Evidence and First-Person Authority
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Corbí, Josep E.
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Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2011
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In this paper, I challlenge David Finkelstein's claim that evidence does not contribute to first-person authority. To this end, I first argue that the phenomenon of first-person authority involves a certain combination of two kinds of authority, namely: an epistemic (insofar as evidence is at issue here) and a practical (insofar as the capacity to shape one's own psychological and dispositions is the central concern) kind of authority. Secondly, I defend the view that gathering evidence plays a crucial role regarding an agent's ability to preserve (or cultivate) her practical authority upon herself. |
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