The Relevance of Moral Disagreement
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Corbí, Josep E.
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Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2002
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Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper, I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical frame- work Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Al- though I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them. |
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