NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

Entry with two correlated signals : the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

IMPORTANT: Aquest repositori està en una versió antiga des del 3/12/2023. La nova instal.lació está en https://roderic.uv.es/

Entry with two correlated signals : the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects

dc.contributor.author	Barrachina Monfort, Alejandro
dc.contributor.author	Tauman, Yair
dc.contributor.author	Urbano Salvador, Amparo
dc.date.accessioned	2022-05-19T16:27:16Z
dc.date.available	2022-05-19T16:27:16Z
dc.date.issued	2021
dc.identifier.citation	Barrachina Monfort, Alejandro Tauman, Yair Urbano Salvador, Amparo 2021 Entry with two correlated signals : the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects International Journal of Game Theory 50 1 241 278
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10550/82895
dc.description.abstract	Recent advances in information and communication technologies have increased the incentives for firms to acquire information about rivals. These advances may have major implications for market entry because they make it easier for potential entrants to gather valuable information about, for example, an incumbent's cost structure. However, little theoretical research has actually analyzed this question. This paper advances the literature by extending a one-sided asymmetric information version of Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) limit pricing model. Here, the entrant is allowed access to an intelligence system (IS) of a certain precision that generates a noisy signal on the incumbent's cost structure. The entrant thus decides whether to enter the market based on two signals: the price charged by the incumbent and the signal sent by the IS. Crucially, for intermediate values of IS precision, the set of pooling equilibria with ex-ante profitable market entry is non-empty. Moreover, the probability of ex-ante non-profitable entry is strictly positive. In classical limit pricing models, an entrant never enters in a pooling equilibrium, so this result suggests that the use of an IS may potentially increase competition.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, num. 1, p. 241-278
dc.subject	Espionatge
dc.subject	Societat de la informació
dc.subject	Competència econòmica
dc.title	Entry with two correlated signals : the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.date.updated	2022-05-19T16:27:17Z
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s00182-020-00748-8
dc.identifier.idgrec	152852
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES