (a) resolutions corresponding to the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission between 1947 and 1949; (b) resolutions on the protection of non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT in 1968 and 1995; and (c) resolutions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destructions since 2004.

(1a) The three resolutions the SC adopted between 1947 and 1949 in correspondence to the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission had no substantive outcome and were eventually discontinued due to the suspension of the Commission.[207]

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[203] Cf. ibid., Article 7 paragraph 2 and Article 29.
[204] Cf. ibid., Article 27.
[205] A listing of all SC resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is annexed on page 137. As in the case of the General Assembly, it might not be a complete list since not all resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament may be tagged with the key words "atomic" or "nuclear".
[206] Note: Complete reference information of all resolutions and official documents cited in this chapter can be consulted from the section 'References' and from Table 2 on p. 137.
[207] Resolution 20 of 10 March 1947, resolution 52 of 22 June 1948 and resolution 74 of 16 September 1949.

(1b) After almost twenty years, in which the Security Council had not agreed on any resolutions concerning nuclear weapons, it adopted resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 on the protection of non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT. The resolution considered the use or threat of nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace and security and assured protection to non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. It was due to bring non-nuclear weapon states to sign the NPT in spite of security doubts.

The assurance was reiterated by resolution 984 of 4 November 1995, which also referred to declarations of the permanent members of the SC, restricting the possible use of nuclear weapons. Russia, Great Britain, the USA, and France undertook that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT except in the case of an aggression against them, their allies or states they had a security commitment with, carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. China, however, undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances.[208] On 24 September 2009, the SC adopted resolution 1887 (2009) by which it reaffirmed the NPT and the IAEA as well as general issues concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament such as the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

(1c) In the aftermath of 9/11, the SC adopted resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The resolution considered the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as a threat to international peace and security and called on all member states to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The SC expressed its concern about the threat of nuclear terrorism and therefore obliged all states, to refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempted to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and to adopt and enforce laws which prohibit and prevent the proliferation of these weapons. The SC furthermore created the 1540 Committee in order to supervise the implementation of the resolution. The mandate of the 1540 Committee, which was initially limited to two years, was prolonged for another two years 2006, for another three years in 2008 and for another ten years in 2011.[209,210]

[208] Documents S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263, S/1995/264, S/1995/265 all of 6 April 1995.
[209] Resolution 1673 of 27 April 2006, resolution 1810 of 25 April 2008 and resolution 1977 of 20 April 2011.
[210] Cf. UN [ed.], "1540 Committee", *United Nations*, 2014j, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/>.

(2) Moreover, the SC has adopted a series of case-based resolutions. In 1981, it condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak, yet without further consequences.[211] Ten years later, in 1991, the SC condemned Iraq for having violated their IAEA safeguards and demanded immediate and full compliance of these.[212]

The SC has furthermore adopted several resolutions on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. In 1993, the SC condemned North Korea's intention to withdraw from the NPT and urged North Korea to reconsider its announcement.[213] In 2006, the SC condemned North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and demanded its immediate suspension. In addition, the SC required all member states to restrain from transactions with North Korean involving material, technology or financial resources connected to North Korea's nuclear weapons programme.[214] The same year, the SC adopted resolution 1718 of 16 October 2006 by which it imposed sanctions against North Korea due to its first nuclear weapons test. According to Article 41 of the UN Charter, it established an embargo on military equipment, goods and services related to the development of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; an embargo on luxury goods; and a travel ban and assets freeze on designated persons and entities directly or indirectly related to the nuclear weapons programme. The SC also created the 1718 Committee in order to supervise the implementation of the resolution.[215] Since then, the SC has reiterated and intensified sanctions against North Korea and set up a Panel of Experts to assist the 1718 Committee.[216, 217]

Besides, in 1998, the SC condemned nuclear weapons tests, which were previously conducted by India and Pakistan, and demanded that not only India and Pakistan but all states refrained from further nuclear tests in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.[218]

Most recently, the SC has also adopted several resolutions on the presumed Iranian nuclear weapons programme. In 2006, the SC called upon Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, which was to be verified by the IAEA.[219] Since Iran did not respond to this request, the SC adopted resolution

[211] Resolution 487 of 19 June 1981.
[212] Resolution 707 of 15 August 1991 was based on resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, in which the SC already presumed a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The resolution was terminated by resolution 1762 of 29 June 2007 and by resolution 1957 of 15 December 2010.
[213] Resolution 825 of 11 May 1993.
[214] Resolution 1695 of 15 July 2006.
[215] Resolution 1718 of 16 October 2006.
[216] Resolution 1874 of 12 June 2009, resolution 1928 of 7 June 2010, resolution 1985 of 10 June 2011, resolution 2050 of 12 June 2012, resolution 2087 of 22 January 2013, resolution 2094 of 7 March 2013 and resolution 2141 of 5 March 2014.
[217] Cf. UN [ed.], "1718 Committee", *United Nations*, 2014k, available at:
<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/>.
[218] Resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998.
[219] Resolution 1696 of 31 July 2006.

1737 of 23 December 2006 and imposed sanctions similar to those against North Korea. According to Article 41 of the UN Charter, it established an embargo on goods and services related to the development of nuclear weapons as well as a travel ban and assets freeze on designated persons and entities related directly or indirectly to the presumed nuclear weapons programme. The SC also created the 1737 Committee in order to supervise the implementation of the resolution. Since 2007, the SC has reiterated and intensified sanctions against Iran and set up a Panel of Experts to assist the 1737 Committee.[220, 221]

3.3 Critical Reflections

In contrast to the General Assembly, which pursues a policy towards reaching global zero, the Security Council aims to maintain the *status quo*. While it takes powerful steps to impede further horizontal proliferation, it only makes gradual efforts to encourage general nuclear disarmament. The only UN body with enforcement power is characterized by the fact that all of its permanent members, which have a right of veto, are in possession of nuclear weapons. These rather oppose self-restrictive policies in terms of vertical nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Even though in 2009, the SC reaffirmed the aim of achieving a nuclear weapons free world, there have been few efforts towards this aim.[222] Resolution 1887 of 24 September 2009, for example, urged nuclear disarmament measures as established by Article VI of the NPT; the further ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); and the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Following the resolution, Russia and the USA, signed and ratified New START, making bilateral nuclear disarmament commitments, yet outside the context of the Security Council. Furthermore, China and the USA have still not ratified the CTBT and the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has not even started.

Besides, the obligation to formulate plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments as established by Article 26 of the UN Charter has not been fulfilled at all. Consequently, the Security Council – in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament – works rather as an inter-governmental forum between the five official nuclear-weapon states than a global governance body. All efforts of the General Assembly and the

[220] Resolution 1737 of 24 March 2007, resolution 1803 of 3 March 2008, resolution 1835 of 27 September 2008, resolution 1929 of 9 June 2010 and resolution 2159 of 9 June 2014.
[221] Cf. UN [ed.], "1737 Committee", *United Nations*, 2014l, available at:
< http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/>.
[222] UN [ed.], "Security Council calls for world free of nuclear weapons during historic summit", *United Nations*, 2014m, available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32223&>.

Security Council depend on the political will of the five permanent members, who at the same time are the most powerful nuclear-weapon states in the world.

Ernie Regehr argues that the permanent members of the Security Council follow a non-sustainable strategy of nuclear non-proliferation. On the long run, the rise of new nuclear weapons cannot be prevented through coercion but only through conviction. However, by adhering to the nuclear weapons regime, the permanent members of the Security Council set a bad example and raise doubts about the credibility of the NPT:

> "The Security Council cannot credibly make the disarmament rules, even though nuclear disarmament enjoys overwhelming global support among populations and governments, because the P-5/N-5 – the five that could be the core rule-makers – are not prepared themselves to be legally bound by such rules."[223]

He concludes that the Security Council urgently needs to agree on concrete disarmament measures as established by Article VI of the NPT, including instruments, such as the IAEA safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon states, which verify the compliance of disarmament measures, in order to encourage discernible progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.[224]

4. The IAEA

4.1 Structure, Functions and Powers

The IAEA is an independent international organization related to the UN system through a permanent working relationship established by GA resolution 1145(XII) of 14 November 1957. Its main objectives are, on one hand, the promotion of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes and on the other hand, the prevention of nuclear technologies for military purposes.

In order to promote nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, the IAEA has the function: to encourage and assist research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses; and therefore to make provision for materials, services, equipment, and facilities; to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information; and to encourage the exchange of training of scientists and experts.[225]

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[223] REGEHR, Ernie, "The Security Council and Nuclear Disarmament", in Boulden, Jane et al. [ed.], *The United Nations and nuclear orders*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009, p. 44.
[224] Ibid., p. 44ff.
[225] Cf., *IAEA Statute*, 23 October 1956, Article III.A, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html>.

In order to prevent nuclear technologies for military purposes, the IAEA has the function: to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information are not used for any military purpose; to apply such safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a state, to any of that state's activities in the field of atomic energy; to establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property; and to acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment to carry out its authorized functions.[226]

The IAEA is to conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter to promote peace and international co-operation; with the policies of the UN towards worldwide disarmament; and with any international agreements following such policies.[227] The IAEA furthermore submits annual reports on its activities to the UN General Assembly and, when appropriate, to the Security Council.[228]

The functions of the IAEA are carried out by its three main bodies: the General Conference, the Board of Governors, and the Secretariat. The General Conference is one of two policy-making bodies of the IAEA. It consists of all 162 member states, which are each represented by one delegate who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The General Conference meets in regular annual sessions and in special sessions that may be convened by the Director General at the request of the Board of Governors or of a majority of members. The General Conference may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the IAEA Statute or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the Statute, and may make recommendations to IAEA members, to the Board of Governors or to both.[229]

The second policy-making body of the IAEA is the Board of Governors (the Board). It consists of 32 or more member states. At least ten members are designated by the Board for a term of one year. These are the ten member states most advanced in the technology of atomic energy, plus the members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy from world regions that are not represented by the first ten. Another 22 members are elected by the General Conference for a term of two years with due regard to equitable representation

[226] Ibid.
[227] Ibid., Article III.B.1 and Article 1.4 of GA resolution 1145(XII) of 14 November 1957.
[228] *IAEA Statute*, op. cit., note 225, Article III.B.4 and Article 3 of GA resolution 1145(XII) of 14 November 1957.
[229] *IAEA Statute*, op. cit., note 225, Article V.

of all world regions on the Board as a whole, so that the Board at the end consists of at least five representatives of the area of Latin America, four representatives of the area of Western Europe, three representatives of the area of Eastern Europe, four representatives of the area of Africa, two representatives of the area of the Middle East and South Asia, one representative of the area of South East Asia and the Pacific, and one representative of the area of the Far East. The Board has authority to carry out the functions of the IAEA in accordance with the Statute. It meets at such times as it may determine, usually five times a year. It also prepares annual reports of the IAEA and specific reports if required by the UN or any other organization which is related to the IAEA. All reports have to be submitted by the General Conference.[230]

The Secretariat is tasked with running the IAEA. It is divided in six major departments: management, nuclear sciences and applications, nuclear energy, nuclear safety and security, technical cooperation, and safeguards and verification.[231]

4.2 IAEA Safeguards under the NPT

One of the main tasks of the IAEA is to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement such as the NPT. [232, 233] As mentioned in Chapter 1.2.4, the NPT[234] consists of three pillars: (1) nuclear non-proliferation, (2) nuclear disarmament and (3) the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Referring to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon state parties undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons to other states, nor to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or the control over nuclear weapons (Article I of the NPT). Non-nuclear-weapon state parties undertake not to receive nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons, nor to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons (Article II of the NPT). The latter furthermore undertake to accept safeguards, as laid down in an agreement with the IAEA (Article III.1 and III.2 of the NPT).[235]

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[230] *IAEA Statute*, op. cit., note 225, Article VI.
[231] Cf. IAEA [ed.], "Employees & Staff: Strength Through Diversity", *International Atomic Energy Agency*, 2014a, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/About/staff.html>.
[232] *IAEA Statute*, op. cit., note 225 Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute.
[233] Safeguards agreements are also provided for: the Treaty for the Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin America and the Caribbean), the Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific), the Argentine-Brazilian Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy, the Bangkok Treaty (Southeast Asia), the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa), and the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty.
[234] *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 1 July 1968, available at: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml>.
[235] Ibid.

In return, all state parties to the NPT receive the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the NPT. They are allowed to exchange equipment, materials and scientific and technological information and encouraged to cooperate with other states or international organizations for peaceful purposes (Article IV of the NPT).[236]

Furthermore, all state parties to the NPT undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, on nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (Article V of the NPT).[237]

In accordance with Article III.1 and III.2 of the NPT, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (the Safeguards Agreement) has been adopted by document INFCIRC/153/(Corrected)[238] of June 1972. It is based on assessments of the correctness and completeness of declarations on nuclear material and nuclear-related activities employed by NNWS. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Although the Safeguards Agreement authorizes the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to do so are limited. That is why the Safeguards Agreement was strengthened by the Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540(Corrected)[239] of September 1992, which grants complementary inspection authority to that provided under the Safeguards Agreement.[240] Until today, the Safeguards Agreement has entered into force in 175 NNWS and the Additional Protocol in 115 NNWS.[241]

According to Article VII.C of the Statute, the IAEA Board of Governors is to report any case of non-compliance of safeguards arrangements under the IAEA to all its members, the UN Security Council, and the UN General Assembly. If the recipient state fails to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the IAEA may curtail or suspend assistance being provided by the IAEA or by a member and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient member. The IAEA may also suspend any non-complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership. However, in-depth

[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid.
[238] IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), INFCIRC/153(Corrected), June 1972, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf>.
[239] IAEA, *Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards - INFCIRC/540(Corrected)*, INFCIRC/153(Corrected), September 1997, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf>.
[240] Cf. IAEA [ed.], "The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency", *International Atomic Energy Agency*, 2014b, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/safeg_system.pdf>.
[241] The complete status list can be consulted at: <https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/sv.html >.

measures concerning the non-compliance of safeguards under the NPT can only be implemented by the Security Council.[242]

4.3 Verification and Compliance of the NPT

There are five mayor cases referring to the non-compliance of the Safeguards Agreement under the NPT. These include: Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria.

Iraq joined the IAEA in 1959 and signed the NPT in 1968. The Safeguards Agreement came into force in 1972. Since the mid-1970s, Iraq had been suspected of having a nuclear weapons programme. However, because of the absence of evidence, Iraq's civil nuclear programme was suported by the IAEA in accordance with the right to peaceful use established by the Statute of the IAEA and the NPT. Nevertheless, suspicions of a military nuclear programme did not diminish and eventually led to the Israeli attacks on Iraq's nuclear reactor Osirak (see Chapter 1.1.7).[243] In 1981, the IAEA strongly condemned the Israeli attack, and voted to discontinue all technical assistance to Israel. They also considered to suspend Israel from the IAEA. However, due to pressure from the USA, which backed Israel by temporarily withdrawing from the IAEA and ceasing all its contributions (the main financial source of the IAEA), no further steps were taken.[244]

During the First Gulf War, suspicions of an Iraqi nuclear weapons programme arose again. In 1991, the SC adopted a resolution, which set out terms for a formal cease-fire. It furthermore emphasized Iraq's obligations under the NPT and demanded Iraq to unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. It also requested Iraq to submit a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all nuclear weapons-related items to the IAEA and to accept urgent on-site inspection of the IAEA and the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all such items.[245] IAEA teams working in co-operation with the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) gradually unveiled the full extent of Iraq's large clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Subsequently, the IAEA Board of Governors declared that Iraq had been violating the Safeguards Agreement and reported this to the Security Council. Afterwards, they carried out inspections and operations to dismantle all nuclear-weapons related items. The fact that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme had been ongoing for several years, without being detected by the IAEA, led to sharp criticism and to

[242] *IAEA Statute*, op. cit., note 225.
[243] Israel was not the first state attempting to destroy Osirak. Shortly before, Iran tried to do so as well, but without success.
[244] FISHER, David, *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency*. *The First Forty Years*, Vienna: IAEA Publications, 1997, p. 103ff.
[245] SC Resolution 687 of 8 April 1991, para. 11-13.

the creation of the Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540(Corrected)[246] of September 1992 mentioned above.[247]

North Korea signed the Statute of the IAEA in 1974 and the NPT in 1985. In 1992, after lengthy negotiations and under growing international pressure, North Korea also brought into force the Safeguards Agreement. However, the IAEA was unable to verify that the initial report sub-mitted by North Korea covered all nuclear material they really had. In 1993, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two locations that appeared to be nuclear waste stores, which were not listed in the initial report. After North Korea had rejected the request, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that North Korea was violating the Safeguards Agreement and reported this to the Security Council. Shortly after that, North Korea gave notice of its withdrawal from the NPT. However, due to international pressure, North Korea suspended the withdrawal before it came into effect. One year after, in 1994, North Korea definitely withdrew from the IAEA and suspended the Safeguards Agreement. Negotiations between the USA and North Korea led to a new agreement, which was to substitute the Safeguards Agreement: the USA would provide two light water reactors to North Korea and, in return, North Korea would freeze and ultimately dismantle their nuclear weapons programme. The agreement also stipulated that the IAEA would be allowed to monitor the freeze. Nonetheless, in the following years, little progress was made to implement the agreement.[248]

In October 2002, the USA alleged North Korea of secretly continuing its nuclear weapons programme in spite of the new agreement. In November 2002, the IAEA requested information about the suspected programme, but received no reply. In December, the IAEA once more insisted that North Korea should reply and cooperate with the IAEA and emphasized that unregistered nuclear activities would constitute a violation of North Korea's international commitments. After that, North Korea expelled all IAEA inspectors, removed surveillance equipment from its nuclear facilities, and declared its withdrawal from the NPT. The IAEA Board of Governors once again condemned North Korea's non-compliance and reported this to the UN Security Council. Notwithstanding the actions taken by the IAEA and the Security Council, North Korea continued its nuclear weapons programme, and by

[246] IAEA, *Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards - INFCIRC/540(Corrected)*, INFCIRC/153(Corrected), September 1997, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf>.
[247] Cf. FISHER, David, op. cit. note 244, p. 115f.
[248] Cf. FISHER, David, op. cit. note 244, p. 288f.

carrying out its first nuclear weapons test in 2006, caused a serious backlash for the IAEA and the NPT.[249]

Iran joined the IAEA in 1958, signed the NPT in 1968 and brought into force the Safeguards Agreement in 1974. In 2002, suspicions arose that Iran was operating a nuclear weapons programme. In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been secretly enriching uranium and producing plutonium and thus repeatedly and over an extended period of time failed to meet its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement. Shortly after that, Iran signed the Additional Protocol, but did not ratify it. In the following, the IAEA repeatedly called on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, but Iran rejected the demand claiming its programme was for peaceful purposes only. Meanwhile, France, Great Britain, and Germany started negotiations with Iran, but little progress was made. In 2005, the IAEA declared that Iran's withholding of information on its nuclear programme constituted a non-compliance of the Safeguards Agreement and, in 2006, reported this to the UN Security Council. In spite of a series of sanctions adopted by the SC (see Chapter 2.3.2) and serious tensions between Iran and other countries, particularly Israel and the USA, Iran has not withdrawn from the IAEA or the NPT, and continues partially cooperating with the IAEA. However, the situation continues to be opaque and the outcome remains to be seen.[250]

Libya acceded the IAEA in 1963, the NPT in 1968, and brought into force the Safeguards Agreement in 1980. For about 20 years, it had been carrying out a nuclear weapons programme without the IAEA taking notice of it. When in 1993 the US Navy revealed the programme, Libya immediately announced to dismantle it and to adopt the Additional Protocol. In 2004, the IAEA confirmed Libya's non-compliance of the Safeguards Agreement and, in the following years, monitored the dismantling of the Libya's nuclear weapons programme.[251]

Syria as well as Libya joined the IAEA in 1963 and the NPT in 1968, but brought into force the Safeguards Agreement in 1992. In 2007, Israel unilaterally bombed a building in Syria which it believed was a nuclear reactor under construction. Syria denied the allegations and allowed inspectors of the IAEA to visit the site. In 2011, the IAEA released a report which assessed that the destroyed facility indeed was a reactor, and reported this as a non-

[249] Cf. IAEA [ed.], "IAEA and DRPK", *International Atomic Energy Agency*, 2014c, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml>.
[250] Cf. IAEA [ed.], "IAEA and Iran. Chronology of Key Events", *International Atomic Energy Agency*, 2014d, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/iran_timeline11.shtml>.
[251] Cf. IAEA [ed.], "IAEA and Libya. Chronology of Key Events", *International Atomic Energy Agency*, 2014e, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaealibya/libya_timeline.shtml>.

compliance to the UN Security Council. An IAEA investigation into the matter is still ongoing, with progress hindered by limited Syrian cooperation and the Syrian Civil War. [252]

4.4 Critical Reflections

In 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its former General Director Mohamed El Baradei were jointly awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize 2005 "for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way".[253] However, the IAEA safeguards system under the NPT has been criticized for multiple reasons.

First, the dual system of supporting nuclear energy for civil use on the one hand and preventing its military use on the other hand is highly disputed. It is assumed that some nuclear weapons programmes, for example the North Korean, originated from IAEA-based support of nuclear technology for civil use.

Second, the IAEA Statute as well as the NPT and the safeguards under the NPT are voluntary state commitments and therefore lack universality. 162 UN member states form part of the International Atomic Energy Agency and 189 of the NPT. North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel are the only UN member states, which do not form part of the NPT. Furthermore, both the Statute of the IAEA and the NPT offer the possibility to withdraw. Article XVIII paragraph D of the Statute of the IAEA establishes:

> At any time after five years from the date when this Statute shall take effect […] or whenever a member is unwilling to accept an amendment to this Statute, it may withdraw from the Agency by notice in writing to that effect given to the depositary Government referred to in paragraph C of article XXI, which shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all members.[254]

Furthermore, Article X paragraph 1 of the NPT stipulates that:

> Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.[255]

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[252] Cf. IAEA [ed.], "IAEA and Syria. Chronology of Key Events", *International Atomic Energy Agency*, 2014f, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeasyria/syria_timeline5.shtml>.
[253] NOBEL FOUNDATION, the, "The Nobel Peace Prize 2005", *nobelprize.org*, available at: <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2005/>.
[254] *Statute of the IAEA*, op cit., note 225.
[255] *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, op. cit., note 234.

However, the NPT does not define what is to be understood as "extraordinary events". North Korea's withdrawal from both, the IAEA and the NPT, emphasizes the fragility of member state commitments and reduces the credibility of the IAEA and the NPT.

Third, the IAEA is subject to legal and technical restrictions. Legal gaps were tried to be filled by the Additional Protocol, which has only been ratified in 124 states until today. Technical gaps are due to financial, instrumental and personnel deficiencies. Both of the gaps facilitate secret nuclear weapons programmes that cannot be discovered by the IAEA. National intelligence services form a clandestine parallel system to the IAEA safeguards system.

Fourth, another aspect of criticism refers to the NPT, which divides the international community in official nuclear-weapon states, non-official nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. It is criticized that the NPT has 'legitimated' the official nuclear-weapon states, which are furthermore accused of undermining Article VI of the NPT, which urges all states to pursue negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.[256]

Fifth, the IAEA is also suspected of being subject to political influences and acting beyond its competences. The acting of the IAEA after the US withdrawal from the IAEA in order to back Israel after the Osirak attack, gives one example of political influence. Moreover, the IAEA has been criticized of acting impartial and beyond its competences in the contemporary case of Iran. The American Lawyer Daniel H. Joyner argues that the IAEA was applying measures of the Additional Protocol, even though it has not come into force in Iran yet:

> "It must be remembered that the IAEA is not a general policeman of international nuclear energy law. It is not the 'UN's nuclear watchdog', as the media is so fond of calling it. The agency is an independent international organization, which was created through a treaty -- an instrument of international law. As such, it has only the international legal personality and the limited mandate of legal authority, which are provided both in the agency's statute and in its bilateral Safeguards Agreements with member states."[257]

[256] Cf. also MICHEL, Quentin, "Critical Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", *Nuclear Law Bulletin*, 2007/2, 2007, p. 21ff.; and BIAD, Abdelwahab, "Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On", *Nuclear Law Bulletin*, 2010/2, 2010, p. 7f..

[257] JOYNER, Daniel H., "Overstepping bounds", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 2012, available at: <http://thebulletin.org/iran-and-bomb-legal-standards-iaea-0>.

5. The International Court of Justice

5.1 Structure, Functions and Competences

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The Court's tasks are to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states (*continuous cases*) and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies (*advisory proceedings*). The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected by both the General Assembly and the Security Council for terms of nine years. The legal sources of the Court are international treaties and conventions in force, international custom, the general principles of law, and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. Moreover, if the parties agree, the Court can decide a case *ex aequo et bono*[258], that means, without limiting itself to existing rules of international law.[259]

Only states may be parties to continuous cases. By signing the UN Charter, a state member of the UN undertakes to comply with any decision of the Court in a case to which it is a party. It is rare for a decision not to be implemented. A state which finds that the other side has failed to implement a decision of the Court, may address the Security Council, which is empowered to recommend or decide upon the measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.[260]

Advisory proceedings before the Court are open solely to five organs of the United Nations and to 16 specialized agencies within the UN system. The UN General Assembly and Security Council may request advisory opinions on "any legal question". Other UN organs and authorized specialized agencies such as the IAEA can only do so with respect to "legal questions arising within the scope of their activities". When it receives a request for an advisory opinion, the Court, in order to give its opinion with full knowledge of the facts, is empowered to hold written and oral proceedings. After the consultation procedures, the Court delivers the advisory opinion at a public sitting. It is of the essence of such opinions that they are advisory, and – unlike the Court's judgments – have no binding effect. The requesting organ, agency or organization remains free to give effect to the opinion by any means open to it, or not to do so.[261]

[258] Latin for "according to the right and good" means that a judge may decide not only pending on the existing rules and law but on moral principles such as fairness and equability.
[259] Cf. Charter of the United Nations, op. cit., note 153, Chapter XIV; and ICJ, "How the Court works", *International Court of Justice*, 2014, available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=6>.
[260] Ibid.
[261] Ibid.

5.1 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice published the 'Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'[262] upon the request of the General Assembly in 1994, which asked the Court if the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted in any circumstance under international law. In its conclusions the Court decided:

A. Unanimously, that

> "there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons";

B. By eleven votes to three votes[263], that

> "there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such";

C. Unanimously, that

> "a threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful";

D. Unanimously, that

> "a threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;"

E. By seven votes to seven votes[264], by the President's casting vote[265],

> "that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
> However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake";

F. Unanimously, that

> "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

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[262] INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf> .
[263] IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, and Higgins; AGAINST: Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma.
[264] IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, and Ferrari Bravo; AGAINST: Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, and Higgins.
[265] The President of the ICJ has a casting vote in the event of votes being equally divided.

Applicable Law

The Court considered that the most directly relevant applicable law is that relating to the use of force according to the UN Charter; the law applicable in armed conflicts; and any relevant treaties on nuclear weapons (para. 34). Before examining the applicable law sources, the Court emphasized the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons:

> "The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy al1 civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. The radiation released by a nuclear explosion would affect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious danger to future generations. Ionizing radiation has the potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects and illness in future generations" (para. 35).

UN Charter

The Court first addressed the question of the legality or illegality of nuclear weapons under the provisions of the UN Charter. Article 2 paragraph 5 of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. However, the UN Charter provides two exceptions: First, Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if any armed attack occurs and second, Article 42 of the Charter authorizes the Security Council to take military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter. The Court furthermore noted that these provisions do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed (para. 37-39).

The Court then brought into mind that the exercise of the right of self-defence is, according to customary international law, subject to the principles of *necessity* and *proportionality*. This condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter. The proportionality principle may not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all circumstances. But at the same time, a use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. The very nature of nuclear weapons and their profound risks are further considerations to be taken in mind by states believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defence in accordance with the requirements of proportionality (para. 40-44).

In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack, states sometimes signal that they possess certain weapons to use in self-defence against any state violating their territorial

integrity or political independence. Whether a signaled intention to use force if certain events occur is or is not a 'threat' within Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter depends on the circumstances. The notions of 'threat' and 'use' of force under Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case was illegal – for whatever reason – the threat to use such force would likewise be illegal (para. 47 and 48).

International Law on Nuclear Weapons

Having dealt with the provisions given in the UN Charter, the Court addressed the question whether there are specific rules in international law regulating the legality or illegality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons *per se*. First, the Court rejected that nuclear weapons should be treated in the same way as poisoned weapons under the Second Hague Declaration of 1899, the Hague Convention IV of 1907, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as these do not define what is to be understood by 'poison' or 'poisoned weapons', and different interpretation exists, usually referring to weapons whose prime or even exclusive effect is to poison or asphyxiate (para. 54-56). The Court then stipulated that, until now, weapons of mass destruction have been declared illegal by specific instruments and that, although in the last two decades, many negotiations have been conducted with regard to nuclear weapons, they have not resulted in a treaty of general prohibition of the same kind as for bacteriological and chemical weapons (para. 57 and 58).[266]

The Court stipulated that the present nuclear-weapons treaties deal exclusively with acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons, without specifically addressing their threat or use. They point to an increasing concern in the international community with these weapons and could therefore be seen as foreshadowing a future general prohibition of the use of such weapons, but do not constitute such a prohibition *per se*. Although the Treaties of Tlatelolco (NWFZ in Latin America) and Rarotonga (NWFZ in the South Pacific) and their Protocols, as well as the declarations made by the permanent members of the Security Council in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty generally restrict the use of nuclear weapons, they reserve exemptions in certain circumstances. Thus, they cannot be interpreted as a comprehensive and universal conventional prohibition on the use, or threat of nuclear weapons (para. 59-63).

[266] The Court is referring to the 'Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction' of 10 April 1972, which prohibits the possession of bacteriological and toxic weapons and reinforces the prohibition of their use, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 13 January 1993, which prohibits al1 use of chemical weapons and requires the destruction of existing stocks.

International Customary Law and International Humanitarian Law

The Court then examined whether a prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons can be derived from customary international law. The Court did not consider itself able to find an *opinio juris*[267] prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons *per se*. It referred to the General Assembly, which annually adopts resolutions requesting the member states to conclude a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance. These resolutions reveal the desire of a very large section of the international community, but the emergence, as *lex lata*[268], of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent *opinio juris* on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence on the other hand (para. 65-73).

The Court not having found a conventional rule of general scope, nor a customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons *per se*, then dealt with the question whether recourse of nuclear weapons must be considered as illegal in the light of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, as established by the Hague and the Geneva Conventions (para. 74 and 75).

There are two main principles of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, which are based on the distinction of combatants and non-combatants. The first principle is the protection of civilians; states must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. The second principle is the prohibition to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants; it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In application of that second principle, states do not have unlimited freedom of choice regarding to the weapons they use. The Court likewise referred, in relation to these principles, to the Martens Clause, which was first included in the Hague Convention II of 1899 and which has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology. A modern version of that clause is to be found in Article 1 paragraph 2 of the 1977 Additional Protocol, which reads as follows:

> "In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience."

[267] The expression *opinio juris* refers to a norm that derives from customary law.
[268] The term *lex lata* means "current law" and is opposed to the term *lex ferenda*, which means "future law".

Humanitarian law, at a very early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons either because of their indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or because of the unnecessary suffering caused to combatants, that means, a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives. Accordingly, if the use of weapons would not meet the requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to use such would also be contrary to that law. Furthermore, these fundamental rules apply to all states whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law as established in the Nuremberg Trials (para. 78 and 80).

The Court noted that most of the principles and rules of humanitarian law had evolved prior to the invention of nuclear weapons and that the Conferences of Geneva of 1949 and between 1974-1977 did not specifically deal with nuclear weapons. However, in the Court's view, it cannot be concluded from this that the established principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict do not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in question and the Martens Clause (para. 85-87).

The Court then referred to the principle of neutrality as established in Article I of the Hague Convention V of 1907:

> "The principle of neutrality, in its classic sense, was aimed at preventing the incursion of belligerent forces into neutral territory, or attacks on the persons or ships of neutrals. Thus: the territory of neutral powers is inviolable."

The Court stipulated that as in the case of the principles of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, international law leaves no doubt that the principle of neutrality, which is of a fundamental character similar to that of the humanitarian principles and rules, is applicable, to all international armed conflict, whatever type of weapons might be used (para. 88-90).

The Court furthermore found that the applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian law and of the principle of neutrality to nuclear weapons is hardly disputed, but the conclusions to be drawn from this applicability are controversial. The Court observed that none of the states advocating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances, including the 'clean' use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons, has indicated what, supposing such limited use were feasible, would be the precise circumstances justifying such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons. This being so, the Court did not consider that it had a sufficient basis for a determination on the validity of this view (para. 90-94).

The Court was however not able to determinate whether the use or threat of nuclear weapons was illegal in any circumstance due to their inherent and total incompatibility with the law applicable in armed conflict. It indicated that the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict make the conduct of armed hostilities subject to a number of strict requirements. Thus, methods and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, the use of such weapons in fact seems reconcilable with respect for such requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considered that it did not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily contrary to the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance (para. 95).

Moreover, the Court emphasized the fundamental right of every state to survival and self-defence and the practice referred to as 'policy of deterrence', to which a considerable part of the international community has adhered to for many years (para. 96). According to the present state of international law viewed as a whole, the Court observed that it could not reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a state in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake (para. 97).

Obligation to Nuclear Disarmament

At last, the Court referred to the obligation to nuclear disarmament as recognized by Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty:

> "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The Court also hinted at the first General Assembly resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946, which unanimously adopted to set up a commission whose terms of reference included making specific proposals for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of al1 other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". In a large number of subsequent resolutions, the General Assembly has reaffirmed the need for nuclear disarmament. Thus, in resolution 808 A (IX) of 4 November 1954, which was likewise unanimously adopted, it concluded "that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention

providing for: … (b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes." The same conviction has been expressed outside the United Nations context in various instruments.

The Security Council reaffirmed in its resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 "the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply fully with al1 their obligations" and urged "all States, as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control which remains a universal goal." The importance of fulfilling the obligation expressed in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was also reaffirmed in the final document of the Review and Extension Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held from 17 April to 12 May 1995.

5.3 Critical Reflections

The crucial and the most controversial point of the Advisory Opinion is conclusion E, which states that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law", but leaves open whether "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." By doing so, the Court *de facto* denies to answer the advisory question and leaves open the possibility that nuclear weapons might be permitted under international law in extreme circumstances. The close vote of conclusion E and the individual statements and dissident opinions of the judges implicate the controversy of the decision.

First, the Court broadly considered the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons under Article 2, paragraph 5 (general prohibition of use of force), Article 51 (inherent right of self-defence), and Article 42 (military enforcement measures authorized by the Security Council) of the UN Charter. However, the Court did not discuss the legality of nuclear weapons under Article 1(1) of the UN Charter (maintenance of international peace and security), questioning if nuclear weapons would have to be considered as a threat to international peace and security *per se*.

Second, the Court argued that there are no specific rules in international law explicitly regulating the legality or illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, nuclear

weapons could not be treated in the same way as poisoned weapons under the Second Hague Declaration[269] of 1899, the Hague Convention IV[270] of 1907 and the Geneva Protocol[271] of 1925 as different interpretation exists about the terms 'poison' or 'poisoned weapon'. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 establishes that:

> "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world […]."

It is indisputable that ionizing radiation is poisonous.[272] The Court adopted a restrictive interpretation by saying that "different interpretation exists, usually referring to weapons who's prime or even exclusive effect is to poison or asphyxiate." However, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 does not indicate any restrictions as does for example Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons[273], which defines an "incendiary weapon" as a weapon or munition which is '*primarily*' designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons." In contrary, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 includes "*all* analogous liquids, materials or devices". The Court's decision to exclude nuclear weapons from the Geneva Protocol of 1925, therefore severely undermines radiation effects of nuclear weapons.

Third, the Court also denied the existence of international costmary law. The Court paradoxically justified its decision by the "still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence" (para. 73), a practice whose legality was before called into question (para. 48). In other words, it justified the absence of customary international law with the presence of a lawfully doubted state practice.

Forth, the Court referred to the 'Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their

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[269] *Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land*, 29 July 1899, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150?OpenDocument>.

[270] *Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land*, 18 October 1907, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6>.

[271] *Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare*, 17 June 1925, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/280?OpenDocument>.

[272] The standard reference work *Principles and Methods of Toxicology*, for example, defines poison as "any substance (chemical, physical, biological) that is harmful or destructive to a biological (living) system". It furthermore dedicates an entire chapter to ionizing radiation and a subchapter on the effects of nuclear weapons) (HAYES, Wallace A., *Principles and Methods of Toxicology*, 5th ed., New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008, p. 699 – 772; 1826)

[273] *Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III)*, 10 October 1980, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/515>.

Destruction'[274] of 10 April 1972 to conclude from it that such convention does not exists for nuclear weapons. However, the Court failed to acknowledge that the Convention also implicated costmary international law by stipulating that all states acted "with a view to achieving effective progress toward general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction […]."

Fifth, in a more general sense, nuclear weapons can be seen in line with biological and chemical weapons forming the group of "weapons of mass destruction" or the so-called "ABC-weapons". Their purpose, namely the "mass destruction", universally objects the most essential principles of humanitarian law: the protection of civilians and the prohibition to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants. Customary international law explicitly prohibited biological and chemical weapons before nuclear weapons were invented and would likewise have prohibited nuclear weapons if the Cold War and the subsequent proliferation of such weapons, had not undermined the international will to do so. Yet, the proliferation of nuclear weapons does not – as the Court argues – justify the non-prohibition of nuclear weapons. It rather calls for the rectification of this state practice in accordance with the correct application of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, international customary law and international humanitarian law; a step the Court decided not to make.

In his declaration, Judge Vereshchetin, who was in favor of conclusion E, suggested that the Court should "remain within its judicial function and should not act as a legislator."[275] This issue has raised a controversial debate among legal scholars. David Kennedy, for example, described the advisory opinion as "lengthy and equivocal".[276] In contrast to Judge Vereshchetin, he states that it proved the "return of politics to law".[277] He argues that the judges failed to take a clear legal position and to act with good faith, defending humanitarian values.[278] He sees the ICJ trapped between "moralism and the apology of process"; "legal passivity and action"; "fact and law".[279]

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[274] *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction*, 10 April 1972, available at: < http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/450?OpenDocument>.

[275] INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons (Declaration of Judge Vereshchetin)*, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996,., p. 280/58, available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7505.pdf>

[276] KENNEDY, David, „Nuclear Weapons Case", in Boisson de Chazournes, Laurens and Philippe Sands [ed.], *International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 462.

[277] Ibid., p. 463.

[278] Ibid., p. 464.

[279] Ibid., p. 469f.

He concludes that:

> "There is a broad story of international law and institutions – a turn from law to politics, and then a nervous glance back over the shoulder, perhaps a return to law, to law at once as politics and antidote to politics. And there is the movement within international law from form to process – followed by an uncertain recoil against the procedural. But most of all we find a polemic for the law itself, claiming now both to embrace the perils of nuclear war and hold them at bay. In that, this is a story less about nuclear weapons than about law – a story which invites our rebellion, our insistence on an honest confrontation with the perils and possibilities of the nuclear age. But in the end, if we wish to speak more about nuclear weapons, we must speak more about the law, speak in a way this case is silent, about the law which emboldens states as warriors and structures deterrence as rational […]."[280]

Martti Koskenniemi criticizes the decision of the ICJ in a similar way. He argues that legal decisions must be based on 'reason' and not as political decisions on 'passion'. The virtue of lawyers is therefore the ability to stick to legal methods and abstain from all political or other non-legal influences.[281] The ICJ failed to comply with this virtue by participating in a "doctrinal practice that puts its hope in the contrast of legal reasoning to ideology, philosophy and political prophecy [and] ends up as a collection of makeshift apologies."[282] As Kennedy, he asserts that conclusion E derived from a severe conflict between law and politics, two concepts that, in his opinion, cannot be distinguished precisely.[283] He claims that any definite decision of the Court would have implicated a clear political statement. The Court, however, circumvented this problem by not giving a definite decision at all. The main issue at stake, the "possible mass killing of innocent people by nuclear weapons", was thus undermined by the conflict between law and politics. [284] After broadly discussing the role of the judges, Koskenniemi concludes that they focused too much on complying legal formalities instead of saying what was intrinsically right:

> "As lawyers, we need to be able to say that we know that the killing of the innocent is wrong not because of whatever chains of reasoning we can produce to support it, or who it was that told us so, but because of who we are. Without so defining ourselves, how could we possibly be trusted to do the right thing in the unique and precarious situations in which that passion is triggered?"[285]

[280] Ibid., p. 472.
[281] KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, "Faith, *I*dentity, and the Killing of the Innocents: International Lawyers and Nuclear Weapons", *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 10:10, 1997, p. 137.
[282] UNGER, R.M., cited in ibid., p. 138.
[283] Ibid., p. 140f.
[284] Ibid., p. 143.
[285] Ibid., p. 162.

CHAPTER III - THEORETICAL APPROACHES

In the third chapter, I will apply theoretical approaches which serve to explain both, the armament and proliferation of nuclear weapons and the achievements and failures of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These include *Game Theoretic Models*, the *Sagan-Waltz Controversy*, and the *Global Governance Problématique* according to Weiss and Thakur.

1. Game Theory

1.1 The Prisoners' Dilemma

Game theory is a mathematical method that infers rational choice behavior in situations of social conflict, in which the success of the individual depends not only on its own actions, but also on the actions of others. Modern game theory is based on the 1944 book *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Since then, it has become a key methodology in economic science and also influenced other disciplines such as sociology and political science.[286]

The Theory is built on the concept of the *homo oeconomicus*, which suggests that human beings are self-interested and rational actors. They constantly aim to maximize their utility and thereby dispose of all information required to make rational choices. This concept was later on applied not only to individuals, but also to collective actors. The theory assumes that actors cooperate in order to maximize their utility. However, in certain situations they might not cooperate even if it would maximize the utility of the two parties. This problem, which plays an important role in game theory, is referred to as the *prisoners' dilemma*.[287]

The prisoners' dilemma was developed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 and subsequently formalized by Albert W. Tucker. Today there exist plenty of versions of the prisoners' dilemma, of which the most common goes like this: Two prisoners are accused of having jointly committed a robbery, which is sentenced to three years of prison, but the police do not have enough evidence to convict them. Without confession the prisoners could only be charged for possession of stolen goods, which is sentenced to one year of prison. Therefore, the police offer each prisoner a deal: If one confesses the crime and betrays the other, he will be released without sentence. If both confess, they will be each sentenced to two years of prison. Both prisoners are held in solitary confinement and cannot communicate

[286] Cf. BRAMS, Steven J. and Morton D. Davis, "game theory", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2014, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/224893/game-theory>.
[287] Ibid.

with each other. Consequently, there are three possible outcomes: (1) if one confesses and the other does not, the former will be released and the latter will be sentenced to 3 years; (2) if neither confesses, each will be sentenced to 1 year; and (3) if both confess, each will be sentenced to 2 years.

