Recursive and bargaining values
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Calvo, Emilio; Gutiérrez-López, Esther
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Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2021
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We introduce two families of values for TU-games: the recursive and bargaining values. Bargaining values are obtained as the equilibrium payoffs of the symmetric non-cooperative bargaining game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). We show that bargaining values have a recursive structure in their definition, and we call this property recursiveness. All efficient, linear, and symmetric values that satisfy recursiveness are called recursive values. We generalize the notions of potential, and balanced contributions property, to characterize the family of recursive values. Finally, we show that if a time discount factor is considered in the bargaining model, every bargaining value has its corresponding discounted bargaining value. |
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