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Significado y valor: la crítica pragmatista al emotivismo
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- Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència
- Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència. 2006. No. 36
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Significado y valor: la crítica pragmatista al emotivismo
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| Faerna García-Bermejo, Angel Manuel | |||
| Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2006 | |||
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| Pragmatism and Logical Positivism constitute different traditions in philosophy, though for a period of time they shared some views and had intellectual and social interests in common. John Dewey, in particular, collaborated to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science promoted by Carnap, Neurath, and other positivists. In this relationship, the topic of values were the main issue. For the positivist party, emotivism represented the 'official doctrine' regarding ethical (or, in general, evaluative) sentences; whereas for Dewey value judgements had full, genuine empirical meaning. Here we examine Dewey's crticism of emotivism as represented by its best known theorist, Charles L. Stevenson, trying to assess the real scope of the differences between positivist and pragmatist traditions. | |||
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