NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

dc.contributor.author	Corbí, Josep E.
dc.date.accessioned	2015-03-26T08:14:17Z
dc.date.available	2015-03-26T08:14:17Z
dc.date.issued	2000
dc.identifier.citation	Corbí, Josep E. 2000 The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs Noûs 34 4 377 386
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10550/42866
dc.description.abstract	There is an argumentative route that begins with a platitude like: The Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ): 'To be justified in believing one proposition P on the basis of another proposition E, one must be (1) justified in believing E, (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P' and ends up by challenging our capacity to justifiedly believing propositions concerning physical objects and past events. This is, at least, what Richard Fumerton claims, but, like Christopher Hookway, I doubt that there is such a route. In the coming pages, I seek to show how Hookway's challenge may find additional motivation in a reflection on the content of a certain kind of belief, namely: beliefs about particular causal processes.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Noûs, 2000, vol. 34, num. 4, p. 377-386
dc.subject	Coneixement, Teoria del
dc.title	The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.date.updated	2015-03-26T08:14:18Z
dc.identifier.idgrec	008017
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES