NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

dc.contributor.author	Corbí, Josep E.
dc.date.accessioned	2015-03-27T11:00:17Z
dc.date.available	2015-03-27T11:00:17Z
dc.date.issued	2004
dc.identifier.citation	Corbí, Josep E. 2004 Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations Theoria 19/2 50 155 172
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10550/42887
dc.description.abstract	Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most prom- ising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Theoria, 2004, vol. 19/2, num. 50, p. 155-172
dc.subject	Metafísica
dc.title	Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.date.updated	2015-03-27T11:00:18Z
dc.identifier.idgrec	008013
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES