NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

The Relevance of Moral Disagreement

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

dc.contributor.author	Corbí, Josep E.
dc.date.accessioned	2015-03-27T11:04:58Z
dc.date.available	2015-03-27T11:04:58Z
dc.date.issued	2002
dc.identifier.citation	Corbí, Josep E. 2002 The Relevance of Moral Disagreement Grazen Philosophische Studien 63 217 233
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10550/42888
dc.description.abstract	Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper, I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical frame- work Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Al- though I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Grazen Philosophische Studien, 2002, num. 63, p. 217-233
dc.subject	Metafísica
dc.title	The Relevance of Moral Disagreement
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.date.updated	2015-03-27T11:05:00Z
dc.identifier.idgrec	008014
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES