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A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values

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dc.contributor.author	Calvo, Emilio
dc.contributor.author	Gutiérrez-López, Esther
dc.date.accessioned	2022-05-19T17:58:42Z
dc.date.available	2022-05-19T17:58:42Z
dc.date.issued	2015
dc.identifier.citation	Calvo, Emilio Gutiérrez-López, Esther 2015 A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values Theory and decision 80 2 271 293
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10550/82901
dc.description.abstract	The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357-380, 1996). We demonstrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs associated with the bargaining equilibria when a time discount factor is considered. In a second model, we replace the time cost with the probability that the game ends without agreements. This model also implements these values in transferable utility games, moreover, the model implements the α-consistent values in the nontransferable utility setting.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Theory and decision, 2015, vol. 80, num. 2, p. 271-293
dc.subject	Economia Aspectes psicològics
dc.title	A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.date.updated	2022-05-19T17:58:42Z
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s11238-015-9500-5
dc.identifier.idgrec	105921
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES