Immanuel Kant famously rejected hedonism. It is, however, much less known that Kant himself ? despite his rejection of hedonism in moral matters ? puts forward a hedonistic theory when he talks about human happiness. While this essay is primarily concerned with a discussion of what I shall call Kant?s ?prudential hedonism?, my findings are also systematically relevant, in at least two ways: Firstly, Kant?s argumentative strategy ? dismissing hedonism with regard to morality, while endorsing it with regard to human happiness? suggests that hedonism as a philosophical approach deserves a nuanced treatment. Secondly, Kant?s own hedonism suggests that this approach might have a considerably higher systematic potential as hedonism is frequently granted in contemporary debates. In this essay, I will start by sketching Kant?s prudential hedonism. Then, I will discuss three difficulties my reading encounters ? the indeterminacy of pleasure, the possibility of something like a ?theory? of well-being in Kantian terms, and the problem of a deficit in autonomy ?, before returning to the two systematic implications of my interpretation in the conclusion.