NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

dc.contributor.author	Grimaltos, Tobies
dc.contributor.author	Rosell, Sergi
dc.date.accessioned	2014-05-05T14:32:57Z
dc.date.available	2014-05-05T14:32:57Z
dc.date.issued	2013
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10550/34866
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, we put forward a conceptual argument for the Falsity Condition for lying, upon the assumption that lying is a form of deception. We argue that if the definition of lying did not include the Falsity Condition, then successful lying would not secure that the addressee ends up believing a falsehood (about what the lie is about), which is necessary for deceiving, and then successful lying (as such) would not necessarily be a form of deception.	es_ES
dc.language.iso	en	es_ES
dc.subject	lying	es_ES
dc.subject	falsity condition	es_ES
dc.subject	deceiving	es_ES
dc.title	On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition	es_ES
dc.type	conference output	es_ES
dc.identifier.idgrec	106349	es_ES