Are credit screening contracts designed for men?
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Comeig Ramírez, Irene; Jaramillo Gutiérrez, Ainhoa; Ramírez López, Federico
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Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2022
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Access to credit is key to succeed in business. Theoretical models of credit under asymmetric information classify borrowers and grant or deny credit, typically based on incentive-compatible contracts with collateral. However, if women are particularly risk averse, female borrowers may be wrongly classified and denied credit. We conduct in three countries a laboratory experiment to study this systematic gender difference. Results show that incentive-compatible contracts with collateral fail to disclose women’s private information, while disclosing men’s private information. We suggest that banks should incorporate the gender difference in risk attitudes to avoid the glass ceiling in women’s access to credit. |
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