NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

The Distinctiveness of Second-Person Attributions

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

dc.contributor.author	Corbí, Josep E.
dc.date.accessioned	2023-05-29T07:10:49Z
dc.date.available	2023-05-29T07:10:49Z
dc.date.issued	2022
dc.identifier.citation	Corbí, Josep E. 2022 The Distinctiveness of Second-Person Attributions Teorema 41 2 15 30
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10550/87002
dc.description.abstract	In Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction (2021), Routledge, Diana Pérez and Antoni Gomila articulate a complex web of conceptual and empirical explorations that altogether make a remarkable case for the primitiveness and distinctiveness of second-person mental attributions. I find their case for the primitiveness of second-person attributions quite convincing and deeply rooted in their philosophical project, whose specific nature I will examine in the first section. The rest of the paper will then focus on their case for the distinctiveness of those mental attributions that are made in second- person interactions. My conclusion will be that Pérez and Gomila's various strategies to motivate the distinctiveness of such attributions are ultimately unsatisfactory.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Teorema, 2022, vol. 41, num. 2, p. 15-30
dc.subject	Identitat (Psicologia)
dc.subject	Filosofia de la ment
dc.subject	Jo (Psicologia)
dc.title	The Distinctiveness of Second-Person Attributions
dc.type	journal article
dc.date.updated	2023-05-29T07:10:49Z
dc.identifier.idgrec	159365
dc.rights.accessRights	open access