In his book El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico Carlos Moya presents an argument against Frankfurt-Style cases according to which what makes an alternative robust and exempting is a matter of the context in which the agent finds himself; thus, alternatives that don?t seem to be robust can become robust and exempting in certain special circumstances, and Frankfurt scenarios present just such circumstances. In this paper I offer three objections to Moya?s brilliant argument. First, I defend that it is not clear that the alternative Moya finds in such cases is doing the work of grounding, at least partially, the attribution of blame to the agent. Secondly, I examine a reply Moya gives to a critique made by Pereboom according to which Moya?s argument presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities and thus begs the question against the compatibilist. I defend that Moya?s response is insufficient to elude Pereboom critique. Finally, I defend that Moya?s strategy can be disarticulated if a deterministic Frankfurt-case can be presented.  Keywords: Robust alternatives, context, Frankfurt-style cases, Principle of alternative possibilities, determinism.