NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO
Crowding out effect and sorting in competitive labor markets with motivated workers
Repositori DSpace/Manakin
- Inici
- Investigació
- e-prints
- 61 - Psicologia
- Visualitza element
IMPORTANT: Aquest repositori està en una versió antiga des del 3/12/2023. La nova instal.lació está en https://roderic.uv.es/
Crowding out effect and sorting in competitive labor markets with motivated workers
Mostra el registre complet de l'element
|
Visualització
|
| Cunyat, Antoni | |||
| Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2016 | |||
|
|||
| We consider a competitive labor market with moral hazard and adverse selection where firms employ teams of two workers. There exist two types of workers: selfish workers and motivated workers. Selfish workers only respond to monetary incentives. Motivated workers not only respond to monetary incentives but their behavior is also driven by intrinsic motivation. However, if a firm chooses an output-based reward system, their intrinsic motivation is undermined. We obtain that self-selection into contracts separating workers based on their motivation is feasible, provided that the crowding out effect is powerful enough. More importantly, all firms have expected positive profits. Our model produces in this case heterogeneity at the firm level. | |||
| Veure al catàleg Trobes | |||
Aquest element apareix en la col·lecció o col·leccions següent(s)
-
61 - Psicologia [1800]