NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms

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	Prades, J.L.; Corbí, Josep E.
	Aquest document és un/a Comunicació/Ponència, creat/da en: 2001
	In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicallst assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the non- physical properties that participate In that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then Insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine- grained mental contents could be physically implemented In the way that functional properties are. Therefore, we will examine the metaphysical con- ditions under which the implementing mechanism of a particular instance of a functional property may be individuated, and see how genuine beliefs and desires-Insofar as they track the world-cannot meet such conditions.
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