When Deduction leads to Belief
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Grimaltos, Tobies; Hookway, Christopher
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Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 1995
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T h e paper questions the common assumption that rational individuals believe all propositions which they know to be logical consequences of their other beliefs: although we must acknowledge the truth of a proposition which is a deductive consequence ofour beliefs, we may not genuinely believe it. This conclusion is defended by arguing that some familiar counter- examples to the claim that knowledge isjustified true belief fail because they involve propositions which are not really believed. Beliefs guide conduct or issue in assertion by answering questions which arise in the course of deliberation and conversation, but the troublesome cases present proposi- tions which do not present the agent's answer to any question. The paper concludes by sketching the conditions under which the deductive conse- quences of our beliefs can be believed |
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