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dc.contributor.author | Corbí, Josep E. | |
dc.contributor.author | Prades, Josep L. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-01-10T11:39:27Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-01-10T11:39:27Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Corbí, Josep E. Prades, Josep L. 2006 Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 2 61 80 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10550/81260 | |
dc.description.abstract | I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. to this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming across a particular situation. Following on from Bernard Williams, I talk of an agent's character as a factor that con- tributes to fixing what situations an agent comes morally across. A crucial point, in the debate, will be how an agent confronts the normatively loaded features of his own character when he is engaged in first-person deliberation. | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2006, vol. 2, num. 2, p. 61-80 | |
dc.subject | Filosofia | |
dc.title | Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception | |
dc.type | journal article | es_ES |
dc.date.updated | 2022-01-10T11:39:28Z | |
dc.identifier.idgrec | 036429 | |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | es_ES |