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A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

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A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

dc.contributor.author	Hernández, Penélope
dc.contributor.author	Peris, Josep E.
dc.contributor.author	Vidal Puga, Juan
dc.date.accessioned	2023-06-16T12:02:09Z
dc.date.available	2023-06-17T04:45:06Z
dc.date.issued	2023	es_ES
dc.identifier.citation	Hernández, P., Peris, J. E., & Vidal-Puga, J. (2023). A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. European Journal of Operational Research, 307 (2), 922-928.	es_ES
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10550/88343
dc.description.abstract	This paper deals with the problem of finding a way to distribute the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree problem between the players. A rule that assigns a payoff to each player provides this distribution. An optimistic point of view is considered to devise a cooperative game. Following this optimistic approach, a sequential game provides this construction to define the action sets of the players. The main result states the existence of a unique cost allocation in subgame perfect equilibria. This cost allocation matches the one suggested by the folk rule.	es_ES
dc.language.iso	en	es_ES
dc.publisher	Elsevier	es_ES
dc.subject	game theory	es_ES
dc.subject	minimum cost spanning tree	es_ES
dc.subject	cost allocation	es_ES
dc.subject	subgame perfect equilibrium	es_ES
dc.title	A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems	es_ES
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.subject.unesco	UNESCO::CIENCIAS TECNOLÓGICAS	es_ES
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.015	es_ES
dc.accrualmethod	CI	es_ES
dc.embargo.terms	0 days	es_ES
dc.type.hasVersion	VoR	es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES