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Evidence and First-Person Authority

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

dc.contributor.author	Corbí, Josep E.
dc.date.accessioned	2015-03-06T12:55:17Z
dc.date.available	2015-03-06T12:55:17Z
dc.date.issued	2011
dc.identifier.citation	Corbí, Josep E. 2011 Evidence and First-Person Authority Teorema 30 3 51 66
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10550/42642
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, I challlenge David Finkelstein's claim that evidence does not contribute to first-person authority. To this end, I first argue that the phenomenon of first-person authority involves a certain combination of two kinds of authority, namely: an epistemic (insofar as evidence is at issue here) and a practical (insofar as the capacity to shape one's own psychological and dispositions is the central concern) kind of authority. Secondly, I defend the view that gathering evidence plays a crucial role regarding an agent's ability to preserve (or cultivate) her practical authority upon herself.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Teorema, 2011, vol. 30, num. 3, p. 51-66
dc.subject	Psicoanàlisi
dc.subject	Coneixement, Teoria del
dc.subject	Autoritat
dc.title	Evidence and First-Person Authority
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.date.updated	2015-03-06T12:55:17Z
dc.identifier.idgrec	057603
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES