

---

# **ARS ORANDI: RAMON LLULL'S ARS COMPENDIOSA DEI**

## **ARS ORANDI: L'ARS COMPENDIOSA DEI DE RAMON LLULL**

---

ROBERT D. HUGHES

*Centre de Documentació Ramon Llull, Universitat de Barcelona*

robert\_d\_hughes@yahoo.co.uk

**Resum:** Utilitzant el breu estudi sobre les *artes orandi* de Barbara H. Jaye com a punt de partida, examino l'*Ars compendiosa Dei* de Ramon Llull (maig de 1308) a la llum de la definició que proporciona del gènere. Tot i que no comparteixo la creença de Jaye que l'*ACD* és l'únic text dins del corpus de Llull que podria qualificar-se com una *ars orandi*, realitzo una mena d'«experiment mental» sobre la base dels seus coneixements. Incorporo pel meu compte la consideració de certes construccions lògiques aristotèliques (per exemple, teories de l'antítesi) per mostrar com aquests (i altres) determinants interactuen amb les creences cristianes en la seva explicació de les relacions entre la misericòrdia i la justícia divines i els seus homòlegs humans. La humanitat penitent es troba situada dins d'aquesta xarxa de relacions precisament respecte d'un Déu just i misericordiós. Al centre d'aquesta relació hi ha el discurs bidireccional entre Déu i la humanitat, articulats primordialment en la forma d'adreçar-se el primer a la segona i posteriorment en la resposta d'aquesta com a orant-contemplativa.

**Paraules clau:** Oració, lògica, retòrica, justícia i misericòrdia (divines), antítesi.

**Abstract:** Using Barbara H. Jaye's brief survey of the *artes orandi* as a starting point, I examine Ramon Llull's *Ars compendiosa Dei* (May 1308) in the light of the definition she provides of the genre. Though I do not share Jaye's belief that the *ACD* is the sole text within Llull's corpus which might qualify as such an *ars*, I nevertheless carry out a kind of «thought experiment» on the basis of her insights. I incorporate into my own account consideration of certain Aristotelian logical constructs (e.g. theories of antithesis) to show how these (and other) determinants interact with Christian beliefs in their explication of the relations holding between divine mercy and justice and their human counterparts. Penitent humanity finds itself situated within precisely such a

network of relations in respect of a just and merciful God. At the heart of this relationship lies the bidirectional discourse between God and humanity, articulated primordially in the former's address to the latter and subsequently in the latter's response as orant-contemplative.

**Key words:** Prayer, Logic, Rhetoric, (Divine) Justice and Mercy, Antithesis.



## 1. INTRODUCTION

The possibility, if not the desirability, of studying Ramon Llull's *Ars compendiosa Dei* (Montpellier, May 1308; Llull 1985; hereafter *ACD*) in relation to prayer came to my attention on reading Barbara H. Jaye's brief survey and analysis of the *artes orandi* (Jaye 1992).<sup>1</sup> In her study, Jaye mentions the *ACD* as being the sole text of Llull's which might—in part and remotely—qualify as such an *ars*. For Jaye a text constitutes an *ars orandi* if it is «not only concerned with «how to» pray but [also treats] prayer as a systematic activity *requiring conscious verbal strategies*» (Jaye 1992: 84; emphasis added). Although I hold the view that Llull's much earlier *Llibre de contemplació en Déu* (1273-1274?; hereafter *LC*) amply, if broadly, fulfils the requirements for inclusion among such *artes*, as might many more of his works, in what follows I shall carry out a kind of «thought experiment» on the basis of her insights.

Ramon Llull (1232?-1316?) composed his *ACD* in Montpellier in May 1308, during a period of intense productivity.<sup>2</sup> Since the turn of the century he had written numerous works of considerable importance within his oeuvre: among others, the *Rhetorica nova* (Catalan version—now lost—, Cyprus, Sept 1301; Latin version, Genoa 1303); the *Logica nova* (Genoa, May 1303); the *Liber de significatione* (Montpellier, Feb 1304); the *Liber de praedicatione* (Montpellier, Dec 1304); the *Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam* (Montpellier, March 1305); the *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* (Montpellier, March 1305); the *Ars generalis ultima* (Lyon-Pisa, Nov 1305-March

1. This article presents a modified extract from a considerably longer comparative study relating to prayer in William of Auvergne's *Rhetorica divina, seu ars oratoria eloquentiae divinae* (1240) and Ramon Llull's *Ars compendiosa Dei*, which study I hope to be able to publish *in extenso* at a later date. I only became aware of J. E. Rubio's article (Rubio 2017), after completing the very final version of my own account; any similarities of detail are purely coincidental.

2. Estimated dates for the birth and death of Ramon Llull can be found in Bonner (2007: 1, 10); Fidora & Rubio (2008: 24, 126); Badia, Santanach & Soler (2016: 1, 14); and Austin & Johnston (2018: vii).

1308; hereafter *AGU*), namely, the final reformulation of his Art, and its very slightly anticipatory condensation, the *Ars brevis* (Pisa, Jan 1308). The *ACD*, as its title suggests, is one of Llull's Arts and is based on the *AGU* (pace Jaye 1992: 100), representing the very final Artistic text from the Ternary Phase of his production (LlullDB).<sup>3</sup>

As its editor has noted, the word *Dei* in the title of *ACD* denotes an objective genitive (Llull 1985: 4), a fact which Llull himself confirms within the text's prologue: «Liber iste siue *Ars* est proprie *Dei* [...]» (Llull 1985: 18). God, therefore, in this Lullian text, is examined by means of Llull's Art, which for him means not only an art or science, i.e. an *epistēmē* (the phrase *ista ars sive scientia* is commonplace in Llull's writings) and a craft or form of productive knowledge, i.e. a *technē*, but also a method of investigation applicable to all subject matters (Llull 1985: 4; Bonner 2007: 74-75, 173 s.). It is no surprise, therefore, that the *ACD* itself is likewise said to be applicable in this way: «Liber iste siue *Ars* est proprie *Dei*, uerumtamen potest aliis scientiis applicari» (Llull 1985: 18). As with all of his works, its explicit aim is to follow the Lullian «first intention», namely, to remember, know, love, serve, honour and praise the Divinity (Llull 1985: 25), as is summarised in the opening lines of the text: «Ad intelligendum et diligendum Deum facimus Artem istam, ut intellectus humanus artificialiter ascendat in divinam cognitionem et per consequens in amorem» (Llull 1985: 17). In Lullian terms, therefore, it addresses both *sciència* and *amància* (Bonner 2017; Rubio 2017: 278). Llull also emphasises here the necessity both of an artificial (i.e. Artistic) method to assist the intellect in achieving the stated goal and of the action of divine grace and wisdom in this procedure (Llull 1985: 17). In describing the completion of this undertaking, however, i.e. the inclusion of the role occupied by love therein, Llull immediately and characteristically has recourse to an *a minore ad maius* argument: «Et quia quanto Deus magis intelligitur, tanto magis diligitur, idcirco *Ars* ista efficitur ad Deum maxime diligendum» (Llull 1985: 17).

In the same prologue, Llull makes it clear that such understanding and love of God fulfils a specific formal role within the *ACD*, namely, as its *subjectum*: «Subiectum huius Artis est Deum intelligere et amare [...]» (Llull 1985: 18). However, he also leaves no doubt as to the existential, apologetic and truth-and-falsehood-discerning function of that same subject: «Subiectum huius Artis est Deum intelligere et amare, et sic cognoscere ueram legem et per consequens falsam sectam» (Llull 1985: 18; emphasis

3. Jaye's confusion in suggesting that the *ACD* derives from Llull's *Art demonstrativa* (Montpellier, c. 1283; Llull 1932: 1-228; Llull 2007) is probably attributable to the occurrence of the following sentence within the prologue to the former: «Quoniam sicut ars demonstrandi concludit per superius et inferius, sic requirit concludere per aequale, ut non sit dare uacuum inter ipsa» (Llull 1985: 18).

added). Of course, in his works the affirmation of (a) truth is always accompanied by the corresponding negation of (a) falsehood: «[...] tenendo modum, quem affirmando aut negando in ipso intendimus conseruare» (Llull 1985: 18), as testified by Figures Y (Truth) and Z (Falsity) from the time of his first Art, the *Art abreuçada d'atrobare la veritat* or *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (Majorca, c. 1274; hereafter *AAAV*). Likewise, affirmation and negation constitute the second and third of the three species of the first Rule of *ACD*, namely, *utrum*: «Prima regula siue quaestio est per “utrum” [...] Et habet tres species, uidelicet dubitationem, affirmationem et negationem» (Llull 1985: 23). The sentence «[s]ubiectum huius Artis est Deum intelligere et amare, et sic cognoscere ueram legem et per consequens falsam sectam» (Llull 1985: 18) may at first appear to be a *non sequitur*; its reasoning becomes clear, however, as soon as we realise that it is based on the maximity of understanding and love with respect to God that Llull's (ultimately Christian) Art makes available to us in comparison with the lesser degrees thereof, in his view, offered by the other two monotheisms (e.g. Llull 1985: 17, 18, 23-24).

Rather uncharacteristically in Llull's oeuvre, *ACD* refers to concrete sources: Biblical, ecclesiastical and scholastic; citing Genesis, Isaiah, the Gospels of Matthew, Luke and John, as well as I Corinthians, not to mention Clement V, Gregory the Great, the eighth-century Apostle's Creed and Thomas Aquinas (Llull 1985: 335-336). Furthermore, in Dist. 30, Part 2, Lull specifically applies his method to the «Four Senses of Scripture» (Llull 1985: 314-329). These four senses, administered a Lullian «twist», are then themselves employed in the examination of individual prayers and Biblical passages and the results therefrom are set alongside analyses of the same prayers and passages conducted according to the Art (Llull 1985: 316-329).

In Aristotelian terms, as derived from the *Categories*, there are four species of antithesis or opposition: that between relatives (e.g. the double and the half); that between contraries (e.g. the good and the bad); that between pairs expressing privation or possession of an attribute (e.g. blindness and sight); and that between pairs evincing affirmation and negation (e.g. s/he is sitting and s/he is not sitting) (Aristotle 1995a [1984]: 18-21; Aristotle 1995b [1984]: 189-190; Isidore of Seville 2010 [2006]: 87-88; Isidore of Seville 1911: 2, 31, 1-7; Fahnestock 2002 [1999]: 48; Rubine-lli 2009: 25-26; 99-100; Bonner 2007: 197 and n. 25). Aristotle goes on to indicate, moreover, that affirmation and negation are contradictory opposites, specifying that they are such «when what one signifies universally the other signifies not universally», contradiction thereby featuring as the fourth of the species of opposites (Aristotle 1995c [1984]: 27). It is at all times necessary to bear these distinctions in mind when parsing Lullian discourse, even and especially when that discourse is exemplary, i.e.

is the divine discourse of the *ars Dei* within which there exists no opposition, for the reason that Llull is ever alert to the existence of the oppositional forces of (not least hermeneutical) error and deficiency introduced by human sin, frailty and failings (cf. Bonner 2007: 225 s.).

To understand the complexity of the oppositional relations, for instance, between God and sin in the mind of medieval readers, therefore, it is worth referring to the *De peccato* by William of Durham (d. 1249), a text wherein the author distinguishes between sin's threefold opposition to God, nature and the Law. To quote L. B. Gillon, in William's eyes «[e]ntre la bonté divine et le péché on reconnaîtra l'existence d'une opposition de contradiction; entre le péché et le bien de nature, celle d'une opposition de privation; enfin entre la Loi et le péché, celle d'une opposition de contrariété» (Gillon 1937: 59). Not least, this shows that since the early-thirteenth century there had been active debate concerning the precise nature of the oppositions pertaining between humanity and God, humanity and nature and humanity and the Christian religion.

## 2. STRUCTURE OF *ACD*

As is customary in Llull's Artistic works, *ACD* begins with a Prologue (Llull 1985: 17-18) outlining the professed aims of the text and a section covering the divisions thereof (Llull 1985: 19-21). The prologue is explicit in situating the text within the realms of demonstrative syllogistics as opposed to that of dialectic (Llull 1985: 17):

In Arte ista intendimus indagare medium primitivum, uerum, necessarium et reale, existens inter subjectum et praedicatum, ut per ipsum primitivum, uerum, reale et necessarium possimus facere syllogismum, et a syllogismo opinatio siue dialectico elongari.

The rationale Llull provides for his repudiation of the dialectical syllogism here consists in the opinions and disputed questions (*opinioniones siue dubia*) that arise therefrom, as a result of which the intellect is said frequently to succumb to error and deviate from true understanding (Llull 1985: 17). There may, however, be certain elements of opportunism allied to this apparent repudiation, given the fact that Llull generally asserts that the Art he forges in terms of certain dialectical lines of thought is indeed demonstrative (Ruiz Simon 1999: 47-62; Rubio 2008: 247). So, in this instance, he may simply be exercising caution while deferring to the presumed preferences of his audience.

Distinction 1 presents and defines the 18 generalmost Principles drawn from the *AGU* (Llull 1985: 21-23), as well as the 10 generalmost Rules or Questions, also defined

(Llull 1985: 23-26). Distinction 2 enumerates and defines the 27 —syllogistic— subjects (Llull 1985: 27), and then proceeds to show both how various attributes may be predicated of such subjects (Llull 1985: 28) and how the definitions of the principles from Dists 1 and 2 are connected and are of mutual benefit to each other (Llull 1985: 28-30). The final part of Dist. 2 is concerned with the quest for the «real and natural» —i.e. not «intentional»— «middles» (*medium reale et naturale*, Llull 1985: 18) —rather than «middle terms» (Bonner 2007: 220-222)— which obtain between the subjects and predicates of syllogisms consisting exclusively of substantial terms (Llull 1985: 30). The «middle» sought is said to be «primitivum, uerum, reale et necessarium» (Llull 1985: 17, 19), and consists in an act pertaining to the things denoted by the syllogism in question: «[...] sic iste actus “sentire” dicitur esse medium, existens inter res, per dictum syllogismum designatas» (Llull 1985: 18). Only by means of «middles» of this kind may conclusions *per aequiparantiam* be drawn (Llull 1985: 18; Ruiz Simon 1999: 238-295; Bonner 2007: 220-225; Rubio 2008: 256-257; Gayà 2008: 479-482). The «equal» and «substantial» terms which go to form the convertible subjects, predicates and major and minor premises of such syllogisms *eodem medio remanente* are, of course, the principles and subjects enumerated and defined earlier in Dists 1 and 2 (Llull 1985: 17, 30). Notably, many of Llull's propositions consisting of (often multiple) subjects and (often multiple) predicates as formulated with respect to the Principles of his Art, as well as the latter's elaboration in the form of the Lullian «correlatives» and of their definitions, have a rhetorical function in parallel to their logical one, as shown in *AGU*, Dist. 10, 86, «De rhetorica», esp. ll. 1561-1583 (Llull 1986: 363-364; Badia, Santanach & Soler 2016: 70-75). This fact belies the impression that Llull's more logical texts lack any rhetorical adornment, one conspicuous example of which is his use of the positive, comparative and superlative degrees (see below, 3.3.1).

The parallelism of structure between the *AGU* and *ACD* has been noted by the editor of the latter text (Llull 1985: 4-5). Present, therefore, in the *ACD* are common elements such as the Lullian Alphabet, the Principles, the Rules, the Fourth Figure and the Multiplication thereof, along with sections covering the overall Subject of this particular Art, i.e. God (Gayà 2008: 470-472), the Application of all the foregoing to the 45 explicit terms or principles therein (i.e. the 18 generalmost Principles and the 27 subjects), the Questions drawn from the preceding 29 Distinctions, as well as the processes whereby one familiarises oneself with the Art («De habitatione») and by which it is learnt («De modo discendi») (Llull 1985: 4-5; Bonner 2007: 121-187; Rubio 2008: 280-297). However, in the *ACD* only the fourth (i.e. the most comprehensive and, combinatorially speaking, most generative) of the Lullian Figures present in *AGU* is employed. Likewise, apart from the sections concerning the 18 Principles and

the 10 Rules, both of which occur in Dist. 2, all other elements of the Art are treated within the text's final two distinctions (i.e. Dist. 29, «De applicatione» and Dist. 30, Part 2), in the latter case being thereby appended to the most highly self-referential treatment thereof in the section «De quaestionibus» (Dist. 30, Part 1). In this, the *ars lulliana* defers to the *ars Dei*, which occupies the bulk of the text.

The question remains, however: How do we explain the presence of a mini-treatise on prayer in the closing pages of the text? At least five points are worth considering: 1) the type of prayer Llull discusses is differentially Christian; 2) the type of prayer he discusses features within a treatise concerning specifically Scriptural prayer, as well as other associated Scriptural passages, and as such invokes traditional models of Biblical hermeneutics (de Lubac 1998 [1959]; Bonner 2007: 280-281); 3) the full text in which such discussion occurs is one which serves—both propaedeutically and maieutically—missionary apologetic goals; 4) such discussion occurs in a work of Llull's Art, the universalising tendencies of which are acknowledged, and therefore his treatment of prayer may be expected to have much more general applicability than would be true of treatments possessing a narrower, intra-Christian focus (Bonner 2007: 257-259; 278 s.); and 5) his treatment of prayer occurs in the finalmost pages of the text, a fact which might suggest that prayer is, in fact, the most practical application of the maximal knowledge and love of the Divinity as made available via the Art of God (or *ars Dei*) itself.

### 3. ANALYSIS OF *ACD*, DIST. 30, PART 2: THE «TREATISE ON PRAYER» (WITH REFERENCE TO THE *LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ*, THE *DOCTRINA PUERIL* AND THE *ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA*)

#### 3.1 THE IDENTITY BETWEEN THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES; THE CAUSAL LIMITATIONS ON THE EXTERNAL AGENCY OF DIVINE MERCY AND JUSTICE

In *ACD*, Dist. 30, 1, 24, 512, Llull poses a question of major relevance when considering how he conceives of the relationship between divine justice and divine mercy. He frames this particular question in terms of the relation of identity holding between divine mercy and the singularity of the divine will, a relation which itself gives rise to a question of a philosophical and theological nature, namely, «[v]trum uoluntas Dei singulariter diligit parcere et non iudicare?» (Llull 1985: 287). In light of the coactivity of the divine attributes, here «Justice» and «Mercy», the questioner asks: is there not a risk that God's single will might be divided, unless He were to

show a preference for one of the acts associated with an attribute, in this case «Mercy», rather than for the other such act, given that divine mercy and justice are distinct, at least *intentionaliter*, in their actions? Llull's lapidary answer sows certainty where there previously lay doubt: «Diuina uoluntas est eadem cum diuina iustitia et misericordia» (Llull 1985: 287). In other words, because the identity relations which hold between the convertible divine attributes dictate concordant, though not homogeneous, actions on each of their parts, no divisions—as in contrary differences—can arise when those attributes express their internal or external dynamism.

As Llull has shown in one of the preceding questions, Dist. 30, 1, 24, 510, any restrictions these infinite divine actions face must be confined solely to aspects of their *external* causality, restrictions resulting exclusively from the limited capacity of their «passive» recipients, which or who are finite, a notion deriving ultimately from Proclus (Llull 1985: 286; Hughes 2014: 161). Nevertheless, God's infinite mercy is proved to be as powerful as His power is merciful: «Diuina misericordia et diuina potestas idem sunt» (Llull 1985: 287). Llull poses a further significant question regarding the relation of divine mercy to human sin in Dist. 30, 1, 24, 518, on the prior understanding that the former relates to the latter as does a substance to an accident (Dist. 30, 1, 24, 515), i.e. as the ontologically superior to the ontologically inferior. Equating divine mercy with perfection wherein there can obtain no contrariety, the question is posed as to whether sin can resist or thwart (*resistere seu contrariari*) divine mercy or, in other words, whether the relation of contrariety sin expresses as reverse secondary causality or *refluentia* can be considered forceful enough to render divine mercy less effective externally. Interestingly, Llull couches his response primarily in terms of privation, namely, the privation of the disposition to forgiveness (*priuatio dispositionis ueniae*) or, in other words, of the human disposition to seek forgiveness from God, which privation alone is capable of hindering divine mercy's external agency (Llull 1985: 287).

The limitations facing the infinite agency of divine justice, on the other hand, are those associated with the composite *habitus* of human justice and its associated moral accidents. Thus, should this *habitus* be deficient in any respect or even in privation, the corresponding infinite agency would be either reduced or absent. Such restrictions here again answer to the limited capacity of the recipient and may also be found to obtain should human justice fail to be accompanied by the virtues, by the disposition of the just, by the acquisition of merit attendant thereon through divine dispensation, and by the election to eternal beatitude—in a qualified sense—dependent on a person's exercise of the *habitus* of justice, the latter of which especially, Llull stresses, is attributable more to the action of divine grace than to that of justice itself (Llull 1985: 144).



### 3.2 CONTEXTUAL EXCURSUS: LULLIAN DIVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF PRAYER

#### 3.2.1 *LC* and the *Doctrina pueril*

In his *LC* (1273-1274?), 5, 315, 2, Llull distinguishes three «figures» within the single «form» of prayer, namely, the sensual; the intellectual; and that of sensual and intellectual prayer combined (Llull 1914: 3-4; Rubio 2017: 283). In this, as in his statement within the *Doctrina pueril* (1274-1276), 84, 1, that «[o]ració és alavament devot, piadós pensament a Deu demanar aternal benuyransa o pregar Deu dels bens qui-s covenen a esta vida temporal» (Llull 2005: 226), Llull is perhaps echoing John Damascene's definition from his *De fide orthodoxa*, 3, 24, or at least the tradition thereof, to the effect that «[o]ratio est ascensus mentis in Deum: aut eorum quae consentanea sunt postulatio a Deo», (John Damascene 1864: 1089C), yet his phrasing likewise recalls that of Hugh of Saint-Cher's (1190?-1263) definition of prayer in his Commentary on *Ecclesiasticus*, which states that «oratio enim est pius affectus animi in deum directus, pro bonis aeternis adipiscendis» (Hugh of Saint-Cher 1703: f. 242, col. 2, t. 3.), even though Llull's definition substitutes an intellectual term, i.e. *pensament*, for Hugh's affective such, i.e. *affectus* (cf. also Rubio 2017: 281). Both of these Lullian references clearly emphasise, as is only to be expected, the ascensive nature of prayer, i.e. as both the soul's ascent to God and, in the former case with its tripartite schema, as divisible into ascending phases, while in the latter case also stressing the petitionary nature thereof. These elements of divisibility and ascent are perpetuated likewise, though according to a different schema, in the second Lullian text mentioned (Llull 2005: 226), for, there, also in Chapter 84, 2, Llull enumerates three modes of prayer: the first consisting of the acts of memory, understanding and will (i.e. mental prayer) as directed towards God for the purposes of worship; the second, the naming (which may be merely mental) and the utterance (which is vocal) of the content of those acts; and, third, the mode of prayer implemented by the practice of good deeds in combination with meditation on and love of moral goodness («cogitant e amant be»), namely, in the latter case the two acts associated with the intellect and the will respectively (Llull 2005: 226). Significantly for us, in discussing the reassuringly beneficial effects of prayer on the orant, Llull concludes § 18 of the same chapter with an epitomic definition thereof: «[...] oració es migá enfre home e Deu» (Llull 2005: 230).

#### 3.2.2 *AGU* and the «Hundred Forms»

In the «Ad centum formas» section of *AGU* (Llull 1986: 324-395), a section in which Llull's «General Art» is applied to the «Hundred Forms» in both the abstract

and the concrete and according as such Forms are either of the most general (Dist. 30, 10 A; Llull 1986: 324-356) or of a subaltern (i.e. particular) nature (Dist. 30, 10 B; Llull 1986: 356-395), we encounter near the very end Form 99, «De oratione» (Llull 1986: 388-391), the opening line of which defines prayer as follows: «[o]ratio est forma, cum qua orans sanctifice loquitur Deo» (Llull 1986: 388; cf. Clement of Alexandria 1902: 68-69; Clement of Alexandria 1857: 455-456; cf. Cassiodorus 1865: 117A). This definition is immediately followed by the recommendation that whoever wishes to pray well should be disposed towards the good in accordance with the virtues (*secundum nonum subiectum*), by means of which latter God is honoured (Llull 1986: 388). That prayer is the penultimate of the Hundred Forms no doubt carries weight in the sense of (*paene*) *ultimum sed non minimum* and corresponds well with the positioning of the mini-treatise on prayer in *ACD*. That prayer is also reiteratively equated with contemplation in 99. «De oratione» (e.g. «[o]rator siue contemplator», «[o]rator siue contemplator», «[c]ontemplator siue orator») (Llull 1986: 388) is also made evident and reveals the enduring role of contemplation even in the very final iterations of Llull's Art (Rubio 2017: 281). Furthermore, as it unfolds, the text emphasises the primordial nature of God's address to humanity through His divine attributes (Goodness, Greatness, etc.), and their production of their respective effects in Creation (the good, the great, etc.) whereby humanity, in its response, may likewise manifest the created similitudes of those primitive and eternal attributes («cum quibus tuus populus sit bonus et magnus», «quod tuus populus sit in te bonus et magnus laudator et seruator», «ut [tuus populus] in aeternam te collaudaret, benediceret et magnificaret») (Llull 1986: 388-389). In this process, Llull leads his reader through various of the features of the *AGU* which may be applied to prayer (e.g. the Evacuation of the Third Figure, the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure, as well as application according to the First Subject, i.e. «De Deo»), giving brief examples of how prayers may be constructed and articulated. In doing so, he also refers to his own *Arbre de filosofia d'amor* (Paris, Oct 1298), which he recommends the reader should conjoin with those intellectual aspects of *AGU* relating to prayer which he has been outlining.

In his discussion of the «First Subject», namely, De Deo, Llull makes the important point, regarding the efficacy of petitionary prayer, that God fails to answer the prayers of (or «hearken to») sinners «contra suas rationes, neque etiam contra earum relatiuos [i.e. correlatiuos]», that is to say, that God always acts only in accordance with His attributes (and their correlatives) and thus is always self-consistent. The foregoing, however, represents less a constraint on God than on the praying sinner, to the effect that the latter must ensure that his or her prayers conform to the doctrine of God articulated within the section «De Deo» (Llull 1986: 189-216) and, as we have

seen in *ACD*, that s/he adopts the correct disposition towards divine justice and mercy, acquires the *habiti* thereof, practises contrition, the confession of and satisfaction for sins, and is in receipt of divine grace (see above, 1., 3.1. and below, 3.3.1.). What Llull is describing in the above quotation, therefore, is imperfect prayer, a fact which is brought to light imminently when he continues with a brief discourse concerning the habituation of the orant in terms of the greater love and devotion s/he should show towards God than to him- or herself or to any others, whereby that orant becomes «de caritate et sanctitate habituatus» (Llull 1986: 389), which habituation is held to be the very means by which prayer may achieve its perfection. Llull, in fact, contrasts the «friendship» such a *habitus* provides to the orant not only with the privation thereof and the resulting state of «friendlessness» should s/he fail to practise prayer in such a manner («[s]i autem hoc non facis, nullum quidem amicum habes») (Llull 1986: 389-390), but also with friendship's contrary, namely, the enmity of no less a figure than God Himself, towards whom an injustice would have been committed («[...] immo Deus est tuus inimicus, eo quia ei iniuriam facis») (Llull 1986: 390).

In modern —though not Lullian— philosophical terminology, Llull casts the relationship between love and hate as one of exclusive disjunction in referring to the love, as opposed to hate, the orant ought to bear towards the divine justice that God brings to bear on the sins s/he has committed. Using an irrealis counterfactual, Llull argues that were hatred to be borne towards divine justice, God's mercy could not be the orant's «friend» (*amica*), owing to the injustice that orant would be performing against God. The results of such a situation are laid out clearly by Llull: instead of being «de caritate et sanctitate habituatus», the orant would become habituated to their contrary, namely, cruelty, that is to say, to something situated at the furthest extreme from the theological virtues of faith and charity (Llull 1986: 390). Furthermore, in addition to such a reversal, there would occur a «perversal» of love into hate, which latter the orant would have as his or her *habitus* for eternity (Llull 1986: 390). The centrality of divine justice and mercy to Llull's account of prayer is in great evidence here, as is the fact that earthly acts of justice or injustice may be undertaken with respect to the Divinity.

Llull assigns a subordinate, though active, role to belief as a substitute for understanding, when the latter is unable to attain (i.e. contemplate intellectually) the lofty heights of the divine «Reasons» and their acts, though nonetheless maintains the possibility of just such intellectual contemplation via the understanding. The very ritual or «act-ual» aspects of contrition, confession and satisfaction which in *ACD* he subsumes under the functionality of the «spiritual sense» of conscience, are similarly subsumed, though here are embedded within the heart of a practise of prayer wherein

conscience itself is examined or surveyed at the metalevel «per princip[i]a et regulas», as are likewise contrition and confession (Llull 1986: 390). As if to ensure that his recipe for prayer is not read in too intellectualist a light, Llull gives a step-by-step account of the intertwined and causally linked stages of alternating intellective/affective prayer acting under the direction of an energised conscience, itself answerable to the «principia et regulae» of the *AGU*, the fruits of which collaborative endeavour are not to be ignored, as the following quotation shows (Llull 1986: 390):

Orator, in tua oratione excita tuam conscientiam et discurre ipsam per princip[i]a et regulas. Et si hoc facis, cum ea impetrabis contritionem. Et si discurras contritionem per principia et regulas, cum ipsa impetrabis motum in corde. A quo egredientur gemitus et suspiria, et a corde ad oculos aqua ascendet, madefaciendo tuam faciam et tuas manus et uestes. Et illam aquam senties calidam, quia a calido et feruente fonte oritur; et illa aqua sancta procurabit tibi confessionem. Et si confessionem discurras per principia et regulas, ipsa deducet te ad satisfactionem et poenitentiam; quae quidem coniunget te cum Deo in gloria sempiterna.

The role and presence of one of Llull's five «spiritual senses», namely, conscience —«which understands man's errors and failings» (Badia, Santanach & Soler 2016: 96)— in the above process and in the above text is clearly important. For as Badia, Santanach and Soler have appositely noted «These five spiritual senses are exclusive to the *Book of Contemplation* (Rubio 1997: 45-53); in subsequent works, the functions attributed thereto are examined using different interpretative models related to prayer, prayer also being one of the most important fields of application for Ramon Llull's Art» (Badia, Santanach & Soler 2016: 59-60). Similarly, the fact that conscience is, in a certain sense, a «sense» helps to reduce the distance (i.e. bring concordance) between the abstract «principia et regulae» and the concrete and sensory movements of the heart, groans, sighs and tears, and their physical consequences of moistness and heat, which are all carefully detailed.

This brief segment (99. «De oratione») starts out with a definition, quickly moves on to the hortatory subjunctive: «Orator siue contemplator oret siue contempletur Deum [...]» (Llull 1986: 388) involving precise instructions regarding the technical features of *AGU* to be employed, then passes on to direct address of the Deity in the form of «model prayers»: «O domine Deus, bone et magnifice, [...]», «[q]uoniam tu, Domine, es essentia et substantia, [...]», «[q]uoniam tu, Domine, es bonus et magnus creator, [...]» (Llull 1986: 388; Rubio 2017: 281). These sections are once more followed by hortatory subjunctives giving detailed instructions regarding further features of *AGU* to be applied to prayer, sometimes interspersed with the standard enumerative indices «[a]mplius» and «[i]tem» (Llull 1986: 389). Having done this, Llull then implements an abrupt shift in the text by addressing the reader-orant directly, using the

imperative form: «Orator, in tua oratione dilige plus Deum, quam temet ipsum; et etiam quam alia» (Llull 1986: 389), continuing in this mode throughout the remainder (i.e. over half of) the segment in question.

As Llull makes clear in bringing the ninety-ninth of the «Hundred Forms» to a close, prayer is not only material and spiritual, but also, at least in its ideal form, *artificial*, that is to say, an «art»: in other words, one of the practical fields of application for his own «Art», i.e. an art within an Art. For Llull, who in this segment evidently entertains a broader understanding of prayer than the simply petitionary: «[...] benedic, lauda et dilige diuinum amorem, et gratias quam plurimas redde», «[o]rator, discurre per nonum subiectum intelligendo, amando et recolendo, timendo et sperando, et gratias reddendo» (Llull 1986: 390), the «Hundred Forms» themselves are a support for prayer, each providing material for surveyal by means of the *AGU*'s «principa et regulae» and thereby subject matter from which to generate «new» prayers (Llull 1986: 390-391). The *habitus* of good and great prayer that the orant may achieve by means of praying *artificialiter*, in the manner Llull recommends, is what enables him or her wholly to cleave to God: «Orator, ora [...] artificialter, ut supra dictum est, ut tua anima de bona et magna oratione sit habituata; et cum tali habitu sit cum Deo penitus ligata et concatenata» (Llull 1986: 391), a conclusion which seems to reiterate—as well as provide an amplificatory gloss on—his earlier statement in *Doctrina pueril*, 84, 18, to the effect that «[...] oració es migá enfre home e Deu» (Llull 2005: 230).

### 3.3 THE «TREATISE ON PRAYER» (*ACD*, DIST. 30, PART 2)

#### 3.3.1 Llull's four *declarationes* and the hermeneutic context of the «Four Senses of Scripture» (*quadriga*)

Ramon Llull's «treatise on prayer» occurs in the fifth section («Expositio») of the second part («De quarta figura») of the thirtieth and final Distinction («De quaestionibus») of *ACD* (Llull 1985: 295-330). The purpose of the «Expositio» section is, according to Llull, to provide instruction whereby, using the (ternary combinations of the «Fourth Figure» of the) Art (Bonner 2007: 143-144; Rubio 2008: 274, 280, 283, 288), one might explicate and clarify («exponere siue declarare») the authorities of Holy Scripture (Llull 1985: 295). A description of the nature and function of the component elements of the «Fourth Figure», the «ordering» thereof and the multiplication of its «compartments» and its «propositions»—of which, all told, there would be an astounding  $49,140 = 252 \times 195$  (cf. also Rubio 2008: 291)—, as well as of its practical

«proof» is provided in the preceding sections, 1-4, of Dist. 30, 2 (Llull 1985: 216-314). The «Expositio» section itself is divided into two parts: a theoretical one (Llull 1985: 314-316) concerning the *quadriga* or «Four Senses of Scripture» (de Lubac 1998 [1959]; Matter 1992 [1990]: 13-14, 50-142; Turner 1995: 89-92) as interpreted by Llull, senses which he calls «[...] quattuor gradus sensuales, siue quattuor species, existentes sub sensu auctoritatis, qui est genus earum» (Llull 1985: 314); and a practical one (Llull 1985: 316-329) in which the examples of ten Scriptural authorities are examined *artificialiter*, which «Artistic» template is held to provide the model for the interpretation of all other Scriptural authorities.

As Llull would have known, in a monastic context, his reference to the *quadriga* would have firmly placed his text within the reader's horizon of expectations concerning *Lectio divina*, a complex procedure which entails the ascent from the literal (or historical) to the allegorical (or spiritual, i.e. Christological), tropological (or moral) and anagogical (or eschatological) senses of the Bible. The *quadriga* itself can be traced to the fifth century CE and John Cassian's *Conferences* 8, 3 and 14, 8 (John Cassian 1997: 292-293 and 509-511, respectively). A well-known medieval rhyming couplet, usually attributed to Augustine of Dacia (d. 1282), testifies to the lasting effect of and the popular manner of understanding Cassian's layered taxonomical schema: 'The Letter speaks of deeds; Allegory to faith; / The Moral how to act; Anagogy our destiny' («Lettera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, / moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia»). Origen of Alexandria (c. 184-c. 253 CE) had earlier developed a threefold schema for the senses of Scripture in his *Periarchon* (*De principiis*), 4, which has only come down to us in the translation of Rufinus of Aquileia (c. 340-410 CE), to which three senses Cassian had added the fourth, mystical such (de Lubac 1998 [1959]: 143-150). The primary distinction in all cases, however, corresponded to that between the literal and spiritual senses, of which latter there were considered to be two or three varieties. The complex nature of *Lectio divina* meant, in fact, that there was perceived to be an equivalence and continuity—though not synonymy—between the acts of reading, meditation, prayer and even writing (Robertson 2011: esp. 138-144). For this reason, Llull's discourse in *ACD*, Dist. 30, 2, serves a range of purposes wherein Scriptural exegesis, either according to the *quadriga* or Artistic methods, engages the reader—alternately or simultaneously—in all the abovementioned acts. Llull's broad aim in this respect, therefore, surely must have been to place all the contemplative and practical aspects of *Lectio divina* at the disposal of actively proselytising orant-friar-Artists and vice versa.

In Llull's case, to be noted first is the fact that the «Four Senses», itemised by him according to the most common medieval sequence, namely, the literal, the allegorical,

the tropological and the anagogical (de Lubac 1998 [1959]: 75-115, here 105; also 132-142; Matter 1992 [1990]: 54), are said to be *gradi sensuales* or ascending «levels of meaning» and that these are subordinate —as a «species» is to its «genus»— to the «sense of Scripture» itself and are to be found therebeneath («sub sensu auctoritatis») (Llull 1985: 314). Noteworthy as far as the second (practical) part of the section is concerned, is Llull's typical recourse to (here largely Scriptural) *exempla*, investigated according to the methods of the Art in a combined process which marries the Art's compendious nature with its germinal potentialities as well as the generality of its method with all particular cases: «Et sicut illas [auctoritates: i.e. illa exempla] tractabimus artificialiter, sic omnes aliae auctoritates sacrae Scripturae possunt tractari» (Llull 1985: 316). Llull identifies two modes in accordance with which the Scriptural authorities are to be examined, the first of which modes will involve analysis of the authority in question in terms of the «Four Senses of Scripture» («quoad expositiones auctoritatum»), the second of which will involve adducing the proposition, question and solution pertaining to that authority in accordance with the designated compartment of the «Fourth Figure» (Llull 1985: 316).

It is highly unusual for Llull to have recourse to *auctoritates*, particularly in his apologetic works, and, for methodological reasons, even and especially to that compound Ur-text which founds both Judaism and Christianity, though not Islam, namely, the Holy Bible. It might also seem strategically strange for him to do so, given the ultimate or remote addressees of *ACD*, that is to say, non-believers and, particularly, Muslims. However, the brief commentaries he offers on established Christian prayers or phrases/verses therefrom (e.g. *Ave Maria*, *Pater noster*, *qui es in caelis*), prayers both Biblical and non-Biblical (though liturgical), and on Biblical verses themselves (e.g. Gen 1:1, Jn 1:1) are, as previously mentioned, bipartite. In other words, using a conventional starting point (*auctoritates*), they make, at least initially, conventional exegetical or hermeneutical moves (interpretation according to the *quadriga*), which are then in each case followed by their interpretation according to a Lullian schema, viz. according to the *principia et regulae* from the «Fourth Figure» deriving from *AGU*.

After rejecting the standard terminology for the *quadriga* on the grounds of its barbarity, confusion, lack of clarity and enigmatic sense, Llull proposes to «translate» the terms into Latin (Llull 1985: 314). To this end, he provides clarifications or «translations» (*declarationes*) of the four Scriptural senses (Llull 1985: 314-316), clarifications which provide the reader with four «corrective lenses», as it were, whereby to view and see the senses of Scripture, which senses themselves offer optics or perspectives on the Biblical text itself. Forging a structural and architectonic analogy wherein parts are related to a whole, he first likens the «Four Senses» to the components of a house, in

increasing order of importance: foundations (*sensus litteralis*); walls (*sensus allegoricus*); roof (*sensus tropologicus*); and the entire dwelling place itself (*sensus anagogicus*), which he calls the (Aristotelian) «final cause» of the house (cf. Chenu 1957: 198). As we can see, he, in fact, retains the terms themselves (of Greek origin), so his «translation» here occurs rather at the level of the seemingly simple, domestic analogy he employs (Llull 1985: 314). Llull, in fact, returns to precisely this architectonic analogy in Dist. 30, 2, 5.5, when interpreting the Biblical verse (Mt 16:18), *Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam* (cf. Chenu 1957: 199). In this we see a duplication at two different levels of interpretation of the same analogy, namely, at the metalevel of a theoretical hermeneutic analogy denoting methods of exegesis and at the practical level of the application of that analogy, here serving ecclesiological ends (Llull 1985: 322). Notably, however, in the section covering the four *declarationes*, i.e. Dist. 30, 2, 5.1 (Llull 1985: 314), the *sensus litteralis* comes first, as it also does in *declarationes* 2, 3 and 4 (Llull 1985: 314-315), and is here assigned a foundational role. In each instance, the *sensus litteralis* is mentioned without comment and, so, would appear to be self-explanatory. Equally, at this stage of the text, it is not even glossed, in the customary fashion, as indicating *historia*, though this lack of detail is soon rectified in the explanatory passage which follows on from the fourth *declaratio*, in Dist. 30, 2, 5, 4 (Llull 1985: 315). However, as the following shows, Llull is keen to adapt this quadripartite scheme to one of his preferred ternary formats, not only for reasons of the pedagogical, rhetorical, semantic and semiotic redundancy focus on the *sensus litteralis* would represent, but also on account of the spiritual and intellectual ascent embodied by the three remaining «senses».

In the second *declaratio*, articulated according to evolving ecclesiological and prototypical phases, Llull compares the allegorical, tropological and anagogical senses to the positive, comparative and superlative degrees (of adjectives) respectively. These are degrees which he employs to denote the various ascending levels of existence and agency, as duplicated, likewise triadically, in terms of levels of rhetorical ornamentation provided that the terms to which such degrees are attached already possess beautiful matter, form and function (Llull 1986: 364-365; Llull 2006: 120-123; Bonner 2007: 245-250). In this case, the comparative level is equated with the early stages of the acquisition of knowledge relating to customs and likenesses («mores et similitudines»), which obtain above the literal sense since they are derived intellectually therefrom, stages which may equate to the progress of learning in pre-Christian times or, at least, in secular spheres. The comparative level is said to pass over from the realm of likenesses into that of real events and moral actions («est transitivus ad rem, uidelicet ad actum»), the example of which he gives is the Church Militant (Llull 1985: 314-315),



while the superlative level equates to the Church Triumphant, a situation wherein he describes the latter as having achieved its repose and in which *Christus bellator* becomes *Christus victor* («uictoriam siue quitem») (Llull 1985: 315 and 322-323). Repose or *quies* is a term closely associated with final causality and hence, in Neoplatonic Christian terms, with the *redditus ad Deum*.

The third brief *declaratio* calls upon medieval semiotic theories—a topic Llull had recently covered in his *Liber de significatione* (Montpellier, Feb 1304) and the *locus classicus* for which was Peter Lombard's *In IV Sententiarum*—in order to compare the allegorical sense with the *sensus signandi*, the tropological with the *sensus signati* and the anagogical with the *sensus compositus ex signo et signato*, the whole of which process he likens in syllogistic terms to the formation of a conclusion from its premises (Llull 1985: 315). His fourth set of comparisons brings in distinctions between intentional and real existence, a distinction bearing logical and ontological implications, and between artificial and natural knowledge, a distinction bearing epistemological such. Now the allegorical sense is equated with mere intentional status, while the tropological sense is assigned both real and natural such, the anagogical sense representing the perfection of the other three and possessing a «sensus finale ultimum» in which the former come to rest (Llull 1985: 315). Once more, the four *declarationes expositionis* outlined above and the principles they embody are, like the method of his Art, said to be appropriate for application to all *auctoritates sanctorum* and, even more, are said to be so «ad placitum» (Llull 1985: 315).

Immediately after he has made the above four *declarationes*, Llull pauses to distinguish between direct (*rectus*) and indirect (*obliquus*) usage of the literal sense as found in Scripture, the first of which he associates with the clarity of the historical sense, and to the second of which he attributes confusion and obscurity, which latter two characteristics both invite and require one to move beyond this level and to make one's ascent to the allegorical, tropological or anagogical senses. Llull's use of the accusative singular form *sensum* as well as of the disjunctive conjunction *sive* in the sentence in question: «[...] sed ascendere supra ipsam [litteram] ad sensum allegoricum siue tropologicum siue anagogicum» may indicate that he believes even the first such (i.e. allegorical) sense might be sufficient to dispel any obscurity (Llull 1985: 315). Furthermore, though Llull normally considers textual difficulty to have a positive virtue, insofar as it impels the intellect to ascend higher, through greater effort, serving didactic ends and thus affording spiritual pleasure, and even, via its ordering of the intentions, paving the way to salvation, here it is clear that the association of indirect sense (*sensus obliquus*) with the darkness and negativity of the potentially unintelligible (*obscuritas*) is enough to taint any hermeneutical approach

which derives its results from the «sensus metaphoricus, parabolicus et obscurus siue aenigmaticus», adjectival terms which are presented in a plesionymous series (Llull 1985: 315; cf. also Santanach 2015: 346-348). Here Llull may be discouraging the use of traditional hermeneutics in order to promote his own comparatively «unproblematic» and «clear» methods.

Interestingly, the term *aenigmaticus* has a lengthy pedigree, and, to a Christian reader, its use here can only be viewed in relation to St Paul's comment in 1 Cor 13:12 (BSV) to the effect that «videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem nunc cognosco ex parte tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum. Nunc autem manet fides spes caritas tria haec maior autem his est caritas», where the term *aenigma* forms the inferior side of the qualitative distinction between the *visio Dei* available *in via* and that granted us *in patria* (i.e. in beatitude). Similarly, in his *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, 3, 1, when discussing the re-entry of the mind into itself (the mind consisting of the Augustinian triad of memory, intellect and will and acting as a reflection or image of the Triune God), a re-entry which should follow the two initial stages of contemplation which have focused on the divine *vestigia* in creation, St Bonaventure construes the vision of God accessible to man's intellectual faculties-as-divine-image in precisely the terms used by St Paul in 1 Cor 13:12: «Considera igitur harum trium potentiarum [sc. potentiarum animae] operationes et habitudines, et videre poteris Deum per te tanquam per imaginem, quod est videre per speculum in aenigmate» (Bonaventure 1891: 303). Llull himself, however, is quick to turn the emergence of doubt elicited by the appearance of confusion, obscurity and indirectness into an opportunity for the clarificatory potential of the various elements of his Art to be actualised: «[...] illud, in quod dubitabit, discurrat per principia et per regulas et etiam per distinctiones; sicut nos fecimus per processum Artis» (Llull 1985: 315-316), with the proviso that in this process divine assistance (i.e. grace) is essential. Llull again refers to the *aenigmaticum* and to the phrase *in aenigmate* in Dist. 30, 2, 5.3 when interpreting the first line of the Creed, *Credo in unum Deum*, according to the senses of the *quadriga* (Llull 1985: 319), and he does so once more in relation to the possibility of doubt, though here also as regards the role of belief as an intellectual act: «[c]redere autem est actus ipsius intellectus, qui credit hoc, quod non intelligit» (Llull 1985: 318). It is belief's liminal position between doubt and intellectual knowledge that enables Llull to posit that, even in the superlative degree, belief still participates in obscurity, though an obscurity from which doubt has been removed: «[c]redere in superlatiuo gradu positum est aenigmaticum extra dubitationem positum, eo quia est signum summum circa lucem» (Llull 1985: 319). Such belief *in via* must always occur *in aenigmate*, the condition in which the earthly *visio Dei* subsists, enabling us

to have negative knowledge of what God is *not*, as well as a modicum of knowledge, however dim or dark, as to what God *is*: «[...] in aenigmate credimus et aliquantulum intelligimus hoc, quod Deus est, et suam bonitatem, trinitatem etc.» (Llull 1985: 319).

3.3.2 The ten *auctoritates* and the «bifocal» interpretative lens used to generate prayers

Llull examines ten *auctoritates*, first through a quadrival interpretative lens adapted to his own power of vision and, second, through a lens of his own devising ground according to the specifications of his Art. Three of the *auctoritates* are Biblical prayers proper or fragments thereof (i.e. Dist. 30, 2.1, the *Ave Maria* and Dist. 30, 2.2, the *Pater noster, qui es in caelis*), while the third is liturgical and creedal (Dist. 30, 2.3, the *Credo in unum Deum*). The remaining *auctoritates* are all Biblical, with the exception of Dist. 30, 2.9, which consists in the dictum of Pope Gregory the Great (c. 540–604 CE) from his Homily 26, 1. For convenience, I list the remaining *auctoritates* as follows: Dist. 30, 2.4 (Gen 1:1): «In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram etc.»; Dist. 30, 2.5 (Mt 16:18): «Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam»; Dist. 30, 2.6 (Jn 1:1): «In principio erat uerbum»; Dist. 30, 2.7 (Isa 7:9): «Nisi crederitis, non intelligetis»; Dist. 30, 2.8 (Jn 14:9): «Philippe, qui uidet me, uidet et Patrem»; Dist. 30, 2.9 (Gregory the Great): «Fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum» (Gregory the Great 1878: 1197C); and Dist. 30, 2.10 (Jn 10:11): «Ego sum pastor bonus». Here the reader will have noted the careful and wide-ranging selection of texts Llull has made, texts covering matters of creedal, ecclesiological, theological, epistemological and pastoral importance. Not only this is evident, however, but also in the fragments selected one can see that, as far as he can, Llull is opting for the greatest level of brevity possible.

I shall now list and elucidate the various ternary sets of concepts designated by letters from the Lullian «Alphabet» by means of which Llull explicates the various abovementioned *auctoritates* in the second, practical, part of each *expositio*. For brevity, I have largely omitted from consideration his discussions —albeit no less interesting— of each *auctoritas* according to the quadrival «lens». It should be mentioned, however, that such discussions are concentrated predominantly on the following: the status of faith in relation to understanding; the matter of semiotic and epistemological levels; and, above all, ecclesiological, eschatological, Christological and circumincessional concerns. I shall, however, provide sample discussions of the four senses explicated by Llull regarding the first two of his chosen *auctoritates*, namely, 1. *Ave Maria* and 2. *Pater noster, qui es in caelis*, in tandem with his Artistic explanations thereof.

In many cases, it should be noted, it is the very terms of the *auctoritas* itself (or at least of a proposition derivable therefrom) which elicit and determine the letters denoting the particular concepts selected for application, rather than the latter's being imposed upon the former, as Llull repeatedly states: e.g. «[e]t damus doctrinam ad eligendum et inueniendum cameras pertinentes ad propositum, scilicet ad exponendum auctoritates» (Llull 1985: 322). However, the situation is not invariably thus, for Llull grants that application in the reverse direction (i.e. of a compartment to an *auctoritas*) is equally permissible: «Per praedictam cameram potest artista facere propositiones, quaestiones et solutiones, tenendo modum, quem tenuimus capitulo probationis, *applicando auctoritatem ad ipsam cameram, aut e conuerso*» (Llull 1985: 323, emphasis added).

1) For discussion of 1. *Ave Maria* (Llull 1985: 316-317), see below, 3.3.3.1.

2) For discussion of 2. *Pater noster, qui es in caelis* (Llull 1985: 317-318), see below, 3.3.3.2.

3) *Credo in unum Deum* (Llull 1985: 318-320) investigates the *auctoritas* by means of the compartment [D E F], where the letter F represents *intellectus*, that of E *unitas* and that of D *aeternitas*, which latter we can gather from Llull's circumlocutory statement that «[...] quia Deus est bonitas, magnitudo etc., ad placitum possumus accipere de ipsis litteris, et sic accipimus D» (Llull 1985: 320).

4) *In principio creauit Deus caelum et terram etc.* (Llull 1985: 320-322) makes use of the compartment [B E K], wherein B represents *principium*, which applies to both the terms *principio* and *creavit* from the *auctoritas*, E is taken to represent *summitas*, while K denotes *minoritas*. The selection and discovery of any applicable ternary compartment itself gives rise to a hermeneutic lens, vision through which may be maximised according to the comparative and superlative levels, such that the proposition «Deus est bonus, potens et gloriosus» (a further instance of the compartment [B E K]), itself a «short form» of prayer and subject for contemplation, may have its spirituality intensified by ascent towards superlativity (Llull 1985: 320-322; Badia, Santanach and Soler 2016: 137-148).

5) *Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam* elicits the compartment [E F G], wherein the letter E signifies polysemically *potestas*, *principium* and *unitas*, while F and G possess the here dual significeds of *intellectus* and *medium*, on the one hand, and *voluntas* and *fnis*, on the other. From this compartment, therefore, arise a variety of *praedicationes* constructed from the range of possibilities the compartment offers.

6) *In principio erat uerbum* (Llull 1985: 323-324) gives rise to the compartment [D E F], wherein the phrase *in principio* calls forth the letter E, here as *principium*, the word *erat* invokes the concept of *aeternitas* and, hence, D, *aeternitas* being the analogical reading of *principium*, while the term *verbum* is said to correspond to *intellectus* and, thus, F, the reason for which is that «intellectus declarant hoc, quod est conceptum in mente», there being a clear and non-trivial —though, equally, inexplicit— connection here between the notion of *conceptus in mente* and *verbum mentis*, as is also made clear in the preceding «Expositio per quattuor species» section (Llull 1985: 323-324), where Llull states regarding the allegorical sense that «[...] conceptum mentis causat uerbum, quod est signum mentis» (Llull 1985: 323).

7) *Nisi crederitis, non intelligetis* educes the compartment [E F G] and, since both verbal components of the *auctoritas* signify mental operations, the choice of F (*intellectus*) is held to be appropriate. The letter E (*potestas*) is then selected on the grounds that *potestas* constitutes that whereby *credere* and *intelligere* enter into partnership. The mutually interpenetrating dispositions of the intellect and the will, as a result of which what is loveable may be understood and vice versa, such dispositions constituting a single genus, a simultaneous activity and a single sign of the divine intellect and will as regards their operations, provides the rationale for the choice of G (*voluntas*) as the third component of the compartment (Llull 1985: 325-326).

8) *Philippe, qui uidet me, uidet et Patrem* brings forth the compartment [C E F] and reveals by its choice of the letter F (*intellectus*) that Llull conceives of the *visio Dei*, whether *in via* or *in patria*, as being intellectual in nature: «[...] per uidere intelligo intelligere», «[...] illa uisio siue intellectio [...]» (Llull 1985: 326), and likewise that such a conclusion itself is reached as a result of an act of the intellect. The term *Patrem* suggests to Llull the concept of *principium* or E, reflecting the Father's begetting (*principiat*) of the Son, while the *visio/intellectio Dei* is said to be maximal, a reference to the Principle of *magnitudo* or C.

9) *Fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebebat experimentum* generates the compartment [F G H]. F is selected in its sense of *intellectus*, for the reason that faith is said to be a *habitus* of the intellect. *Meritum*, on the other hand, is held to be a sign of virtue, the Principle of Virtue being designated by the letter H. The second clause of the *auctoritas* leads Llull to choose the Principle of *valentia* (i.e. worth/usefulness) or G, on the grounds of his own gloss on the above *auctoritas* to the effect that merit is worthless where there exists proof: «[n]on ualet meritum, ubi est experimentum» (Llull 1985: 328).

10) *Ego sum pastor bonus* calls forth the compartment [B E F], the letter E, representing *principium*, being justified by a chain of reasoning according to which the

---

term *ego*, the grammatical sign for the first-person singular *per primitivatem* (i.e. on account of its primariness), elicits the choice of the Principle *principium*, which term itself gives rise to the selection of the letter E. The presence of the term *bonus* within the *auctoritas* naturally leads to the choice of *bonitas* and, hence, B, while the term *pastor* suggests *intellectus* or F to Llull, since a shepherd/-ess must know his or her flock (Llull 1985: 328). Llull's concluding words to this part of the text even suggest that the expository and glossatory abilities the Artist will have picked up from this treatise may be applied, by descending to the other branches of knowledge, to philosophy, law and medicine, etc., thereby reasserting the generality of his method (Llull 1985: 329).

As the reader will have noticed, the above *auctoritates* might equally serve, not only as the basis for hermeneusis, prayer and contemplation, but also as *themata* for the construction of sermons, i.e. for purposes of preaching. In this respect, Llull had recently completed his vast *Liber de praedicatione* (Montpellier, Dec 1304). In fact, at the end of what I have called his «mini-treatise on prayer», Llull explicitly asserts the applicability of *ACD*, Dist. 30, Part 2, to the construction of sermons, thus: «Praedictus modus expositionis est subiectum praedicationis, quoniam per ipsum potest sermocinator sermocinari ad placitum, et auctoritates sanctorum faciliter declarare, et suum sermonem ordinare et in altiore gradum ponere» (Llull 1985: 329). The foregoing statement, however, does not mean that Llull's «treatise on prayer» is instead a «treatise on preaching», for the reason that the so-called treatise embodies general principles applicable to all branches of knowledge and religious practice and that, featuring as Llull's text does within the broad tradition of *Lectio divina*, its reader necessarily inhabits a world wherein reading, prayer, contemplation and writing exist in continuity with each other.

### 3.3.3 Sample discussions of *Ave Maria* and *Pater, qui es in caelis* (Llull 1985: 316-318)

#### 3.3.3.1 *Ave Maria*

Significantly, the first prayer to come under Llull's scrutiny is Marian, namely, the *Ave Maria*, and, in dealing with the opening «proposition» (i.e. salutation and nominal address) thereof, he confirms its provenance to be Biblical (Lk 1:28).<sup>4</sup> He

4. Llull's treatment of this fragment of the *Ave Maria* recalls, not least, the different, though also fragmentary, treatment he gives of the same prayer in the *Romanç d'Evast e Blaquerna* (Montpellier, 1276-1283), Chs 61-66 (Llull 2009: 279-304; Llull 2016: 267-293).

analyses the salutation *Ave* in terms of its semiotic functions at the various hermeneutic levels: allegorically speaking, «[...] *Ave* est signum salutationis et benevolentiae» (Llull 1985: 316); tropologically it signifies the passage towards the Incarnation: «[...] transit ad actum» (Llull 1985: 316), while anagogically it signifies the attainment of rest (i.e. completion or perfection), which latter he equates with heavenly salvation. He then goes on to reveal the four «senses» or «levels of meaning» associated with the name *Maria*, which name he had previously admitted was an addendum to the Lucan account. He states that in literal terms *Maria* is a «vocal sign» or meaningful sound, that is to say, a *vox significativa*, which in Lullian terms indicates that *Maria* as *vox* possess a rhetorical function of no small sublimity as regards beauty, a beauty which may be accentuated at positive (i.e. allegorical), comparative (i.e. tropological) and superlative (i.e. anagogical) levels (Badia Santanach & Soler 2016: 52-53). For its allegorical reading, he draws an analogy (based on the relation of a container to its contents) between the prayers of sinners contained in Mary and the many fish contained in the sea, an analogy, which, at least in respect of Christ's words to his disciples in Mt 4:19 and Mk 1:17, has a Biblical precedent. Perhaps Llull is then assisted by the near homophony and alliterative qualities of the words *mare/matrem* and *pisces/preces/peccantium* in making the link between the allegorical and tropological senses of the name *Maria*, which latter sense designates the *mater peccantium*, «[...] eo quia pro eis impetrat preces» (Llull 1985: 316), a reference to her intercessory role. Like all created beings, the human being «Mary of Nazareth» is held by Llull to signify her Creator; however, she does so pre-eminently as the Mother of God, her son being the most perfect created being and Son of God. The term *Maria* itself, a *nomen*, is also a *signum* which signifies, likewise pre-eminently, the relation between pre-eminent mother and exemplary son, the God-man: «[a]nagogice uero *Maria* signat maximam matrem maximi Filii, uidelicet Domini nostri Iesu Christi, qui est uerus Deus et uerus homo» (Llull 1985: 316). Significant as regards Llull's Mariological devotion is the fact that Mary, considered as the superlative example of motherhood, represents, in her heavenly state, the perfection towards which all earthly mothers tend as mothers *in via* and the perfection in which they shall find repose as mothers or «essences of maternity/maternal natures» *in patria*: «[i]n qua maxima matre in patria quiescent omnes aliae maternitates beatae» (Llull 1985: 316). In the case of his Artistic explanation of 1. *Ave Maria* (Llull 1985: 316-317), Llull uses letters from the compartment [B F G], specifying the multiple senses of each letter. The species (or senses) of B consist of: *bonitas*, *differentia*, *necessitas*, *summitas* and *praedestinatio*; the species of F consist of: *intellectus*, *medium*, *infinitas*, *agentia* and *saluatio*, while those of G consist of *voluntas*, *finis*, *singularitas* and *valentia*.

### 3.3.3.2 *Pater, qui es in caelis*

In this instance, the literal sense of the entire phrase resides in the fact that these were the words spoken by Jesus Christ (Mt 6:9 and Lk 11:2). The positive level/allegorical sense of the term *Pater* points to our human origins: «[...] signat nostrum principium», while the comparative level/tropological sense designates the *principium* represented by Christ, in whom God and man are conjoined and in and by whose death on the Cross the world was retrieved and renewed. In anagogical and superlative terms, God the Father is signified, He being the «principium primitivum, habentem Filium diuinum et humanum primitivum» (Llull 1985: 317). Having spelled out the tripartite reading in terms of three varieties of *principium*, Llull then adduces the reason for Christ's utterance of the phrase *Pater noster*, namely, to denote that God the Father was the Father of the Son of God and the Son of man, which perhaps represents a Johannine understanding of Christ, as well as one consistent with the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE).

The phrase *qui es in caelis* is then construed positively and allegorically in terms of *caelum's* signifying *altitudo* or loftiness and, since it is declined in the plural, i.e. as *in caelis*, to denote the loftiness in which God the Father consists. Tropologically and comparatively, *caelum/caeli* signifies/signify the loftiest acts of loftiness («[...] altiores actus altitudinis»), which acts pertaining to God the Father consist in the creation of angels and souls. Anagogically, on the other hand, *caelum/caeli* signifies/signify maximal loftiness in the superlative degree, which Llull exemplifies in terms of Christ's divine goodness, greatness, etc. and their human counterparts (Llull 1985: 317-318).

In the case of Llull's Artistic explanation of 2. *Pater noster, qui es in caelis* (Llull 1985: 317-318), the compartment adduced is [B C E], where the only two senses of B in relation to the term *Pater* given are *bonitas* and *differentia*, the single sense of C given is *magnitudo* and the single sense of E given is *potestas*. Here Llull refers the reader back to preceding «Probatio» section, namely, Dist. 30, 2, 4 (Llull 1985: 299-314). In discussing the term *caelum* according to the compartment [B C E], Llull maintains maximum brevity, once more referring the reader to the preceding section on «Probatio».

## 4. CONCLUSION

As I have tried to show, Ramon Llull focuses considerable attention on distinctions inherent in the Aristotelian understanding of antithesis (i.e. relativity; privation/



possession; contrariety; and affirmation/negation, which may be contradictory). He does this, I suggest, not only at the physical and metaphysical levels, but also at those of logic, rhetoric and ontology, as well as of speculative and practical theology. A case for the negative relevance, at least, of antithesis to the explication of the apparent dualities of divine unity and divine distinction, for instance, or of divinity and humanity in Christ, of God and Creation, even of human virtue and human vice, need not be made, given the critiques to which medieval Christianity had already been subject both internally and externally by the time Llull was writing. Neoplatonic theories of evil as privation, moreover, themselves reliant on the above distinctions, may be used to reinforce the both Aristotelian and Christian notion that the good in general is the contrary of the evil in general and thus that there can exist nothing contradictory to God. The above considerations help shape the landscape and define the horizons of prayer. Moreover, Aristotle's broad taxonomy of types of antithesis as adopted by Llull both answers to the need for and provides the means whereby to articulate a range of non-contradictory types of opposition made available to the orant, and through the use of which that orant may conceive of and make his or her prayer more compatible with the *ars Dei* itself.

In the endeavour of articulating the *ars Dei* and its relations to prayer, Llull supplies his own rhetorical precepts, often identifiable at what might be called a «material» or ontological level, though likewise frequently subsumed under his logical concerns, if not articulated in para-grammatical terminology (i.e. the positive, comparative and superlative degrees). Thus, in *ACD* we seem to witness a subsumption of rhetoric under logic and ontology in the service of prayer; in the penultimate analysis, such prayer is viewed through a *quadrigal* lens, though in the final such through an *Artistic* one, the artistry of which, through rigorous imitation of its exemplary cause, might hope to coincide with divine discourse, the *ars Dei*. As a result, the positioning of «the mini-treatise on prayer» in *ACD* guarantees that while the text is in its own right undoubtedly «artful», preceptive and penitential, it remains open-ended and «incomplete», as it were, thereby necessarily functioning at both a propaedeutic and a maieutic level. In terms of Jaye's definition of the *artes orandi*, then, we could say that in *ACD* prayer is a systematic activity requiring not only conscious verbal strategies but also hermeneutic and *Artistic* such.

ROBERT D. HUGHES  
*Centre de Documentació Ramon Llull*  
*Facultat de Filologia Catalana - Universitat de Barcelona*  
robert\_d\_hughes@yahoo.co.uk  
ORCID 0000-0003-4623-8906

## Abbreviations

BSV = Biblia Sacra Vulgata.

## BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES

- ARISTOTLE (1995a [1984]) *Categories*, in J. Barnes (ed. and trans.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, 1, Bollingen Series LXXI, 2, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1995 [1984], 2 vol., p. 3-24.
- ARISTOTLE (1995b [1984]) *Topics*, in J. Barnes (ed. and trans.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, 1, Bollingen Series LXXI, 2, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 2 vol., p. 167-277.
- ARISTOTLE (1995c [1984]) *De interpretatione*, in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, 1, Bollingen Series LXXI, 2, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 2 vol., p. 25-38.
- AUSTIN, A. M. & M. D. JOHNSTON, eds. (2018) *A Companion to Ramon Llull and Lullism*, Amy M. Austin, Alexander Ibarz and Mark D. Johnston (trans.), Leiden/Boston, Brill.
- BADIA, L., J. SANTANACH & A. SOLER (2016) *Ramon Llull as a Vernacular Writer: Communicating a New Kind of Knowledge*, Robert D. Hughes (trans.), London, Tamesis.
- BONAVENTURE (1891) in Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae *Opera omnia, ed. studio et cura Patrum Colegii a S. Bonaventura ad plurimos codices mss. emendata, anecdotis aucta, prolegomenis scholiis notisque illustrata*, Quaracchi, 1882-1902, t. v, *Opuscula varia theologica*.
- BONNER, A. (2007) *The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull. A User's Guide*, Leiden/Boston, Brill («Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters», 95).
- BONNER, A. (2017) «La gènesi de l'Art de Ramon Llull; un instrument de conversió entre "ciència" i "amància"», *Actes del Congrés d'Obertura de l'Any Llull. «En el setè centenari de Ramon Llull: el projecte missional i la pervivència de la devoció»*. Palma, 24-27 de novembre de 2015, Lola Badia, Alexander Fidora & Maribel Ripoll Perelló (ed.), Barcelona / Palma de Mallorca, Universitat de Barcelona / Universitat de les Illes Balears («Col·lecció Blaquerna», 12), p. 33-55
- CASSIODORUS (1865), *Expositio in Psalterium*, in Jacques-Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina*, LXX, Paris, 221 vol., col. 9-1056.
- CHENU, M. -D. (1957) *La Théologie au douzième siècle*, Paris, J. Vrin.

- CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (1857) *Stromateis*, in Jacques-Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca*, 9, Paris, 161 vol., col. 9-602.
- CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (1902) *Stromateis*, in Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies, Book VII, The Greek Text with Translation, Introduction, Notes Dissertations and Indices*, Fenton John Anthony Hort and Joseph B. Mayor (ed.), London/New York, Macmillan & co./The Macmillan Company, 1902. [Available online at <<https://bit.ly/3AajS8Q>>; accessed 29/04/20.]
- DE LUBAC, H. (1998 [1959]), *Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture*, 1, Mark Sebanc (trans.) and Robert Louis Wilken (foreword), Ressourcement: Retrieval and Renewal in Catholic Thought, Grand Rapids, MI/Edinburgh, William B. Eerdmans/T&T Clark. [Originally published as *Exégèse médiévale*, 1: *Les quatre sens de l'écriture*, Paris, Éditions Montaigne.]
- FAHNESTOCK, J. (2002 [1999]), *Rhetorical Figures in Science*, New York / Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- FIDORA, A. & J. E. RUBIO, ed. (2008) *Raimundus Lullus. An Introduction to his Life, Works and Thought*, Robert D. Hughes, Anna A. Akasoy and Magnus Ryan (trans.), Turnhout, Brepols («Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis», 214. Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina, Supplementum Lullianum, II).
- GAYÀ, J. (2008) «III.C. The Divine Realm», in Alexander Fidora & Josep E. Rubio (ed.), *Raimundus Lullus. An Introduction to his Life, Works and Thought*, Robert D. Hughes, Anna A. Akasoy and Magnus Ryan (trans.), Turnhout, Brepols («Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis», 214. Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina, Supplementum Lullianum, II), p. 461-515.
- GILLON, L. B. (1937) *La théorie des oppositions et la théologie du péché au XIIIe siècle*, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Paris.
- GREGORY THE GREAT (1878) *XL homiliarium in evangelia*, in Jacques-Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina: sive bibliotheca universalis [...]*, LXXVI, T. 2, Paris, 221 vol., col. 1075-1312.
- HUGH OF SAINT-CHER (HUGO CARDINALIS) (1703) *Super Ecclesiasticum* in Hugonis de Sancto Charo, *S. Romane Ecclesiae Tituli S. Sabinae Cardinalis Primi Ordinis Praedicatorum*, Tomus Tertius, In *Libros Proverbiorum, Ecclesiastae, Canticorum, Sapientiae, Ecclesiastici*, «Venice, Nicolò Pezzana (apud Nicolaum Pezzana), f. 171-268».
- HUGHES, R. D. (2014) «What does Ramon Llull mean when he says “[el resclús] se marvellá com podia esser que Deus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina”, (*Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles*, Ch.

- 105, «De la oració»?», *SCRIPTA, Revista Internacional de Literatura i Cultura Medieval i Moderna*, 4, p. 157-199.
- ISIDORE OF SEVILLE (1911) in W. M. Lindsay (ed.), *Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum Libbri* xx, Oxford: E Typographeo Clarendoniano, 2 vol., n. p.
- ISIDORE OF SEVILLE (2010 [2006]) *Etymologiae* in Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, Oliver Berghof (trans., introd. and notes) with the collaboration of Muriel Hall, *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- JAYE, B. H. (1992) *Artes orandi*, in Marianne G. Briscoe, *Artes praedicandi* and Barbara H. Jaye, *Artes orandi*, Typologie des sources du Moyen Âge occidental, fasc. 61, Turnhout, Brepols, p. 79-118.
- JOHN CASSIAN (1997), *The Conferences*, Boniface Ramsey, O.P. (trans. and notes), New York, NY/Mahwah, NJ, Paulist Press («Ancient Christian Writers», 57).
- JOHN DAMASCENE (1864) *Expositio Fidei Orthodoxa in Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca*, xciv, J.-P. Migne (ed.), 161 vol., Paris, Imprimerie Catholique, col. 1857-1866.
- LLULL, R. (1914) *Libre de contemplació en Déu*. Salvador Galmés (ed.), Palma de Mallorca, Comissió Editora Lulliana (Obres de Ramon Lull, Toms I-VII).
- (1932) *Art demostrativa. Regles introductòries. Taula general*, Salvador Galmés (ed.), Palma de Mallorca (Obres de Ramon Llull, xvi).
- (1985) *Ars compendiosa Dei, in Monte Pessulano anno MCCCVIII composita*, Manuel Bauzá Ochogavía (ed.), Turnhout, Brepols («Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina», xiii, vol. 134, «Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis», xxxix).
- (1986) *Ars Generalis Ultima, MCCCIV-MCCCVIII, Lugduni anno MCCCIV incepta, Pisis anno MCCCVIII ad finem perducta*, Alois Madre (ed.), Turnhout, Brepols («Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina», xiv, vol. 128, «Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis», lxxv).
- (2005) *Doctrina pueril*, Joan Santanach i Suñol (ed.), Palma de Mallorca, Patronat Ramon Llull (Nova Edició de les Obres de Ramon Llull, vii).
- (2006), *Retòrica nova*, Josep Batalla, Lluís Cabré and Marcel Ortín (ed.); Anthony Bonner (pres.); Robert D. F. Pring-Mill (pref.), Turnhout / Santa Coloma de Queralt, Brepols / Obrador Edendum. [Traducció de l'obra llatina de Ramon Llull, i.]
- (2007) *Ars demonstrativa*, Josep Enric Rubio Albarracín (ed.), Turnhout, Brepols («Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina», xxxi, vol. 27, «Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis», xxciii).

- (2009) *Romanç d'Evast e Blaquerna*, Albert Soler and Joan Santanach (ed.), Palma de Mallorca, Patronat Ramon Llull (Nova Edició de les Obres de Ramon Llull, VIII).
- (2016) *Romance of Evast and Blaquerna*, Robert D. Hughes (trans.); Albert Soler and Joan Santanach (introd.), Barcelona/Woodbridge, Barcino/Tamesis.
- LLULldb = BONNER, Anthony (dir.), *Base de dades Ramon Llull*, Centre de documentació Ramon Llull, Universitat de Barcelona. [<http://www.ub.edu/llulldb>]
- MATTER, E. A. (1992 [1990]) *The Voice of My Beloved: The Song of Songs in Western Medieval Christianity*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- NOU GLOSSARI GENERAL LUL·LIÀ, Centre de Documentació Ramon Llull, Universitat de Barcelona. [<http://nggl.ub.edu/>]
- RUBINELLI, S. (2009) *Ars Topica: The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*, David S. Levene (introd.), Springer Science+Business Media B. V.
- RUBIO, J. E. (1997) *Les bases del pensament de Ramon Llull. Els orígens de l'Art lul·liana*, València/Barcelona, Institut Interuniversitari de Filologia Valenciana / Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat («Biblioteca Manuel Sanchis Guarner», 35).
- (2008) «III. Thought: The Art», in Alexander Fidora and Josep E. Rubio (ed.), *Raimundus Lullus. An Introduction to his Life, Works and Thought*, Robert D. Hughes, Anna A. Akasoy and Magnus Ryan (trans.), Turnhout, Brepols («Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina, Supplementum Lullianum», II, «Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis», 214), p. 243-310.
- (2017) «Oració i contemplació en la mística de Ramon Llull», *Actes del Congrés d'Obertura de l'Any Llull. «En el setè centenari de Ramon Llull: el projecte missional i la pervivència de la devoció»*. Palma, 24-27 de novembre de 2015, Lola Badia, Alexander Fidora and Maribel Ripoll Perelló (ed.), Barcelona / Palma de Mallorca, Universitat de Barcelona / Universitat de les Illes Balears («Col·lecció Blaquerna», 12), p. 275-286.
- RUIZ SIMON, J. M. (1999) *L'Art de Ramon Llull i la teoria escolàstica de la ciència*, Barcelona, Quaderns Crema.
- SANTANACH I SUÑOL, J. (2015) «Ramon Llull i l'obscuritat que il·lumina. Apunts sobre l'origen i rendibilitat literària d'un recurs exegetí», *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 45/1, p. 331-354.
- TURNER, D. (1995) *Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis of the Song of Songs*, Kalamazoo, MI/Spencer, MA, Cistercian Publications («Cistercian Studies», 156).