NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

Goals and guesses as reference points: a field experiment on student performance

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

IMPORTANT: Aquest repositori està en una versió antiga des del 3/12/2023. La nova instal.lació está en https://roderic.uv.es/

Goals and guesses as reference points: a field experiment on student performance

dc.contributor.author	Sabater Grande, Gerardo
dc.contributor.author	Georgantzís, Nikolaos
dc.contributor.author	Herranz Zarzoso, Noemí
dc.date.accessioned	2023-07-05T11:00:07Z
dc.date.available	2023-07-06T04:45:07Z
dc.date.issued	2022	es_ES
dc.identifier.citation	Sabater-Grande, G., Georgantzís, N. & Herranz-Zarzoso, N. Goals and guesses as reference points: a field experiment on student performance. Theory Decis 94, 249–274 (2023).	es_ES
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10550/88622
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, we study overconfidence and goal-setting in academic performance, with and without monetary incentives. Students enrolled in a microeconomics course were offered the possibility of setting their own target grade before taking part in the final exam. They were also asked to guess their grade immediately after they had taken the exam (“post-diction”). In general, students overestimated their performance, both at the goal-setting and at the post-diction stages. Controlling for several sources of this bias (cognitive abilities, academic record and self-reported academic confidence), we find that the use of monetary rewards mitigates the overestimation of potential achievements and eliminates overestimation of actual achievements through the improvement of actual performance. Our results suggest that monetary incentives do not cause subjects to put more effort into correct guesses but make them put more effort into academic performance. Using students’ academic records to measure overall skill, we find a strong Dunning–Kruger bias which is intensified in the presence of monetary rewards.	es_ES
dc.language.iso	en	es_ES
dc.publisher	Springer Link	es_ES
dc.subject	overconfidence bias	es_ES
dc.subject	reference points	es_ES
dc.subject	self-chosen goals	es_ES
dc.subject	postdictions	es_ES
dc.subject	monetary incentives	es_ES
dc.subject	dunning	es_ES
dc.subject	kruger cognitive bias	es_ES
dc.title	Goals and guesses as reference points: a field experiment on student performance	es_ES
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.subject.unesco	UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS	es_ES
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s11238-022-09892-x	es_ES
dc.accrualmethod	S	es_ES
dc.embargo.terms	0 days	es_ES
dc.type.hasVersion	VoR	es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES