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The Distinctiveness of Second-Person Attributions
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The Distinctiveness of Second-Person Attributions
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| Corbí, Josep E. | |||
| Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2022 | |||
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| In Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction (2021), Routledge, Diana Pérez and Antoni Gomila articulate a complex web of conceptual and empirical explorations that altogether make a remarkable case for the primitiveness and distinctiveness of second-person mental attributions. I find their case for the primitiveness of second-person attributions quite convincing and deeply rooted in their philosophical project, whose specific nature I will examine in the first section. The rest of the paper will then focus on their case for the distinctiveness of those mental attributions that are made in second- person interactions. My conclusion will be that Pérez and Gomila's various strategies to motivate the distinctiveness of such attributions are ultimately unsatisfactory. | |||
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72 - Filosofia [1085]