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dc.contributor.author | Tobies Grimaltos | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-23T13:05:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-23T13:05:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10550/91376 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper I explore the duties we have as believers and communicators of be- liefs. I maintain that we have a duty regarding to what Williams (2002) calls the two vir- tues of truth: accuracy and sincerity. We ought to be reliable in forming our beliefs, and we ought to transmit what we really believe. I defend two principles, one for each of these two virtues, that, in my opinion, are at the same time epistemic and moral. With re- gard to accuracy I propose a variant of Clifford's principle, and according to sincerity I propose that to assert that p, one has not only to believe that p but also accept that p. | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Teorema, 2023, vol. 42, num. 3, p. 131-142 | |
dc.source | Tobies Grimaltos (2023). The Duty to Believe: Accuracy, Sincerity, and Acceptance. Teorema, 42 3 131 142 | |
dc.subject | filosofia | |
dc.subject | valors (filosofia) | |
dc.title | The Duty to Believe: Accuracy, Sincerity, and Acceptance | |
dc.type | journal article | |
dc.date.updated | 2023-11-23T13:05:42Z | |
dc.identifier.idgrec | 162159 | |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access |