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dc.contributor.author | Iranzo, Valeriano | es |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-04-16T11:11:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-04-16T11:11:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | es |
dc.identifier.citation | Iranzo García, Valeriano. Filosofía de la ciencia e historia de la ciencia. En: Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència, 2005, No. 35: 19 | es |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10550/43086 | |
dc.description.abstract | The paper analyzes which is the proper role of history of science in philosophy of science. I argue that, traditionally, philosophy of science has focused on the normative dimension of science. Several positions within philosophy of science stem from different perspectives on such dimension. I classify them according to two variables (descriptivism/prescriptivism, and historicism/non-historicism). Then I discuss the role of history of science within all these four alternatives. I conclude that: (1) philosophers and historians pursue not only different, but opposite aims; (2) historical evidence is useful for assessing the relation between methods and results; besides this, only very simple or radical philosophical views can be ¿refuted¿ by historical evidence; (3) the disagreement between those who think that history of science is necessary for philosophy of science and those who think it is not is, in fact, a disagreement about the prospects for a general theory of science; (4) such disagreement cannot be resolved appealing to historical evidence; if it can be resolved, philosophical arguments should somehow be invoked. | en_US |
dc.subject | Hª y Fª de la Ciencia | es |
dc.subject | Ciencias básicas y experimentales | es |
dc.subject | Filosofía. Etica | es |
dc.subject | Humanidades | es |
dc.title | Filosofía de la ciencia e historia de la ciencia | es |
dc.type | journal article | es_ES |
dc.subject.unesco | UNESCO::FILOSOFÍA | es |
dc.type.hasVersion | VoR | es_ES |