

Polarisation and Electoral Realignment: The Case of the Right-Wing Parties in Spain

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Abstract

The article analyses the consequences of elite polarisation at the mass level. We study the electoral re-alignment within the right-wing Spanish electorate in recent years, whereby support for the long-predominant Partido Popular has been eroded dramatically to the benefit of new challengers. Measuring ideological polarisation at the party system level and at the individual level, we show how the polarising strategy implemented by the liberal Ciudadanos - and imitated by PP - to gain support from the right-wing electorate paved the way for a massive transfer of conservative voters to the radical-right Vox. The results provide counter-intuitive evidence about the electoral effects of elite polarisation: those individuals who perceived party polarisation less tended to vote more for the radical right party, while those who perceived greater polarisation among parties were more likely to vote for moderate forces.

Keywords

Partido Popular, Ciudadanos, Vox, de-alignment, mainstream parties, radical right, elections, party strategies

Mainstream conservative political parties have experienced electoral decline in European democracies in the last decade as a consequence of the rise of new radical-right forces. In some cases, this change has favoured centrist or left-wing parties, while many other conservative parties have resisted by adopting more right-wing discourses or even making coalitions with their radical-right opponents (De Lange 2012). The result is usually an increase in systemic polarisation and the spread of centrifugal politics among mainstream parties.

Spain provides an outstanding example of such transformation. The long-predominant centre-right Partido Popular (People's Party, PP) has recently seen its electoral base largely hollowed out by new actors on both sides: Ciudadanos (Citizens, Cs) at the centre, and Vox on the right. For almost 30 years, PP had been one of the strongest conservative parties in Europe, encapsulating most of the electorate from the centre to the far right, and had monopolised right-wing parliamentary representation at the national level (Astudillo & García-Guereta 2006). Since José María Aznar became the party leader, its electoral support fluctuated between 34.7 per cent of the electorate (1993, the lowest score) and 44.6 per cent (2011, the highest); in 2011-2015, this gave the party one of the few single-party majorities in Europe amid the Great Recession. Thereafter, however, PP has seen its support decline to a low point of 16.7 per cent in the April 2019 election, by far its worst result in 40 years.

Previous studies have stressed the importance of economic voting, anti-incumbency protest and cultural changes in the electorate to explain electoral realignment on the right (Bischof & Wagner 2019; Norris & Inglehart 2019). Other scholars argue that new parties adopt innovative strategies, like issue entrepreneurship or anti-establishment rhetoric, to challenge mainstream forces (de Vries & Hobolt 2020; Hutter, Kriesi, & Vidal 2018; Mudde 2007). In particular, anti-immigration and authoritarian

attitudes have been important drivers of support for radical right forces (Donovan 2019; Mudde 2007) and some scholars have claimed this is the case for Vox (Vampa 2020). However, the rapid decline of PP happened in spite of its management of a robust economic recovery, and its incumbency position helped the party to maintain its electoral base until it was expelled from government through a no-confidence vote in 2018. In the same vein, authoritarian values and tough stances on immigration do not seem to have played a fundamental role in the rise of Vox, while the electorate's main political values and ideological identity have remained broadly unaltered throughout this time.

In contrast to the arguments proposed by the literature to explain the decline of mainstream conservative parties, this article aims to explain the electoral realignment on the Spanish centre-right by focusing on the consequences for electoral behaviour of centrifugal party competition and the resulting polarisation. An electoral realignment occurs in 'critical elections that brought sharp and long-lasting changes in voting patterns' (Mayhew 2000, p. 450). Centrifugal or polarising party strategies are those implying a shift of a party toward the extremes (here, its own right) or pushing moderate voters towards the extremes. Building on these concepts, we argue that polarising competition has blurred the differences between moderate and radical parties in the eyes of the voters, thus favouring the switching of moderate voters towards Vox without radicalising the electorate's preferences.

To test our argument, the article is organised as follows. First, we provide some theoretical arguments about polarisation and party competition. We then sketch the traits of the Spanish political scene since 2014, before presenting our hypotheses and variables. The following two sections give evidence of the increase of polarisation, as well as the parties' centrifugal strategies. The seventh section empirically assesses the consequences

for the parties' electoral support. The conclusion discusses the counter-intuitive role of polarisation at the end of this period.

Polarisation and party competition

Polarisation is usually related to ideological or policy distances between voters and between parties across the ideological spectrum of any given polity in a way which decisively shapes how political forces compete within the party system (Campbell 2016; Dalton 2008; Sartori 1976). Polarisation usually denotes, implicitly or explicitly, three different components: an ideological distance among parties, voters, or both; an element of extremism related to the presence of anti-system forces; and parties' internal homogeneity (Schmitt 2016, p. 3). The most common approach analyses ideological polarisation as based on the party distances on the left–right dimension, although ideological differences may also be captured on other dimensions and relating to specific issues (Lauka, McCoy, & Firat 2018; Tronconi & Valbruzzi 2020).

Scholars have divided over two main sources of polarisation. The first approach suggests that parties increase their ideological distances when voters move to the extremes (Cox 1990; Ezrow 2007), depending on the strength of voters' attachment to parties (Ezrow et al. 2011), their propensity to abstain (Dreyer & Bauer 2019) or the institutional incentives produced by the electoral system (Curini & Hino 2012, p. 463; Dow 2011).

A second approach assumes that elites are prone to polarisation (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, p. 17) and that, therefore, they may adopt centrifugal strategies to compete with their adversaries, which, in turn, produce changes in voters' partisanship and ideological perceptions (Lupu 2015), fuelling polarisation in the electorate. This

perspective is important for our analysis, as it shows the linkage between party strategies and the resulting level of system polarisation.

Some party strategies aim explicitly to avoid polarisation. For instance, mainstream parties employ ‘dominance strategies’, like converging on the centre, avoiding controversial issues by focusing on the economic left-right policies, or emphasising competence and government experience (de Vries & Hobolt 2020, p. 89). On the contrary, new parties may attempt to expand their electoral presence, to the detriment of the dominant parties, by implementing ‘innovation strategies’, such as politicising new issues (‘issue entrepreneurship’) and employing anti-establishment rhetoric (de Vries & Hobolt 2020, p. 58).

These innovation strategies are likely to produce polarisation. Hence, in stable democracies, the breakthrough of radical right parties has contributed to an increased polarisation at the party level, because they legitimise extreme ideological positions, while moving opposing parties and voters to the ideological extremes (Bischof & Wagner 2019; Castanho Silva 2018; Mudde 2013). Critical contexts certainly helped the breakthrough of the radical right parties: the anti-incumbency vote has usually punished the mainstream parties that ruled the country during the recession years (Downes & Loveless 2018), and the anti-immigration vote has fuelled support for far-right parties that, in times of economic crisis, have taken hard stances against immigrants and other scapegoats like the European Union (Pardos-Prado 2015; Szöcsik & Polyakova 2019). In an effort to face these challenges, mainstream conservative parties may strategically emphasise those issues that have a chance of mitigating electoral losses (Downes & Loveless 2018) by changing their platforms as a reaction against the new radical competitors (Mudde 2013; Rooduijn, de Lange & van der Brug 2012).

Of no less interest, centre parties may also adopt centrifugal strategies to push mainstream parties to the extremes (Hazan 1997) in order to avert the permanent risk of being trapped among moderate left and right forces (Duverger 1954). The idea of a centre party producing polarisation rather than moderation might seem paradoxical. However, Sartori (1976, p. 119) had already warned about the polarising effect of centre parties. Hence, the fragile situation of a small centre party competing simultaneously with both left and right mainstream parties produces incentives to foster centrifugal dynamics of competition. Nagel & Wlezien (2010) labelled this centrifugal dynamic the ‘occupied centre hypothesis’ and used it to explain why, in the UK, the existence of the Liberal Party forced the Conservatives and the Labour party to move towards the extremes to please their voters.

What could the consequences of these polarising strategic party choices be for the electorate? The increase of polarisation is assumed to negatively affect party switching overall, reducing party volatility (Dejaeghere & Dassonneville 2017). The argument is that, when polarisation is high, the ideological distances between parties also increase, making a switch less likely (Hazan, 1997). This should benefit those parties already represented in the parliament.

However, in a context of political upheaval, new parties may take advantage of polarising strategies when these are based on specific issues that could damage mainstream parties. Voters may in fact prefer parties that take strong stances on issues that go in the same direction of their own policy preferences (Rabinowitz & Macdonald 1989). As a result, even without relevant left–right changes in the electorate, polarising strategies may be successful in attracting moderate voters (Pardos-Prado & Dinas 2010). This would give evidence to a centrifugal strategy implemented from the centre to compete with a dominant party.

Nevertheless, polarisation may have paradoxical effects in those situations where two different new parties compete simultaneously for the same electoral space with similar centrifugal strategies in a context of frustrated voters. To understand such a paradox, we need to distinguish between two dimensions of elite polarisation. The first gauges the ideological distances between parties, that is the voter's perception of the extent of elite polarisation (or horizontal polarisation). The second, in contrast, captures the distance between voters and parties, that is the voters' perceptions of how far party elites are from the voters' own positions (vertical polarisation). This is a distinction that has, so far, been under-explored in the literature.

We assume that, although these two dimensions may be correlated, individuals may have differing perceptions of them and, consequently, these perceptions may affect their electoral choices differently (Orriols & Balcells 2012). For instance, one may feel ideologically far from most of the parties in the spectrum, but at the same time perceive a limited distance among those parties (and vice versa). Party strategies may produce different combinations of these dimensions. In particular, similar centrifugal strategies, implemented by two different parties around the same cleavage, may dilute distinctions between parties if the voter does not see substantial differences between her preferred party and the others on the relevant issues at hand. In a context where she anticipates that her vote will not impede the victory of her ideological adversaries (here, the left-wing parties), she may decide to 'cock a snook' with her vote and choose the party perceived as the most genuine representative against the opposite bloc (Hopkin 2020; Zelle 1995) - the one which produces more rejection among her adversaries - even if she perceives it ideologically further from herself than other parties.

To better understand how these mechanisms could have influenced Spanish voters, the next section will introduce the political context where the party realignment took place, before formulating our hypotheses.

The splintering of the centre and right in Spain

The years 2014-2019 marked a period of deep political transformation for the Spanish party system. In the 2015 general election, the traditional two-party politics was replaced by a four-party scheme, after the parliamentary breakthrough of Podemos (We can) and Cs, followed by the arrival of Vox in April 2019. That was the result of an unprecedented electoral realignment within the left and particularly within the right. While in 2011 PP still represented the whole electorate from the centre to the far-right, the four general elections held since then splintered this political space through a staggered process of political fragmentation, as more than 50 per cent of those former PP's voters moved gradually to the new forces (Table 1).

This fragmentation also produced important consequences for the government, led by PP between December 2011 and June 2018 (Table 2). By the time Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy called for a new election in December 2015, the economic crisis had already passed. However, government formation became much more complicated with the loss of PP's majority. The failed attempt to form an alternative majority by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers Party, PSOE) and Cs eventually forced a new election in June 2016. Rajoy was able to form a new minority cabinet in November with the parliamentary support of Cs while the main left-wing opposition parties were occupied with their own internal crisis.

Nevertheless, the frailty of the ruling minority ended up with a no-confidence vote in June 2018 that replaced Rajoy's government with a new PSOE cabinet, headed by

Pedro Sánchez, with additional parliamentary support from Podemos and regionalist parties. This alternation in government fostered more realignment among conservative voters in the two elections of 2019, to the benefit of Cs in April and Vox in November (Simón 2020a). The change in the balance of power between parties produced a new political deadlock after the April election: although PSOE and Cs had a potential parliamentary majority, Cs rejected any deal with the socialists, fearing the electoral costs, while the PSOE made an unsuccessful attempt to form a coalition with Podemos (Simón 2020b).

Overall, the electoral realignment on the right was the result of increasing party competition faced by PP from both sides: while Cs challenged its moderate electorate, Vox competed for its most conservative voters. To a lesser extent, a realignment also took place on the left between PSOE and Podemos, which in turn reinforced the dynamic of competition between left and right.

PP's political decline

The government years were not smooth sailing for the internal life of PP. Rajoy combined a conservative approach to dealing with the crisis, based on austerity policies, with a moderate profile for the cabinet ministers and the party central executive, which was mostly formed of pragmatic politicians loyal to the prime minister. Despite the improvement in the economic situation since 2014, the cabinet had become highly unpopular for political reasons (Bosco 2018). On the one hand, during the financial crisis several cases of political corruption emerged, involving prominent national and regional leaders of the party. This not only discredited Rajoy and his cabinet, but also eroded citizens' political trust in traditional parties (Orriols & Cordero 2016, pp. 474-5). In the 2015 general election, this factor produced intense vote switching from PP towards Cs

(Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio, 2016). But the most dramatic impact came with the Supreme Court's decision that PP was guilty of corruption and illegal funding, which eventually led to the no-confidence vote and the end of the Rajoy cabinet in June 2018.

On the other hand, the government had to deal with a political revolt in Catalonia, where the nationalist parties which were ruling at the regional level challenged the authority of the Spanish state, demanding for a referendum on secession. The situation became increasingly unstable until October 2017, when the Catalan parliament voted in favour of a unilateral declaration of independence, leading Rajoy's cabinet to use the constitutional powers to implement direct rule over Catalonia. These political developments fuelled internal dissatisfaction and criticism from the party's right-wing factions, who called for a tougher party line against the Catalan secessionists. The former conservative prime minister, José María Aznar, described Rajoy's cabinet style as one of 'languid resignation' (Cué 2013), referring also to the excessive moderation of the executive policy agenda and the failure to deliver some key party electoral promises (like tax cuts, or the reverting of existing progressive policies on abortion or gay marriage).

This internal dissatisfaction helped Pablo Casado to become new party leader after Rajoy's resignation. The new party executive removed the previous moderate elite and adopted a harder line, characterised by strong opposition to the new left-wing government and a more conservative discourse. Other members preferred to quit the party. From 2014 onwards, there were occasional announcements of members and local groups leaving the party, which mirrored a more general decline of the party's membership and electorate.

Hence, the party's waning fortunes in the opinion polls reflected how the right-wing space was becoming gradually fragmented. It started first among moderate voters. As Table 3 shows, between 2011 and 2019, the party lost 30 points among individuals who placed themselves at positions 6 and 7 on the left-right axis, while its share of voters

placing themselves at point 5 was reduced to a quarter of what it had been in 2011. In a second stage, the electoral fragmentation spread towards the furthest positions on the right (9 and 10 on the axis), where the party's support dropped from an average 86 per cent in 2011 to about 38 per cent in April 2019¹.

Cs up and down

Although Cs was born in 2006 in Catalonia, as a regional party that opposed the Catalan nationalist movement and promoted political change in Spanish politics (Rodríguez-Teruel & Barrio 2016), it made its national breakthrough in the European elections in May 2014. Since then, Cs expanded to other regions across Spain, in parallel with Podemos, and developed a highly centralised party organisation under the strong leadership of Albert Rivera. This expansion was built on absorbing former members and local groups from PP and small centre parties, who saw the new force as an easy springboard for a quick political promotion.

In the 2015 general election, Cs received 3.5 million votes, mostly from the centrist electorate that supported the centripetal approach offered by the party. After the failed attempt to form a government with the PSOE, Cs insisted on a moderate coalition with PP and PSOE after the 2016 election, and it finally became the main parliamentary support for Rajoy's minority government without joining the cabinet. By 2016, Cs had become the first preference among moderate voters at position 5 on the left-right axis, and was supported by more than 20 per cent of those placed at position 6 (Table 3).

Since 2017, the party's support as registered in the CIS opinion polls increased in parallel with PP's decline, a development favoured by Cs' electoral strategy, which was aimed at diving deeper into the conservative waters. As a consequence of this new right-

wing orientation, Cs rejected the possibility of forming a government with the PSOE after the April 2019 election, resulting in a failure to form a government which eventually led to a new election in November. However, the party's inability to use its enlarged strength to build a coalition with the PSOE was punished in the November 2019 election, when Cs collapsed and lost around 80 per cent of its parliamentary representation, forcing Rivera's resignation.

The surge of Vox

The breakthrough of Vox in the Andalusian regional election of December 2018 exacerbated the process of political fragmentation on the right. Vox had been created at the end of 2013 by former conservative PP members who had recently left the party, like Santiago Abascal. Vox criticised PP's tolerance regarding regional nationalisms and the Spanish model of devolution (Vampa 2020), but more generally defended traditional conservative values – with particular emphasis against Islamic immigrants and feminism – in contrast with PP's moderate catch-all ideology.

Although Vox failed to achieve representation in its early years, the party aimed to find a niche in the more conservative electorate, making agreements with other radical right forces in Europe and the United States. Shortly after the party finally made its electoral breakthrough in Andalusia, some pundits in the right-wing media welcomed Vox as an opportunity to replace PP with a genuinely new conservative force.

As Vox became more attractive for right-wing activists and voters, the huge increase in members paralleled the electoral and institutional evolution of the party in the 2019 electoral cycle. Vox gained its first national parliamentary seats in April, and then became the third largest party in November. In May 2019 Vox had also become the fifth

largest Spanish force in the EP elections and a necessary coalition partner after the regional and municipal elections of the same month. Although this rapid electoral expansion was rooted in a wide range of centrist and conservative voters, Vox was particularly successful in challenging PP's long-time dominance among the radical right electorate. Hence, in April 2019 Vox became the first party among voters self-placed at positions 9-10 on the left-right axis, and achieved the support of more than a quarter of those conservative voters at position 8 (Table 3).

Coordination failure on the right

As we have seen in this section, the successful breakthrough of Cs and Vox was the consequence of an enormous 'coordination failure' within the Spanish right. This is the electoral situation produced when two or more political parties located in close proximity on the ideological spectrum fail to run together, eroding their chances of winning against other political opponents (Cox 1997). This coordination failure produced a staggered realignment on both the left and the right, reflected in the high intra-bloc volatility in 2015 (31.2) and 2019 (20.2 and 11.9), and the rise of the effective number of electoral parties to almost six in 2019, doubling the fragmentation score of the previous decades. Most of this volatility and fragmentation was related to the realignment held on the right, particularly in the 2019 general elections, as explained above (see Table A1 in the online Appendix available at: [LINK TO APPENDIX TO BE ADDED HERE](#)).

Hypotheses and measures of vertical and horizontal polarisation

To explain the electoral realignment that took place in Spain, we propose two hypotheses regarding how polarisation may have affected party switching among right-wing voters. These hypotheses relate to the two dimensions mentioned at the end of the theoretical section: vertical and horizontal polarisation. First, we should expect a distinct effect of vertical polarisation (distance between voters and parties) on support for new parties: higher perceived distance between the voter and the parties will increase support for the more radical party (Vox); in opposition, a lower perceived distance will favour the vote for Cs and PP [H₁]. Second, we should expect horizontal polarisation (distance between parties as perceived by voters) to have a distinct effect on support for new parties, in contrast with what the literature has suggested: higher perceived distances between parties will increase support for Cs and PP and decrease support for the more radical Vox, while lower party distances will increase voting for Vox to the detriment of its opponents [H₂].

Previous studies have employed several criteria to measure polarisation, with a vast amount of variation in how they measure dispersion, weighting, the approach employed for the ideological position, and the number of dimensions (Schmitt 2016). We employ three different indicators, based on individuals' perceived ideological distances on the left-right dimension, as obtained from mass surveys. Adopting this ideological cleavage to measure polarisation is a necessary choice, because the Spanish party system is organised around a non-orthogonal structure in which party sorting on other policy dimensions follows the same pattern of alignment as the left-right dimension (Hutter, Kriesi & Vidal 2018; Rovny & Polk 2019).

To describe the evolution of polarisation, we use Russell Dalton's index of ideological polarisation (DIP) for both supply and demand-sides (i.e. based in parties perceived positions, and voters self-positions) in order to observe the consequences of party strategies in terms of polarisation at the party system level (or systemic polarisation) during these years:

$$DIP = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1} w_j \left[\frac{(p_j - \bar{p})}{4.5} \right]^2}$$

where p_j is the party position and \bar{p} is the average position of all political parties the respondent in the left-right axis as perceived by voters, and w_j is the party's vote share. The distance $p_j - \bar{p}$ is divided by 4.5 because it is the mean point in our index ranging from 1 to 10.

To estimate the impact of polarisation on voting at the individual level according to our hypotheses, we employ two additional indicators. The first hypothesis tests the effect of vertical polarisation between individuals and parties as perceived by the former. We measure vertical polarisation with our own estimation of the average of the sum of the distances between the voter and each party (VPI):

$$VPI = \frac{\sum_{j=1} (v - p_j)}{m}$$

where v is the voter's self-placement and p_j is the ideological perceived position on the left-right axis, and m is the number of parties the respondent placed.

The second hypothesis refers to horizontal polarisation between parties. To measure horizontal polarisation, we employ Noam Lupu's index of perceived party polarisation (LIPP), as the sum of the weighted average distances between each pair of parties:

$$LIPP = \sum_{k=1}^{m-1} \sum_{j=1}^m \frac{w_j + w_k}{m-1} |p_j - p_k|$$

where j and k are different parties, p_j and p_k are the ideological positions the respondent assigned parties j and k on the left-right axis, w_j and w_k are their vote shares, and m is the number of parties the respondent placed.

The different measures of polarisation are estimated using survey data from the CIS Data Bank (see endnote 1), particularly its post-electoral studies. These include questions about individuals' self-placement on the left-right index (from 1 to 10), as well as party positions according to individuals. Thus the measures will contribute to capture the ideological polarisation within the party system (DIP) resulting from the arrival of new parties, estimated for both parties and voters, but also the extent of ideological heterogeneity among Spanish political parties as perceived by individuals (with the LIPP index), as well as the elite-mass ideological distance (measured with the VPI).

5 Perceptions of ideological polarisation

Since 2015, polarisation has achieved unprecedented levels of ideological distance among electorates and parties (see Table 4). We estimated an increase of 1 point in Dalton's index of party polarisation (DIP) for the period 2015–2019, which scored above 5 on average, compared to previous years (4.1 points on average in the index for the period 1977–2015). This polarisation could hardly be the result of a radicalisation of the electorate's ideology, as this has remained remarkably very stable since the 1980s (during this decade it has fluctuated between 4.91 in December 2011 and 4.46 in July 2018). Instead, the cause is the breakthrough of Podemos, Cs and Vox into the party

system, as the increase of the number of political parties expanded the ideological distances among the groups of voters they represent. The literature suggests two different mechanisms to sustain this effect: PR electoral systems produce mechanical fragmentation and, therefore, polarisation; besides this, the expectation that elections deliver majority governments fuels centrifugal competition and, consequently, polarisation (Cox 1990, p. 914; Curini & Hino 2012, p. 461). However, as one of the least proportional PR systems – and one of the most stable – and in a context of elections delivering weak minority executives, the rise of polarisation in Spain can hardly rely on these explanations.

Instead, the source of polarisation seems to lie in the centrifugal strategies adopted by the new parties. Between 2011 and 2015, we observe a significant increase in all the indicators of polarisation, particularly in the systemic polarisation (measured with DIP) on both (supply and demand) sides. This is mostly related to the emergence of Podemos and its populist rhetoric directed against the political establishment (*la casta*). However, Podemos' failure to overcome the PSOE and the subsequent electoral stagnancy of the left slightly reduced this polarisation, particularly at the voter level, in 2017-2018. This evolution reflects the decline in popularity of PP and Podemos (the most extreme parties at that time) in the opinion polls. Interestingly, this slight decrease in the systemic polarisation (the DIP index for parties went back from 4.76 in January 2017 to 4.46 in July 2018) and the perceived party polarisation (LIPP fell from 3.08 in January 2017 to 2.78 in July 2018) was not paralleled in the voter/party polarisation (VPI), which suggests a growing distance between many voters and the political parties as a result of political dissatisfaction.

A third stage in this evolution is correlated with the breakthrough of Vox in the Andalusian regional election of December 2018. As stated in previous lines, the systemic

polarisation increased substantially along 2019 (from 4.75 in December 2018 to 5.47 one year later), although it is important to note that perceived distance among parties (LIPP) and between voters and parties (VIP) remained stable, which would suggest that an important proportion of the electorate might not perceive the new radical-right party as being very different from their nearest opponents. This perceived proximity notwithstanding, the increase of systemic polarisation fed the adversarial rhetoric and bad manners between political opponents, expanding the distance between left and right and the rejection of ideological extremes. In this respect, the out-party rejection increased through this decade: by January 2019, 33.2 per cent of individuals rejected any possibility of voting for the PSOE, and 53 per cent for PP, in contrast to the lower levels of party rejection of the previous decade (in 2005, 13.9 per cent of the voters were against the PSOE and 29 per cent against PP). The new forces produced an even greater out-party rejection: Cs 44.5 per cent, Podemos 51.2 per cent, and Vox 71.1 per cent (Table A3 in the online Appendix).

In sum, the arrival of new parties has contributed to grow ideological polarisation in different aspects, according to voters' perception: the ideological distances among parties, among voters, and between voters and parties. This polarisation started first on the left, and then, after a period of political détente in 2018, it was spread on the right. The lack of relevant changes in individuals' ideological self-placement along the decade turns our attention to the role of political parties and their strategies of political competition in order to seek explanations for such a polarising drift, as we argue in the following section.

Centrifugal strategies of competition

In previous sections we provided evidence of the realignment that reshaped Spanish politics, and we stated our expectations about how party polarising strategies could foster this electoral change. In this section, we identify the centrifugal strategies adopted by the three parties: a centre party's strategy aimed at attracting conservative hardliners (Cs); a radical party's strategy aimed at favouring a major realignment by appealing to moderate voters (Vox); and the dilemma the traditionally dominant party on the right had in dealing with them.

Polarising from the centre

Between 2014 and 2019, Cs developed three different competitive strategies. In the beginning, like Podemos, it tried to achieve representation in the national parliament by politicising the cleavage between old and new politics through an innovation strategy (de Vries & Hobolt 2020). Adopting an 'issue entrepreneurship' approach, Cs emphasised the need for democratic transparency, institutional reforms, and the fight against corruption and participation, thus avoiding the left–right cleavage. Cs combined the 'new vs old politics' approach with calls to reform the political system through multiparty coalitions with the establishment parties. After the 2015 election, Rivera adopted a second, more traditional, strategy, where Cs played a pivotal role promoting centripetal agreements with PP or PSOE based on a moderate policy platform.

However, by 2017 political events delivered a chance for Cs to seek dominance over the conservative electorate as Rajoy faced increasing tensions in dealing with Catalan secessionism. In this context, Cs adopted a more clear-cut centrifugal strategy, oriented to gain support among right-wing voters without losing ground among the

moderate electorate, following Hazan's argument (1997). On the one hand, Cs abandoned the previous pivotal strategy distancing itself from the PSOE and dismissing policy agreements with this party in the national or regional parliaments. In January 2017, for instance, Cs' general assembly decided to remove the references to social democracy from the party's statutes. In addition, Cs stepped up its criticism of the PSOE, particularly after the return of Pedro Sánchez as the PSOE's secretary general in May 2017.

On the other hand, Cs focused its competitive strategy around the centre-periphery cleavage, by adopting an uncompromising nationalist discourse against the Catalan independence movement. In this respect, Cs expected to seize upon the reputation as a tough opponent of Catalan nationalism that it had achieved during its initial years. The deterioration of the political situation in Catalonia in the fall of 2017 contributed to the success of this strategy. Hence, Cs called for a tougher implementation of the central government's direct rule over the Catalan regional administration. It also defended strong judicial activism against independentist political leaders. In parallel, the party stressed Spanish nationalism through the political vindication of national pride and national symbols like the flag or the anthem. The party's message emphasised inclusive 'civil patriotism' as opposed to what they understood as exclusionary 'identity-based' regional nationalisms like the Catalan one. The strategy's goal was to polarise party competition over the national issue by relegating the left-right divide. As Rivera stated, 'I do not see reds or blues, I just see Spaniards' (Gálvez 2018). In similar terms, he repeatedly insisted that 'we need to talk more about Spain and Spaniards and less about parties' (Pardo 2018). Actually, the party was increasingly perceived as being skewed to the right by the electorate: in less than three years, voters placed the party almost two points further to the right (Figure 1).

Although PP had for a long time built a strong reputation around identity issues and Spanish nationalism, its ability to replicate Cs' strategy was now severely limited. As an incumbent party, it suffered discredit in the eyes of its own supporters for having failed to satisfactorily manage the Catalan issue, as well as for several cases of political corruption. Hence, Cs' strategy seemed to have successfully worked in the opinion polls by May 2018, increasing the party's electoral momentum. This fuelled a steady transfer of votes from PP, taking the intention to vote for Cs to the top of the opinion polls for some months, while PP's support collapsed. The proportion of former PP voters stating that they intended to switch to Cs increased from 4.2 (April 2017) to 21.5 per cent (July 2018), while PP's loyal voters dropped steadily over this time (source: CIS Data Bank; see Table A4, online Appendix).

However, the return of the left to government in June 2018 downgraded the centrifugal strategy of Cs. The party suddenly lost visibility and influence in its new opposition role. Besides, the PSOE seemed to recover again support among moderate voters, while the arrival of Vox some months later narrowed the window for party competition on the right, as the vote transfers from PP to Cs as recorded in the opinion polls started to switch to the new party (Table A4). Overall, this situation set the party back severely in the opinion polls (Figure 2).

In this new context, Cs decided to maintain its centrifugal strategy, at the risk of collusion with the radical right. For instance, Cs – like PP – joined Vox's major demonstration in Madrid's Colón square in defence of the Spanish nation against Sánchez's cabinet in February 2019. But still more controversial was Rivera's rejection of a deal with the PSOE after the general election in April, against the view of many of his own supporters (42.2 per cent of them preferred a coalition with the socialists)². After

the party's electoral collapse in the November vote, the resignation of Rivera put an end to the centrifugal strategy.

Polarising from the extreme

In the eyes of the conservative electorate, the political situation in the autumn of 2018 was dramatic: PP and Cs had lost control of the government, the PSOE ruled with the parliamentary support of Podemos and regionalist forces, and the end of the direct rule in Catalonia had allowed the secessionist parties to recover control of the Catalan regional administration once again. This situation spread strong dissatisfaction across the right-wing electorate against the new government, against politicians and political parties in general, against regional nationalisms and against Catalan secessionism in particular.

Vox seized upon this political disarray, which was spread across the conservative electorate, to implement a polarising strategy aimed at attracting dissatisfied moderate voters by offering a hard position against Catalan independence and the PSOE government. By the end of 2018, Vox's voters considered political discontent (about government, politics and Catalonia) as the more salient issue – in contrast with PP and Cs supporters, who were more worried about issues such as the economy or unemployment (see Table 5). To a lesser extent, immigration was also a distinctive issue of these supporters. More interestingly, the polarising effect of Vox' breakthrough spread these perceptions across the political spectrum: only one year later, political discontent had become the main problem for the whole electorate, in contrast to the issues of corruption or immigration, which became less important.

Rather than a genuinely populist anti-establishment discourse, Vox employed harsh adversarial rhetoric and bad manners to criticise PP and Cs, which it often labelled

as the ‘tiny, cowardly right’ for being too moderate in their role of opposition to the left’s policies. While Vox disregarded economic and social policies in its political discourse, it emphasised calls for the strong repression of the Catalan independence movement, such as calling repeatedly for the government to jail Catalan authorities and party leaders, to ban parties defending secession and to assume direct rule over the regional institutions. In addition, its platform included the suppression of decentralisation, intolerance regarding Muslim immigration, the defence of traditional values (in opposition to gender policies, such as gender quotas or measures against gender violence) and the exaltation of Spanish nationalism – with some nostalgic winks to the country’s authoritarian past (Barrio 2019; Ferreira 2019). However, the party’s stances on immigration and gender equality substantially limited Vox’ electoral potential beyond the right.

Dealing with polarisation as a mainstream party

While in government, PP avoided centrifugal politics, and responded with ‘dominance strategies’. Once back in opposition, the party found itself in an uncharted territory, competing with these new challengers for the same pool of voters. PP therefore chose to replicate its centrifugal strategy of competition, at the risk of increasing polarisation – despite being the mainstream party. Although PP (and Cs) disregarded Vox’s more controversial discourses on gender or immigration, the three parties coincided in the rejection of the Sánchez government’s position of dialogue with the independence movement. Casado (and other PP leaders) also copied Vox’s bad manners by adopting a disrespectful attitude towards their opponents. For instance, during the electoral campaign in 2019, Casado usually called the prime minister ‘mediocre’, ‘incompetent’ and ‘the biggest traitor in Spanish democratic history’, among other insults (Pardo, 2019). He also promoted the presence of hard-liners on the party lists. Moreover,

PP and Cs (the latter with greater difficulties) excluded any policy of ‘cordon sanitaire’ around Vox, and accepted it as a potential partner in minority local governments after the May 2019 regional and municipal elections. All this came at a cost as PP’s decision to accept Vox support in the institutional arena produced increasing internal criticism from the party’s moderate factions, who defended a more pragmatic, centrist approach.

However, Casado’s centrifugal strategy achieved its goal. Despite a disastrous result in the April 2019 election, in the repeat contest in November PP’s replication strategy resulted in a rather successful containment of its electoral losses, and the party avoided being electorally overwhelmed by its opponents.

Polarising also from the left

Although our study focuses on the right-wing electorate, in Spain centrifugal competition became systemic because it gave PSOE and Podemos incentives to emphasise the extremist drift of their opponents. This is obvious for Podemos and its equally polarising discourse against ‘the three rights’ (Cs, PP and Vox). However, the more relevant consequences affected the PSOE. On the one hand, the rise of polarisation between 2017 and 2019 stimulated the more left-wing positions within the party (see Figure 1). This critically helped Pedro Sánchez against the moderate party elite and allowed him to win the internal primary vote to once again become secretary general in May 2017 (after his forced resignation in October 2016). Polarisation also facilitated the realignment of all the parliamentary opposition, including the Catalan independence movement, in June 2018 to support the no-confidence vote against Rajoy. Finally, polarisation contributed to reducing the costs of the unprecedented coalition cabinet between PSOE and Podemos after the 2019 November election, since the impossibility of inter-bloc agreements did not allow other alternatives for government formation.

Interestingly, in all these episodes, the PSOE could reinforce its position with the left-wing electorate without adopting a centrifugal strategy that could have alienated its potential support among moderate voters. In fact, the failure to form a government after the April election was also motivated by the PSOE's concern that, by allying with Podemos, it would lose ground at the centre; for this reason a coalition with Cs was preferred. Because of Rivera's rejection of a centre-left coalition, a new election could have offered the PSOE a chance to recover centrist voters; however, this did not happen in the end.

The consequences for the electorate

We conducted an empirical analysis to test our two hypotheses (both the negative effect of vertical polarization [H₁] and the positive effect of horizontal polarization [H₂] on the probability of voting for Vox, in contrast with its opponents). Since the main dependent variable is vote choice for PP, Cs and Vox, we use both the logistic and the multinomial regression. To check the robustness of our results, several analyses have been run with different operationalisations of the dependent variable (changing reference categories of party vote; comparing loyalists to switchers). Our models control for the usual socioeconomic drivers and also for ideological identity. We also include voters' perceptions of the political and economic situation, immigration and authoritarian values, according to the alternative explanations given by the literature. Since concerns regarding Catalan secessionism and the PSOE government were key issues for party strategy, they are also included in each model. Our analysis employed data from the CIS post electoral surveys in 2019. For more details about the variables and models, see Tables A5-A6 in the online Appendix

Our first hypothesis tested the differential impact of perceived voter/party distance on the party vote (see Figure 3 to check the main indicators' effect). We have found a positive effect on the Vox vote in April, while the effect is negative for Cs and PP (see Figure 4). Hence, the odds of voting for Vox increased by 66 per cent for each additional point in the voter/party distance index (taking all other electoral choices as a reference category in a logit regression), while the odds of voting for Cs or PP decreased (-88 per cent and -59 per cent, respectively). We found a similar impact for the November election, confirming our hypothesis. In addition to this, higher voter/party distance also has a significant effect on party switching: among former PP voters in 2016, this type of polarisation increased the odds of switching to Vox, and reduced switching to Cs (taking PP loyal vote as a reference category in a multinomial regression). The effect is robust to different specifications of the model, even if we distinguish for other party choices too. In this respect, Vox is the only one of the five big parties whose support receives a constant positive effect of voter/party polarisation, while the support to the other parties, including Podemos, have a negative or insignificant effect. Only when PP vote is estimated taking the vote for Cs as a reference category of the multinomial model do the odds become positive, to a lesser extent than the radical party.

The impact of voter/party polarisation reflects a wide gap between Vox voters and the rest of the parties, although they do not see themselves as particularly further removed from Cs and PP. Actually, in November 2019, individuals voting for Vox perceived themselves as closer to PP than PP voters did themselves; they also perceived Cs closer to them than Vox on the left-right axis.

Our second hypothesis checks a more counter-intuitive mechanism: perceived party polarisation reduces the odds of voting for Vox while increasing the support for the party's more moderate opponents (see the distinctive marginal effects in Figure 4 and

particularly in Figure 5). We also find support for this expectation, as party polarisation has a negative impact on the chances of voting for Vox (-60 per cent), while it has a very strong impact on the odds of voting for Cs (each point of party polarisation multiplies its chances sevenfold) and, more moderately, for PP (+60 per cent). This impact is consistent across different specifications, particularly when it is estimated with multinomial models taking the vote for Cs as a reference category. It also fuelled the odds of becoming a loyal Vox voter between April and November elections, and switching from PP in April, or from Cs in November towards Vox. Hence, as voters perceived more party collusion on the right, blurring the differences between Cs, PP and Vox, the chances of choosing or switching to Vox increased substantially.

The empirical evidence provides a clearer picture of the explanatory mechanisms feeding this electoral realignment. Hence, the polarising centrifugal strategy implemented by Cs (and then followed by the PP) around Spanish nationalism and its tough opposition towards Catalan secessionism and the PSOE government seems, in the end, to have contributed to feeding a radical vote without radicalised voters, as a consequence of the combination of the two different streams of polarisation, vertical and horizontal. The increase of the perceived ideological distance between many right-wing voters and the political parties weakened the linkage between individuals and their parties of reference. Simultaneously, the reduction of the perceived ideological distance among moderate and radical parties diluted the distinctive borders of right-wing parties, reducing the costs of switching to the more radical force. The combination of the two trends facilitated, in the end, a massive switching from PP and Ciudadanos to Vox without the need of ideological radicalisation of moderate and conservative voters. In this respect, polarisation became a positive driver of party switching, in contrast with the evidence provided by previous studies (Dejaeghere & Dassonneville 2017).

Some additional findings help us to better understand this dynamic of competition on the right. On the one hand, economic motivations did not play a relevant role in PP's electoral decline. Loyal PP voters were positively more sensitive to economic problems than Vox supporters. On the contrary, concern about Catalan independence helped increase the chances of voting for the new parties, to the detriment of PP. But after Cs' failure to build an alternative majority with the PSOE, which would have reduced the influence of the Catalan nationalists in the national chamber, this factor turned into a negative effect for Cs in November. In this respect, at the end of 2019 Vox became the representative of those right-wing voters who cared most about the political turbulence, rather than economic problems – a role that had been played by Cs until then.

Regarding the effect of populist or non-liberal values on the realignment, our findings are in line with the literature (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama & Santana 2020). Hence, concern about immigration is a relevant predictor of voting for Vox. In addition, a preference for authoritarian regimes almost doubles the chances of voting for Vox, while it produces the opposite effect for Cs and PP. However, we should be careful about overinterpreting the meaning of this impact.

First, the effect of immigration and authoritarianism disappears in some models when taking into consideration the individual's perception of polarisation. For instance, this happens when estimating the chances of switching to Vox among former PP voters in 2016, or, solely in the case of authoritarian attitudes, when analysing switching to Vox between April and November among former Cs and PP voters.

Moreover, as we pointed out earlier, there is no evidence of such a cultural backlash among Spaniards that could open a window of opportunity for radical right forces. In December 2019, only 5.7 per cent of individuals expressed some preference for authoritarian regimes and around one third of them voted for Vox³. They actually

represented 21 per cent of the total Vox vote, while 70.4 per cent defended democracy as a preferred regime. As for immigration, only 10 per cent of Spaniards perceived it as a main issue⁴ and 22 per cent of them voted for Vox, making up 30 per cent of all its voters (as we saw in Table 4). Concerns about immigration were also positively related to the intention to vote for both PP and Cs immediately after the regional breakthrough of Vox⁵. In summary, while an important proportion of those expressing authoritarian values and concerns about immigration decided to vote for Vox because of the party's nativist discourse, the majority of Vox voters do not share the same opinions about those issues.

These numbers suggest that immigration and authoritarian values do not satisfactorily explain PP's decline and the radical right's entry into the Spanish party system. This points to an important dilemma for right-wing parties in competing around authoritarian values: while it may help to consolidate the electoral support of a small minority on the right, but it may also raise barriers for future expansion towards more moderate voters. This is the reason why PP and Cs have so far avoided competing with Vox on these issues.

Conclusions

This article has argued that the political realignment that took place in the Spanish right-wing political space has been strongly connected with the centrifugal strategies implemented by the new challenger parties in a context of political discredit for the mainstream forces. Cs and Vox adopted hard positions on particular issues, especially around the national identity and against Catalan secessionism, to attract moderate and conservative voters, and forced PP to follow their centrifugal orientation.

Empirically, we have tested satisfactorily the effects of this elite polarisation. First, we found a positive effect of vertical polarisation (perceived distance between each voter and all the parties) on the vote for Vox, i.e. right-wing voters who feel themselves distant from the parties tend to vote for the more radical option. Second, we also found that the horizontal polarisation (perceived distances among parties) has a counter-intuitive effect, since the lower the perceived level of party polarisation, the higher the support for Vox and the lower the probability to vote for Cs and PP. In this respect, the overlapping centrifugal strategies implemented by Cs and, then, by PP blurred party differences between moderate and radical forces. In a context of political frustration, this finally worked to the benefit of Vox's electoral chances. In parallel, this polarising competition on the right also reduced the costs of collaboration between PSOE, Podemos and the regionalists, underpinning the parliamentary support for the new prime minister, Sánchez.

These findings deliver a better assessment of how new parties faced risk and trade-offs after making their breakthrough into the political system. The strengthening of this centrifugal competition also brings new risks for the political system. Strategies of polarisation based on the national identity in ethnically divided societies may foster the dynamics of centrifugal democracy, obstructing consociational arrangements to solve territorial conflicts (Vatter 2016) such as the secessionist crisis in Catalonia. The entry of populist or radical right new actors into the national arena also produces stagnation and deadlock as well as increasing polarised pluralism (Wolinetz 2018). It may also foster 'faulty' euroscepticism, rooted in domestic political crisis (Real-Dato & Sojka 2020). From a longer historical perspective, the organisational decline of mainstream conservative parties has been interpreted as a threatening predictor of the instability of democratic regimes (Ziblatt 2017). All in all, it is still to be seen whether the political

evolution underway is a temporary readjustment after a political backlash or just an episode of a staggered electoral realignment in the Spanish party system.

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¹ All the data on public opinion in the article come from different opinion polls conducted by the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Centre for Sociological Research, CIS), a public-funded entity that is the main reference on social and political surveys in Spain. All these data are available in the CIS Data Bank website (www.cis.es).

² Source: CIS Barometer, May 2019 (E3247).

³ Source: CIS Barometer, December 2019 (E3269).

⁴ In the months prior to the regional breakthrough of Vox, the immigration crisis had certainly gained momentum after the decision of the Sánchez government to accept the refugees rescued by the Aquarius boat in June 2018. Hence, between June and September, the concern about immigration grew from 3.5 to 15.6 per cent (according to CIS Barometers). It has remained stable since then, fluctuating around 10 per cent. However, these numbers are far from the levels of the previous decade when immigration became a problem for more than 30 per cent of the population, especially between 2005 and 2008.

⁵ Source: CIS Barometer, December 2018 (E3234) and January 2019 (E3238).

Table 1. Electoral support for PP, Ciudadanos and Vox in general elections

		2011	2015	2016	2019	2019
		December	December	June	April	November
PP	Votes	10,866,566	7,236,965	7,941,236	4,373,653	5,047,040
	%	44.6	28.7	33.0	16.7	20.8
	Seats	186	123	137	66	89
Ciudadanos	Votes		3,514,528	3,141,570	4,155,665	1,650,318
	%		13.9	13.1	15.9	6.8
	Seats		40	32	57	10
Vox	Votes				2,688,092	3,656,979
	%				10.3	15.1
	Seats				24	52
Total sum	Votes	10,324,323	10,751,493	11,082,806	11,217,410	10,354,337
	%	40.1	42.6	46.1	42.8	42.7
	Seats	154	163	169	147	151

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs.

Table 2. Composition of Spanish Governments (2011-2020)

Government	Time in office	Duration (months)	Type of majority	Parties	Parliamentary seats %	External parliamentary support
Rajoy I	12/2011-12/2015	48	Majority	PP	53	-
Rajoy (caretaker)	12/2015-10/2016	10	Minority	PP	35	-
Rajoy II	10/2016-06/2018	20	Minority	PP	39	Ciudadanos, regionalists
Sánchez I	06/2018-04/2019	11	Minority	PSOE-PSC	35	Podemos, IU, regionalists
Sánchez (caretaker)	04/2019-01/2020	7	Minority	PSOE-PSC		-
Sánchez II	01/2020-...	-	Minority	PSOE-PSC + Podemos + IU	47	Regionalists

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Table 3. Party vote (%) across the left-right dimension in Spanish general elections, 2011-2019

	PP					Ciudadanos				Vox	
	2011 December	2015 December	2016 June	2019 April	2019 November	2015 December	2016 June	2019 April	2019 November	2019 April	2019 November
Left 1	3.6	0	0	0.3	0	0.6	0.9	0.3	0	0	0.9
2	1.8	0.5	0.6	0	0.4	0.5	0.1	1	0	0	0.7
3	1.7	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.4	2.2	1.3	1.3	0.7	0.1	0
4	7.2	1.6	1.2	0.1	0.7	8.3	4.8	3.7	2.8	0.2	0.7
5	32.5	12.3	12	5.9	7.8	20.5	16.9	21.8	10.5	2.2	5.1
6	63.5	41.7	47	24.5	30.8	28.6	22	35.2	17.9	6.4	12.3
7	76	68.3	65.7	39.5	45.1	11.7	13.9	17.0	10.2	15.4	22.4
8	84.4	71.1	75.8	42.8	52.5	9.6	5.4	11.2	2.5	27.0	24.5
9	87.2	81.4	88.3	39.6	45.6	11	1.8	6.9	1.2	40.6	40.8
Right 10	84.8	85.7	77.4	35.5	28.8	3.2	5.4	6.6	3.4	40.8	47.5

Source: CIS databank post-electoral surveys. Rows show percentage of vote for each party in each ideological position for each election.

Table 4. Indicators of perceived polarisation in Spain, 2004-2019

		L-R mean electorate	Dalton's Index (parties) (DIP)	Dalton's Index (voters) (DIP)	Lupu's Index (LIPP)	Voter-Party Distance Index (VPI)
2004	March	4.59	4.11	2.89	-	-
2008	March	4.67	4.21	3.24	-	-
2011	December	4.91	4.41	3.42	2.85	2.66
2015	December	4.65	5.12	3.63	3.09	3
2016	June	4.67	5.21	3.88	3.25	2.95
	October	4.63	5.54	3.89	3.19	3.03
2017	January	4.76	5.32	3.77	3.08	2.94
	April	4.64	5.18	3.46	3.06	2.98
	July	4.58	5.25	3.72	3.23	3.03
	October	4.75	5.12	3.15	3.17	2.98
2018	January	4.73	4.94	3.30	3.08	2.92
	April	4.55	4.97	3.21	2.73	3.03
	July	4.46	4.83	3.23	2.78	3.05
	September	4.67	4.83	3.16	3.02	3
	October	4.59	4.91	3.31	3.1	3.05
	Novembre	4.55	5.02	3.19	3.1	3.1
	December	4.72	4.75	3.29	3.03	2.96
2019	January	4.60	5.03	3.71	3.08	3.4
	February	4.57	5.02	3.66	3.12	3.36
	March	4.61	5.32	4.15	3.15	3.42
	April	4.62	5.37	3.91	3.18	3.35
	May	4.46	5.39	3.89	3.16	3.32
	June	4.55	5.30	4.06	3.14	3.33
	July	4.49	5.41	4.20	3.19	3.5
	September	4.50	5.32	3.96	3.12	3.43
	October	4.54	5.23	3.82	3.11	3.42
	December	4.63	5.47	3.90	3.04	3.26

Source: Own estimation using CIS data bank. We employ the CIS voting intention to weight DIP and LIPP except in the case of time points with elections. L-R mean indicates the average of voters self-placement in the Left-Right axis.

Table 5. Issue saliency in Spain according to right-wing voters' perceptions

	SPAIN		PP		Ciudadanos		Vox	
	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019
Unemployment	59.8	57.4	61.6	61.4	61.8	61.1	41.7	52.7
Political discontentment*	44.9	62.4	49.8	72.7	50.6	68.4	65.6	73.7
Corruption	25.3	20.7	22.7	16.6	23.3	20.9	28.6	21.2
Economic problems	22.3	30.5	18.7	31.3	23.1	34.5	23.8	25.4
Immigration	12.9	9.7	16.2	10.9	21.0	6.6	27.4	29.8

Source: CIS databank (December 2018. December 2019).

Notes: Issue saliency: individuals were asked which were the most relevant problems in Spain, choosing three answers among more than fifty options. Right-wing voters' perceptions: in 2018, groups are segmented by declared voting intention in the next general election; in 2019, the variable is vote recall in 2019 November general election. *Political discontentment includes those worried about four options: the government, politicians and political parties, regional nationalisms and the Catalan secessionism.




Figure 1. Positions of Spanish parties on the left-right axis as perceived by the electorate. Source: CIS data bank. Corresponding values for each time point are provided in Table A2 in the online Appendix. Data on voters' position correspond to the first column of Table 4 (L-R mean electorate column).




Figure 2. Voting intention for PP, Ciudadanos and Vox (2016-2020). Source: CIS data bank.




Figure 3. Main coefficients for right-wing vote in Spain's April 2019 election (logit models). Source: Logistic regressions including control variables for age, gender, profession, education, political variables and ideology. See the online Appendix for more details.




Figure 4. Average marginal effects of polarisation indexes on voting for right-wing parties in the Spanish election of November 2019 (multinomial models). Source: Multinomial regression including all the control variables mentioned in the text. See the online Appendix for more details.




Figure 5. Estimated marginal effect of perceived party polarisation on voting in the Spanish election of November 2019 (multinomial models). Source: Multinomial regression including all the control variables mentioned in the text. See the online Appendix for details.

ONLINE APPENDIX

Polarisation and Electoral Realignment: The Case of the Right-Wing Parties in Spain by Juan Rodríguez-Teruel

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This Appendix includes the following additional information:

- Table A1 with data for the party system;
- Table A2 with perceived party position in the L-R axis;
- Table A3 with the level of rejection of voting for parties;
- Table A4 with loyalty and vote switching from former PP voters;
- Tables A5-A6 with main descriptives for the models in April and November 2019;
- Tables A7-A12 with coefficients obtained by the models with different specifications of the dependent variable in both April and November 2019 elections:
 - o Tables A7-A8: Logistic models explaining vote for PP, Ciudadanos and Vox;
 - o Tables A9-A10: Multinomial models explaining vote choice for those parties with different categories of reference;
 - o Tables A11-A12: Multinomial models explaining loyalty and vote switching among right-wing voters with different categories of reference;
- Figure A1 with the main coefficients related to our hypotheses for the models analysing the vote in the 2019 November election;
- Figure A2 with the scatterplot for the vertical and horizontal polarisation indexes.

For additional data, the survey datasets employed in the analysis and the STATA syntax files, please contact the author (jrteruel@uv.es).

Table A1. Spanish party system data. 1977-2019

	Fragmentation			Volatility			Polarisation			Concentration		
	ENEP	ENPP	New Parties	Total	Intra-bloc	Inter-bloc	Voters	Party	Diff. Party-Voters	Mean L-R electorate	Electoral	Parliamentary
1977	4.5	2.9	-	-	-	-	2.68	3.41	0.73	NA	63.8	80.9
1979	4.3	2.8	3	11.0	7.2	3.8	2.55	3.42	0.87	4.8	65.2	82.6
1982	3.2	2.3	2	43.4	37.4	6.0	3.36	4.92	1.56	4.8	74.5	88.3
1986	3.6	2.7	2	13.1	11.3	1.8	3.67	4.69	1.02	4.5	70	82.6
1989	4.1	2.9	5	9.1	7.8	1.4	3.53	4.28	0.75	4.6	65.4	80.5
1993	3.5	2.7	3	11.5	8.8	2.7	3.48	4.1	0.62	4.7	73.5	85.7
1996	3.2	2.7	0	5.8	4.6	1.2	3.38	4.33	0.95	4.7	76.4	84.8
2000	3.1	2.5	1	9.4	2.6	6.8	2.93	3.76	0.83	4.9	78.7	88.0
2004	3.0	2.5	0	10.8	2.3	8.5	2.89	4.11	1.22	4.6	80.3	89.1
2008	2.8	2.4	1	5.0	4.1	0.9	3.24	4.21	0.97	4.6	83.8	92.2
2011	3.3	2.6	1	16.4	10	6.4	3.42	4.41	0.99	4.9	73.4	84.6
2015	5.1	4.1	5	36.3	31.2	5.1	3.56	5.02	1.46	4.6	50.7	60.9
2016	4.5	3.8	0	6.3	3.4	2.8	3.82	5.13	1.31	4.6	55.6	63.4
A2019	5.9	4.8	1	22.2	20.2	2.0	3.59	5.10	1.51	4.5	45.36	54
N2019	5.9	4.6	2	12.4	11.9	0.6	3.74	5.25	1.51	4.7	48.81	59.7

Source: Own estimation.

Table A2. Left-Right positioning of Spanish political parties according to voters' perceptions

	PSOE	PP	Podemos	Ciudadanos	Vox
2010	4.16	7.6			
2011	4.19	7.89			
2012	4.25	8.01			
2013	4.42	8.17			
2014	4.68	8.23	2.46	5.54	
2015	4.46	8.18	2.29	5.77	
2016	4.52	8.24	2.24	6.43	
01/2017	4.74	8.21	2.18	6.56	
10/2017	4.55	8.22	2.09	6.74	
01/2018	4.49	8.13	2.18	6.76	
10/2018	4.29	8.30	2.30	7.25	
01/2019	4.20	8.00	2.20	7.00	9.30
10/2019	4.20	7.90	2.30	7.1	9.40

Source: CIS Databank. Cells show the average position given by voters to political parties in the Left-Right axis (from 1 to 10).

Table A3. Rejection of voting for specific political parties in Spain. 2005-2019

	PSOE	PP	Podemos	Ciudadanos	Vox
2005	13.9	29.0			
2010	31.2	36.6			
2011	37.5	39.6			
2012	31.6	46.5			
2013	40.9	55.6			
2014	41.9	59.3			
2015	40.5	60.6	41.8	51.1	
2016	36.6	53.4	46.4	44.2	
2017	38.5	52.1	54.7	46.5	
2018	36.9	53.2	58.8	40.9	
01/2019	33.2	53.0	51.2	44.5	71.1
11/2019	32.2	46.8	45.7	47.8	63.8

Source: CIS databank. Cells show the percentage of respondents scoring 0 to the question 'Which is the probability you would vote for this party from 0 (I will never vote for it) to 10 (surely I will vote for it)'.

Table A4. Loyal PP voters and transfers to other parties: opinion polls. 2017-2019

	2017			2018			2019			
	April	July	October	January	April	July	January	February	April	November
Loyals	79.3	73.8	68.8	64.8	63.2	58.5	56.4	53.5	41.5	60.9
Switching to Ciudadanos	4.2	6.4	10.4	15.7	18.7	21.5	18.1	13.7	8.3	1.7
Switching to Vox					1.3	2.2	14.1	10.7	11.2	3.4
Other options	16.5	19.8	20.8	28.5	16.8	17.8	11.4	22.1	39	34
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: CIS data bank. Columns indicate the frequencies of voting intention for those having voted PP in the previous election (which is 2016 in all the columns except the two last, for which is 2019).

Table A5. Main descriptives for models for the April 2019 elections in Spain

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
P23R_PP	5943	.1018004	.3024111	0	1
P23R_Cs	5943	.1075215	.3098011	0	1
P23R_Vox	5943	.0489652	.2158134	0	1
G19_DER	5943	.4637389	.8704289	0	3
G19_exPP16	5943	.3683325	.9375233	0	4
AGE_diez	5943	2.618543	1.64914	0	5
ESTUDIOS2	5942	2.323124	.8235716	1	4
PROFESION	5943	2.056369	1.214334	1	6
tamuni2	5943	1.185933	.761929	0	2
izq_der	5063	2.548884	1.002333	1	5
criticos_e~n	5888	.462466	.4986316	0	1
criticos_pol	5826	.4539993	.4979222	0	1
P4	5943	1.458186	1.481705	1	9
nacional	5943	1.150429	1.856041	0	9
economy	5943	.1356217	.3424153	0	1
inmigration	5943	.0166583	.1279981	0	1
anti_indep	5943	.0928824	.290292	0	1
sanchez	5379	5.915226	2.563632	1	10
distpsoe	5314	4.604817	3.652517	0	10
polper	4541	3.180235	.6460502	0	4.828275
P33_media	4311	3.350638	1.137871	0	8.2

Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019.

Table A6. Main descriptives for models for the 2019 November elections in Spain

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
B22R_PP	4804	.13801	.3449464	0	1
G19N_DER	4804	.4656536	.8959312	0	3
VOT02019DER	4804	.4177769	.881782	0	3
Gender	4804	.5154038	.4998147	0	1
AGE_diez	4804	2.610949	1.655524	0	5
ESTUDIOS2	4804	2.348251	.8332032	1	4
PROFESION	4804	2.07806	1.226887	1	6
TAMUNI	4804	3.825354	1.661587	1	7
religion	4804	1.337427	1.223174	0	9
C3	4804	19.63863	34.2833	1	99
criticos_e~n	4763	.504304	.500034	0	1
criticos_pol	4676	.7645423	.4243299	0	1
B3	4804	1.279975	.7380717	1	4
nacional	4804	.9779351	1.363061	0	4
inmigrantes	4804	.0997086	.2996422	0	1
corrupcion	4804	.203164	.4023955	0	1
malestar	4804	.5643214	.4958971	0	1
economia	4804	.7352206	.4412616	0	1
anti_indep	4804	.0622398	.2416157	0	1
sanchez	4470	6.93311	2.464653	1	10
polper	3553	3.035137	.6914265	0	4.7304
C4_media	3387	3.195867	1.163435	0	9

Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019.

Table A7. Logit models to explain party choice in April 2019 (compared to those not voting for the party)

P23R_PP	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	P23R-Cs	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	P23R_Vox	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Gender	-0.25	0.14	0.07	Gender	0.35	0.12	0.00	Gender	-0.52	0.19	0.01
AGE_diez				AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	0.09	0.33	0.79	1	0.05	0.22	0.82	1	0.63	0.37	0.09
2	0.45	0.31	0.15	2	-0.19	0.21	0.38	2	0.36	0.36	0.32
3	0.57	0.31	0.07	3	-0.22	0.22	0.32	3	0.00	0.38	0.99
4	0.79	0.36	0.03	4	-0.58	0.28	0.04	4	-0.08	0.47	0.87
5	0.85	0.40	0.03	5	-1.06	0.35	0.00	5	-0.03	0.54	0.96
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	-0.08	0.22	0.70	2	0.07	0.22	0.74	2	0.17	0.36	0.64
3	-0.25	0.16	0.11	3	-0.14	0.13	0.29	3	0.68	0.23	0.00
4	0.00	(empty)		4	0.00	(empty)		4	4.65	1.76	0.01
PROFESION				PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	0.68	0.24	0.01	2	-0.93	0.23	0.00	2	-0.52	0.35	0.15
3	0.43	0.25	0.08	3	0.16	0.23	0.50	3	-0.87	0.38	0.02
4	-0.00	0.29	0.99	4	-0.37	0.28	0.18	4	-0.16	0.41	0.71
5	0.34	0.43	0.44	5	0.36	0.28	0.19	5	-0.14	0.53	0.79
6	-0.13	1.21	0.91	6	0.63	0.96	0.51	6	1.59	1.55	0.31
tamuni2	-0.29	0.09	0.00	tamuni2	0.14	0.08	0.06	tamuni2	0.11	0.12	0.37
religion				religion				religion			
1	1.43	0.30	0.00	1	-0.47	0.19	0.02	1	0.41	0.31	0.18
2	1.01	0.29	0.00	2	0.05	0.16	0.76	2	0.03	0.29	0.91
3	-0.07	0.73	0.93	3	-0.24	0.46	0.60	3	-0.94	0.81	0.24
9	0.75	1.14	0.51	9	-1.61	1.29	0.21	9	0.37	1.17	0.75
izq_der				izq_der				izq_der			
1	0.00	(empty)		2	-0.41	0.51	0.42	1	0.00	(empty)	
2	-6.17	1.03	0.00	3	1.06	0.52	0.04	2	-4.83	0.66	0.00
3	-1.91	0.30	0.00	4	-0.02	0.53	0.97	3	-2.26	0.36	0.00
4	-0.34	0.27	0.21	5	0.59	0.60	0.32	4	-0.76	0.30	0.01
5	0.00	(omitted)						5	0.00	(omitted)	
criticos_ecor	-0.26	0.15	0.08	criticos_ecor	-0.16	0.13	0.19	criticos_ecor	0.17	0.20	0.40
criticos_pol	-0.05	0.15	0.73	criticos_pol	-0.34	0.13	0.01	criticos_pol	0.57	0.21	0.01
P4				P4				P4			
2	-0.50	0.28	0.07	2	-0.89	0.30	0.00	2	0.63	0.29	0.03
3	-0.44	0.36	0.21	3	0.22	0.31	0.47	3	0.60	0.39	0.13
8	-0.12	0.46	0.80	8	-0.82	0.47	0.08	8	1.12	0.52	0.03
9	-0.63	1.23	0.61	9	-0.80	1.33	0.55	9	0.35	1.17	0.76
nacional				nacional				nacional			
1	0.35	0.16	0.03	1	-0.27	0.15	0.08	1	0.34	0.21	0.12
2	0.26	0.20	0.20	2	-0.17	0.20	0.38	2	0.29	0.26	0.28
3	-0.50	0.30	0.09	3	-0.59	0.25	0.02	3	-1.58	0.64	0.01
7	-1.52	1.04	0.14	7	-0.63	0.44	0.15	7	0.00	(empty)	
8	0.65	1.58	0.68	8	1.16	1.21	0.34	8	0.00	(empty)	
9	0.00	(empty)		9	0.79	1.11	0.47	9	0.00	(empty)	
economy	-0.02	0.18	0.93	economy	0.15	0.15	0.30	economy	-0.42	0.26	0.11
immigration	-0.23	0.46	0.61	immigration	0.01	0.42	0.99	immigration	1.39	0.45	0.00
anti_indep	-0.94	0.18	0.00	anti_indep	1.16	0.14	0.00	anti_indep	1.47	0.18	0.00
sanchez	0.22	0.03	0.00	sanchez	0.11	0.03	0.00	sanchez	0.25	0.05	0.00
polper	0.47	0.14	0.00	polper	2.02	0.18	0.00	polper	-0.90	0.15	0.00
P33_media	-0.88	0.16	0.00	P33_media	-2.10	0.20	0.00	P33_media	0.50	0.16	0.00
_cons	-1.66	0.67	0.01	_cons	-3.30	0.67	0.00	_cons	-2.65	0.85	0.00

Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019.

Table A8. Logit models for party choice in the November 2019 (compared to those not voting for the party)

P22R_PP	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z		P22R-Cs	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z		P22R_Vox	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Gender	0.26	0.14	0.06		Gender	0.17	0.17	0.31		Gender	-0.61	0.18	0.00
AGE_diez					AGE_diez					AGE_diez			
1	0.36	0.30	0.24		1	-0.07	0.30	0.81		1	-0.51	0.30	0.08
2	0.54	0.29	0.06		2	-0.68	0.31	0.03		2	-0.56	0.28	0.05
3	1.00	0.29	0.00		3	-0.41	0.31	0.18		3	-0.85	0.30	0.01
4	0.92	0.34	0.01		4	-0.68	0.40	0.09		4	-1.09	0.39	0.01
5	0.98	0.39	0.01		5	-1.73	0.51	0.00		5	-1.75	0.51	0.00
ESTUDIOS2					ESTUDIOS2					ESTUDIOS2			
2	0.51	0.24	0.03		2	-0.40	0.36	0.28		2	-0.40	0.42	0.34
3	-0.16	0.15	0.30		3	-0.50	0.18	0.01		3	0.68	0.20	0.00
4	-1.01	1.28	0.43		4	0.00	(empty)			4	0.49	1.22	0.69
PROFESION					PROFESION					PROFESION			
2	-0.13	0.22	0.55		2	-0.27	0.27	0.31		2	-0.07	0.25	0.78
3	-0.12	0.25	0.63		3	0.40	0.33	0.23		3	-0.21	0.34	0.53
4	0.32	0.32	0.31		4	0.21	0.44	0.63		4	-0.50	0.54	0.35
5	0.62	0.40	0.12		5	-0.05	0.40	0.90		5	-0.48	0.42	0.25
6	-1.43	0.91	0.12		6	0.87	0.73	0.23		6	0.56	0.83	0.50
TAMUNI	-0.04	0.04	0.32		TAMUNI	0.17	0.05	0.00		TAMUNI	-0.04	0.05	0.40
religion					religion					religion			
1	1.15	0.24	0.00		1	0.02	0.28	0.95		1	0.25	0.28	0.37
2	0.73	0.22	0.00		2	0.20	0.21	0.36		2	0.22	0.23	0.35
3	1.05	0.49	0.03		3	-0.29	0.64	0.65		3	0.02	0.64	0.97
9	-1.12	1.10	0.31		9	0.42	0.86	0.62		9	1.78	0.71	0.01
C3					C3					C3			
1	0.00	(empty)			1	0.00	(empty)			1	0.00	(empty)	
2	-3.25	1.11	0.00		2	0.00	(empty)			2	1.36	1.11	0.22
3	-3.92	0.73	0.00		3	-2.10	1.02	0.04		3	0.00	(empty)	
4	-4.39	0.69	0.00		4	-1.85	0.95	0.05		4	2.84	1.14	0.01
5	-2.47	0.51	0.00		5	-1.21	0.94	0.20		5	4.08	1.13	0.00
6	-1.03	0.51	0.04		6	-0.95	0.95	0.32		6	5.09	1.15	0.00
7	-0.38	0.49	0.45		7	-1.47	0.94	0.12		7	6.03	1.13	0.00
8	0.19	0.46	0.69		8	-3.19	1.04	0.00		8	5.78	1.09	0.00
9	0.06	0.48	0.90		9	-3.34	1.37	0.01		9	6.24	1.07	0.00
10	0.00	(omitted)			10	0.00	(omitted)			10	6.21	1.03	0.00
criticos_ecor	-0.12	0.13	0.35		criticos_ecor	-0.19	0.17	0.27		criticos_ecor	0.44	0.17	0.01
criticos_pol	0.15	0.18	0.42		criticos_pol	0.26	0.23	0.26		criticos_pol	0.17	0.26	0.52
B3					B3					B3			
2	-1.08	0.28	0.00		2	0.11	0.37	0.76		2	1.48	0.25	0.00
3	-0.27	0.33	0.41		3	0.23	0.37	0.54		3	0.24	0.37	0.51
4	-0.06	0.51	0.91		4	-0.30	0.77	0.70		4	0.33	0.51	0.52
nacional					nacional					nacional			
1	0.37	0.16	0.03		1	0.50	0.21	0.02		1	0.02	0.21	0.93
2	0.44	0.23	0.05		2	0.00	0.34	0.99		2	-0.34	0.31	0.27
3	-0.24	0.28	0.39		3	-0.48	0.42	0.25		3	-1.15	0.40	0.00
4	-0.63	0.48	0.19		4	0.21	0.42	0.61		4	-1.11	0.59	0.06
inmigrantes	-0.20	0.19	0.29		inmigrantes	-0.62	0.31	0.05		inmigrantes	1.13	0.20	0.00
corrupcion	-0.37	0.17	0.02		corrupcion	0.14	0.20	0.47		corrupcion	0.24	0.20	0.22
malestar	0.14	0.14	0.31		malestar	-0.09	0.17	0.59		malestar	-0.01	0.18	0.97
economia	0.40	0.16	0.01		economia	0.13	0.21	0.54		economia	-0.32	0.19	0.09
anti_indep	-0.54	0.20	0.01		anti_indep	0.25	0.24	0.31		anti_indep	1.42	0.20	0.00
sanchez	0.22	0.04	0.00		sanchez	0.10	0.05	0.03		sanchez	0.25	0.05	0.00
polper	0.75	0.15	0.00		polper	2.42	0.31	0.00		polper	-0.73	0.14	0.00
C4_media	-1.07	0.18	0.00		C4_media	-2.54	0.37	0.00		C4_media	0.69	0.16	0.00
_cons	-2.83	0.79	0.00		_cons	-3.07	1.22	0.01		_cons	-8.86	1.35	0.00

Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019.

Table A9.1. Multinomial models to explain PP vote in April 2019 (ref. category: vote for Vox / vote for Cs)

Voted for PP in 2019 (vs Ciudadanos)				Voted for PP in 2019 (vs Vox)			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z		Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Gender	-0.55	0.16	0.00	Gender	0.24	0.22	0.26
AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	0.11	0.37	0.77	1	-0.44	0.45	0.33
2	0.55	0.35	0.11	2	0.01	0.43	0.98
3	0.64	0.35	0.07	3	0.37	0.45	0.42
4	1.08	0.42	0.01	4	0.58	0.53	0.28
5	1.46	0.48	0.00	5	0.53	0.60	0.37
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	-0.13	0.28	0.64	2	-0.26	0.38	0.48
3	-0.06	0.18	0.74	3	-0.75	0.25	0.00
4	-0.45	8486.25	1.00	4	-18.75	6103.45	1.00
PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	1.19	0.30	0.00	2	0.91	0.38	0.02
3	0.15	0.30	0.62	3	1.05	0.41	0.01
4	0.29	0.37	0.43	4	0.23	0.45	0.61
5	0.07	0.47	0.88	5	0.36	0.63	0.57
6	-0.24	1.35	0.86	6	-1.28	1.60	0.43
tamuni2	-0.34	0.10	0.00	tamuni2	-0.28	0.13	0.03
religion				religion			
1	1.66	0.34	0.00	1	0.78	0.40	0.05
2	0.94	0.32	0.00	2	0.83	0.39	0.03
3	0.02	0.82	0.98	3	0.86	1.02	0.40
9	1.85	1.64	0.26	9	0.17	1.51	0.91
izq_der				izq_der			
2	11.08	724.84	0.99	2	-2.59	1032.77	1.00
3	13.96	724.84	0.98	3	-0.69	1032.77	1.00
4	15.80	724.84	0.98	4	-0.88	1032.76	1.00
5	15.60	724.84	0.98	5	-1.18	1032.76	1.00
criticos_econ	-0.09	0.17	0.61	criticos_econ	-0.31	0.22	0.15
criticos_pol	0.25	0.17	0.16	criticos_pol	-0.58	0.23	0.01
inmigration	0.13	0.58	0.83	inmigration	-1.14	0.54	0.03
P4				P4			
2	0.34	0.38	0.38	2	-0.75	0.34	0.03
3	-0.49	0.43	0.25	3	-0.83	0.46	0.07
8	0.76	0.61	0.21	8	-0.82	0.59	0.16
9	0.07	1.64	0.97	9	-0.61	1.47	0.68
nacional				nacional			
1	0.53	0.20	0.01	1	-0.03	0.23	0.88
2	0.38	0.25	0.12	2	-0.05	0.29	0.85
3	-0.06	0.37	0.87	3	1.04	0.69	0.13
7	-1.07	1.10	0.33	7	13.63	1473.00	0.99
8	-0.21	1.63	0.90	8	18.26	13788.68	1.00
9	-17.06	3276.93	1.00	9	-1.03	4847.20	1.00
anti_indep	-1.25	0.20	0.00	anti_indep	-1.72	0.22	0.00
sanchez	0.12	0.04	0.00	sanchez	-0.08	0.05	0.14
polper	-1.30	0.22	0.00	polper	0.99	0.19	0.00
P33_suma	0.20	0.05	0.00	P33_suma	-0.18	0.04	0.00
_cons	-15.40	724.84	0.98	_cons	2.17	1032.77	1.00

Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019.

Table A9.2. Multinomial models to explain Cs vote in April 2019 (ref. category: vote for Vox / vote for PP)

Voted for Cs in 2019 (vs PP)				Voted for Cs in 2019 (vs Vox)			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z		Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Gender	0.55	0.16	0.00	Gender	0.80	0.22	0.00
AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	-0.11	0.37	0.77	1	-0.54	0.41	0.19
2	-0.55	0.35	0.11	2	-0.54	0.40	0.17
3	-0.64	0.35	0.07	3	-0.28	0.42	0.51
4	-1.08	0.42	0.01	4	-0.50	0.53	0.34
5	-1.46	0.48	0.00	5	-0.93	0.61	0.13
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	0.13	0.28	0.64	2	-0.14	0.40	0.73
3	0.06	0.18	0.74	3	-0.69	0.25	0.00
4	0.45	8486.25	1.00	4	-18.30	5896.13	1.00
PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	-1.19	0.30	0.00	2	-0.28	0.40	0.49
3	-0.15	0.30	0.62	3	0.91	0.43	0.04
4	-0.29	0.37	0.43	4	-0.06	0.48	0.90
5	-0.07	0.47	0.88	5	0.29	0.58	0.62
6	0.24	1.35	0.86	6	-1.04	1.55	0.50
tamuni2	0.34	0.10	0.00	tamuni2	0.05	0.14	0.69
religion				religion			
1	-1.66	0.34	0.00	1	-0.88	0.35	0.01
2	-0.94	0.32	0.00	2	-0.10	0.32	0.74
3	-0.02	0.82	0.98	3	0.85	0.89	0.34
9	-1.85	1.64	0.26	9	-1.68	1.67	0.31
izq_der				izq_der			
2	-11.08	724.84	0.99	2	-13.66	735.67	0.99
3	-13.96	724.84	0.98	3	-14.65	735.67	0.98
4	-15.80	724.84	0.98	4	-16.68	735.67	0.98
5	-15.60	724.84	0.98	5	-16.77	735.67	0.98
criticos_econ	0.09	0.17	0.61	criticos_econ	-0.22	0.22	0.32
criticos_pol	-0.25	0.17	0.16	criticos_pol	-0.82	0.24	0.00
inmigration	-0.13	0.58	0.83	inmigration	-1.27	0.56	0.02
P4				P4			
2	-0.34	0.38	0.38	2	-1.09	0.39	0.01
3	0.49	0.43	0.25	3	-0.34	0.46	0.46
8	-0.76	0.61	0.21	8	-1.59	0.65	0.01
9	-0.07	1.64	0.97	9	-0.68	1.45	0.64
nacional				nacional			
1	-0.53	0.20	0.01	1	-0.57	0.25	0.02
2	-0.38	0.25	0.12	2	-0.44	0.31	0.15
3	0.06	0.37	0.87	3	1.10	0.68	0.11
7	1.07	1.10	0.33	7	14.70	1473.00	0.99
8	0.21	1.63	0.90	8	18.47	13788.68	1.00
9	17.06	3276.93	1.00	9	16.03	3571.70	1.00
anti_indep	1.25	0.20	0.00	anti_indep	-0.47	0.21	0.03
sanchez	-0.12	0.04	0.00	sanchez	-0.20	0.05	0.00
polper	1.30	0.22	0.00	polper	2.29	0.23	0.00
P33_suma	-0.20	0.05	0.00	P33_suma	-0.38	0.05	0.00
_cons	15.40	724.84	0.98	_cons	17.57	735.67	0.98

Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019.

Table A9.3. Multinomial models to explain Vox vote in April 2019 (ref. category: vote for PP / vote for Cs)

Voted for Vox in 2019 (vs PP)				Voted for Vox in 2019 (vs Ciudadanos)			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z		Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Gender	-0.24	0.22	0.26	Gender	-0.80	0.22	0.00
AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	0.44	0.45	0.33	1	0.54	0.41	0.19
2	-0.01	0.43	0.98	2	0.54	0.40	0.17
3	-0.37	0.45	0.42	3	0.28	0.42	0.51
4	-0.58	0.53	0.28	4	0.50	0.53	0.34
5	-0.53	0.60	0.37	5	0.93	0.61	0.13
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	0.26	0.38	0.48	2	0.14	0.40	0.73
3	0.75	0.25	0.00	3	0.69	0.25	0.00
4	18.75	6103.45	1.00	4	18.30	5896.13	1.00
PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	-0.91	0.38	0.02	2	0.28	0.40	0.49
3	-1.05	0.41	0.01	3	-0.91	0.43	0.04
4	-0.23	0.45	0.61	4	0.06	0.48	0.90
5	-0.36	0.63	0.57	5	-0.29	0.58	0.62
6	1.28	1.60	0.43	6	1.04	1.55	0.50
tamuni2	0.28	0.13	0.03	tamuni2	-0.05	0.14	0.69
religion				religion			
1	-0.78	0.40	0.05	1	0.88	0.35	0.01
2	-0.83	0.39	0.03	2	0.10	0.32	0.74
3	-0.86	1.02	0.40	3	-0.85	0.89	0.34
9	-0.17	1.51	0.91	9	1.68	1.67	0.31
izq_der				izq_der			
2	2.59	1032.77	1.00	2	13.66	735.67	0.99
3	0.69	1032.77	1.00	3	14.65	735.67	0.98
4	0.88	1032.77	1.00	4	16.68	735.67	0.98
5	1.18	1032.77	1.00	5	16.77	735.67	0.98
criticos_econ	0.31	0.22	0.15	criticos_econ	0.22	0.22	0.32
criticos_pol	0.58	0.23	0.01	criticos_pol	0.82	0.24	0.00
inmigration	1.14	0.54	0.03	inmigration	1.27	0.56	0.02
P4				P4			
2	0.75	0.34	0.03	2	1.09	0.39	0.01
3	0.83	0.46	0.07	3	0.34	0.46	0.46
8	0.82	0.59	0.16	8	1.59	0.65	0.01
9	0.61	1.47	0.68	9	0.68	1.45	0.64
nacional				nacional			
1	0.03	0.23	0.88	1	0.57	0.25	0.02
2	0.05	0.29	0.85	2	0.44	0.31	0.15
3	-1.04	0.69	0.13	3	-1.10	0.68	0.11
7	-13.63	1473.00	0.99	7	-14.70	1473.00	0.99
8	-18.26	13788.68	1.00	8	-18.47	13788.68	1.00
9	1.03	4847.20	1.00	9	-16.03	3571.70	1.00
anti_indep	1.72	0.22	0.00	anti_indep	0.47	0.21	0.03
sanchez	0.08	0.05	0.14	sanchez	0.20	0.05	0.00
polper	-0.99	0.19	0.00	polper	-2.29	0.23	0.00
P33_suma	0.18	0.04	0.00	P33_suma	0.38	0.05	0.00
_cons	-2.17	1032.77	1.00	_cons	-17.57	735.67	0.98

Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019.

Table A10.1. Multinomial models to explain PP vote in Nov. 2019 (ref. category: vote for Vox / vote for Cs)

Voted for PP in Nov 2019 (vs Ciudadanos)				Voted for PP in Nov 2019 (vs Vox)			
Gender	-0.04	0.20	0.86	Gender	0.60	0.19	0.00
AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	0.27	0.40	0.49	1	0.62	0.37	0.09
2	0.94	0.39	0.02	2	0.74	0.35	0.03
3	1.05	0.39	0.01	3	1.25	0.36	0.00
4	1.13	0.49	0.02	4	1.40	0.45	0.00
5	2.04	0.59	0.00	5	1.97	0.57	0.00
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	0.80	0.40	0.04	2	0.60	0.44	0.17
3	0.40	0.21	0.06	3	-0.69	0.22	0.00
4	17.82	11084.13	1.00	4	-1.19	1.61	0.46
PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	0.15	0.32	0.63	2	-0.04	0.28	0.89
3	-0.51	0.38	0.18	3	0.10	0.36	0.78
4	0.09	0.49	0.85	4	0.57	0.56	0.31
5	0.56	0.52	0.28	5	0.76	0.49	0.13
6	-1.84	1.11	0.10	6	-1.46	1.09	0.18
tamuni2	-0.40	0.13	0.00	tamuni2	0.01	0.12	0.90
religion				religion			
1	0.95	0.34	0.00	1	0.56	0.33	0.09
2	0.53	0.28	0.06	2	0.41	0.29	0.15
3	1.13	0.77	0.14	3	0.71	0.72	0.33
9	-0.96	1.31	0.46	9	-2.11	1.19	0.08
C3				C3			
2	15.77	3904.34	1.00	2	13.33	1974.43	0.99
3	0.13	3058.68	1.00	3	28.62	2383.97	0.99
4	-0.47	3058.68	1.00	4	11.95	1974.43	1.00
5	0.88	3058.68	1.00	5	12.92	1974.43	0.99
6	1.72	3058.68	1.00	6	13.09	1974.43	0.99
7	2.47	3058.68	1.00	7	12.73	1974.43	0.99
8	4.28	3058.68	1.00	8	13.27	1974.43	0.99
9	4.54	3058.68	1.00	9	13.04	1974.43	0.99
10	1.30	3058.68	1.00	10	13.20	1974.43	0.99
criticos_econ	0.12	0.20	0.56	criticos_econ	-0.41	0.19	0.03
criticos_pol	-0.07	0.27	0.81	criticos_pol	-0.07	0.29	0.79
B3				B3			
2	-0.59	0.44	0.18	2	-1.70	0.31	0.00
3	-0.42	0.46	0.37	3	-0.39	0.43	0.37
4	0.25	0.88	0.78	4	-0.34	0.60	0.58
nacional				nacional			
1	-0.08	0.24	0.73	1	0.22	0.22	0.32
2	0.34	0.37	0.37	2	0.46	0.32	0.15
3	0.13	0.47	0.78	3	0.65	0.46	0.16
4	-0.89	0.61	0.14	4	0.31	0.70	0.66
inmigrantes	0.66	0.35	0.06	inmigrantes	-0.92	0.23	0.00
corrupcion	-0.37	0.24	0.12	corrupcion	-0.44	0.22	0.05
malestar	0.19	0.20	0.36	malestar	0.07	0.20	0.72
economia	0.20	0.24	0.41	economia	0.51	0.21	0.02
anti_indep	-0.36	0.28	0.20	anti_indep	-1.34	0.23	0.00
sanchez	0.12	0.05	0.03	sanchez	-0.08	0.06	0.17
polper	-1.71	0.33	0.00	polper	1.13	0.18	0.00
C4_media	1.59	0.39	0.00	C4_media	-1.33	0.22	0.00
_cons	-2.00	3058.68	1.00	_cons	-12.39	1974.43	0.99

Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019.

Table A10.2. Multinomial models to explain Cs vote in Nov. 2019 (ref. category: vote for Vox / vote for PP)

Voted for Ciudadanos in Nov 2019 (vs PP)				Voted for Ciudadanos in Nov 2019 (vs Vox)			
Gender	0.04	0.20	0.86	Gender	0.64	0.23	0.01
AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	-0.27	0.40	0.49	1	0.35	0.41	0.39
2	-0.94	0.39	0.02	2	-0.20	0.40	0.62
3	-1.05	0.39	0.01	3	0.19	0.42	0.64
4	-1.13	0.49	0.02	4	0.27	0.54	0.62
5	-2.04	0.59	0.00	5	-0.07	0.70	0.92
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	-0.80	0.40	0.04	2	-0.20	0.55	0.71
3	-0.40	0.21	0.06	3	-1.08	0.26	0.00
4	-17.82	1108	1.00	4	-19.00	11084.13	1.00
PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	-0.15	0.32	0.63	2	-0.19	0.35	0.58
3	0.51	0.38	0.18	3	0.61	0.45	0.18
4	-0.09	0.49	0.85	4	0.47	0.67	0.48
5	-0.56	0.52	0.28	5	0.20	0.56	0.72
6	1.84	1.11	0.10	6	0.38	1.08	0.72
tamuni2	0.40	0.13	0.00	tamuni2	0.41	0.15	0.01
religion				religion			
1	-0.95	0.34	0.00	1	-0.40	0.38	0.29
2	-0.53	0.28	0.06	2	-0.12	0.31	0.70
3	-1.13	0.77	0.14	3	-0.42	0.88	0.63
9	0.96	1.31	0.46	9	-1.16	1.04	0.27
C3				C3			
2	-15.77	3904	1.00	2	-2.43	3368.29	1.00
3	-0.13	3058	1.00	3	28.49	2691.09	0.99
4	0.47	3058	1.00	4	12.42	2336.03	1.00
5	-0.88	3058	1.00	5	12.04	2336.03	1.00
6	-1.72	3058	1.00	6	11.36	2336.03	1.00
7	-2.47	3058	1.00	7	10.27	2336.03	1.00
8	-4.28	3058	1.00	8	9.00	2336.03	1.00
9	-4.54	3058	1.00	9	8.51	2336.03	1.00
10	-1.30	3058	1.00	10	11.89	2336.03	1.00
criticos_econ	-0.12	0.20	0.56	criticos_econ	-0.53	0.23	0.02
criticos_pol	0.07	0.27	0.81	criticos_pol	-0.01	0.34	0.98
B3				B3			
2	0.59	0.44	0.18	2	-1.11	0.42	0.01
3	0.42	0.46	0.37	3	0.03	0.50	0.96
4	-0.25	0.88	0.78	4	-0.59	0.91	0.52
nacional				nacional			
1	0.08	0.24	0.73	1	0.31	0.28	0.27
2	-0.34	0.37	0.37	2	0.13	0.44	0.78
3	-0.13	0.47	0.78	3	0.52	0.57	0.36
4	0.89	0.61	0.14	4	1.20	0.70	0.09
inmigrantes	-0.66	0.35	0.06	inmigrantes	-1.59	0.36	0.00
corrupcion	0.37	0.24	0.12	corrupcion	-0.07	0.27	0.79
malestar	-0.19	0.20	0.36	malestar	-0.12	0.24	0.63
economia	-0.20	0.24	0.41	economia	0.31	0.27	0.26
anti_indep	0.36	0.28	0.20	anti_indep	-0.98	0.29	0.00
sanchez	-0.12	0.05	0.03	sanchez	-0.20	0.07	0.00
polper	1.71	0.33	0.00	polper	2.84	0.34	0.00
C4_media	-1.59	0.39	0.00	C4_media	-2.93	0.40	0.00
_cons	2.00	3058	1.00	_cons	-10.38	2336.03	1.00

Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019.

Table A10.3. Multinomial models to explain Vox vote in Nov. 2019 (ref. category: vote for PP / vote for Cs)

Voted for Vox in Nov 2019 (vs PP)				Voted for Vox in Nov 2019 (vs Ciudadanos)			
Gender	-0.60	0.19	0.00	Gender	-0.64	0.23	0.01
AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	-0.62	0.37	0.09	1	-0.35	0.41	0.39
2	-0.74	0.35	0.03	2	0.20	0.40	0.62
3	-1.25	0.36	0.00	3	-0.19	0.42	0.64
4	-1.40	0.45	0.00	4	-0.27	0.54	0.62
5	-1.97	0.57	0.00	5	0.07	0.70	0.92
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	-0.60	0.44	0.17	2	0.20	0.55	0.71
3	0.69	0.22	0.00	3	1.08	0.26	0.00
4	1.19	1.61	0.46	4	19.00	11084.13	1.00
PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	0.04	0.28	0.89	2	0.19	0.35	0.58
3	-0.10	0.36	0.78	3	-0.61	0.45	0.18
4	-0.57	0.56	0.31	4	-0.47	0.67	0.48
5	-0.76	0.49	0.13	5	-0.20	0.56	0.72
6	1.46	1.09	0.18	6	-0.38	1.08	0.72
tamuni2	-0.01	0.12	0.90	tamuni2	-0.41	0.15	0.01
religion				religion			
1	-0.56	0.33	0.09	1	0.40	0.38	0.29
2	-0.41	0.29	0.15	2	0.12	0.31	0.70
3	-0.71	0.72	0.33	3	0.42	0.88	0.63
9	2.11	1.19	0.08	9	1.16	1.04	0.27
C3				C3			
2	-13.33	1974	0.99	2	2.43	3368.30	1.00
3	-28.62	2383	0.99	3	-28.49	2691.10	0.99
4	-11.95	1974	1.00	4	-12.42	2336.04	1.00
5	-12.92	1974	0.99	5	-12.04	2336.04	1.00
6	-13.09	1974	0.99	6	-11.36	2336.04	1.00
7	-12.73	1974	0.99	7	-10.27	2336.04	1.00
8	-13.27	1974	0.99	8	-9.00	2336.04	1.00
9	-13.04	1974	0.99	9	-8.51	2336.04	1.00
10	-13.20	1974	0.99	10	-11.89	2336.04	1.00
criticos_econ	0.41	0.19	0.03	criticos_econ	0.53	0.23	0.02
criticos_pol	0.07	0.29	0.79	criticos_pol	0.01	0.34	0.98
B3				B3			
2	1.70	0.31	0.00	2	1.11	0.42	0.01
3	0.39	0.43	0.37	3	-0.03	0.50	0.96
4	0.34	0.60	0.58	4	0.59	0.91	0.52
nacional				nacional			
1	-0.22	0.22	0.32	1	-0.31	0.28	0.27
2	-0.46	0.32	0.15	2	-0.13	0.44	0.78
3	-0.65	0.46	0.16	3	-0.52	0.57	0.36
4	-0.31	0.70	0.66	4	-1.20	0.70	0.09
inmigrantes	0.92	0.23	0.00	inmigrantes	1.59	0.36	0.00
corrupcion	0.44	0.22	0.05	corrupcion	0.07	0.27	0.79
malestar	-0.07	0.20	0.72	malestar	0.12	0.24	0.63
economia	-0.51	0.21	0.02	economia	-0.31	0.27	0.26
anti_indep	1.34	0.23	0.00	anti_indep	0.98	0.29	0.00
sanchez	0.08	0.06	0.17	sanchez	0.20	0.07	0.00
polper	-1.13	0.18	0.00	polper	-2.84	0.34	0.00
C4_media	1.33	0.22	0.00	C4_media	2.93	0.40	0.00
_cons	12.39	1974	0.99	_cons	10.38	2336.04	1.00

Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019.

Table A11.1. Multinomial models to explain loyalty and switching for former PP voters in April 2019

REFERENCE CATEGORY: LOYALS TO PP IN APRIL							
PP VOTERS SWITCHING TO CIUDADANOS				PP VOTERS SWITCHING TO VOX			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z		Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Gender	0.69	0.23	0.00	Gender	-0.14	0.25	0.57
AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	-0.07	0.52	0.89	1	0.18	0.55	0.75
2	-0.58	0.50	0.25	2	-0.45	0.53	0.39
3	-1.20	0.52	0.02	3	-0.65	0.54	0.23
4	-1.71	0.63	0.01	4	-0.94	0.64	0.14
5	-1.75	0.70	0.01	5	-0.90	0.70	0.20
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	0.03	0.40	0.94	2	0.33	0.41	0.42
3	-0.24	0.25	0.34	3	0.51	0.28	0.07
4	-2.51	2419	1.00	4	28.37	9201.18	1.00
PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	-1.35	0.49	0.01	2	-0.97	0.48	0.04
3	0.04	0.44	0.93	3	-0.72	0.46	0.11
4	0.32	0.47	0.49	4	-0.39	0.52	0.45
5	-0.14	0.81	0.86	5	-0.10	0.85	0.90
6	-18.63	1353	1.00	6	1.32	1.70	0.44
tamuni2	-0.00	0.14	0.99	tamuni2	0.09	0.15	0.54
religion				religion			
1	-0.86	0.51	0.09	1	-0.27	0.52	0.61
2	-0.23	0.48	0.64	2	-0.38	0.50	0.45
3	0.10	1.38	0.94	3	-0.59	1.39	0.67
9	-0.28	1.80	0.88	9	-16.94	7126.75	1.00
izq_der				izq_der			
2	-13.82	1269	0.99	2	-9.74	2005.60	1.00
3	-15.32	1269	0.99	3	11.74	1973.72	1.00
4	-17.03	1269	0.99	4	12.06	1973.72	1.00
5	-16.29	1269	0.99	5	12.32	1973.72	1.00
criticos_econ	0.04	0.25	0.86	criticos_econ	0.34	0.26	0.18
criticos_pol	-0.32	0.25	0.20	criticos_pol	0.30	0.27	0.27
inmigration	0.44	0.75	0.55	inmigration	0.45	0.60	0.45
P4				P4			
2	0.03	0.52	0.96	2	0.41	0.39	0.29
3	0.66	0.64	0.30	3	-0.01	0.64	0.98
8	-16.80	4022	1.00	8	-0.18	0.89	0.84
9	1.16	1.65	0.48	9	-0.25	1.64	0.88
nacional				nacional			
1	-0.80	0.29	0.01	1	0.08	0.26	0.75
2	-0.50	0.37	0.17	2	-0.32	0.34	0.35
3	0.30	0.51	0.55	3	-1.25	1.07	0.24
7	0.33	1.45	0.82	7	-14.13	2769.35	1.00
8	0.69	1780	1.00	8	0.14	18621.85	1.00
9	18.11	5866	1.00	9	1.16	9234.56	1.00
anti_indep	1.56	0.26	0.00	anti_indep	1.74	0.25	0.00
sanchez	-0.04	0.05	0.44	sanchez	0.13	0.07	0.06
polper	1.20	0.32	0.00	polper	-0.76	0.21	0.00
P33_media	-0.89	0.37	0.02	P33_media	0.85	0.22	0.00
_cons	15.05	1269	0.99	_cons	-14.18	1973.72	0.99

Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019.

Table A11.2. Multinomial models to explain loyalty and switching for former PP voters in April 2019

REFERENCE CATEGORY: OTHER VOTE CHOICES												
PP LOYALS				PP VOTERS SWITCHING TO CIUDADANOS				PP VOTERS SWITCHING TO VOX				
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z		Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z		Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	
Gender	-0.47	0.15	0.00	Gender	0.22	0.20	0.28	Gender	-0.62	0.24	0.01	
AGE_diez				AGE_diez				AGE_diez				
	1 0.40	0.40	0.32		1 0.33	0.39	0.40		1 0.57	0.46	0.22	
	2 0.80	0.38	0.03		2 0.22	0.38	0.57		2 0.35	0.46	0.44	
	3 0.99	0.38	0.01		3 -0.21	0.41	0.61		3 0.35	0.48	0.47	
	4 1.14	0.42	0.01		4 -0.57	0.53	0.28		4 0.20	0.58	0.73	
	5 1.04	0.46	0.02		5 -0.71	0.61	0.24		5 0.14	0.65	0.83	
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2				
	2 -0.07	0.24	0.78		2 -0.04	0.37	0.92		2 0.27	0.41	0.52	
	3 -0.30	0.18	0.09		3 -0.54	0.22	0.01		3 0.21	0.27	0.43	
	4 -11.60	9171.59	1.00		4 -14.11	2238.1	1.00		4 16.77	737.60	0.98	
PROFESION				PROFESION				PROFESION				
	2 0.61	0.27	0.02		2 -0.75	0.45	0.10		2 -0.36	0.46	0.44	
	3 0.67	0.27	0.01		3 0.70	0.41	0.08		3 -0.06	0.45	0.90	
	4 0.35	0.33	0.28		4 0.68	0.41	0.10		4 -0.04	0.50	0.94	
	5 -0.48	0.59	0.42		5 -0.62	0.61	0.31		5 -0.58	0.71	0.41	
	6 0.09	1.36	0.95		6 -18.54	1353.1	1.00		6 1.41	1.70	0.41	
tamuni2	-0.41	0.10	0.00	tamuni2	-0.41	0.13	0.00	tamuni2	-0.32	0.15	0.03	
religion				religion				religion				
	1 1.92	0.35	0.00		1 1.05	0.40	0.01		1 1.65	0.43	0.00	
	2 1.35	0.34	0.00		2 1.13	0.36	0.00		2 0.97	0.41	0.02	
	3 -0.64	0.89	0.47		3 -0.54	1.12	0.63		3 -1.23	1.15	0.28	
	9 1.34	1.19	0.26		9 1.06	1.45	0.46		9 -15.60	7126.75	1.00	
izq_der				izq_der				izq_der				
	2 11.74	1269.51	0.99		2 -2.08	1.25	0.10		2 2.00	1552.67	1.00	
	3 15.99	1269.51	0.99		3 0.67	1.09	0.54		3 27.72	1511.26	0.99	
	4 17.98	1269.51	0.99		4 0.95	1.09	0.38		4 30.04	1511.26	0.98	
	5 18.51	1269.51	0.99		5 2.22	1.13	0.05		5 30.83	1511.26	0.98	
criticos_econ	-0.34	0.16	0.04	criticos_econ	-0.29	0.22	0.18	criticos_econ	0.00	0.25	0.99	
criticos_pol	-0.03	0.16	0.87	criticos_pol	-0.35	0.22	0.11	criticos_pol	0.27	0.26	0.30	
inmigration	0.12	0.50	0.81	inmigration	0.56	0.65	0.39	inmigration	0.58	0.52	0.27	
P4				P4				P4				
	2 -0.27	0.31	0.38		2 -0.24	0.47	0.60		2 0.14	0.35	0.70	
	3 -0.95	0.41	0.02		3 -0.29	0.57	0.61		3 -0.96	0.60	0.11	
	8 -1.33	0.63	0.03		8 -18.12	4022.1	1.00		8 -1.51	0.76	0.05	
	9 -0.41	1.51	0.79		9 0.75	1.44	0.60		9 -0.67	1.68	0.69	
nacional				nacional				nacional				
	1 0.52	0.18	0.00		1 -0.28	0.27	0.30		1 0.60	0.25	0.02	
	2 0.21	0.23	0.36		2 -0.30	0.34	0.38		2 -0.11	0.33	0.73	
	3 -0.71	0.32	0.03		3 -0.41	0.43	0.35		3 -1.96	1.04	0.06	
	7 -1.43	1.06	0.17		7 -1.11	1.06	0.29		7 -15.56	2769.35	1.00	
	8 -19.42	9109.42	1.00		8 -18.74	1529.1	1.00		8 -19.29	16241.67	1.00	
	9 -18.24	5866.66	1.00		9 -0.13	1.45	0.93		9 -17.07	7131.59	1.00	
anti_indep	-0.56	0.20	0.00	anti_indep	1.00	0.22	0.00	anti_indep	1.18	0.23	0.00	
sanchez	0.26	0.04	0.00	sanchez	0.22	0.05	0.00	sanchez	0.38	0.07	0.00	
polper	0.36	0.16	0.02	polper	1.55	0.31	0.00	polper	-0.41	0.18	0.03	
P33_media	-0.84	0.18	0.00	P33_media	-1.73	0.35	0.00	P33_media	0.01	0.19	0.95	
_cons	-20.06	1269.51	0.99	_cons	-5.01	1.33	0.00	_cons	-34.24	1511.26	0.98	


Source: CIS 3248 postelectoral survey. May 2019.

Table A12. Multinomial models to explain loyalty and switching for former PP voters in November 2019 (reference category: rest of voters)

PP loyals (in April & November)				Ciudadanos loyals (in April & November)				Voted for Vox in November			
Gender	0.15	0.16	0.36	Gender	0.16	0.19	0.42	Gender	-0.51	0.19	0.01
AGE_diez				AGE_diez				AGE_diez			
1	0.45	0.39	0.25	1	-0.13	0.34	0.71	1	-0.40	0.32	0.22
2	0.50	0.38	0.18	2	-0.93	0.35	0.01	2	-0.50	0.31	0.11
3	0.96	0.38	0.01	3	-0.22	0.35	0.52	3	-0.52	0.33	0.12
4	1.01	0.43	0.02	4	-0.69	0.46	0.13	4	-0.71	0.43	0.09
5	0.92	0.49	0.06	5	-1.63	0.58	0.00	5	-1.41	0.55	0.01
ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2				ESTUDIOS2			
2	0.88	0.28	0.00	2	0.02	0.40	0.97	2	0.10	0.45	0.83
3	0.36	0.19	0.05	3	-0.37	0.20	0.07	3	0.82	0.22	0.00
4	-0.60	1.44	0.68	4	-18.20	8233.56	1.00	4	0.25	1.31	0.85
PROFESION				PROFESION				PROFESION			
2	-0.27	0.26	0.31	2	-0.36	0.30	0.23	2	-0.18	0.27	0.51
3	-0.23	0.30	0.45	3	0.26	0.37	0.48	3	-0.33	0.37	0.37
4	0.45	0.37	0.23	4	0.62	0.47	0.18	4	-0.13	0.58	0.83
5	0.16	0.53	0.76	5	-0.32	0.48	0.50	5	-0.45	0.47	0.34
6	-1.10	1.04	0.29	6	0.27	0.88	0.76	6	0.24	0.94	0.80
tamuni2	-0.10	0.10	0.32	tamuni2	0.36	0.13	0.01	tamuni2	-0.09	0.12	0.47
religion				religion				religion			
1	1.64	0.31	0.00	1	0.19	0.32	0.55	1	0.82	0.30	0.01
2	1.03	0.28	0.00	2	0.34	0.24	0.15	2	0.47	0.25	0.06
3	0.90	0.64	0.16	3	-0.39	0.77	0.61	3	0.19	0.67	0.78
9	0.46	1.20	0.70	9	0.76	0.97	0.43	9	1.90	0.79	0.02
C3				C3				C3			
2	-0.91	2053.38	1.00	2	-1.86	2514.56	1.00	2	0.87	1.13	0.44
3	12.64	1502.92	0.99	3	-2.90	2103.66	1.00	3	-13.95	922.07	0.99
4	12.35	1502.92	0.99	4	12.66	1727.00	0.99	4	1.64	1.14	0.15
5	14.24	1502.92	0.99	5	13.32	1727.00	0.99	5	2.69	1.13	0.02
6	15.67	1502.92	0.99	6	13.84	1727.00	0.99	6	3.95	1.15	0.00
7	17.00	1502.92	0.99	7	14.27	1727.00	0.99	7	5.40	1.13	0.00
8	17.17	1502.92	0.99	8	12.38	1727.00	0.99	8	5.05	1.09	0.00
9	17.77	1502.92	0.99	9	12.98	1727.00	0.99	9	5.83	1.09	0.00
10	17.39	1502.92	0.99	10	15.13	1727.00	0.99	10	5.46	1.04	0.00
criticos_econ	-0.04	0.16	0.79	criticos_econ	-0.24	0.20	0.23	criticos_econ	0.39	0.19	0.04
criticos_pol	0.39	0.22	0.08	criticos_pol	0.36	0.26	0.17	criticos_pol	0.36	0.27	0.19
B3				B3				B3			
2	0.07	0.34	0.84	2	0.46	0.43	0.29	2	1.62	0.30	0.00
3	-0.53	0.40	0.18	3	-0.49	0.51	0.34	3	0.05	0.40	0.90
4	0.11	0.60	0.85	4	-0.75	1.06	0.48	4	0.35	0.58	0.54
nacional				nacional				nacional			
1	0.51	0.20	0.01	1	0.71	0.24	0.00	1	0.29	0.23	0.21
2	0.40	0.28	0.15	2	0.21	0.37	0.58	2	-0.07	0.35	0.84
3	-0.54	0.32	0.09	3	-0.77	0.49	0.12	3	-1.25	0.41	0.00
4	-1.87	0.80	0.02	4	0.32	0.44	0.47	4	-1.31	0.61	0.03
inmigrantes	0.12	0.24	0.63	inmigrantes	-0.31	0.35	0.38	inmigrantes	1.14	0.23	0.00
corrupcion	-0.40	0.20	0.05	corrupcion	-0.15	0.24	0.54	corrupcion	0.11	0.21	0.60
malestar	0.16	0.17	0.34	malestar	0.02	0.20	0.90	malestar	0.06	0.19	0.77
economia	0.29	0.19	0.12	economia	0.18	0.24	0.44	economia	-0.18	0.21	0.39
anti_indep	-0.31	0.26	0.23	anti_indep	0.26	0.29	0.36	anti_indep	1.33	0.23	0.00
sanchez	0.31	0.04	0.00	sanchez	0.21	0.05	0.00	sanchez	0.37	0.06	0.00
polper	0.54	0.17	0.00	polper	2.46	0.36	0.00	polper	-0.46	0.15	0.00
C4_media	-0.83	0.21	0.00	C4_media	-2.58	0.42	0.00	C4_media	0.40	0.18	0.03
_cons	-21.22	1502.92	0.99	_cons	-18.63	1727.00	0.99	_cons	-9.14	1.36	0.00


Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey. December 2019.

Figure A1. Main coefficients for right-wing vote in November 2019 election



Source: Logistic regression including control variables for age, gender, profession, education, political variables and ideology. Source: CIS 3269 postelectoral survey, December 2019.

Figure A2. Scatterplot of polarisation indexes



Source: Own elaboration. CIS 3269 post electoral survey. December 2019.