The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism
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Dal Monte, Daniel Dal Monte
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Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2019
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This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant?s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant?s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected. |
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