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A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
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A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
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| Hernández, Penélope; Peris, Josep E.; Vidal Puga, Juan | |||
| Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2023 | |||
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| This paper deals with the problem of finding a way to distribute the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree problem between the players. A rule that assigns a payoff to each player provides this distribution. An optimistic point of view is considered to devise a cooperative game. Following this optimistic approach, a sequential game provides this construction to define the action sets of the players. The main result states the existence of a unique cost allocation in subgame perfect equilibria. This cost allocation matches the one suggested by the folk rule. | |||
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