The possible individual outcomes, which are also referred to as *payoffs*, can be visualized in a matrix:

		prisoner 2		
prisoner 1		remains silent	confesses	total
	remains silent	P1: 1 year, P2: 1 years	P1: 3 years, P2: 0 years	P1: 4 years
	confesses	P1: 0 years, P2: 3 years	P1: 2 years, P2: 2 years	P1: 2 years
	total	P2: 4 years	P2: 2 years	

Individually, it is more beneficial for each prisoner to confess no matter how the other acts. The prisoner would either be released (in case the other one remained silent) or sentenced to 2 years of prison (in case the other one also confessed). The total of both possible outcomes would thus be of 2 years of prison. If the prisoner remained silent, he would be either sentenced to 1 year of prison instead of being released (in the case the other one also remained silent) or to 3 years of prison instead of 2 years (in the case the other one confessed). The total of both possible outcomes would then be of 4 years of prison, twice as much as in case of confession.

The possible collective outcomes, that is the combined sentences of both prisoners, can also be visualized in a matrix:

		prisoner 2	
prisoner 1		remains silent	confesses
	remains silent	2 years	3 years
	confesses	3 years	4 years

Collectively, it would be more beneficial for both prisoners to remain silent. They would be each sentenced to 1 year of prison and together to 2 years of prison, which would be the lowest amount of all possible combined outcomes. The dilemma therefore consists in the fact that the individually and the collectively most beneficial strategy contradict: If both

prisoners opt for the individually most beneficial choice "confession", they achieve the collectively least beneficial outcome (4 years of prison).

In the prisoners' dilemma, cooperation in form of collective action is hindered by the fact that the prisoners cannot communicate with each other. However, if they could communicate with each other, there would still remain the risk of being betrayed by the other. The actors do not dispose of all information required to make a complete rational choice.

1.2 Application of the Prisoners' Dilemma on the Soviet-US Arms Race

Since the 1960s, the prisoners' dilemma has been applied to scores of areas, *inter alia* to the Soviet-US nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Analogously to the original model, the Soviet Union and the US are described as two actors, which can decide between two possible choices: nuclear armament or disarmament. There are again three possible outcomes: (1) if one state arms while the other disarms, the former will be secure of nuclear attack, while the other one will be insecure (*unilateral nuclear armament*); (2) if both states arm, both states will be insecure of nuclear attack (*bilateral nuclear armament*); (3) if both states disarm, both states will be secure of nuclear attack (*bilateral nuclear disarmament*). The possible outcomes for both states can again be visualized in a matrix:[288]

		USSR		
USA		disarm	arm	total
	disarm	USA: 3, USSR: 3	USA: 1, USSR: 4	USA: 4
	arm	USA: 4, USSR: 1	USA: 2 USSR: 2	USA: 6
	total	USSR: 4	USSR: 6	

Individually, it is more beneficial for each state to arm no matter how the other acts. The state would either achieve nuclear superiority (in case the other one disarmed) or draw even with the other one (in case the other one also armed). The total of both possible outcomes would thus be a payoff of 6. If the state disarmed, it would either draw even with the other state instead of achieving nuclear superiority (in the case the other one also disarmed) or it would end up with nuclear inferiority instead of drawing even (in the case the other one

[288] Since the outcome cannot be measured quantitatively as in the original prisoners' dilemma, the payoffs are symbolized by numbers. The most preferred outcome is indicated with a '4', and the least preferred outcome is indicated with a '1'. It is assumed, that both sides ideally prefer to arm while the other side disarms to maximize their military security.

armed). The total of both possible outcomes would then be a payoff of 4; two less than in case of armament.

The possible collective outcomes can also be visualized in a matrix:

		USSR	
USA		disarm	arm
	disarm	6	5
	arm	5	4

Collectively, it would be more beneficial for both states to disarm. They would each achieve a payoff of 3 and together of 6, which would be the highest amount of all possible combined outcomes. The dilemma therefore consists again in the fact that the individually and the collectively most beneficial strategy contradict: If both states opt for the individually most beneficial choice "armament", they achieve the collectively least beneficial outcome (a pay-off of 4). In comparison to the prisoners, who cannot communicate, states indeed are able to do so. However, the risk that one state betrays the other is fairly high since payoffs rise by successfully doing so.[289]

2. The Sagan-Waltz-Controversy

2.1 Neorealism

Neorealism, or structural realism, is a theory of international relations, which was developed by international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics*. It derived from classical realist theory as of Hans J. Morgenthau and Edward H. Carr and is – similarly to the above described game theoretical approach – based on economic theory and empirical observations mainly referring to the Cold War. Waltz asserts that the international system consists of states (*units*) and international relations (*structures*).[290] The two main features of Waltz's theory are (1) the *anarchic order* of the international system and (2) the *distribution of power* among states.

[289] Cf. PLOUS, Scott, "The nuclear arms race: prisoner's dilemma or perceptual dilemma?", *Journal Of Peace Research*, 30:2, 1993, 163-179.
[290] WALTZ, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p. 38ff.

In the tradition of classic realism, Waltz asserts that the international system is an anarchic system because there is no legitimate monopoly of force such as a world government. Because of this anarchic order, international relations are characterized by mistrust and insecurity. States are never certain of the other states' intention and suffer from permanent threat of war. In order to counter this *security dilemma*, states act in accordance with the *principle of self-help*.[291] States are described as "unilateral actors, who, at a minimum, [seek] their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination". Therefore, they either increase their economic and military strength (*internal efforts*) or create alliances with other states (*external efforts).*[292]

Depending on their resources, states have different *capabilities of power*.[293] The *distribution of power* in the international system may be dominated by one, two, or many superpowers (*unipolarity*, *bipolarity*, and *multipolarity*). The distribution of power is likely to change until a *balance of power* is achieved, in which the power capabilities of opposing states or state alliances are equilibrated. Such balance of power was achieved during the Cold War and prevented a ballistic confrontation between the two blocs.[294]

2.2 Kenneth N. Waltz: "More May Be Better"

In his later work, Waltz attempted to support his neorealist approach by analyzing the impact of nuclear weapons on the Cold War and on international politics in general. In his 1981 publication "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better", he argues that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons has contributed to international peace and security in the past and is likely to do so in the future. His thesis is mainly based on the observation that the post-World War II era has been the most peaceful era in the 20th century, whereby he defines peace as the "absence of general war among the major states of the world". He claims that the "high ability of the postwar international system to absorb changes and to contain conflicts and hostilities" is linked to the invention and proliferation of nuclear weapons.[295]

Waltz reemphasizes that states coexist in an anarchic system, in which self-help is the principle of action. The most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security. The chances of peace rise if states can achieve their own

[291] Ibid., p. 102ff.
[292] Ibid., p. 118.
[293] Ibid., p. 97.
[294] Ibid., p. 129ff.
[295] WALTZ, Kenneth N., "More May Be Better", in Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*: *An Enduring Debate*, 3rd ed., New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012, p. 4.

security without using force. They can do so by either *defence* or *deterrence*, which are not to be confused:

> "How can one state dissuade another state from attacking? One way to counter an intended attack is to build fortifications and to muster forces that look forbiddingly strong. To build defenses so patently strong that no one will try to destroy or overcome them would make international life perfectly tranquil. I call this the defensive ideal. The other way to counter an intended attack is to build retaliatory forces able to rain unacceptable punishment upon a would-be aggressor. 'To deter' means to stop people from doing something by frightening them."[296]

War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains. States are not inclined to run major risks for minor gains. If states can score only small gains because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight. Waltz argues that many wars might have been avoided had their outcome been foreseen. Yet, uncertainty about outcomes does not work decisively against the fighting of wars in conventional wars, but countries armed with conventional weapons go to war knowing that even in case of defeat their sufferings will be limited. This is not the case with nuclear weapons:

> "Calculations about nuclear war are made differently. If countries armed with nuclear weapons go to war with each other, they do so knowing that their suffering may be unlimited. In a conventional world, one is uncertain about winning or losing. In a nuclear world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated."[297]

Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, nobody dares to start a war. Therefore, nuclear weapons can be seen as a "deterrent ideal". In short: "If a state has nuclear weapons or enjoys their protection then that state will not be subject to a war in which its vital interests are at stake."[298]

Waltz also addresses the fear of irresponsible use und incapacity of self-control among nascent nuclear-weapon states and the fear of nuclear proliferation among non-state actors, but rejects them as "unrounded". This fear has always existed and never be proved to become true: "New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been."[299] He then concludes:

> "The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly. […] Because they do, the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared."[300]

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[296] Ibid., p. 5.
[297] Ibid., p. 9
[298] Verbal note from Keneth N. Waltz at UC Santa Barbara, 24 February 2005, available at: <http://www.uctv.tv/shows/Scott-Sagan-and-Kenneth-Waltz-The-Spread-of-Nuclear-Weapons-A-Debate-Renewed-9491>.
[299] WALTZ, Kenneth N., op. cit. note 295, p. 10ff. and 40.
[300] WALTZ, Kenneth N., op. cit., note 295, p. 40.

2.3 Scott D. Sagan: "More Will Be Worse"

In 1994, political scientist Scott D. Sagan outlined an antithesis to Waltz' approach which was initially titled "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons" and later renamed to "More Will Be Worse".

His organizational approach is mainly based on the assumption that "military organizations, unless professionally managed through a checks- and balances system of strong civilian control, are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirement for stable nuclear deterrence" and that "there are strong reasons to believe that future nuclear-armed states will lack the positive mechanism of civilian control", because "many current and emerging proliferator have either military-run governments or weak civilian-led governments in which the professional military has a strong and direct influence on policymaking."[301]

Sagan argues, that the assumption of rationality as derived from economic theory is only an assumption and not an empirically tested fact: "Political scientists often assume high degrees of rationality, not because it is accurate, but because it is helpful: it provides a relatively simple way of making predictions, by linking perceived interests with expected behavior."[302] Realists like Waltz "have confused prescriptions of what rational states *should* do with predictions of what real states *will* do."[303]

According to Sagan, there are two major impediments to pure rationality in organizational behavior: First, large organizations function within a severely bounded rationality and second, complex organizations commonly have multiple conflicting goals, and the process by which objectives are chosen and pursued is strongly political.[304] Furthermore, military leaders are more inclined to use military force than civilian leaders. This is due to several reasons, such as the self-selection into the profession, the subsequent professional socialization, and the pure and short-minded military logic they are accustomed to.[305]

He concludes that military organizations that are not subject to a checks- and balances system of strong civilian control, are inclined to deterrence failures and accidental use of nuclear weapons contrary to national interests.[306]

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[301] SAGAN, Scott D., "More Will Be Worse", in Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*: *An Enduring Debate*, 3rd ed., New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012, p. 42f.
[302] Ibid., p. 45.
[303] Ibid., p. 78.
[304] Ibid., p. 46.
[305] Ibid., p. 49f.
[306] Ibid., p. 77.

2.4 Continuation of the Debate

In further articles, Waltz and Sagan discussed the applicability of their approaches to different cases, such as the nuclear armament of India and Pakistan in the context of the Cashmere Conflict, or the (possible) nuclear armament of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran in the context of (possible) US invasion. Waltz argues that the nuclear armament of India and Pakistan has created a balance-of-power and a state of security and peace between the two countries.[307] Sagan counters that the state between India and Pakistan is neither secure nor peaceful.[308]

Waltz furthermore argues, that nuclear armament was the only option for Iraq, North Korea, and Iran to secure themselves from US invasion. While Iraq failed to achieve nuclear weapons and hence suffered its third US invasion, North Korea achieved nuclear weapons and thus impeded a US invasion. Waltz claims that, consequently, the nuclear armament of Iran would be rational in order to secure themselves from US invasion. It would furthermore stabilize the Middle-East by establishing a balance of power between Israel and the US on one side and Iran on the other side. He also claims that Iraq, North Korea, and Iran would be interested and capable in keeping their nuclear weapons safe, and that they could only use them as deterrence since any first strike would be retaliated with a second strike.[309] Sagan counters, that military organizations in Iraq, North Korea, and Iran lack a checks- and balances system of strong civilian control, which makes irrational first-strike use against the interests of civilian population probable. Furthermore, he hints at the risk of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors and nuclear terrorism.[310]

Conclusively, they also debate if nuclear zero would be the best option, whereby they focus on the role of the United States. Both refer to the 2009 Prague Speech, in which US president Obama promised, that "the United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons". Subsequently he was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize "primarily for his work on and commitment to nuclear disarmament."[311]

Waltz opposes nuclear zero, because of three reasons: first, nuclear-weapon states have no interest in giving up their nuclear weapons and therefore won't do so; second, since nuclear-weapon states won't give up their nuclear weapons, the only way for non-nuclear-weapon states threatened by nuclear-weapon states, to ensure their security is becoming a nuclear-weapon state; and third, even in the event that all nuclear-weapon states agreed on

[307] Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*: *An Enduring Debate*, 3rd ed., New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012, p. 157ff.
[308] Ibid., 138ff.
[309] Ibid., 180ff.
[310] Ibid., 200ff.
[311] Ibid., 215ff.

nuclear zero, it would be impossible to control the dismantle of *all* nuclear weapons because of the security dilemma.[312]

Waltz describes Obama's words as "rhetoric coming from the White House". He argues, that the United States show in fact no intention of dropping its nuclear forces below the second-strike level. He thereby refers to what Obama said subsequent to his promise in the 2009 Prague Speech: "Make no mistake: as long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal, to deter any adversary and guarantee that defense to our allies."[313]

Waltz argues that, on one hand, states with nuclear weapons arsenals are secure from severe attack, but, on the other hand, states without nuclear weapons arsenals are vulnerable to severe attack from states with nuclear weapon arsenals. States with nuclear weapons have never fought one another. However, violent conflicts still exist, but they take place in the "periphery of international politics". In particular, the United States has been "beating up poor and weak states". Since 1983, the US has invaded six countries, beginning and ending with Iraq:

> "Like any dominant power, the US is a looming threat in the minds of many international leaders. When President George W. Bush identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as forming an axis of evil in January of 2002, and when he then ordered the invasion of one of them, what were the other two to think? It would make sense for them to believe that they might be next, and in that case to take steps to deter the United States from invading. But how can any state hope to deter a world-dominant power? Conventional defense and deterrence strategies have historically proven ineffective against the United States, so, logically, nuclear weapons are the only weapons capable of dissuading the United States from working its will on other nations."[314]

He then asks: "If somehow world leaders blundered into an agreement to pursue nuclear zero, then what would any nuclear country with sensible leaders do?" and answers: "cheat." The ban of nuclear weapons would be impossible to police and enforce, and countries would be tempted to break rules. And because some might cheat all would have strong incentives to do so.[315] Waltz concludes:

> "With the dawn of nuclear age, peace has prevailed among those who have nuclear weapons or enjoy their protection. Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons. They are the only weapons ever invented that work decisively in effect that we should eliminate the cause of the extensive peace that the nuclear world has enjoyed" (ibid., 223).

[312] Ibid., p. 215 ff.
[313] Ibid., p. 221.
[314] Ibid.
[315] Ibid.

Sagan, on the other hand, supports nuclear zero and argues that Obama is right to declare that the United States seeks a world without nuclear weapons and take concrete steps toward that long-term goal. His argumentation is once again based on the threat of nuclear terrorism:

> "First, the most dangerous nuclear threats to the United States today and on the horizon are from terrorists and potential new nuclear powers […]. Second, the spread of nuclear weapons to new states, and indirectly to terrorist organizations, will be made less likely if the United States and other nuclear-armed nations are seen to be working in good faith toward disarmament. […]
>
> The choice we face […] is between creating a nuclear-weapons-free world or living in a world with many more nuclear-weapons states. And if there are more nuclear nations, and more atomic weapons in global arsenals, there will be more opportunities for terrorists to steal or buy the bomb."[316]

He admits that the realization of nuclear zero cannot be guaranteed by verification measures. However, this uncertainty would not impede nuclear zero, if states would retain the option to rearm. If one state would secretly rearm, than it would have to be aware that other states could also rearm. There would still be a latent form of nuclear deterrence even in a nuclear-free world. States could furthermore protect themselves from possible secret nuclear attacks by employing ballistic missile defenses.[317] Sagan concludes:

> "In medieval times, European mapmakers placed the words *hic sunt dracones* (here be dragons) at the edge of the known world. Disarmament critics today are like those medieval mapmakers, fearing that we are entering unknown territory fraught with hidden nuclear monsters. But these dragons are fantasies. The genuine strategic challenges we face in creating a secure nuclear-free world—adequate verification, enforcement of violations and mutual-defense deployments—are challenges that can be met over time. And the world we are heading toward if we fail to find safe paths to mutual and verifiable disarmament—a world crowded with nuclear-weapons states and terrorist temptations—is even more fraught with danger."[318]

[316] Ibid., p. 216.
[317] Ibid., p. 218.
[318] Ibid., p. 219.

3. The Global Governance Problématique according to Weiss and Thakur

3.1 The Five Global Governance Gaps

In 2010, the international scholars, Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur published the book *Global governance and the UN*, in which they analyzed the achievements and challenges of such. They introduce their approach by portraying the *Problématique of Global Governance*. First they observe, that even though there is no world government, the world is characterized by a vast amount of functioning cross-border interactions. Indeed, disruptions and threats are rare and in many instances less frequent in the international domain than in many sovereign countries that should have effective functioning governments: "That is to say, international transactions are typically characterized by order, stability, and predictability."[319] The question, which derives from this observation is: How is the world governed even in the absence of a world government? The answer, Weiss and Thakur argue, lies in the concept of global governance. Global governance is defined as "the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations among citizens, society, markets, and the state in the international arena – the wielders and objects of international public power."[320] The limits of global governance, which they call the "refrain" of their book are described as follows:

> "The role of global governance institutions is restricted to containing the contagion. […] Global governance can play a facilitative and constraining role, but it rarely plays a determinant and predominant role. The authority and capacity for the latter is vested almost exclusively in domestic public authorities."[321]

Furthermore, the evolution of intergovernmental institutions to facilitate international responses lags behind the emergence of collective problems with trans-border, especially global dimensions.[322]

The major global governance institution is the United Nations. Thereby, they distinct between three United Nations: the *first United Nations* consists of the intergovernmental arena of the UN, where the 193 member states discuss issues and make recommendations and decisions; the *second United Nations* consists of the UN machinery itself, that is the bodies and staff members in the UN system, mainly the secretariat, which can be considered

[319] WEISS, Thomas G. and Ramesh Thakur, *Global governance and the UN*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010, p. 1.
[320] Ibid., p. 6.
[321] Ibid., p. 2
[322] Ibid., p. 3

as the international civil service; the *third United Nations* consist of non-state actors, such as market institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, academics or the civil society in general, which influence UN policies.[323]

The deficits of global governance, in particular of the United Nations, can be explained by five gaps: knowledge gaps, normative gaps, policy gaps, institutional gaps, and compliance gaps. The first gap is the *knowledge gap*: "Often little or no consensus exists about the nature, causes, gravity, and magnitude of a problem, either about empirical information or theoretical explanations. And there is often disagreement over the best remedies and solutions to these problems."[324]

Two examples for knowledge gaps are global warming and nuclear weapons. Neither of which was known when the UN Charter was signed and possible threats deriving from them as well as potential strategies to counter possible threats are highly disputed. Furthermore, policy issues are often framed by ideological positions. On one hand, the UN is an important actor to fill knowledge gaps and overcome ideological positions. On the other hand, it is questionable, if ideological positions can be overcome by filling knowledge gaps: "How useful are additional empirical data and theoretical explanations in the face of dominant world views or entrenched ideologies? Can new information and experiences guide policymakers, or are they largely irrelevant?"[325]

The second gap is the *normative gap*, whereby 'norm' is defined in an ethical sense as a "pattern of behavior that should be follows in accordance with a given value system – the moral code of a society, a generally accepted standard of proper behavior."[326] Weiss et al. argue, that reaching consensus about universally acceptable norms is enormously difficult. One example for filling a normative gap was the creation of the universal human rights, which was a long and complex process. The UN assumes an ambiguous role in filling normative gaps:

> "As a universal organizations, the UN is an exceptional forum for seeking normative consensus on how best to deal with global problems […]. At the same time, the UN is a maddening forum because dissent by powerful states or mischief by large coalitions of less powerful states means either that no action occurs or that agreement is possible only on a lowest common denominator."[327]

[323] Ibid., p. 7.
[324] Ibid., p. 8.
[325] Ibid., p. 9.
[326] Ibid., p. 10.
[327] Ibid., p. 11.

The third gap is the *policy gap*, whereby 'policy' is defined as "an interlinked set of governing principles and goals and the agreed programmes of action to implement those principles and achieve those goals."[328] Such policies are for example the Kyoto Protocol, which is to combat global warming, and the NPT, which is to combat the threat of nuclear weapons. Global governance highly depends on who the relevant policy makers are: national authorities or international organizations? National authorities usually apply a boundary-based separation between domestic and foreign policies and seek to mediate the two fields. This is not the idea of global governance, since the whole globe is supposed to be their stage. However, the two UN policy making organs, the Security Council and the General Assembly, operate as intergovernmental forums, and therefore are directly steered by national authorities: "While the source and scale of most of today's pressing challenges are global and any effective solution must also be global, the policy authority for tackling them remains vested in states."[329]

The forth gap is the *institutional gap*, whereby the 'institution' is used in two senses: as "formal organizational entities" as well as "regimes – recurring and stable patterns of behavior around which expectations converge".[330] Weiss and Thakur argue that if "policy is to escape the trap of being ad hoc, episodic, judgmental, and idiosyncratic, it must be housed within an institution that has resources and autonomy."[331] Institutional gaps can refer to the fact that there is no global institution, which may address certain policy problems, or that there is a global institution, which may address certain policy problems, but lacks the support of key states. For example, before the International Criminal Court (ICC) came into force, there was no permanent institution to counter international crimes, which could only be judged on an ad hoc basis. However, when the ICC came into force in 2002, the US, Russia, and China, denied its recognition and decreased its authority severely. The institutional gap is striking within the UN system because no powerful global institutions with overarching authority and resources exist. Even the most powerful international institutions, such as the Security Council, often lack appropriate resources or authority or both.[332]

[328] Ibid., p. 12.
[329] Ibid., p. 15.
[330] Ibid., p. 17.
[331] Ibid., p. 15.
[332] Ibid., p. 15

The fifth and final gap is the *compliance gap*:

> "Compliance measures must include mechanisms to identify defections and defectors from agreed-upon norms and commitments in the realm of international governance as well as incentives that reward the cooperation and disincentives that punish defection (including the use of force to bring those who have not complied back into line)."[333]

Compliance consists of three steps: implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. However, the question is, who has the authority, responsibility, and capacity to monitor and enforce commitments that have been made and obligations that have been accepted? For example, how can the compliance of international treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the NPT be ensured? The only global institution that can legitimately enforce the compliance of international obligations is the Security Council. All other actors, such as member states, other UN bodies, and non-state actors, are restricted to calling attention to noncompliance and push to compliance by non-forcible means. The most relevant and typical examples of compliance gaps are in the area of international peace and security. For example, even though Article 47 of the UN Charter calls for standing UN military forces, no such exists. If the Security Council decides to enforce the compliance of international obligations by forcible means it has to "beg and borrow troops" in order to execute its decision.[334]

3.2 Application of the Global Governance Gaps to the Nuclear Weapons Regime

Knowledge Gaps

There is broad agreement about the danger and destructiveness of nuclear weapons. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as well as the numerous nuclear weapons tests have provided the international community with sufficient empirical evidence. However, there is broad disagreement about the best policy strategies to counter the existence of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the two most radical opinions, as described in Chapter 2.3.2, are completely opposite. The so called 'nuclear pessimists', such as Scott D. Sagan, call for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They consider nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace and security and fear a nuclear strike, which in the worst-case could lead to a nuclear world war. Therefore, global governance has to adopt measures to enforce complete nuclear disarmament and prevent nuclear proliferation. The so-called 'nuclear optimists', such as Kenneth N. Waltz, however, call for the maintenance and possible gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons. They consider nuclear weapons as a chance for international peace and

[333] Ibid., p. 20.
[334] Ibid., p. 20f.

security and claim that nuclear weapons are not employed to be used, but only to deter. They do not cause nuclear wars but prevent conventional wars. Therefore, global governance should not seek nuclear disarmament, nor horizontal non-proliferation in any case. Besides those two extremes, there are opinions which defend the *status quo*. They tolerate the present nuclear-weapon states, but do not tolerate further horizontal proliferation.

Furthermore, the global governance of nuclear weapons is framed by ideological positions. Nuclear pessimists identify nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as a necessary step towards the ideal state of peace and pacifism. Nuclear optimists, however, perceive nuclear weapons as a necessary evil in a realist state of anarchy and insecurity. Nuclear weapons are often justified by the need and right to self-defense against external threats such as enemy states and terrorists.

The UN is an important actor to fill knowledge gaps and overcome ideological positions in terms of nuclear weapons. Its various disarmament bodies, in particular the UN Institution for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), whose mission is to "assist the international community in finding and implementing solutions to disarmament and security challenges",[335] generate a considerable amount of empirical data and theoretical explanations to facilitate nuclear disarmament. However, it is questionable, if filling the knowledge gaps helps overcoming ideological positions: How useful are empirical data and theoretical explanations, if the five permanent members of the Security Council stick on their nuclear weapons arsenal in terms of self-defense?

Normative Gaps

There is no international treaty that condemns the existence of nuclear weapons. One of the most powerful norms since 1945, however, has been the taboo against their use. Indeed, since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, nuclear weapons have never been used again. Weiss and Thakur argue that:

> "Norms, not deterrence, have anathematized the use of nuclear weapons as unacceptable, immoral, and possibly illegal – even for states that have assimilated such weapons into military arsenals and integrated them into military commands and doctrines."[336]

There is not only a taboo on warfare use, but also on nuclear weapon tests. However, history shows that it was a long process to impose the taboo of nuclear weapon tests. Since 1958,

[335] UNIDIR [ed.], "The Institute", *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*, 2014, available at: <http://www.unidir.org/about/the-institute>.
[336] WEISS, Thomas G. and Ramesh Thakur, op. cit., note 319, p. 101.

the GA has been demanding the complete suspension of nuclear weapon tests and the negotiation of a treaty insuring such suspension. Even though today, more than 50 years later, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has still not come into force, the norm indeed has, and since 1996 the only country who has carried out nuclear weapons tests, North Korea, has been condemned by the international community for doing so. Weiss and Thakur emphasize the role of the UN in the norm generating process as follows:

> "The unique legitimacy of the United Nations, especially of the General Assembly, is the chief explanation for why so many declarations and resolutions were first adopted in the UN before producing conventions and treaties in the UN and elsewhere; this is an example of norms followed by laws. Even treaties that are negotiated outside UN forums are often submitted to the UN machinery for formal endorsement. This process has no bearing on the legal standing of a treaty but substantially enhances its moral weight."[337]

However, the General Assembly's norm generation efforts also demonstrate the limits of such. The GA has been adopting scores of resolutions referring to the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, which received a large majority among UN members, and therefore could be considered as a broadly accepted norm among the international community. However, this norm has neither achieved resonance in the Security Council nor in the International Court of Justice.

Policy Gaps

Even though there are plenty of international treaties concerning nuclear weapons, such as the NPT, NWFZs, the CTBT and bilateral arms reduction treaties between Russia and the USA, there is no treaty on the prohibiting nuclear weapons such as on biological or chemical weapons, which can be referred to as a policy gap.

Weiss and Thakur argue that global governance is more likely to happen, if the relevant policy makers are international organizations instead of national authorities. The relevant policy makers of the global governance of nuclear weapons, however, are primarily national authorities, which apply a boundary-based separation between domestic and foreign policies, whereby national interests are likely to come before international (or global) interests. If national authorities of nuclear-weapon states opt for nuclear disarmament they run the risk of decreasing their national security and their international power. They therefore would have to make a national sacrifice to support an international goal, which is difficult to defend

[337] Ibid., p. 102.

at the domestic level, in particular when the opposition can use strategies of insecurity, such as threats of "enemy states" or terrorists, to politicize society.

Both the General Assembly and the Security Council operate as intergovernmental instruments. It is not surprising that all nuclear-weapon states and partially their allies disable the elimination of the nuclear weapons regime. Even though, a broad majority of the international community supports the elimination of the nuclear weapons regime, they have neither the capability nor the authority to fill the policy gap. On the contrary, the fact that all permanent members of the Security Council are nuclear-weapon states reinforces the policy gap: The veto of only one of these states would suffice to block a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, even if all other 192 UN member states supporteded it.

Institutional Gaps

As described in Chapter 1.2.1, the UN has established several institutions, which deal with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee), the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR), and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the only institution that – besides the Security Council – has decisive competence is the Conference on Disarmament, which formally does not form part of the UN system: "The CD is in the paradoxical position of being the UN's sole disarmament legislative forum while not being a true UN body."[338]

The CD – as well as the Security Council – operates as an intergovernmental forum, which leads to a policy gap again. Since the CD conducts its works by consensus, any of the 65 member states can block any policy proposal. Since all of the nine nuclear-weapon states form part of the CD, only little progress towards nuclear non-proliferation or disarmament has been made. Even though the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was negotiated by the CD, it had to be past to the General Assembly because of India's rejection. Since then, the CD has been unable to even start negotiations on certain issues, such as a ban on fissile materials.

Weiss and Thakur claim that there is a "widespread sense that the UN has become dysfunctional and moribund as a forum for negotiating arms control and disarmament treaties" and hint to Kofi Annan citing, in which he said that the CD "faces a crisis of relevance

[338] Ibid., p. 112.

resulting in part from dysfunctional decision-making procedures and the paralysis that accompanies them."[339]

Compliance Gaps

In accordance with the security dilemmas described in Chapter 3.1, the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament faces various compliance gaps, which negatively affect already existing treaties as well as possible future treaties:

> "Nuclear arms control faces a four-part crisis: some NPT states are engaged in undeclared nuclear activities, other states have failed to honor their disarmament obligations, some states are not party to the NPT, and some nonstate actors seek to acquire nuclear weapons."[340]

The international community has established compliance measures, such as the safeguards system under the NPT, which provide mechanisms to identify defections and defectors of the NPT. However, these measures are connected to three compliance gaps: first, they are only valid for states who have agreed to them (*implementation gap*); second, they proved to be insufficient even in cases where states have agreed to them (*monitoring gap*); and third, the consequences in case of non-compliance are unclear (*enforcement gap*).

The fact, that in spite of the NPT, four more states came into possession of nuclear weapons and several others attempted to do so, emphasizes the several compliance gaps enabling them to do so. In the case of India, Israel and Pakistan, compliance of the NPT could not be assured because they had not ratified the NPT. There was no legal base to implement any measures preventing nuclear proliferation (*implementation gap*). In other states, such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria, clandestine nuclear weapons programmes were established even though they had ratified the NPT. The IAEA thus failed to detect these programs (*monitoring gap*).

Improved monitoring measures require increased authority of the IAEA as provided in the Additional Protocol and increased resources of the IAEA (budget, staff, technology, etc.). However, both the adoption of the Additional Protocol as well as the increase of IAEA funding depend on the member states of the NPT and the IAEA.

[339] Ibid., p. 113.
[340] Ibid., p. 119.

CONCLUSION

Nuclear weapons have spread slowly but surely. One new state has come into the possession of nuclear weapons approximately every five years since the Second World War. Today, nine states – the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea – are in possession of atomic bombs and thus make part of the 'nuclear club'. It is assumed that all of them but Pakistan and North Korea are also in possession of hydrogen bombs. Five more states – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey – are provided with US atomic bombs as part of NATO's nuclear weapons sharing. In total, about 30 countries have sought nuclear weapons, but voluntarily or forcibly decided to stop them.

It can be observed that the (attempted) proliferation of nuclear weapons occurs in the contexts of international conflicts such as World War II, the Cold War, the Sino-Indian Conflict, the Middle East Conflict(s), the Gulf War(s) and, most recently, the US 'War' against terrorists and 'rogue states'. Moreover it can be determined that the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons is very rare. So far, South Africa has been the only state that developed nuclear weapons and subsequently dismantled its programme. There are little prospects that other states will follow this unique example.

Contemporarily, three more tendencies of nuclear proliferation can be observed: first, nuclear-weapon states seek to impede the rise of further nuclear-weapon states, but adhere to their own nuclear weapons arsenals; second, some non-nuclear-weapon states are suspected to seek nuclear weapons, but seem unable to achieve them due to capability gaps or international pressure; and third, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors, particularly terrorists, is seen as a looming threat to international security.

The global debate about nuclear weapons is practically as old as nuclear weapons themselves. On one hand, there have been gradual achievements concerning the global governance of nuclear weapons: the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have considerably contributed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral test ban and disarmament agreements have decreased the number of nuclear tests to almost zero and the number of warheads from 64,500 to 16,000 warheads since 1986. On the other hand, global governance failed to achieve comprehensive nuclear disarmament. There are still enough nuclear weapons in existence to blow up the entire surface of the earth.

Looking at the history of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, it can be concluded that global governance has created instruments that, in general, significantly helped the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, but

neither achieved to prevent the creation of new nuclear powers, nor to establish concrete steps towards complete nuclear disarmament.

The present is furthermore marked by a stagnation of nuclear disarmament efforts. The aim of reaching global zero has been mainly replaced by the aim of maintaining the *status quo*. Since the beginning of the 21st century, powerful steps were taken to impede further horizontal proliferation, but few steps were taken to impede vertical proliferation or promote further nuclear disarmament.

The United Nations, which came into existence at the very same time nuclear weapons did, have played a key role in the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament ever since. The very first resolution of the General Assembly, resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946, demanded the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Since then, the General Assembly has created several disarmament bodies, held three special sessions on disarmament, and adopted hundreds of comprehensive resolutions in order to achieve global zero. The Security Council, in contrast, has only adopted a few selective resolutions in order to prevent further states from becoming nuclear powers and thus maintain the *status quo*.

The General Assembly, however, has no enforcement power. It is only able to make non-binding recommendations to the members of the UN or to the Security Council. Yet, resolutions against the nuclear weapons regime are precisely addressed to the nuclear-weapon states, who oppose them and deny to implement them voluntarily. The same occurs with the Security Council: since all of its five permanent members are nuclear-weapon states, they can easily prevent the adoption of any resolution and their forcible implementation by their right to veto. Therefore, many of the General Assembly's resolutions, even if adopted by large majorities and reiterated scores of times, are not being enforced. We can therefore conclude that the two main organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the Security Council, assume two contradictory positions: The General Assembly has the political will, but not the legal competence to enforce measures in order to realize global zero. The Security Council, in contrast, does have the legal competence to enforce measures in order to realize global zero, but not the political will to do so.

In spite of the fact that the General Assembly has no enforcement power, it has significantly contributed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by establishing an intergovernmental discussion platform which has been constantly pushed by UN disarmament bodies. The creation of important international institutions and treaties in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, such as the IAEA and the NPT, were strongly influenced by General Assembly efforts.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 are considered as the most important achievements of the global governance towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. However, they are criticized for various reasons: First, the dual system of supporting nuclear energy for civil use on the one hand and preventing its military use on the other hand is suspected of leading to further horizontal proliferation. It is assumed that some nuclear weapons programmes, for example the North Korean one, originated from IAEA-based support of nuclear technology for civil use. Second, the IAEA Statute as well as the NPT and the safeguard system under the NPT are voluntary state commitments and therefore lack universality. North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel, for example, are the only UN member states, which do not form part of the NPT. Furthermore, both the IAEA and the NPT offer the possibility to withdraw. Third, the IAEA is subject to legal and technical restrictions. Legal gaps that derived from the initial Safeguards Agreement were filled by the Additional Protocol in order to ensure not only of the correctness of state declarations but also the completeness. However, 60 non-nuclear-weapon states which form part of the NPT have not ratified the Additional Protocol and twelve of these have not even ratified the initial Safeguards Agreement. Challenges ensuring member states compliance of the NPT result furthermore from technical gaps due to financial, instrumental and personnel deficiencies. Fourth, another aspect of criticism refers to the NPT, which divides the international community in official nuclear-weapon states, non-official nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. It is argued that the NPT has discriminatorily legitimized the official nuclear-weapon states and de-legitimized all other (future) nuclear-weapon states. The official nuclear-weapon states are furthermore accused of undermining Article V of the NPT, which urges all states to pursue negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. And fifth, the IAEA is suspected of being subject to political influences and dependencies, for example in connection with the USA, who is the largest contributor of the IAEA.

In 1994, the General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, hoping that International Law would enforce, what International Politics failed to do. In 1996, the Court constituted that there exists neither customary nor conventional international law which specifically authorized or prohibited the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to Article 2 paragraph 4 (prohibition of the use of force) and fail the requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter (inherent right of self-defense) in terms of

necessity and proportionality. The threat or use of nuclear weapons would furthermore violate international law applicable in armed conflicts, particularly international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, the Court could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake. It thus left a loophole, which failed to counteract the nuclear weapons regime. The Court qualified this statement by adding that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. If the nuclear-weapon states fulfill this obligation remains to be seen.

Game theoretical approaches explain the discrepancy between the ideal state (global zero) and the real state (ongoing horizontal proliferation and lack of comprehensive disarmament) by the security dilemma. They argue that *collectively*, it would be most beneficial for the international community to completely disarm all nuclear weapons, so that all states would be secure of nuclear attacks. However, even if all states would agree on complete nuclear disarmament, they could not ensure that all states complied with their commitments. Therefore, *individually*, states rather choose to adhere to their nuclear weapons arsenals or create such, than running the risk of being subject to possible nuclear threat.

Kenneth N. Waltz argues that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons has contributed to international peace and security in the past and is likely to do so in the future. His thesis is mainly based on the observation that since the end of the Second World War and the rise of the nuclear weapons regime, there has been no general war among the major states of the world. Waltz emphasizes that states coexist in an anarchic system, in which self-help is the principle of action. The most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security. If a state has nuclear weapons or enjoys their protection then it will not be subject to a war in which its vital interests are at stake. Waltz also addresses the fear of irresponsible use und incapacity of self-control of nascent nuclear-weapon states and the fear of nuclear proliferation amongst non-state actors, but rejects them as 'unrounded'. New nuclear-weapon states as rational actors will be as concerned as the old ones, or even more concerned. He furthermore argues that the nuclear weapons regime has created a global hegemony of nuclear-weapon states, and that the proliferation to further states such as Iran would equilibrate the international system.

The antipode of Kenneth N. Waltz, Scott D. Sagan, sharply criticizes Waltz' ideas. His organizational approach is mainly based on the assumption that military organizations, un-

less professionally managed through a checks- and balances system of strong civilian control, are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirement for stable nuclear deterrence and that there are strong reasons to believe that nascent nuclear powers will not fulfill these requirements. He argues that Waltz' thesis is based on the assumption that states always act rationally, which has not always been the case. He therefore considers the fear of irresponsible use und incapacity of self-control of further nuclear-weapon states and the nuclear proliferation amongst non-state actors as justified. He concludes that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons constitute a threat to international peace and security and must be prevented.

Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur analyze the limits of global governance. They claim that the role of global governance institutions is restricted to "containing the contagion". Global governance rather plays a facilitative and constraining role. National public authorities remain those who play the determinant and predominant role.

The major global governance institution is the United Nations. Thereby, they distinct between three United Nations: the *first United Nations* consists of the intergovernmental arena of the UN, where the 193 member states discuss issues and make recommendations and decisions; the *second United Nations* consists of the UN machinery, that is the bodies and staff members in the UN system, mainly the secretariat, which can be considered as the international civil service; the *third United Nations* consists of *non-state actors*, such as market institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, academics, or the civil society in general, which influence UN policies.

The deficits of global governance, in particular of the United Nations, can in general be explained by *knowledge gaps*, *normative gaps*, *policy gaps*, *institutional gaps*, and *compliance gaps*. The global governance of nuclear weapons is subject to all of these gaps, but especially to the latter three, which severely impede the progress of nuclear disarmament. The UN plays an important role in filling these gaps, but – at the end – national authorities are those who make the decisions. National authorities, however, are likely to prefer national interests before international/global interests – in the field of security more than in any other field. This is in particular the case of nuclear disarmament: If national authorities of nuclear-weapon states opt for nuclear disarmament they run the risk of decreasing their national security and their international power (undesired national outcome). Therefore, they reject comprehensive nuclear disarmament (desired global outcome).

The bias between global governance on the one hand and state politics on the other hand forms the ever-repeating dilemma not only in terms of nuclear weapons but in terms of countless controversial patterns in the international system.

The analysis has shown that the question – *Why has it not yet been possible to bring the nuclear weapons regime to an end and why are prospects about a nuclear weapon free future so bleak?* – has many answers. Nonetheless, the three main causes identified in this thesis are: (1) lack of political will of NWS, (2) lack of unequivocal international legislation and jurisprudence, and (3) lack of comprehensive control of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

In the beginning, I linked this question to the concepts of idealism and realism. We may now be able to conclude, if the existence of nuclear weapons and its implications support either the idealist or the realist perspective on the international system. On the one hand, we could see the international system as an anarchic system uncontrolled by external law, in which states are permanently threatened by war. On the other hand, we could see the international system as an international federation of states that are subject to international law, which establishes peace and security.

In terms of nuclear weapons, the international system neither matches with the first nor with the second scenario, but something in-between. There is international law that severely restricts the nuclear weapons regime and seeks for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. However, it has not been comprehensively and effectively applied yet.

Hobbes and Montesquieu are considered as two of the most important precursors of democratic and constitutional states. Their idealist concepts of national peace and security may have seem unrealistic at the time they lived, but eventually became reality. It was a long and painful road until the first democratic and constitutional states evolved and many states – if not most – have not reached the end of the road yet. Kant is considered as an important precursor of international law and global governance. His idealist concept of international peace and security may seem unrealistic at the moment, but might become reality in the future. Therefore, Schmitt is wrong when he depreciates Kant's ideas and those of Kelsen as "fictions" and sticks to the reality. He thereby neglects human progress. The human history has even shown a continuous "process of humanity combining into ever larger and more stable units for the purpose of governance – first the family, then the tribe, then the city-state, and then the nation – a process which presumably would eventually culminate in the entire world being combined in one political unit."[341]

[341] WEISS, Thomas G. and Ramesh Thakur, *Global governance and the UN*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010, p. 32.

The current nuclear weapons regime challenges the international community. It harshly contradicts the ideal of permanent international peace and security, as well as basic principles of international law such as universality, equality and nondiscrimination. A world without nuclear weapons may seem illusionary at the moment. However, that does not mean, that we have to adjust ourselves to the 'cruel' reality, but it gives us the chance to change the present and seek a better future.

What can be done to improve the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament? The 1999 Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament urged for a Security Council reform, new normative principles, operational arrangements, finance compliance and new sources of financing, to deal effectively with international security problems in the 21st century.[342] Indeed, abolishing the right to veto of the permanent members of the Security Council or giving the General Assembly the power to enforce its solution, would – in theory – facilitate and accelerate nuclear disarmament. Therefore, this could be considered as the ideal solution. However, – in practice – such reformation would not work. Adopting nuclear disarmament policies without the agreement of the nuclear powers, in particular the permanent members of the Security Council, would lead to nothing, but incompliance.

Solution must therefore be adjusted to the fact that nuclear powers have a privileged role in the international system, or to say it in Orwell's words: *All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others*. Consequently, there is no way to force nuclear powers to disarm. They have to voluntarily agree to nuclear disarmament. So, how do we make nuclear powers voluntarily agree to nuclear disarmament?

The *first United Nations*, which consists of the 193 member states, has to further promote nuclear disarmament and keep calling the threat of nuclear weapons – a threat that has been rather pushed into the background during the last years – back into the consciousness of state authorities and civil society. The *second United Nations*, which consists of the UN bodies and staff members in the UN system, has to push nuclear-weapon states to further negotiate nuclear disarmament agreements. The International Court of Justice has hereby the important task to ensure that the "obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" is being fulfilled by nuclear weapons. Both, the *second United Nations* and the *third United Nations*, which consist of non-state actors, such as NGO's, think tanks,

[342] Cited in ibid., p. 102

academics, or the civil society in general, play an important role in terms of information and education towards state authorities and civil society. They have to lobby nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on national and international level and pressure decision makers. All these efforts have to be accompanied by further development of an effective international security system that has the competency and capability to universally supervise nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and counteract the security dilemma.

Next year marks the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which will coincide with the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. This occasion will offer an important opportunity to advance the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

"We believe that political scientists should try to help improve government policy. We study international politics because we believe it matters and that it influences all of our lives. We also write about international politics because we believe that strong scholarship can influence policymaking by challenging underlying beliefs, discovering and interpreting new evidence, and providing new ideas and arguments" (Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz).[343]

[343] SAGAN, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*: *An Enduring Debate*, 3rd ed., New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012, p. xi.

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APPENDIX

Table 1: GA Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (1945-2013)

Symbol	Title	Date	Voting Summary[344]
A/RES/1(I)	Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy	24.01.1946	Y: 47, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 4, TVM: 51
A/RES/191(III)	Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission	04.11.1948	Y: 40, N: 6, A: 4, NV: 7, TVM: 58
A/RES/192(III)	Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council	19.11.1948	Y: 43, N: 6, A: 1, NV: 8, TVM: 58
A/RES/299(IV)	International Control of Atomic Energy	23.11.1949	Y: 49, N: 5, A: 3, NV: 2, TVM: 59
A/RES/496(V)	International control of atomic energy	13.12.1950	Y: 47, N: 5, A: 3, NV: 5, TVM: 60
A/RES/502(VI)	Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; international control of atomic energy	11.01.1952	Y: 42, N: 5, A: 7, NV: 6, TVM: 60
A/RES/808(IX)[A]	Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments : report of the Disarmament Commission; Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction	04.11.1954	Y: 57, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 2, TVM: 60
A/RES/808(IX)[B]	Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments : report of the Disarmament Commission; Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction	04.11.1954	adopted without vote
A/RES/808(IX)[C]	Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments : report of the Disarmament Commission; Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction	04.11.1954	Y: 56, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 2, TVM: 60
A/RES/810(IX)[A]	Concerning an international atomic agency	04.12.1954	adopted without vote
A/RES/810(IX)[B]	Concerning the international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy	04.12.1954	adopted without vote
A/RES/913(X)	Effects of atomic radiation	03.12.1955	adopted without vote
A/RES/912(X)	Peaceful uses of atomic energy	03.12.1955	adopted without vote
A/RES/914(X)	Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction	16.12.1955	Y: 56, N: 7, A: 0, NV: 13, TVM: 76
A/RES/1115(XI)	Authorization for the Advisory Committee established by General Assembly resolution 810 (IX) to negotiate on behalf of the United Nations an agreement to establish relations between the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency	11.01.1957	adopted without vote
A/RES/1011(XI)	Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction	14.02.1957	adopted without vote
A/RES/1145(XII)	Agreement governing the relationship between the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency	14.11.1957	adopted without vote
A/RES/1146(XII)	Authorization to the International Atomic Energy Agency to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice	14.11.1957	adopted without vote
A/RES/1149(XII)	Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons	14.11.1957	Y: 71, N: 9, A: 1, NV: 1, TVM: 82
A/RES/1147(XII)	Effects of atomic radiation	14.11.1957	adopted without vote
A/RES/1148(XII)	Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction	14.11.1957	Y: 56, N: 9, A: 15, NV: 2, TVM: 82
A/RES/1242(XIII)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	30.10.1958	adopted without vote
A/RES/1252(XIII)[D]	Question of disarmament; the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests; the reduction of the military budgets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries	04.11.1958	Y: 75, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 3, TVM: 81
A/RES/1252(XIII)[B]	Question of disarmament; the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests; the reduction of the military budgets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries	04.11.1958	Y: 55, N: 9, A: 12, NV: 5, TVM: 81
A/RES/1252(XIII)[C]	Question of disarmament; the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests; the reduction of the military budgets of the Union of Soviet Socialist	04.11.1958	Y: 75, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 4, TVM: 81

[344] Y=Yes; N=No; A= Abstentions; NV=Non-Voting; Total Voting Membership.

	Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries		
A/RES/1252(XIII)[A]	Question of disarmament; the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests; the reduction of the military budgets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries	04.11.1958	Y: 49, N: 9, A: 22, NV: 1, TVM: 81
A/RES/1347(XIII)	Effects of atomic radiation	13.12.1958	adopted without vote
A/RES/1344(XIII)	Report of the Secretary-General on the 2nd United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	13.12.1958	Y: 77, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 5, TVM: 82
A/RES/1355(XIV)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	03.11.1959	adopted without vote
A/RES/1376(XIV)	Progress report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation	17.11.1959	Y: 78, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 4, TVM: 82
A/RES/1380(XIV)	Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	20.11.1959	Y: 68, N: 0, A: 12, NV: 2, TVM: 82
A/RES/1379(XIV)	Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara	20.11.1959	Y: 51, N: 16, A: 15, NV: 0, TVM: 82
A/RES/1402(XIV)[A]	Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	21.11.1959	Y: 78, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 2, TVM: 82
A/RES/1402(XIV)[B]	Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	21.11.1959	Y: 60, N: 1, A: 20, NV: 1, TVM: 82
A/RES/1503(XV)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	12.12.1960	adopted without vote
A/RES/1531(XV)	Possibilities of increasing voluntary contributions to the Operational Fund of the International Atomic Energy Agency	15.12.1960	Y: 84, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 15, TVM: 99
A/RES/1576(XV)	Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	20.12.1960	Y: 68, N: 0, A: 26, NV: 5, TVM: 99
A/RES/1574(XV)	Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation	20.12.1960	adopted without vote
A/RES/1577(XV)	Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	20.12.1960	Y: 88, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 6, TVM: 99
A/RES/1578(XV)	Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	20.12.1960	Y: 83, N: 0, A: 11, NV: 5, TVM: 99
A/RES/1617(XV)	Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfillment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959	21.04.1961	adopted without vote
A/RES/1632(XVI)	Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal; The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control	27.10.1961	Y: 87, N: 11, A: 1, NV: 4, TVM: 103
A/RES/1629(XVI)	Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation	27.10.1961	Y: 74, N: 0, A: 17, NV: 9, TVM: 100
A/RES/1648(XVI)	Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain their renewal	06.11.1961	Y: 71, N: 20, A: 8, NV: 4, TVM: 103
A/RES/1649(XVI)	The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control	08.11.1961	Y: 71, N: 11, A: 15, NV: 6, TVM: 103
A/RES/1651(XVI)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	23.11.1961	adopted without vote
A/RES/1652(XVI)	Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone	24.11.1961	Y: 55, N: 0, A: 44, NV: 4, TVM: 103
A/RES/1653(XVI)	Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons	24.11.1961	Y: 55, N: 20, A: 26, NV: 2, TVM: 103
A/RES/1665(XVI)	Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	04.12.1961	adopted without vote
A/RES/1762(XVII)	The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	06.11.1962	Y: 51, N: 10, A: 40, NV: 9, TVM: 110
A/RES/1764(XVII)	Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation	20.11.1962	Y: 86, N: 0, A: 11, NV: 13, TVM: 110
A/RES/1769(XVII)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	29.11.1962	adopted without vote
A/RES/1770(XVII)	Third International Conference on the Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy	29.11.1962	Y: 85, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 25, TVM: 110
A/RES/1801(XVII)	Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons	14.12.1962	Y: 33, N: 0, A: 25, NV: 52, TVM: 110
A/RES/1886(XVIII)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	18.10.1963	adopted without vote
A/RES/1896(XVIII)	Effects of atomic radiation	11.11.1963	adopted without vote
A/RES/1909(XVIII)	Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons	27.11.1963	Y: 64, N: 18, A: 25, NV: 4, TVM: 111
A/RES/1910(XVIII)	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	27.11.1963	Y: 104, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 3, TVM: 111
A/RES/2026(XX)	Reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency	18.11.1965	adopted without vote
A/RES/2028(XX)	Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	19.11.1965	Y: 93, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 19, TVM: 117
A/RES/2032(XX)	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	03.12.1965	Y: 92, N: 1, A: 14, NV: 10, TVM: 117
A/RES/2056(XX)	Third international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	16.12.1965	Y: 79, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 38, TVM: 117
A/RES/2078(XX)	Effects of atomic radiation	18.12.1965	adopted without vote

A/RES/2098(XX)	General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system	20.12.1965	adopted without vote
A/RES/2149(XXI)	Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	04.11.1966	Y: 110, N: 1, A: 1, NV: 9, TVM: 121
A/RES/2153(XXI)[B]	Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	17.11.1966	Y: 48, N: 1, A: 59, NV: 14, TVM: 122
A/RES/2153(XXI)[A]	Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	17.11.1966	Y: 97, N: 2, A: 3, NV: 19, TVM: 121
A/RES/2156(XXI)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	22.11.1966	adopted without vote
A/RES/2164(XXI)	Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons	05.12.1966	Y: 80, N: 0, A: 23, NV: 18, TVM: 121
A/RES/2163(XXI)	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	05.12.1966	Y: 100, N: 1, A: 2, NV: 18, TVM: 121
A/RES/2188(XXI)	General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system	13.12.1966	Y: 98, N: 1, A: 6, NV: 17, TVM: 122
A/RES/2213(XXI)	Effects of atomic radiation	17.12.1966	adopted without vote
A/RES/2258(XXII)	Effects of atomic radiation	25.10.1967	adopted without vote
A/RES/2284(XXII)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	05.12.1967	adopted without vote
A/RES/2286(XXII)	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America	05.12.1967	Y: 82, N: 0, A: 28, NV: 12, TVM: 122
A/RES/2289(XXII)	Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	08.12.1967	Y: 77, N: 0, A: 29, NV: 16, TVM: 122
A/RES/2309(XXII)	Question of holding a 4th international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy	13.12.1967	Y: 86, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 32, TVM: 122
A/RES/2346(XXII)[B]	Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	19.12.1967	Y: 110, N: 0, A: 8, NV: 5, TVM: 123
A/RES/2346(XXII)[A]	Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	19.12.1967	Y: 112, N: 1, A: 4, NV: 6, TVM: 123
A/RES/2343(XXII)	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	19.12.1967	Y: 103, N: 1, A: 7, NV: 12, TVM: 123
A/RES/2373(XXII)	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	12.06.1968	Y: 95, N: 4, A: 21, NV: 4, TVM: 124
A/RES/2382(XXIII)	Effects of atomic radiation	01.11.1968	adopted without vote
A/RES/2406(XXIII)	Fourth international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	16.12.1968	adopted without vote
A/RES/2456(XXIII)[C]	Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States	20.12.1968	Y: 75, N: 9, A: 30, NV: 12, TVM: 126
A/RES/2456(XXIII)[B]	Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States	20.12.1968	Y: 98, N: 0, A: 16, NV: 12, TVM: 126
A/RES/2456(XXIII)[D]	Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States	20.12.1968	Y: 108, N: 0, A: 7, NV: 11, TVM: 126
A/RES/2456(XXIII)[A]	Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States	20.12.1968	Y: 103, N: 7, A: 5, NV: 11, TVM: 126
A/RES/2457(XXIII)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	20.12.1968	Y: 93, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 29, TVM: 126
A/RES/2455(XXIII)	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	20.12.1968	Y: 109, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 12, TVM: 126
A/RES/2496(XXIV)	Effects of atomic radiation	28.10.1969	adopted without vote
A/RES/2536(XXIV)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	11.12.1969	adopted without vote
A/RES/2575(XXIV)	Fourth international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	15.12.1969	adopted without vote
A/RES/2605(XXIV)[B]	Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States	16.12.1969	Y: 80, N: 1, A: 37, NV: 8, TVM: 126
A/RES/2605(XXIV)[A]	Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States	16.12.1969	Y: 110, N: 0, A: 10, NV: 6, TVM: 126
A/RES/2604(XXIV)[B]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	16.12.1969	Y: 114, N: 1, A: 4, NV: 7, TVM: 126
A/RES/2604(XXIV)[A]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	16.12.1969	Y: 99, N: 7, A: 13, NV: 7, TVM: 126
A/RES/2623(XXV)	Effects of atomic radiation	13.10.1970	adopted without vote
A/RES/2651(XXV)	Fourth international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	30.11.1970	adopted without vote
A/RES/2655(XXV)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	04.12.1970	adopted without vote
A/RES/2665(XXV)	Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control	07.12.1970	Y: 109, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 13, TVM: 127
A/RES/2664(XXV)	Implementation of the results of the Conference on Non-Nuclear-weapon states	07.12.1970	Y: 106, N: 0, A: 9, NV: 12, TVM: 127
A/RES/2666(XXV)	Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2456 B (XXIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the	07.12.1970	Y: 104, N: 0, A: 12, NV: 11, TVM: 127

	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)		
A/RES/2660(XXV)	Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof	07.12.1970	Y: 104, N: 2, A: 2, NV: 19, TVM: 127
A/RES/2663(XXV)[B]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	07.12.1970	Y: 112, N: 0, A: 1, NV: 14, TVM: 127
A/RES/2663(XXV)[A]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	07.12.1970	Y: 102, N: 0, A: 13, NV: 12, TVM: 127
A/RES/2763(XXVI)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	08.11.1971	adopted without vote
A/RES/2773(XXVI)	Effects of atomic radiation	29.11.1971	adopted without vote
A/RES/2829(XXVI)	Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control	16.12.1971	Y: 103, N: 0, A: 9, NV: 20, TVM: 132
A/RES/2830(XXVI)	Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	16.12.1971	Y: 101, N: 0, A: 12, NV: 19, TVM: 132
A/RES/2828(XXVI)[B]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	16.12.1971	Y: 71, N: 2, A: 38, NV: 21, TVM: 132
A/RES/2828(XXVI)[C]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	16.12.1971	Y: 91, N: 2, A: 21, NV: 18, TVM: 132
A/RES/2828(XXVI)[A]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	16.12.1971	Y: 74, N: 2, A: 36, NV: 20, TVM: 132
A/RES/2905(XXVII)	Effects of atomic radiation	17.10.1972	adopted without vote
A/RES/2907(XXVII)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	31.10.1972	adopted without vote
A/RES/2935(XXVII)	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	29.11.1972	Y: 101, N: 0, A: 17, NV: 14, TVM: 132
A/RES/2931(XXVII)	Implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States	29.11.1972	Y: 100, N: 0, A: 10, NV: 22, TVM: 132
A/RES/2936(XXVII)	Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	29.11.1972	Y: 73, N: 4, A: 46, NV: 9, TVM: 132
A/RES/2934(XXVII)[A]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	29.11.1972	Y: 105, N: 4, A: 9, NV: 14, TVM: 132
A/RES/2934(XXVII)[C]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	29.11.1972	Y: 80, N: 4, A: 29, NV: 19, TVM: 132
A/RES/2934(XXVII)[B]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	29.11.1972	Y: 89, N: 4, A: 23, NV: 16, TVM: 132
A/RES/3056(XXVIII)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	29.10.1973	adopted without vote
A/RES/3063(XXVIII)	Effects of atomic radiation	09.11.1973	Y: 86, N: 0, A: 13, NV: 36, TVM: 135
A/RES/3079(XXVIII)	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	06.12.1973	Y: 116, N: 0, A: 12, NV: 7, TVM: 135
A/RES/3078(XXVIII)[A]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	06.12.1973	Y: 89, N: 5, A: 33, NV: 8, TVM: 135
A/RES/3078(XXVIII)[B]	Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	06.12.1973	Y: 65, N: 7, A: 57, NV: 6, TVM: 135
A/RES/3154(XXVIII)[B]	Effects of atomic radiation	14.12.1973	Y: 117, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 13, TVM: 135
A/RES/3154(XXVIII)[A]	Effects of atomic radiation	14.12.1973	Y: 86, N: 0, A: 28, NV: 21, TVM: 135
A/RES/3154(XXVIII)[C]	Effects of atomic radiation	14.12.1973	Y: 91, N: 0, A: 33, NV: 11, TVM: 135
A/RES/3213(XXIX)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	05.11.1974	Y: 66, N: 0, A: 9, NV: 63, TVM: 138
A/RES/3226(XXIX)	Effects of atomic radiation	12.11.1974	adopted without vote
A/RES/3265(XXIX)[A]	Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia	09.12.1974	Y: 104, N: 1, A: 27, NV: 6, TVM: 138
A/RES/3265(XXIX)[B]	Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia	09.12.1974	Y: 96, N: 2, A: 36, NV: 4, TVM: 138
A/RES/3263(XXIX)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	09.12.1974	Y: 128, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 8, TVM: 138
A/RES/3262(XXIX)	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	09.12.1974	Y: 115, N: 0, A: 17, NV: 6, TVM: 138
A/RES/3258(XXIX)	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	09.12.1974	Y: 114, N: 0, A: 15, NV: 9, TVM: 138
A/RES/3257(XXIX)	Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban	09.12.1974	Y: 95, N: 3, A: 33, NV: 7, TVM: 138
A/RES/3386(XXX)	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	12.11.1975	adopted without vote
A/RES/3410(XXX)	Effects of atomic radiation	28.11.1975	adopted without vote

A/RES/3472(XXX)[B]	Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects	11.12.1975	Y: 82, N: 10, A: 36, NV: 16, TVM: 144
A/RES/3472(XXX)[A]	Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects	11.12.1975	Y: 126, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 16, TVM: 144
A/RES/3478(XXX)	Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests	11.12.1975	Y: 94, N: 2, A: 34, NV: 14, TVM: 144
A/RES/3476(XXX)[A]	Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia	11.12.1975	adopted without vote
A/RES/3476(XXX)[B]	Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia	11.12.1975	adopted without vote
A/RES/3474(XXX)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	11.12.1975	Y: 125, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 17, TVM: 144
A/RES/3477(XXX)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific	11.12.1975	Y: 110, N: 0, A: 20, NV: 14, TVM: 144
A/RES/3467(XXX)	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3258 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	11.12.1975	Y: 115, N: 0, A: 12, NV: 17, TVM: 144
A/RES/3473(XXX)	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3262 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	11.12.1975	Y: 113, N: 0, A: 16, NV: 15, TVM: 144
A/RES/3466(XXX)	Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban	11.12.1975	Y: 106, N: 2, A: 24, NV: 12, TVM: 144
A/RES/31/10	Effects of atomic radiation	08.11.1976	adopted without vote
A/RES/31/11	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	10.11.1976	adopted without vote
A/RES/31/70	Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects	10.12.1976	Y: 132, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 14, TVM: 146
A/RES/31/71	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	10.12.1976	Y: 130, N: 0, A: 1, NV: 15, TVM: 146
A/RES/31/73	Establishment of and nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	10.12.1976	Y: 91, N: 2, A: 43, NV: 10, TVM: 146
A/RES/31/67	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	10.12.1976	Y: 119, N: 0, A: 14, NV: 13, TVM: 146
A/RES/31/75	Implementation of the conclusions of the 1st Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	10.12.1976	Y: 115, N: 2, A: 19, NV: 10, TVM: 146
A/RES/31/66	Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of and treaty designed to achieve and comprehensive test ban	10.12.1976	Y: 105, N: 2, A: 27, NV: 12, TVM: 146
A/RES/31/89	Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests	14.12.1976	Y: 95, N: 2, A: 36, NV: 13, TVM: 146
A/RES/32/6	Effects of atomic radiation	31.10.1977	adopted without vote
A/RES/32/50	Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development	08.12.1977	adopted without vote
A/RES/32/49	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	08.12.1977	adopted without vote
A/RES/32/83	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	12.12.1977	Y: 105, N: 0, A: 28, NV: 16, TVM: 149
A/RES/32/82	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	12.12.1977	Y: 131, N: 0, A: 1, NV: 17, TVM: 149
A/RES/32/79	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 31/67 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	12.12.1977	Y: 118, N: 0, A: 13, NV: 18, TVM: 149
A/RES/32/76	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3473 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	12.12.1977	113 Y: 0, N: 14, A: 22, NV: 149, TVM:
A/RES/32/78	Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban; conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests	12.12.1977	Y: 126, N: 2, A: 1, NV: 20, TVM: 149
A/RES/32/105[F]	Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa	14.12.1977	Y: 113, N: 7, A: 17, NV: 12, TVM: 149
A/RES/32/155	Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Detente	19.12.1977	adopted without vote
A/RES/33/4	Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development	02.11.1978	adopted without vote
A/RES/33/3	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	02.11.1978	adopted without vote
A/RES/33/5	Effects of atomic radiation	03.11.1978	adopted without vote
A/RES/33/72[B]	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states	14.12.1978	Y: 124, N: 0, A: 14, NV: 12, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/72[A]	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states	14.12.1978	Y: 137, N: 2, A: 4, NV: 7, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/65	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	14.12.1978	Y: 97, N: 2, A: 37, NV: 14, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/64	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	14.12.1978	Y: 138, N: 0, A: 1, NV: 11, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/58	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/76 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	14.12.1978	adopted without vote
A/RES/33/61	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	14.12.1978	adopted without vote

A/RES/33/57	Implementation of the conclusions of the 1st Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Establishment of a preparatory committee for the 2nd Conference	14.12.1978	Y: 122, N: 1, A: 16, NV: 11, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/71[A]	Military and nuclear collaboration with Israel	14.12.1978	Y: 72, N: 30, A: 37, NV: 11, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/71[B]	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	14.12.1978	Y: 103, N: 18, A: 18, NV: 11, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/71[C]	Urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons	14.12.1978	Y: 130, N: 2, A: 8, NV: 10, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/91[F]	Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of such States where there are no such weapons at present	16.12.1978	Y: 105, N: 18, A: 12, NV: 15, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/91[D]	Study on nuclear weapons	16.12.1978	Y: 117, N: 0, A: 21, NV: 12, TVM: 150
A/RES/33/183[G]	Nuclear collaboration with South Africa	24.01.1979	Y: 96, N: 5, A: 23, NV: 27, TVM: 151
A/RES/34/11	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	02.11.1979	adopted without vote
A/RES/34/12	Effects of atomic radiation	09.11.1979	adopted without vote
A/RES/34/63	Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development	29.11.1979	adopted without vote
A/RES/34/84	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States	11.12.1979	Y: 114, N: 1, A: 25, NV: 12, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/85	Conclusion of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	11.12.1979	Y: 120, N: 0, A: 22, NV: 10, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/77	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	11.12.1979	Y: 136, N: 0, A: 1, NV: 15, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/78	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in South Asia	11.12.1979	Y: 96, N: 2, A: 40, NV: 14, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/71	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/58 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	11.12.1979	adopted without vote
A/RES/34/74	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	11.12.1979	adopted without vote
A/RES/34/89	Israeli nuclear armament	11.12.1979	Y: 97, N: 10, A: 38, NV: 7, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/87C	Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present	11.12.1979	Y: 99, N: 18, A: 19, NV: 16, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/83G	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	11.12.1979	Y: 112, N: 16, A: 14, NV: 10, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/76B	Nuclear capability of South Africa	11.12.1979	adopted without vote
A/RES/34/83J	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	11.12.1979	Y: 120, N: 2, A: 19, NV: 11, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/86	Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	11.12.1979	Y: 110, N: 1, A: 29, NV: 12, TVM: 152
A/RES/34/93E	Nuclear collaboration with South Africa	12.12.1979	Y: 119, N: 4, A: 18, NV: 11, TVM: 152
A/RES/35/12	Effects of atomic radiation	03.11.1980	adopted without vote
A/RES/35/17	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	06.11.1980	adopted without vote
A/RES/35/112	Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development	05.12.1980	adopted without vote
A/RES/35/145A	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	12.12.1980	Y: 111, N: 2, A: 31, NV: 10, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/154	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	12.12.1980	Y: 110, N: 2, A: 31, NV: 11, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/155	Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	12.12.1980	Y: 121, N: 0, A: 24, NV: 9, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/148	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	12.12.1980	Y: 96, N: 3, A: 44, NV: 11, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/147	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	12.12.1980	adopted without vote
A/RES/35/143	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 34/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlateloco)	12.12.1980	Y: 138, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 11, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/157	Israeli nuclear armament	12.12.1980	Y: 99 , N: 6, A: 38 , NV: 11, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/156C	Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present	12.12.1980	Y: 95, N: 18, A: 27, NV: 14, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/152D	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	12.12.1980	Y: 112, N: 19, A: 14, NV: 9, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/146A	Nuclear capability of South Africa	12.12.1980	Y: 132, N: 0, A: 13, NV: 9, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/152C	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	12.12.1980	Y: 124, N: 4, A: 17, NV: 9, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/152B	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	12.12.1980	Y: 118, N: 18, A: 7, NV: 11, TVM: 154

A/RES/35/145B	Prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time	12.12.1980	Y: 129, N: 0, A: 16, NV: 9, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/156F	Study on nuclear weapons	12.12.1980	Y: 126, N: 0, A: 19, NV: 9, TVM: 154
A/RES/35/206B	Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa	16.12.1980	Y: 127, N: 4, A: 13, NV: 10, TVM: 154
A/RES/36/14	Effects of atomic radiation	28.10.1981	adopted without vote
A/RES/36/25	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	11.11.1981	Y: 128, N: 1 , A: 4 , NV: 23 , TVM: 156
A/RES/36/27	Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security	13.11.1981	Y: 109, N: 2, A: 34, NV: 12 , TVM: 157
A/RES/36/84	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	09.12.1981	Y: 118 , N: 2 , A: 23 , NV: 14 , TVM: 157
A/RES/36/94	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	09.12.1981	Y: 115, N: 17, A: 12, NV: 13, TVM: 157
A/RES/36/95	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	09.12.1981	Y: 145 , N: 0 , A: 2 , NV: 9 , TVM: 157
A/RES/36/100	Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe	09.12.1981	Y: 82, N: 19, A: 41, NV: 15, TVM: 157
A/RES/36/88	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	09.12.1981	Y: 93 , N: 3 , A: 44 , NV: 17 , TVM: 157
A/RES/36/87A	Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	09.12.1981	adopted without vote
A/RES/36/87B	Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	09.12.1981	Y: 107 , N: 2 , A: 31 , NV: 17 , TVM: 157
A/RES/36/83	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/143 concerning the signature and ratificationof Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	09.12.1981	Y: 138, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 14, TVM: 157
A/RES/36/98	Israeli nuclear armament	09.12.1981	Y: 101, N: 2, A: 39, NV: 15, TVM: 157
A/RES/36/97E	Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present	09.12.1981	Y: 84, N: 18, A: 42, NV: 13, TVM: 157
A/RES/36/92I	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	09.12.1981	Y: 121, N: 19, A: 6, NV: 11, TVM: 157
A/RES/36/86A	Nuclear capability of South Africa	09.12.1981	Y: 129 , N: 4 , A: 10 , NV: 14 , TVM: 157
A/RES/36/92E	Nuclear weapons in all their aspects	09.12.1981	Y: 118, N: 18, A: 5, NV: 16, TVM: 157
A/RES/36/81B	Prevention of nuclear war	09.12.1981	adopted without vote
A/RES/36/92K	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon	09.12.1981	Y: 68 , N: 14 , A: 57 , NV: 18 , TVM: 157
A/RES/36/78	United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	09.12.1981	adopted without vote
A/RES/36/92J	World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament	09.12.1981	Y: 78, N: 3, A: 56, NV: 20, TVM: 157
A/RES/36/172E	Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa	17.12.1981	Y: 119, N: 19 , A: 4, NV: 15, TVM: 157
A/RES/37/18	Armed Israeli agression against Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security	16.11.1982	Y: 119 , N: 2 , A: 13 , NV: 23, TVM: 157
A/RES/37/19	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	19.11.1982	Y: 105 , N: 2 , A: 25 , NV: 25 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/78A	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	09.12.1982	Y: 114 , N: 1 , A: 32 , NV: 10 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/72	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	09.12.1982	Y: 124 , N: 2 , A: 19 , NV: 12 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/80	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	09.12.1982	Y: 108 , N: 17 , A: 19 , NV: 13 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/81	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	09.12.1982	Y: 144 , N: 0 , A: 3 , NV: 10 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/76	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	09.12.1982	Y: 99 , N: 2 , A: 45 , NV: 11 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/75	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	09.12.1982	adopted without vote
A/RES/37/85	Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests	09.12.1982	Y: 115 , N: 5 , A: 25 , NV: 12 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/71	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/83 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	09.12.1982	Y: 136 , N: 0 , A: 7 , NV: 14, TVM: 157
A/RES/37/82	Israeli nuclear armament	09.12.1982	Y: 106 , N: 2 , A: 34 , NV: 15 , TVM: 157

A/RES/37/69D	Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa	09.12.1982	Y: 120, N: 8, A: 16 , NV: 13, TVM: 157
A/RES/37/78J	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	09.12.1982	Y: 112 , N: 19, A: 15 , NV: 11 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/74B	Nuclear capability of South Africa	09.12.1982	Y: 132 , N: 4 , A: 11 , NV: 10 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/78C	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	09.12.1982	Y: 118 , N: 19 , A: 9 , NV: 11 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/78I	Prevention of nuclear war	09.12.1982	Y: 130 , N: 0 , A: 17 , NV: 10 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/78E	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon	09.12.1982	Y: 81 , N: 14 , A: 52 , NV: 10 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/73	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	09.12.1982	Y: 111 , N: 1 , A: 35 , NV: 10 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/87	Effects of atomic radiation	10.12.1982	adopted without vote
A/RES/37/100C	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	13.12.1982	Y: 117 , N: 17 , A: 8 , NV: 15 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/100A	Freeze in nuclear weapons	13.12.1982	Y: 122 , N: 16 , A: 6 , NV: 13 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/99A	Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present	13.12.1982	Y: 70, N: 18, A: 51, NV: 18 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/100B	Nuclear arms freeze	13.12.1982	Y: 119 , N: 17 , A: 5 , NV: 16 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/99F	Review of and supplement to the Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all aspects	13.12.1982	Y: 141 , N: 1 , A: 2 , NV: 13 , TVM: 157
A/RES/37/99H	Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Desctruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof	13.12.1982	adopted without vote
A/RES/37/167	United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	17.12.1982	Y: 111 , N: 26 , A: 7 , NV: 13 , TVM: 157
A/RES/38/8	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	04.11.1983	adopted without vote
A/RES/38/9	Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security	10.11.1983	Y: 123, N: 2, A: 12, NV: 21, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/39G	Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa	05.12.1983	Y: 122, N: 9, A: 17, NV: 10, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/60	United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	14.12.1983	adopted without vote
A/RES/38/62	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	15.12.1983	Y: 119, N: 2, A: 26, NV: 11, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/67	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	15.12.1983	Y: 108, N: 17, A: 18, NV: 15, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/68	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	15.12.1983	Y: 141, N: 0, A: 6, NV: 11, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/75	Condemnation of nuclear war	15.12.1983	Y: 95, N: 19, A: 30, NV: 14, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/73G	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	15.12.1983	Y: 126, N: 17, A: 6, NV: 9, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/78	Effects of atomic radiation	15.12.1983	adopted without vote
A/RES/38/65	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	15.12.1983	Y: 94, N: 3, A: 46, NV: 15, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/64	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	15.12.1983	adopted without vote
A/RES/38/73B	Freeze on nuclear weapons	15.12.1983	Y: 124, N: 15, A: 7, NV: 12, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/72	Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests	15.12.1983	Y: 118, N: 4, A: 24, NV: 12, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/61	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	15.12.1983	Y: 135, N: 0, A: 9, NV: 14, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/74	Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty	15.12.1983	Y: 134, N: 0, A: 7, NV: 17, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/69	Israeli nuclear armament	15.12.1983	Y: 99, N: 2, A: 39, NV: 18, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/73E	Nuclear-arms freeze	15.12.1983	Y: 124, N: 13, A: 8, NV: 13, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/76	Nuclear-weapon freeze	15.12.1983	Y: 108, N: 18, A: 20, NV: 12, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/63	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	15.12.1983	Y: 117, N: 0, A: 29, NV: 12, TVM: 158

A/RES/38/183P	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	20.12.1983	Y: 99, N: 18, A: 24, NV: 17, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/183N	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	20.12.1983	Y: 122, N: 1, A: 25, NV: 10, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/183A	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	20.12.1983	Y: 88, N: 31, A: 24, NV: 15, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/181A	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	20.12.1983	Y: 142, N: 0, A: 6, NV: 10, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/183B	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	20.12.1983	Y: 110, N: 19, A: 15, NV: 14, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/181B	Nuclear capability of South Africa	20.12.1983	Y: 133, N: 4, A: 11, NV: 10, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/183D	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	20.12.1983	Y: 108, N: 19, A: 16, NV: 15, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/183G	Prevention of nuclear war	20.12.1983	Y: 128, N: 0, A: 20, NV: 10, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/183C	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon	20.12.1983	Y: 74, N: 12, A: 57, NV: 15, TVM: 158
A/RES/38/188I	Review of and supplement to the Comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects	20.12.1983	Y: 146, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 9, TVM: 158
A/RES/39/12	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	13.11.1984	adopted without vote
A/RES/39/14	Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security	16.11.1984	Y: 106, N: 2, A: 33, NV: 18, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/52	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	12.12.1984	Y: 122, N: 3, A: 23, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/57	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	12.12.1984	Y: 104, N: 19, A: 20, NV: 16, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/58	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	12.12.1984	Y: 146, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/63H	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	12.12.1984	Y: 128, N: 17, A: 5, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/55	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	12.12.1984	Y: 100, N: 3, A: 42, NV: 14, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/54	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	12.12.1984	adopted without vote
A/RES/39/63G	Freeze on nuclear weapons	12.12.1984	Y: 127, N: 11, A: 11, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/51	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	12.12.1984	Y: 139, N: 0, A: 8, NV: 12, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/60	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/72 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests	12.12.1984	Y: 123, N: 2, A: 24, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/61B	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa : nuclear capability of South Africa	12.12.1984	Y: 137, N: 4, A: 11, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/63C	Nuclear-arms freeze	12.12.1984	Y: 129, N: 12, A: 8, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/53	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	12.12.1984	Y: 124, N: 0, A: 24, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/74	United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	13.12.1984	adopted without vote
A/RES/39/94	Effects of atomic radiation	14.12.1984	adopted without vote
A/RES/39/148[G]	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	17.12.1984	Y: 100, N: 12, A: 26, NV: 21, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/148[B]	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	17.12.1984	Y: 98, N: 16, A: 24, NV: 21, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/148[K]	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	17.12.1984	Y: 124, N: 13, A: 9, NV: 13, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/148[F]	Climatic effects of nuclear war : nuclear winter	17.12.1984	Y: 130, N: 0, A: 11, NV: 18, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/147	Israeli nuclear armament	17.12.1984	Y: 94, N: 2, A: 44, NV: 19, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/148[D]	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	17.12.1984	Y: 101, N: 19, A: 17, NV: 22, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/148[C]	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	17.12.1984	Y: 102, N: 19, A: 13, NV: 25, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/151[D]	Nuclear-weapon freeze	17.12.1984	Y: 104, N: 18, A: 18, NV: 19, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/148[P]	Prevention of nuclear war	17.12.1984	Y: 128, N: 6, A: 12, NV: 13, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/148[E]	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon	17.12.1984	Y: 71, N: 11, A: 53, NV: 24, TVM: 159

A/RES/39/151[B]	Study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects	17.12.1984	Y: 143, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 14, TVM: 159
A/RES/39/148[A]	Unilateral nuclear disarmament measures	17.12.1984	Y: 126, N: 1, A: 13, NV: 19, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/6	Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security	01.11.1985	Y: 88, N: 13, A: 39, NV: 19, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/8	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	08.11.1985	adopted without vote
A/RES/40/18	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	18.11.1985	Y: 76, N: 0, A: 12, NV: 71, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/80A	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	12.12.1985	Y: 124, N: 3, A: 21, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/80B	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	12.12.1985	Y: 121, N: 3, A: 24, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/85	Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	12.12.1985	Y: 101, N: 19, A: 25, NV: 14, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/86	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	12.12.1985	Y: 142, N: 0, A: 6, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/83	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	12.12.1985	Y: 104, N: 3, A: 41, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/82	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	12.12.1985	adopted without vote
A/RES/40/94M	General and complete disarmament : 3rd Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	12.12.1985	Y: 138, N: 0, A: 11, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/94H	General and complete disarmament : nuclear-weapon freeze	12.12.1985	Y: 120, N: 17, A: 10, NV: 12, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/94B	General and complete disarmament : study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects	12.12.1985	adopted without vote
A/RES/40/88	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/60 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests	12.12.1985	Y: 120, N: 3, A: 29, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/79	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/51 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	12.12.1985	Y: 139, N: 0, A: 7, NV: 13, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/89B	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa : nuclear capability of South Africa	12.12.1985	Y: 135, N: 4, A: 14, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/93	Israeli nuclear armament	12.12.1985	Y: 101, N: 2, A: 47, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/95	United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	12.12.1985	adopted without vote
A/RES/40/81	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	12.12.1985	Y: 116, N: 4, A: 29, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/152B	Bilateral nuclear-arms and space-arms negotiations	16.12.1985	Y: 107, N: 0, A: 40, NV: 12, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/152P	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	16.12.1985	Y: 131, N: 16, A: 6, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/152G	Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter	16.12.1985	Y: 141, N: 1, A: 10, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/151F	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	16.12.1985	Y: 126, N: 17, A: 6, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/160	Effects of atomic radiation	16.12.1985	adopted without vote
A/RES/40/151E	Freeze on nuclear weapons	16.12.1985	Y: 126, N: 12, A: 10, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/152A	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	16.12.1985	Y: 123, N: 19, A: 7, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/152C	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	16.12.1985	Y: 117, N: 19, A: 11, NV: 12, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/151C	Nuclear-arms freeze	16.12.1985	Y: 131, N: 10, A: 8, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/152Q	Prevention of nuclear war	16.12.1985	Y: 136, N: 3, A: 14, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/40/152H	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon	16.12.1985	Y: 70, N: 11, A: 65, NV: 13, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/12	Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security	29.10.1986	Y: 86, N: 5, A: 55, NV: 13, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/36	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	11.11.1986	adopted without vote
A/RES/41/46A	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	03.12.1986	Y: 135, N: 3, A: 14, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/46B	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	03.12.1986	Y: 127, N: 3, A: 21, NV: 8, TVM: 159

A/RES/41/51	Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	03.12.1986	Y: 106, N: 18, A: 25, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/52	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	03.12.1986	Y: 149, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/62A	Effects of atomic radiation	03.12.1986	adopted without vote
A/RES/41/62B	Effects of atomic radiation	03.12.1986	adopted without vote
A/RES/41/49	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	03.12.1986	Y: 107, N: 3, A: 41, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/48	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	03.12.1986	adopted without vote
A/RES/41/59N	General and complete disarmament : notification of nuclear tests	03.12.1986	Y: 130, N: 1, A: 22, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/59F	General and complete disarmament : nuclear disarmament	03.12.1986	adopted without vote
A/RES/41/45	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	03.12.1986	Y: 145, N: 0, A: 7, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/54	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/88 on the immediate cessation and prohibiton of nuclear-weapon tests	03.12.1986	Y: 123, N: 3, A: 26, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/55A	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	03.12.1986	Y: 150, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/55B	IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF AFRICA : NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA	03.12.1986	Y: 139, N: 4, A: 13, NV: 3, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/60F	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	03.12.1986	Y: 132, N: 17, A: 4, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/60E	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : freeze on nuclear weapons	03.12.1986	Y: 136, N: 12, A: 5, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/60I	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/151C on a nuclear arms freeze	03.12.1986	Y: 139, N: 12, A: 4, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/47	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	03.12.1986	Y: 137, N: 1, A: 15, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/86A	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	04.12.1986	Y: 88, N: 0, A: 56, NV: 15, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/86N	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	04.12.1986	Y: 140, N: 0, A: 13, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/86F	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	04.12.1986	Y: 130, N: 15, A: 5, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/86H	Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter	04.12.1986	Y: 140, N: 1, A: 10, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/93	Israeli nuclear armament	04.12.1986	Y: 95, N: 2, A: 56, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/86B	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	04.12.1986	Y: 118, N: 17, A: 10, NV: 14, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/86G	Prevention of nuclear war	04.12.1986	Y: 134, N: 3, A: 14, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/41/212A	UN Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	11.12.1986	adopted without vote
A/RES/41/212B	UN Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	11.12.1986	Y: 119, N: 0, A: 28, NV: 12, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/6	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	20.10.1987	adopted without vote
A/RES/42/24	United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	27.11.1987	adopted without vote
A/RES/42/26A	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	30.11.1987	Y: 137, N: 3, A: 14, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/26B	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	30.11.1987	Y: 128, N: 3, A: 22, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/31	Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	30.11.1987	Y: 112, N: 18, A: 20, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/32	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	30.11.1987	Y: 151, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/29	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	30.11.1987	Y: 114, N: 3, A: 36, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/28	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	30.11.1987	adopted without vote
A/RES/42/38A	General and completed disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	30.11.1987	Y: 115, N: 0, A: 39, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/38D	General and completed disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	30.11.1987	Y: 143, N: 0, A: 13, NV: 3, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/38C	General and completed disarmament : notification of nuclear tests	30.11.1987	Y: 147, N: 1, A: 8, NV: 3, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/38H	General and completed disarmament : nuclear disarmament	30.11.1987	adopted without vote

A/RES/42/25	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	30.11.1987	Y: 147, N: 0, A: 7, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/34B	Implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa	30.11.1987	Y: 140, N: 4, A: 13, NV: 2, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/34A	Implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa	30.11.1987	Y: 151, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/44	Israeli nuclear armament	30.11.1987	Y: 97, N: 2, A: 52, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/39C	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	30.11.1987	Y: 135, N: 17, A: 4, NV: 3, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/39B	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : freeze on nuclear weapons	30.11.1987	Y: 139, N: 12, A: 4, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/39H	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/60I on a nuclear-arms freeze	30.11.1987	Y: 140, N: 13, A: 2, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/42C	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	30.11.1987	Y: 137, N: 13, A: 7, NV: 2, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/42A	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	30.11.1987	Y: 125, N: 17, A: 12, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/42D	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : prevention of nuclear war	30.11.1987	Y: 140, N: 3, A: 14, NV: 2, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/27	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	30.11.1987	Y: 143, N: 2, A: 8, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/42/67	Effects of atomic radiation	02.12.1987	adopted without vote
A/RES/43/6	Observer status for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in the General Assembly	27.10.1988	adopted without vote
A/RES/43/16	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	28.10.1988	adopted without vote
A/RES/43/55	Effects of atomic radiation	06.12.1988	adopted without vote
A/RES/43/63A	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	07.12.1988	Y: 136, N: 4, A: 13, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/63B	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	07.12.1988	Y: 127, N: 3, A: 21, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/68	Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	07.12.1988	Y: 117, N: 17, A: 16, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/69	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	07.12.1988	Y: 152, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/66	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	07.12.1988	Y: 116, N: 3, A: 34, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/65	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	07.12.1988	adopted without vote
A/RES/43/75A	General and complete disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiation	07.12.1988	Y: 141, N: 0, A: 12, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/75O	General and complete disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	07.12.1988	Y: 103, N: 0, A: 46, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/75N	General and complete disarmament : comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons	07.12.1988	Y: 141, N: 1, A: 9, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/75E	General and complete disarmament : nuclear disarmament	07.12.1988	adopted without vote
A/RES/43/75M	General and complete disarmament : Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof	07.12.1988	adopted without vote
A/RES/43/62	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	07.12.1988	Y: 149, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/82	Implementation of the conclusions of the 3rd Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the 4th Review Conference	07.12.1988	Y: 137, N: 0, A: 11, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/71A	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	07.12.1988	Y: 151, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/71B	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa : nuclear capability of South Africa	07.12.1988	Y: 138, N: 4, A: 12, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/80	Israeli nuclear armament	07.12.1988	Y: 99, N: 2, A: 51, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/76E	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	07.12.1988	Y: 133, N: 17, A: 4, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/76B	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : nuclear arms freeze	07.12.1988	Y: 135, N: 12, A: 3, NV: 9, TVM: 159

A/RES/43/78E	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	07.12.1988	Y: 135, N: 13, A: 5, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/78D	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter : report of the Secretary-General	07.12.1988	Y: 145, N: 0, A: 9, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/78B	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : non-use of nuclear weapons and rpevention of nuclear war	07.12.1988	Y: 127, N: 17, A: 6, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/78F	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : prevention of nuclear war	07.12.1988	Y: 136, N: 3, A: 14, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/43/64	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	07.12.1988	Y: 146, N: 2, A: 6, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/13	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	25.10.1989	adopted without vote
A/RES/44/45	Effects of atomic radiation	08.12.1989	adopted without vote
A/RES/44/106	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	15.12.1989	Y: 127, N: 2, A: 22, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/116B	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	15.12.1989	Y: 91, N: 0, A: 61, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/116K	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	15.12.1989	Y: 134, N: 0, A: 18, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/105	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	15.12.1989	Y: 136, N: 3, A: 13, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/119E	Cessation of nuclear-arms race and prevention of nuclear war	15.12.1989	Y: 138, N: 11, A: 6, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/110	Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	15.12.1989	Y: 131, N: 0, A: 21, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/111	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	15.12.1989	Y: 151, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/117C	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	15.12.1989	Y: 134, N: 17, A: 4, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/109	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	15.12.1989	Y: 116, N: 3, A: 32, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/108	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	15.12.1989	adopted without vote
A/RES/44/104	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 43/62 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	15.12.1989	Y: 147, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/113A	Implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa	15.12.1989	Y: 147, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/121	Israeli nuclear armament	15.12.1989	Y: 104, N: 2, A: 43, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/119B	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	15.12.1989	Y: 129, N: 17, A: 7, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/113B	Nuclear capability of South Africa	15.12.1989	Y: 137, N: 4, A: 10, NV: 8, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/116D	Nuclear disarmament	15.12.1989	adopted without vote
A/RES/44/117D	Nuclear-arms freeze	15.12.1989	Y: 136, N: 13, A: 5, NV: 5, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/116O	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof	15.12.1989	adopted without vote
A/RES/44/119F	South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty	15.12.1989	Y: 151, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 4, TVM: 159
A/RES/44/107	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	15.12.1989	Y: 145, N: 2, A: 6, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/7	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	23.10.1990	adopted without vote
A/RES/45/50	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	04.12.1990	Y: 116, N: 2, A: 28, NV: 13, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/58B	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	04.12.1990	Y: 131, N: 0, A: 22, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/58H	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	04.12.1990	Y: 99, N: 0, A: 50, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/49	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	04.12.1990	Y: 127, N: 3, A: 17, NV: 12, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/62C	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war	04.12.1990	Y: 132, N: 12, A: 9, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/58E	Comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons	04.12.1990	adopted without vote
A/RES/45/54	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	04.12.1990	Y: 145, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/53	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	04.12.1990	Y: 114, N: 3, A: 28, NV: 14, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/52	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	04.12.1990	adopted without vote

A/RES/45/56A	IMPLEMENTATION OF DECLARATION ON DENUCLEARIZATION OF AFRICA	04.12.1990	Y: 145, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/48	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 44/104 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	04.12.1990	Y: 141, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 15, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/63	Israeli nuclear armament	04.12.1990	Y: 98, N: 2, A: 50, NV: 9, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/56B	NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA	04.12.1990	Y: 118, N: 4, A: 27, NV: 10, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/58D	Nuclear disarmament	04.12.1990	adopted without vote
A/RES/45/59D	Nuclear-arms freeze	04.12.1990	Y: 126, N: 14, A: 12, NV: 7, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/58J	Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities	04.12.1990	Y: 141, N: 1, A: 11, NV: 6, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/51	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	04.12.1990	Y: 140, N: 2, A: 6, NV: 11, TVM: 159
A/RES/45/71	Effects of atomic radiation	11.12.1990	adopted without vote
A/RES/46/16	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	13.11.1991	Y: 141, N: 0, A: 9, NV: 16, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/28	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	06.12.1991	Y: 110, N: 2, A: 35, NV: 19, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/36J	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	06.12.1991	Y: 130, N: 0, A: 26, NV: 10, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/29	Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	06.12.1991	Y: 147, N: 2, A: 4, NV: 13, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/32	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	06.12.1991	Y: 152, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 12, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/31	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	06.12.1991	Y: 121, N: 3, A: 26, NV: 16, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/30	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	06.12.1991	adopted without vote
A/RES/46/34A	Implementation of the Denuclearization of Africa : nuclear capacity of South Africa	06.12.1991	Y: 108, N: 1, A: 47, NV: 10, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/39	Israeli nuclear armament	06.12.1991	Y: 76, N: 3, A: 75, NV: 12, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/37D	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : Convention on Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons	06.12.1991	Y: 122, N: 16, A: 22, NV: 6, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/37C	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly : nuclear-arms freeze	06.12.1991	Y: 119, N: 18, A: 23, NV: 6, TVM: 166
A/RES/46/44	Effects of atomic radiation	09.12.1991	adopted without vote
A/RES/46/34B	Implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa	09.12.1991	adopted without vote
A/RES/47/8	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	22.10.1992	Y: 146, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 28, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/46	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	09.12.1992	Y: 118, N: 2, A: 41, NV: 18, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/52K	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	09.12.1992	adopted without vote
A/RES/47/47	Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	09.12.1992	Y: 159, N: 1, A: 4, NV: 15, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/50	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	09.12.1992	Y: 162, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 15, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/61	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	09.12.1992	adopted without vote
A/RES/47/53C	Convention on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	09.12.1992	Y: 126, N: 21, A: 21, NV: 11, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/49	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	09.12.1992	Y: 144, N: 3, A: 13, NV: 19, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/48	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	09.12.1992	adopted without vote
A/RES/47/52A	General and complete disarmament : Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons : 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee	09.12.1992	Y: 168, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 11, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/55	Israeli nuclear armament	09.12.1992	Y: 64, N: 3, A: 90, NV: 22, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/53E	Nuclear-arms freeze	09.12.1992	Y: 121, N: 19, A: 27, NV: 12, TVM: 179
A/RES/47/54A	Report of the Disarmament Commission	09.12.1992	adopted without vote
A/RES/47/66	Effects of atomic radiation	14.12.1992	adopted without vote
A/RES/47/76	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	15.12.1992	adopted without vote
A/RES/48/14	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	01.11.1993	Y: 140, N: 1, A: 9, NV: 34, TVM: 184
A/RES/48/38	Effects of atomic radiation	10.12.1993	adopted without vote
A/RES/48/69	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	16.12.1993	Y: 118, N: 3, A: 45, NV: 18, TVM: 184
A/RES/48/75B	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	16.12.1993	adopted without vote
A/RES/48/70	Comprehensive test-ban treaty	16.12.1993	adopted without vote

A/RES/48/73	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	16.12.1993	Y: 166, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 14, TVM: 184
A/RES/48/85	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	16.12.1993	adopted without vote
A/RES/48/76B	Convention on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	16.12.1993	Y: 120, N: 23, A: 24, NV: 17, TVM: 184
A/RES/48/86	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa	16.12.1993	adopted without vote
A/RES/48/72	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	16.12.1993	Y: 153, N: 3, A: 12, NV: 16, TVM: 184
A/RES/48/71	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	16.12.1993	adopted without vote
A/RES/48/78	Israeli nuclear armament	16.12.1993	Y: 53, N: 45, A: 65, NV: 21, TVM: 184
A/RES/48/75L	Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	16.12.1993	adopted without vote
A/RES/49/32	Effects of atomic radiation	09.12.1994	adopted without vote
A/RES/49/75F	1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	15.12.1994	Y: 103, N: 40, A: 25, NV: 17, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/69	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	15.12.1994	Y: 116, N: 4, A: 49, NV: 16, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/75P	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	15.12.1994	Y: 171, N: 0, A: 1, NV: 13, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/70	Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	15.12.1994	adopted without vote
A/RES/49/73	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	15.12.1994	Y: 168, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 14, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/83	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	15.12.1994	adopted without vote
A/RES/49/76E	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	15.12.1994	Y: 115, N: 24, A: 31, NV: 15, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/72	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	15.12.1994	Y: 156, N: 3, A: 10, NV: 16, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/71	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	15.12.1994	adopted without vote
A/RES/49/75L	General and complete disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	15.12.1994	adopted without vote
A/RES/49/75H	Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons	15.12.1994	Y: 163, N: 0, A: 8, NV: 14, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/65	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	15.12.1994	Y: 161, N: 1, A: 6, NV: 17, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/75K	Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legalilty of the threat or use of nuclear weapons	15.12.1994	Y: 78, N: 43, A: 38, NV: 26, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/75E	Step-by-step reduction of nuclear threat	15.12.1994	Y: 111, N: 24, A: 33, NV: 17, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/78	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	15.12.1994	Y: 60, N: 4, A: 100, NV: 21, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/84	The South Atlantic region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone	15.12.1994	Y: 161, N: 3, A: 3, NV: 18, TVM: 185
A/RES/49/138	Establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone	19.12.1994	adopted without vote
A/RES/50/9	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	01.11.1995	Y: 144, N: 1, A: 8, NV: 32, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/26	Effects of atomic radiation	06.12.1995	adopted without vote
A/RES/50/70Q	1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	12.12.1995	Y: 161, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 22, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/64	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	12.12.1995	Y: 110, N: 4, A: 45, NV: 26, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/70I	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	12.12.1995	Y: 150, N: 0, A: 14, NV: 21, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/70N	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	12.12.1995	Y: 105, N: 37, A: 20, NV: 23, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/65	Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	12.12.1995	adopted without vote
A/RES/50/68	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	12.12.1995	Y: 122, N: 0, A: 44, NV: 19, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/77	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	12.12.1995	adopted without vote
A/RES/50/70R	Contribution to nuclear disarmament	12.12.1995	adopted without vote
A/RES/50/71E	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	12.12.1995	Y: 108, N: 27, A: 28, NV: 22, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/67	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	12.12.1995	Y: 154, N: 3, A: 10, NV: 18, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/66	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	12.12.1995	adopted without vote
A/RES/50/78	Final text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty)	12.12.1995	adopted without vote
A/RES/50/70P	Nuclear disarmament	12.12.1995	Y: 106, N: 39, A: 17, NV: 23, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/70C	Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons	12.12.1995	Y: 154, N: 0, A: 10, NV: 21, TVM: 185

A/RES/50/70A	Nuclear testing	12.12.1995	Y: 86, N: 18, A: 44, NV: 37, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/73	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	12.12.1995	Y: 56, N: 2, A: 100, NV: 27, TVM: 185
A/RES/50/245	Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	10.09.1996	Y: 158, N: 3, A: 5, NV: 19, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/10	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	29.10.1996	Y: 141, N: 2, A: 8, NV: 34, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/45M	Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons	10.12.1996	Y: 115, N: 22, A: 32, NV: 16, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/53	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)	10.12.1996	adopted without vote
A/RES/51/45R	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	10.12.1996	Y: 160, N: 0, A: 11, NV: 14, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/45I	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	10.12.1996	Y: 107, N: 37, A: 24, NV: 17, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/43	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	10.12.1996	Y: 125, N: 0, A: 45, NV: 15, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/52	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	10.12.1996	adopted without vote
A/RES/51/46D	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	10.12.1996	Y: 114, N: 31, A: 27, NV: 13, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/42	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	10.12.1996	Y: 156, N: 3, A: 8, NV: 18, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/41	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	10.12.1996	adopted without vote
A/RES/51/45O	Nuclear disarmament	10.12.1996	Y: 110, N: 39, A: 20, NV: 16, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/45G	Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons	10.12.1996	Y: 159, N: 0, A: 11, NV: 15, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/45B	The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	10.12.1996	Y: 129, N: 3, A: 38, NV: 15, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/48	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	10.12.1996	Y: 129, N: 3, A: 32, NV: 21, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/45A	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons : 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee	10.12.1996	Y: 167, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 16, TVM: 185
A/RES/51/121	Effects of atomic radiation	13.12.1996	adopted without vote
A/RES/52/11	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	12.11.1997	Y: 151, N: 1, A: 5, NV: 28, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/38O	Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	09.12.1997	Y: 116, N: 26, A: 24, NV: 19, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/46	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	09.12.1997	adopted without vote
A/RES/52/38M	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	09.12.1997	Y: 161, N: 0, A: 8, NV: 16, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/36	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	09.12.1997	Y: 116, N: 0, A: 51, NV: 18, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/45	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	09.12.1997	adopted without vote
A/RES/52/39C	Convention on theh Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	09.12.1997	Y: 109, N: 30, A: 27, NV: 19, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/38S	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	09.12.1997	adopted without vote
A/RES/52/35	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	09.12.1997	Y: 153, N: 3, A: 8, NV: 21, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/34	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	09.12.1997	adopted without vote
A/RES/52/38L	Nuclear disarmament	09.12.1997	Y: 109, N: 39, A: 18, NV: 19, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/38K	Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons	09.12.1997	Y: 156, N: 0, A: 10, NV: 19, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/38N	The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemishpere and adjacent areas	09.12.1997	Y: 131, N: 3, A: 34, NV: 17, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/41	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	09.12.1997	Y: 147, N: 2, A: 14, NV: 22, TVM: 185
A/RES/52/55	Effects of atomic radiation	10.12.1997	adopted without vote
A/RES/53/21	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	02.11.1998	Y: 113, N: 1, A: 8, NV: 63, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/44	Effects of atomic radiation	03.12.1998	adopted without vote
A/RES/53/77Z	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	04.12.1998	Y: 166, N: 0, A: 8, NV: 11, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/75	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	04.12.1998	Y: 117, N: 0, A: 52, NV: 16, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/83	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	04.12.1998	adopted without vote
A/RES/53/78[D]	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	04.12.1998	Y: 111, N: 39, A: 22, NV: 13, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/77A	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	04.12.1998	adopted without vote

A/RES/53/74	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	04.12.1998	adopted without vote
A/RES/53/77W	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	04.12.1998	Y: 123, N: 25, A: 25, NV: 12, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/77D	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	04.12.1998	adopted without vote
A/RES/53/77X	Nuclear disarmament	04.12.1998	Y: 110, N: 41, A: 18, NV: 16, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/77U	Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons	04.12.1998	Y: 160, N: 0, A: 11, NV: 14, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/77G	Nuclear testing	04.12.1998	Y: 118, N: 9, A: 33, NV: 25, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/77Q	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	04.12.1998	Y: 154, N: 3, A: 10, NV: 18, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/77F	Reducing nuclear danger	04.12.1998	Y: 108, N: 45, A: 17, NV: 15, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/77I	The Conference on Disarmament decision to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	04.12.1998	adopted without vote
A/RES/53/80	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	04.12.1998	Y: 158, N: 2, A: 11, NV: 14, TVM: 185
A/RES/53/77Y	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda	04.12.1998	Y: 114, N: 18, A: 38, NV: 15, TVM: 185
A/RES/54/26	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	15.11.1999	Y: 122, N: 1, A: 6, NV: 59, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/48	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)	01.12.1999	adopted without vote
A/RES/54/63	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	01.12.1999	Y: 158, N: 0, A: 6, NV: 24, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/52	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	01.12.1999	Y: 111, N: 0, A: 53, NV: 24, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/60	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlateloco)	01.12.1999	adopted without vote
A/RES/54/55D	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	01.12.1999	Y: 104, N: 42, A: 17, NV: 25, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/51	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	01.12.1999	adopted without vote
A/RES/54/54Q	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	01.12.1999	Y: 114, N: 28, A: 22, NV: 24, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/54P	Nuclear disarmament	01.12.1999	Y: 104, N: 41, A: 17, NV: 26, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/54D	Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons	01.12.1999	Y: 153, N: 0, A: 12, NV: 23, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/54L	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	01.12.1999	Y: 157, N: 3, A: 4, NV: 24, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/54K	Reducing nuclear danger	01.12.1999	Y: 104, N: 43, A: 14, NV: 27, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/57	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	01.12.1999	Y: 149, N: 3, A: 9, NV: 27, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/54G	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda	01.12.1999	Y: 111, N: 13, A: 39, NV: 25, TVM: 188
A/RES/54/65	Cooperation between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	06.12.1999	adopted without vote
A/RES/54/66	Effects of atomic radiation	06.12.1999	adopted without vote
A/RES/54/280	Agreement concerning the relationship between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	15.06.2000	adopted without vote
A/RES/55/33[D]	2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	20.11.2000	Y: 163, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 22, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/33[R]	A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons	20.11.2000	Y: 155, N: 1, A: 12, NV: 21, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/41	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	20.11.2000	Y: 161, N: 0, A: 6, NV: 22, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/31	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapon	20.11.2000	Y: 111, N: 0, A: 54, NV: 24, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/39	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	20.11.2000	adopted without vote
A/RES/55/34[G]	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	20.11.2000	Y: 109, N: 43, A: 16, NV: 21, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/34[H]	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	20.11.2000	adopted without vote
A/RES/55/33[W]	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	20.11.2000	adopted without vote
A/RES/55/30	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	20.11.2000	adopted without vote
A/RES/55/33[X]	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	20.11.2000	Y: 119, N: 28, A: 22, NV: 20, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/33[S]	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	20.11.2000	adopted without vote

A/RES/55/33[T]	Nuclear disarmament	20.11.2000	Y: 109, N: 39, A: 20, NV: 21, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/33[I]	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	20.11.2000	Y: 159, N: 4, A: 5, NV: 21, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/33[N]	Reducing nuclear danger	20.11.2000	Y: 110, N: 45, A: 14, NV: 20, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/33[Y]	The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" , an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	20.11.2000	adopted without vote
A/RES/55/36	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	20.11.2000	Y: 157, N: 3, A: 8, NV: 21, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/33[C]	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda	20.11.2000	Y: 154, N: 3, A: 8, NV: 24, TVM: 189
A/RES/55/121	Effects of atomic radiation	08.12.2000	adopted without vote
A/RES/55/244	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	16.03.2001	adopted without vote
A/RES/56/24[O]	2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee	29.11.2001	Y: 156, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 29, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/24[N]	A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons	29.11.2001	Y: 139, N: 3, A: 19, NV: 28, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/17	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)	29.11.2001	adopted without vote
A/RES/56/22	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	29.11.2001	Y: 105, N: 0, A: 54, NV: 30, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/30	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	29.11.2001	adopted without vote
A/RES/56/25B	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	29.11.2001	Y: 104, N: 46, A: 11, NV: 28, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/21	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	29.11.2001	adopted without vote
A/RES/56/24[S]	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	29.11.2001	Y: 111, N: 29, A: 21, NV: 28, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/24[R]	Nuclear disarmament	29.11.2001	Y: 103, N: 41, A: 17, NV: 28, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/24[G]	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	29.11.2001	Y: 148, N: 4, A: 4, NV: 33, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/24[C]	Reducing nuclear danger	29.11.2001	Y: 98, N: 45, A: 14, NV: 32, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/24[J]	The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	29.11.2001	adopted without vote
A/RES/56/27	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	29.11.2001	Y: 153, N: 3, A: 6, NV: 27, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/49	Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	07.12.2001	Y: 134, N: 1, A: 2, NV: 52, TVM: 189
A/RES/56/50	Effects of atomic radiation	10.12.2001	adopted without vote
A/RES/56/94	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	14.12.2001	Y: 150, N: 1, A: 2, NV: 36, TVM: 189
A/RES/57/9	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	11.11.2002	Y: 138, N: 1, A: 2, NV: 50, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/49	Cooperation between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	21.11.2002	Y: 128, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 59, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/78	A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons	22.11.2002	Y: 156, N: 2, A: 13, NV: 20, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/68	Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework	22.11.2002	adopted without vote
A/RES/57/100	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	22.11.2002	Y: 164, N: 1, A: 5, NV: 21, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/56	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	22.11.2002	Y: 106, N: 0, A: 55, NV: 30, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/94	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	22.11.2002	Y: 110, N: 45, A: 12, NV: 24, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/69	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	22.11.2002	adopted without vote
A/RES/57/55	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	22.11.2002	adopted without vote
A/RES/57/85	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons "	22.11.2002	Y: 117, N: 30, A: 24, NV: 20, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/67	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	22.11.2002	adopted without vote
A/RES/57/79	Nuclear disarmament	22.11.2002	Y: 107, N: 41, A: 21, NV: 22, TVM: 191

A/RES/57/73	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	22.11.2002	Y: 160, N: 3, A: 5, NV: 23, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/84	Reducing nuclear danger	22.11.2002	Y: 107, N: 46, A: 17, NV: 21, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/58	Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons	22.11.2002	Y: 120, N: 3, A: 42, NV: 26, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/80	The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises	22.11.2002	adopted without vote
A/RES/57/97	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	22.11.2002	Y: 158, N: 3, A: 8, NV: 22, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/59	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda	22.11.2002	Y: 125, N: 6, A: 36, NV: 24, TVM: 191
A/RES/57/115	Effects of atomic radiation	11.12.2002	adopted without vote
A/RES/58/8	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	05.11.2003	Y: 129, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 61, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/59	A path to total elimination of nuclear weapons	08.12.2003	Y: 164, N: 2, A: 14, NV: 11, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/30	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)	08.12.2003	adopted without vote
A/RES/58/71	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	08.12.2003	Y: 173, N: 1, A: 4, NV: 13, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/35	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	08.12.2003	Y: 119, N: 0, A: 58, NV: 14, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/31	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	08.12.2003	adopted without vote
A/RES/58/64	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	08.12.2003	Y: 118, N: 46, A: 13, NV: 14, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/34	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	08.12.2003	adopted without vote
A/RES/58/46	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	08.12.2003	Y: 124, N: 29, A: 22, NV: 16, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/56	Nuclear disarmament	08.12.2003	Y: 112, N: 45, A: 20, NV: 14, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/49	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	08.12.2003	Y: 168, N: 3, A: 8, NV: 12, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/47	Reducing nuclear danger	08.12.2003	Y: 114, N: 47, A: 17, NV: 13, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/50	Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons	08.12.2003	Y: 128, N: 4, A: 43, NV: 16, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/57	The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	08.12.2003	adopted without vote
A/RES/58/68	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	08.12.2003	Y: 162, N: 4, A: 10, NV: 15, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/51	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : a new agenda	08.12.2003	Y: 133, N: 6, A: 38, NV: 14, TVM: 191
A/RES/58/88	Effects of atomic radiation	09.12.2003	adopted without vote
A/RES/59/6	Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	22.10.2004	Y: 104, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 86, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/18	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	01.11.2004	Y: 123, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 67, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/76	A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons	03.12.2004	Y: 165, N: 3, A: 16, NV: 7, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/75	Accelerating implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	03.12.2004	Y: 151, N: 6, A: 24, NV: 10, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/94	Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework	03.12.2004	adopted without vote
A/RES/59/109	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	03.12.2004	Y: 177, N: 2, A: 4, NV: 8, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/64	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	03.12.2004	Y: 118, N: 0, A: 63, NV: 10, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/102	Convention on the Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons	03.12.2004	Y: 125, N: 48, A: 12, NV: 6, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/63	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	03.12.2004	adopted without vote
A/RES/59/83	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	03.12.2004	Y: 132, N: 29, A: 24, NV: 6, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/73	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	03.12.2004	adopted without vote

A/RES/59/77	Nuclear disarmament	03.12.2004	Y: 117, N: 43, A: 21, NV: 10, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/85	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	03.12.2004	Y: 171, N: 4, A: 8, NV: 8, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/79	Reducing nuclear danger	03.12.2004	Y: 116, N: 46, A: 18, NV: 11, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/106	Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	03.12.2004	Y: 170, N: 5, A: 9, NV: 7, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/81	The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	03.12.2004	Y: 179, N: 2, A: 2, NV: 8, TVM: 191
A/RES/59/114	Effects of atomic radiation	10.12.2004	adopted without vote
A/RES/59/290	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	13.04.2005	adopted without vote
A/RES/60/6	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	31.10.2005	Y: 137, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 53, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/49	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	08.12.2005	adopted without vote
A/RES/60/95	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	08.12.2005	Y: 172, N: 1, A: 4, NV: 14, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/53	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	08.12.2005	Y: 120, N: 0, A: 59, NV: 12, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/50	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	08.12.2005	adopted without vote
A/RES/60/88	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	08.12.2005	Y: 111, N: 49, A: 13, NV: 18, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/98	Effects of atomic radiation	08.12.2005	adopted without vote
A/RES/60/52	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	08.12.2005	adopted without vote
A/RES/60/72	Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	08.12.2005	Y: 87, N: 56, A: 26, NV: 22, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/76	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	08.12.2005	Y: 126, N: 29, A: 24, NV: 12, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/70	Nuclear disarmament	08.12.2005	Y: 113, N: 45, A: 20, NV: 13, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/58	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	08.12.2005	Y: 167, N: 3, A: 8, NV: 13, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/79	Reducing nuclear danger	08.12.2005	Y: 115, N: 49, A: 15, NV: 12, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/65	Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	08.12.2005	Y: 168, N: 2, A: 7, NV: 14, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/92	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	08.12.2005	Y: 164, N: 5, A: 5, NV: 17, TVM: 191
A/RES/60/56	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	08.12.2005	Y: 153, N: 5, A: 20, NV: 13, TVM: 191
A/RES/61/8	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	30.10.2006	Y: 114, N: 1, A: 1, NV: 76, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/47	Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	04.12.2006	Y: 133, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 58, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/70	2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee	06.12.2006	Y: 175, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 14, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/104	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	06.12.2006	Y: 172, N: 2, A: 4, NV: 14, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/57	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	06.12.2006	Y: 119, N: 1, A: 59, NV: 13, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/97	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	06.12.2006	Y: 119, N: 52, A: 10, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/88	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	06.12.2006	Y: 141, N: 3, A: 37, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/56	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	06.12.2006	adopted without vote
A/RES/61/83	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	06.12.2006	Y: 125, N: 27, A: 29, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/87	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	06.12.2006	adopted without vote
A/RES/61/78	Nuclear disarmament	06.12.2006	Y: 115, N: 48, A: 18, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/69	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	06.12.2006	Y: 167, N: 3, A: 9, NV: 13, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/85	Reducing nuclear danger	06.12.2006	Y: 118, N: 52, A: 13, NV: 9, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/74	Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	06.12.2006	Y: 167, N: 4, A: 7, NV: 14, TVM: 192

A/RES/61/103	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	06.12.2006	Y: 166, N: 5, A: 6, NV: 15, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/65	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	06.12.2006	Y: 157, N: 7, A: 13, NV: 15, TVM: 192
A/RES/61/109	Effects of atomic radiation	14.12.2006	adopted without vote
A/RES/62/2	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	29.10.2007	adopted without vote
A/RES/62/15	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	05.12.2007	adopted without vote
A/RES/62/59	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	05.12.2007	Y: 176, N: 1, A: 4, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/19	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	05.12.2007	Y: 121, N: 1, A: 56, NV: 14, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/16	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	05.12.2007	adopted without vote
A/RES/62/51	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	05.12.2007	Y: 120, N: 52, A: 10, NV: 10, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/36	Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	05.12.2007	Y: 139, N: 3, A: 36, NV: 14, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/18	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	05.12.2007	adopted without vote
A/RES/62/24	Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	05.12.2007	Y: 109, N: 55, A: 15, NV: 13, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/39	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	05.12.2007	Y: 127, N: 27, A: 27, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/42	Nuclear disarmament	05.12.2007	Y: 117, N: 47, A: 17, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/35	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	05.12.2007	Y: 169, N: 3, A: 8, NV: 12, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/46	Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources	05.12.2007	adopted without vote
A/RES/62/32	Reducing nuclear danger	05.12.2007	Y: 117, N: 52, A: 12, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/37	Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	05.12.2007	Y: 170, N: 3, A: 9, NV: 10, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/56	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	05.12.2007	Y: 170, N: 5, A: 7, NV: 10, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/25	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	05.12.2007	Y: 156, N: 5, A: 14, NV: 17, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/31	Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)	05.12.2007	Y: 174, N: 1, A: 5, NV: 12, TVM: 192
A/RES/62/100	Effects of atomic radiation	17.12.2007	adopted without vote
A/RES/63/6	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	27.10.2008	adopted without vote
A/RES/63/13	Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	03.11.2008	Y: 64, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 127, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/87	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	02.12.2008	Y: 175, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 13, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/39	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	02.12.2008	Y: 122, N: 1, A: 58, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/75	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	02.12.2008	Y: 121, N: 50, A: 10, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/41	Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	02.12.2008	Y: 141, N: 3, A: 34, NV: 14, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/63	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	02.12.2008	Y: 141, N: 3, A: 36, NV: 12, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/38	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	02.12.2008	adopted without vote
A/RES/63/49	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	02.12.2008	Y: 127, N: 30, A: 23, NV: 12, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/56	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	02.12.2008	adopted without vote
A/RES/63/46	Nuclear disarmament	02.12.2008	Y: 117, N: 45, A: 19, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/65	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	02.12.2008	Y: 171, N: 3, A: 7, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/47	Reducing nuclear danger	02.12.2008	Y: 118, N: 50, A: 14, NV: 10, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/73	Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	02.12.2008	Y: 173, N: 4, A: 6, NV: 9, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/84	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	02.12.2008	Y: 169, N: 5, A: 6, NV: 12, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/58	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	02.12.2008	Y: 166, N: 5, A: 7, NV: 14, TVM: 192
A/RES/63/89	Effects of atomic radiation	05.12.2008	adopted without vote
A/RES/64/8	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	02.11.2009	adopted without vote
A/RES/64/24	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	02.12.2009	adopted without vote
A/RES/64/69	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	02.12.2009	Y: 175, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 13, TVM: 192

A/RES/64/27	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	02.12.2009	Y: 118, N: 0, A: 58, NV: 16, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/59	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	02.12.2009	Y: 116, N: 50, A: 12, NV: 14, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/26	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	02.12.2009	adopted without vote
A/RES/64/31	Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	02.12.2009	Y: 109, N: 56, A: 10, NV: 17, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/55	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	02.12.2009	Y: 124, N: 31, A: 21, NV: 16, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/35	International Day Against Nuclear Tests	02.12.2009	adopted without vote
A/RES/64/53	Nuclear disarmament	02.12.2009	Y: 111, N: 45, A: 19, NV: 17, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/44	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	02.12.2009	Y: 170, N: 3, A: 6, NV: 13, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/37	Reducing nuclear danger	02.12.2009	Y: 115, N: 50, A: 14, NV: 13, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/47	Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	02.12.2009	Y: 171, N: 2, A: 8, NV: 11, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/52	Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia	02.12.2009	Y: 166, N: 3, A: 6, NV: 17, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/66	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	02.12.2009	Y: 167, N: 6, A: 6, NV: 13, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/57	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	02.12.2009	Y: 169, N: 5, A: 5, NV: 13, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/29	Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	02.12.2009	adopted without vote
A/RES/64/39	Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)	02.12.2009	Y: 174, N: 0, A: 6, NV: 12, TVM: 192
A/RES/64/85	Effects of atomic radiation	10.12.2009	adopted without vote
A/RES/65/9	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	08.11.2010	adopted without vote
A/RES/65/39	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	08.12.2010	adopted without vote
A/RES/65/61	Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations	08.12.2010	adopted without vote
A/RES/65/91	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	08.12.2010	Y: 179, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 9, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/43	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	08.12.2010	Y: 119, N: 0, A: 58, NV: 15, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/40	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	08.12.2010	adopted without vote
A/RES/65/80	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	08.12.2010	Y: 124, N: 49, A: 11, NV: 8, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/71	Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	08.12.2010	Y: 157, N: 3, A: 22, NV: 10, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/42	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	08.12.2010	adopted without vote
A/RES/65/76	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	08.12.2010	Y: 133, N: 28, A: 23, NV: 8, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/70	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	08.12.2010	adopted without vote
A/RES/65/56	Nuclear disarmament	08.12.2010	Y: 120, N: 45, A: 18, NV: 9, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/58	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	08.12.2010	Y: 174, N: 3, A: 6, NV: 9, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/60	Reducing nuclear danger	08.12.2010	Y: 121, N: 49, A: 14, NV: 8, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/88	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	08.12.2010	Y: 172, N: 6, A: 8, NV: 6, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/59	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	08.12.2010	Y: 173, N: 5, A: 5, NV: 9, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/65	Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	08.12.2010	Y: 179, N: 1, A: 2, NV: 10, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/49	Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia	08.12.2010	Y: 144, N: 3, A: 36, NV: 9, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/72	United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	08.12.2010	Y: 173, N: 1, A: 11, NV: 7, TVM: 192
A/RES/65/96	Effects of atomic radiation	10.12.2010	adopted without vote
A/RES/65/127	Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	13.12.2010	adopted without vote
A/RES/66/7	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	02.11.2011	adopted without vote
A/RES/66/33	2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee	02.12.2011	Y: 175, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 15, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/23	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	02.12.2011	adopted without vote
A/RES/66/64	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	02.12.2011	Y: 175, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 14, TVM: 193

A/RES/66/26	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	02.12.2011	Y: 120, N: 0, A: 57, NV: 16, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/57	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	02.12.2011	Y: 117, N: 48, A: 12, NV: 16, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/25	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	02.12.2011	adopted without vote
A/RES/66/28	Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	02.12.2011	Y: 118, N: 52, A: 6, NV: 17, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/46	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	02.12.2011	Y: 130, N: 26, A: 23, NV: 14, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/51	Nuclear disarmament	02.12.2011	Y: 117, N: 45, A: 18, NV: 13, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/48	Reducing nuclear danger	02.12.2011	Y: 117, N: 49, A: 13, NV: 14, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/61	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	02.12.2011	Y: 167, N: 6, A: 5, NV: 15, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/40	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	02.12.2011	Y: 169, N: 6, A: 6, NV: 13, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/44	Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	02.12.2011	Y: 158, N: 2, A: 21, NV: 12, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/43	Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)	02.12.2011	adopted without vote
A/RES/66/45	United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	02.12.2011	Y: 169, N: 1, A: 11, NV: 12, TVM: 193
A/RES/66/70	Effects of atomic radiation	09.12.2011	adopted without vote
A/RES/67/3	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	05.11.2012	adopted without vote
A/RES/67/9	Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	19.11.2012	adopted without vote
A/RES/67/26	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	03.12.2012	adopted without vote
A/RES/67/76	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	03.12.2012	Y: 184, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 5, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/29	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	03.12.2012	Y: 126, N: 0, A: 57, NV: 10, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/64	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	03.12.2012	Y: 129, N: 49, A: 10, NV: 5, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/46	Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems	03.12.2012	Y: 164, N: 4, A: 19, NV: 6, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/28	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	03.12.2012	adopted without vote
A/RES/67/33	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	03.12.2012	Y: 135, N: 22, A: 26, NV: 10, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/39	High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament	03.12.2012	Y: 179, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 10, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/52	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	03.12.2012	adopted without vote
A/RES/67/60	Nuclear disarmament	03.12.2012	Y: 124, N: 44, A: 18, NV: 7, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/55	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	03.12.2012	Y: 179, N: 4, A: 4, NV: 6, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/45	Reducing nuclear danger	03.12.2012	Y: 123, N: 48, A: 15, NV: 7, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/56	Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations	03.12.2012	Y: 147, N: 4, A: 31, NV: 11, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/73	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	03.12.2012	Y: 174, N: 6, A: 6, NV: 7, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/34	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	03.12.2012	Y: 175, N: 6, A: 5, NV: 7, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/53	Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices	03.12.2012	Y: 166, N: 1, A: 21, NV: 5, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/31	Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia	03.12.2012	Y: 146, N: 2, A: 35, NV: 10, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/59	United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	03.12.2012	Y: 174, N: 1, A: 13, NV: 5, TVM: 193
A/RES/67/112	Effects of atomic radiation	18.12.2012	adopted without vote
A/RES/68/10	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	06.11.2013	adopted without vote
A/RES/68/25	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	05.12.2013	adopted without vote
A/RES/68/68	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	05.12.2013	Y: 181, N: 1, A: 3, NV: 8, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/28	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	05.12.2013	Y: 127, N: 0, A: 57, NV: 9, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/26	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	05.12.2013	adopted without vote
A/RES/68/58	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	05.12.2013	Y: 126, N: 49, A: 9, NV: 9, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/27	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	05.12.2013	adopted without vote

A/RES/68/35	Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	05.12.2013	Y: 120, N: 53, A: 9, NV: 11, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/32	Follow-up to the 2013 High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament	05.12.2013	Y: 137, N: 28, A: 20, NV: 8, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/42	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons	05.12.2013	Y: 133, N: 24, A: 25, NV: 11, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/47	Nuclear disarmament	05.12.2013	Y: 122, N: 44, A: 17, NV: 10, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/40	Reducing nuclear danger	05.12.2013	Y: 125, N: 50, A: 10, NV: 8, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/46	Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations	05.12.2013	Y: 158, N: 4, A: 20, NV: 11, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/65	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	05.12.2013	Y: 169, N: 5, A: 6, NV: 13, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/39	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	05.12.2013	Y: 171, N: 7, A: 5, NV: 10, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/49	Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)	05.12.2013	adopted without vote
A/RES/68/51	United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	05.12.2013	Y: 169, N: 1, A: 14, NV: 9, TVM: 193
A/RES/68/73	Effects of atomic radiation	11.12.2013	adopted without vote

Table 2: SC Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (1945-2013)

Symbol	Title	Date	Voting Summary[345]
S/RES/20(1947)	Security Council resolution 20 (1947) [on international control of atomic energy]	10.03.1947	Y: 011, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000 , TVM: 011
S/RES/52(1948)	Security Council resolution 52 (1948) [on international control of atomic energy]	22.06.1948	Y: 009, N: , A: 002, NV: 000, TVM: 011
S/RES/74(1949)	Security Council resolution 74 (1949) [on transmission of resolutions on atomic energy to the General Assembly]	16.09.1949	Y: 009, N: 000, A: 002, NV: 000, TVM: 011
S/RES/255(1968)	Security Council resolution 255 (1968) [on measures to safeguard non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]	19.06.1968	Y: 010, N: 000, A: 005, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/487(1981)	Security Council resolution 487 (1981) [on the Israeli military attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities]	19.06.1981	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000 , NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/707(1991)	Security Council resolution 707 (1991) [on Iraqi violation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) with regard to inspection of its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons capabilities]	15.08.1991	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/825(1993)	Security Council resolution 825 (1993) [on the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]	11.05.1993	Y: 013, N: 000, A: 002, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/984(1995)	Security Council resolution 984 (1995) [on security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]	11.04.1995	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1172(1998)	Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) [on nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998]	06.06.1998	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1540(2004)	Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) [on non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons]	28.04.2004	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1673(2006)	Security Council resolution 1673 (2006) [on extension of the mandate of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)]	27.04.2006	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1695(2006)	Security Council resolution 1695 (2006) [on the launching of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)]	15.07.2006	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1696(2006)	Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) [on suspention by Iran of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development]	31.07.2006	Y: 014, N: 001, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1718(2006)	Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) [on imposition of restrictive measures on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)]	14.10.2006	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1737(2006)	Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) [on measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development]	23.12.2006	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1747(2007)	Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) [on further measures against Iran in connection with its development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes]	24.03.2007	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1762(2007)	Security Council resolution 1762 (2007) [on termination of the mandates of UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA's Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO)]	29.06.2007	Y: 014, N: 000, A: 001, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1803(2008)	Security Council resolution 1803 (2008) [on further measures against Iran in connection with its development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes]	03.03.2008	Y: 014, N: 000, A: 001, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1810(2008)	Security Council resolution 1810 (2008) [on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on extension of the mandate of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons]	25.04.2008	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1835(2008)	Security Council resolution 1835 (2008) [on Iran's obligations to comply with Security Council's resolutions and meeting the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors]	27.09.2008	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1874(2009)	Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) [on measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in connection with its nuclear weapon tests]	12.06.2009	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1887(2009)	Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) [on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament]	24.09.2009	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1928(2010)	Security Council resolution 1928 (2010) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea]	07.06.2010	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1929(2010)	Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) [on measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development]	09.06.2010	Y: 012, N: 002, A: 001, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1957(2010)	Security Council resolution 1957 (2010) [on termination of the weapons of mass destruction, missile, and civil nuclear-related measures imposed by resolutions 678 (1991) and 707 (1991)]	15.12.2010	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1977(2011)	Security Council resolution 1977 (2011) [on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on extension of the mandate of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons until 25 Apr. 2021]	20.04.2011	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015

[345] Y=Yes; N=No; A= Abstentions; NV=Non-Voting; Total Voting Membership.

S/RES/1984(2011)	Security Council resolution 1984 (2011) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2009) concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 June 2012]	09.06.2011	Y: 014, N: 000, A: 001, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/1985(2011)	Security Council resolution 1985 (2011) [on renewal of the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until 12 June 2012]	10.06.2011	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/2049(2012)	Security Council resolution 2049 (2012) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010) concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 July 2013]	07.06.2012	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/2050(2012)	Security Council resolution 2050 (2012) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts as specified in resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until 12 July 2013]	12.06.2012	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/2055(2012)	Security Council resolution 2055 (2012) [on increase of the size of the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons]	29.06.2012	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/2087(2013)	Security Council resolution 2087 (2013) [on condemning the missile launch of 12 Dec. 2012 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea]	22.01.2013	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/2094(2013)	Security Council resolution 2094 (2013) [on strengthening sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and condemning the missile launch of 12 Feb. 2013]	07.03.2013	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/2105(2013)	Security Council resolution 2105 (2013) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010) concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 July 2014]	05.06.2013	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/2141(2014)	Security Council resolution 2141 (2014) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until 5 Apr. 2015]	05.03.2014	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015
S/RES/2159(2014)	Security Council resolution 2159 (2014) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010) concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 July 2015]	09.06.2014	Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, NV: 000, TVM: 015

Figure 2: Nuclear Fission and Nuclear Fusion



Left: Uranium-235 combines with a neutron to form an unstable intermediate, which quickly splits into the radioactive isotopes barium-144 and krypton-89 plus three neutrons in the process of nuclear fission. Right: Deuterium and tritium combine by nuclear fusion to form helium plus a neutron. In both processes, high amounts of energy are released (Source: *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, available at <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/media/66093/Top-Uranium-235-combines-with-a-neutron-to-form-an>).

Figure 3: World's Nuclear Warhead Stockpile (1945-2010)



Source: *Thomas Rheuters*, available at: <http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/worlds-nuclear-warhead-stockpile-graphic-day>.

Figure 4: Worldwide Nuclear Testing: Atmospheric and Underground (1945-2013)



Source: *CTBTO*, available at: <http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/worlds-nuclear-warhead-stockpile-graphic-day>.

Figure 5: GA Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament per year (1945-2013)



Source: own research and diagram.

Figure 6: SC Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament per year (1945-2013)



Source: own research and diagram.