In this investigation, we aim at examining the influence of institutional female directors on CEO compensation. Specifically, we investigate the impact of institutional female directors as a whole, differentiating by whether female directors have business ties with the firms' boards on which they sit (pressure-sensitive female directors) or do not have business links (pressure-resistant female directors). We hypothesize that there is a nonlinear association, specifically quadratic, between institutional, pressureresistant and pressure-sensitive female directors on boards, and CEO compensation. Our findings show that CEO compensation decreases with low levels of institutional female directors and pressure-resistant female directors on boards, but when their presence on boards increases beyond a certain threshold, CEO compensation also increases. We also find that CEO compensation is not affected by pressure-sensitive female directors on boards. These findings support the premise that institutional female directors on boards cannot be considered a homogeneous group, but play an important role in managerial monitoring and remuneration policies, thus affecting the corporate governance system.