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A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
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Calvo, Emilio; Gutiérrez-López, Esther
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This document is a artículoDate2015
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The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357-380, 1996). We demonstrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs associated with the bargaining equilibria when a time discount factor is considered. In a second model, we replace the time cost with the probability that the game ends without agreements. This model also implements these values in transferable utility games, moreover, the model implements the α-consistent values in the nontransferable utility setting. |
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