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Bounded computational capacity equilibrium

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

dc.contributor.author	Hernández, Penélope
dc.contributor.author	Solan, Eilon
dc.date.accessioned	2019-01-24T13:46:29Z
dc.date.available	2019-01-24T13:46:29Z
dc.date.issued	2014
dc.identifier.citation	Hernández, Penélope Solan, Eilon 2014 Bounded computational capacity equilibrium Working papers ERI-CES 03/2014
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10550/68662
dc.description.abstract	A celebrated result of Abreu and Rubinstein states that in repeated games, when the players are restricted to playing strategies that can be implemented by finite automata and they have lexicographic preferences, the set of equilibrium payoffs is a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. In this paper we explore the limitations of this result. We prove that if memory size is costly and players can use mixed automata, then a folk theorem obtains and the set of equilibrium payoff is once again the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. Our result emphasizes the role of memory cost and of mixing when players have bounded computational power.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Working papers ERI-CES, 2014, num. 03/2014
dc.subject	Economia
dc.title	Bounded computational capacity equilibrium
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.date.updated	2019-01-24T13:46:29Z
dc.identifier.idgrec	105601
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES