The main goal of this study is to analyze whether the existence of remuneration committees tend to disclose more corporate social responsibility (CSR) information. In addition, we test the mod-erating role played by the proportion of independent directors on boards of directors with the relationship between the constitution of remuneration committees and CSR disclosure. Previous research does not appear to have addressed these questions. The research questions proposed are tested using an international sample of 28,610 listed companies, and we took into consideration information on industrial companies from the Middle East, developed Asian and Pacific coun-tries, emerging Europe, developed Europe, Africa, Latin America and North America. These findings provide evidence that the existence of remuneration committees is more likely to disclose CSR information, and the existence of independent board members positively moderates the as-sociation between the existence of remuneration committees and CSR disclosure. We expand on earlier empirical literature concerning corporate governance and CSR issues.